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Projects that have scientific goals and are characte ised by new engineering technologies, 
significant infrastructure, and big budgets are typically found to undergo much scrutiny prior 
to approval. What is less clear is whether concept r views, approval, funding, or early stage 
planning takes proper advantage of potential indicators of success based on learnings from 
relevant past experience. In other words, is the lik lihood of success in meeting all project 
goals considered at the outset, and can early stage proj ct development/planning be made 
more effective? 
 
Through examination of published literature, intervi ws with past and present project 
managers, scientists and engineers, and investigation of selected case studies in Australia, 
Chile, South Africa and Europe, this thesis attempts to (i) identify critical success factors 
relevant to large, complex high-technology projects, (ii) investigate the use of experience as 
success indicators within contemporary case studies, and (iii) distil the results into a set of 
predictive test indicators of likely project success. 
 
While there is considerable literature concerning general management of large projects, and 
covering execution of complex undertakings, there is little specific material dealing with 
success drivers for large and complex high-technology projects. This thesis aims to fill this 
important gap in the current understanding. 
 
The present study distils an epistemic view of high-technology ‘mega-projects’, and through 
case examination and inductive and deductive reasoning, shows that serious attention paid to 
specific aspects of project-shaping can lift the probability of success. An additional output is 
a practical checklist tool for ‘high-tech’ mega-project practitioners. 
 
The findings from this research have direct applicability to current and future approvers and 
managers of large scale high-technology projects, and in particular the Square Kilometre 
Array (SKA) radio telescope project to be built in either Australasia or Southern Africa, and 
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SKADS The SKA Design Studies – a funded work package of the project 
SME Small and Medium Enterprises 
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Term Definition or explanation 
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‘Though this be madness, yet there is method in't.’
Hamlet Act 2, Scene 2, William Shakespeare 
 
The seed idea for researching mega-science project su cess indicators came from a 
serendipitous conversation. Having just emerged from chairing a lengthy and tense Project 
Review Board at my employer organisation – a nationl science and industrial research body 
– I was bemoaning to a small group the general lack of improvement in project management 
performance. In that group was Peter Hall, an experienced project engineer about to fill the 
foundation Chair in Radio Astronomy Engineering at Curtin University. Prof. Hall shared 
and encouraged my interest in investigating the problem, and after further deliberations, I 
was generously offered a doctoral studentship to pursue my research question, with Prof. 
Hall and Prof. Marinova as my academic supervisors. The following year, I accepted a two-
year posting to join the costing and design team for the Square Kilometre Array mega-
project based at the University of Manchester, UK. This placed me in an ideal situation to 
closely observe a large science/engineering project in the formative stages, and to readily 
conduct fieldwork at several European mega-science fa ilities. Motivated primarily by 
practical imperatives and distinguished through working insights, the thesis nonetheless 
extends theoretical boundaries around success criteria n areas such as the implications of 
characterising complexity, project resilience, decision-making, and the linking of project 
review methodologies to successful learning organisations. 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction  
1.1 Introduction to the study 
Each year, the developed and developing nations commit billions of dollars to research and 
development (R&D). In Australia, the 2008/09 Governme t investment in R&D was A$ 3.42 
billion, while R&D expenditure by Australian business for the same year was A$16.86 
billion. Gross Australian R&D investment (GERD) for the 2008/09 year equalled 2.2% of 
GDP (almost 22,000 person-years of effort) – more than triple the 1998/99 figure (ABS, 
2010). The investment budget of Australia’s premier science research agency, the CSIRO1, 
was A$2.8 billion for the period 2006-2010. Tax payers and shareholders have every reason 
to expect these resources to be effectively applied in support of innovation. 
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National support of science is vital. The Australian Prime Minister's Science, Engineering 
and Innovation Council 1999 meeting tabled an analysis (Boskin & Lau, 1992) estimating 
that 49% of economic growth came from technical progress. Another international study 
(Coe & Helpman, 1995) found that every 1% increase in a nation’s investment in research 
increased productivity by 0.23%. Although these figures may not be universally applicable, 
it is clear that investing in science provides a signif cant boost for a country’s future. 
 
Investments in science and engineering R&D should be underpinned by reasonable 
confidence levels, yet as the present study shows, success cannot be assumed. All research 
involves risk, and science/engineering research by its very nature is often highly risky, yet 
this alone cannot explain the poor track record of high-technology (high-tech) projects. 
Personal observations within Australia’s CSIRO suggest that there are few systems in place 
to effectively identify and capture lessons learned from big science, much less in a format 
that might be of practical use at the planning and ‘ uthority for expenditure’ (AFE) stages of 
future projects. Certainly evidence from CSIRO’s Australia Telescope National Facility 
(now CSIRO Astronomy and Space Science - CASS) Project Review Board tends to confirm 
that analogous project histories are rarely considered seriously when initiating, approving or 
reviewing progress of major high-tech projects. Research for this thesis confirms the view 
that such failure is a widespread phenomenon. 
 
The character of large high-tech projects tends to point investigators towards programmatical 
problems when seeking to learn from, or explain, failure.  However traditional project 
management approaches are inadequate against the broader complexities of large scale 
endeavours known as mega-projects (ICCPM, 2011). A recent NASA Space Shuttle report 
(Rhatigan, 2011, p. iii) describes the more chilling consequences of failing to exploit 
institutional knowledge by voicing NASA’s view that: “Columbia failed to preserve the 
lives of our...colleagues due to our own very human errors”. 
 
The world of large high-tech projects is a very exciting place of discovery, break-through, 
and leviathan scale machines that stretch the imagination. It is also complex and messy, with 
frequent problems that sometimes confound the stakehold rs. In a sea of failures, it is no 
wonder that the documented successes are sometimes overlooked. 
 
All this spawned a two-part question. First, is there a more robust process, using theoretical 
and/or empirical predictive indicators derived from the literature and from best-practice 




high-tech mega-projects? Second, how might this be useful for one of the largest science 
construction project to be undertaken over the next15 years – the Square Kilometre Array?2 
 
 
1.2 Approach to the research question 
The objectives which follow from this research question are: 
• To investigate published studies and specific relevant casework to reveal the extent 
to which past project experience and learnings have been used as indicative success 
indicators; 
• To identify specific pre-cursors of success  in large high-tech projects that are 
influential in shaping projects and building resilience; 
• To test any causal links to early project outcomes in contemporary mega-science 
projects, and identify key drivers for project success; 
• To develop a set of indicators applicable as predictive tests of likely project 
success, and present these as a practical process tol for use by project authorities, 
and thereby identifying; 
• The applicability of key success drivers and high-tech project management 
characteristics to the Square Kilometre Array project. 
 
Success and failure in projects is a frequent topic among both project theoreticians and 
practitioners. Mega-projects especially have received attention from academic authors and 
the popular press, often recounting performance failures and cost and time overruns, and 
sometimes leading to fiascos (Grün, 2004; Cooper, 2006). While many notable mega- 
projects are delivered ‘on time, on budget’, large projects - especially those underpinned by, 
or delivering, new technology - are very demanding of management capability, resources, 
and systems engineering, and too often fail in one r more performance criteria (Merrow, 
1988; Morris & Hough, 1986; Hartman & Ashrafi, 2004; MoD, 2009). One informed 
estimate gauges just $80 million of value is delivered for each $100 million invested 
(Crawford & Cooke-Davies, 1999). Whatever the return on investment (ROI), too many 
high-tech mega-projects continue to underperform despit  increased application of systemic, 
disciplined project management approaches and instantaneous information transfer via the 
internet (Archibald, 2003). 
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The topic of project failure has been examined most thoroughly through case investigation, 
and by some scholars. Practically every project flop has met with forensic scrutiny in an 
effort to reveal root cause and commercial impact and often to vindicate some stakeholder. 
In researching for this thesis, my focus was not on causes of failure, but reasons for success. 
This proved to be a far more difficult assignment, since success is frequently viewed as self-
evident. Moreover, success is not necessarily the antithesis of failure. Added to the cost-
schedule-performance trilemma are the added dimensions of success over time, technology 
pathfinding, and even inspirational value. It is project success, not failure, which offers data 
richness. 
 
Much has been written regarding project performance, and the literature contains empirical 
studies of tens, and sometimes hundreds, of projects in an effort to distil factors governing 
their success or failure (e.g. Müller & Turner, 2007; Pinto & Slevin, 1989; Ika, 2009). Case 
study work, involving report analyses, interviews and questionnaires offers much insight 
through evidential data complemented by qualitative judgement (Grün, 2004). Other studies 
derive conclusions through statistical analyses (e.g. Belassi & Tukel, 1996; Dvir et al., 1998) 
and although meaningful, require more interpretation by the practising project manager. 
 
This thesis, drawing heavily on case study work and research from the previous four 
decades, and augmented by contemporary experience, asks: what are the key strategic areas 
that show strong correlation to project success at the project formation, precursor activity, 
execution, and review stages? Seen through the lens of several contemporary projects,  the 
research tests theoretical boundaries, and contributes to the debates about success definitions, 
learning organisations, decision-making, and characte ising project complexity. 
 
Data are examined to identify success factors and succe s criteria for large engineering and 
science projects, and compare these with general mega-projects. Analyses are presented that 
contribute new insights for life-cycle project management, especially applicable at the 
project planning, formation and approval stages, and to show the comparative importance of 
top ranking high-tech project success drivers. The relationships concerning external 
stakeholders are also investigated, especially procurement processes and the importance of 
recognising and managing the wider project environme t. 
 
Importantly, this study looks beyond the obvious in terms of project management skills and 
the necessary qualities of high-tech mega-project managers. I investigate the overlapping and 
intertwining of disciplines (e.g. strategy, engineering, procurement, personnel, finance, etc.) 




subtle characteristics, traits, and initiatives that lead to project success and identify the 
personal and professional attributes, skills and exemplar initiatives that are key ingredients. 
 
As a practical outcome of this thesis, I offer a process tool that can be applied at the early 
stages of project planning. This is in the form of a procedural checklist that fundamentally 
challenges the project design and execution team in very specific areas where research has 
confirmed a strong correlation between success and f ilure. The tool was honed using 
experience gained during interaction with planning engineers at the SKA Program 
Development Office (SPDO), and during a lessons-learned workshop for the recently 
commissioned Dutch LOFAR radio interferometer project. 
 
In reporting on NASA’s defunct Constellation Program, Rhatigan (2011, p. vi) writes: 
“learning from experience is irreplaceable. Learning from the experience of others is the 
next best thing. Both are an exercise in judgement. Sifting the useful kernels in a chaos of 
chaff requires perception and oftentimes detachment.”  This thesis seeks to embody those 
words while recognising that learning based on inductive references from selected projects is 
necessarily imperfect (Cave, 2011). It is my belief that willingness to engage intelligently 
with the imperfect process, and to apply cross-disciplinary thinking, allows important 
success drivers to be distilled. 
 
Outside the scope of this work are the project management toolsets, applications and 
enterprise systems necessary for practical delivery, as well as deep discussion regarding 
organisational and project structures (e.g. Work Breakdown Structures). While these subjects 
are important at the project deployment level, they are already well described in the realm of 
practice manuals or deserving of discrete research programs. Also beyond the scope of the 
present study are investigations among the funding agencies. While they may have a view of 
what success means, and are clearly influential at the AFE stage, no evidence emerged that 
the funding agencies contributed to successful outcomes for science/engineering projects in a 
programmatical or technical performance sense, which is the focus area of this thesis. 
 
The results from the present research will have dirct applicability to current and future 
approvers and managers of large scale science projects, and in particular the Square 








1.3 Research methodology 
 
1.3.1 Literature search 
 
Literature-based data for this thesis is drawn from peer-reviewed journal publications, 
published reports, technical articles and case study extracts. I purposely sought material from 
a broad range of studies from the Western world covering the past 35 years, containing 
diverse project characteristics in terms of purpose, budget, location, engineering 
innovativeness, and sponsor. Care was taken to ensure a representative and significant 
sample of high-tech projects with some systems engin er ng component. Literature sources 
were initially selected from library searches on the keywords ‘project success’, ‘mega-
project’, ‘critical success factor’, ‘lessons learned’ and ‘project learning’, and later 
broadened to target specific areas of project theory. A description of the extant literature is 
given in section 2.2. 
 
 
1.3.2 Case study fieldwork 
 
1.3.2.1 Case study research 
 
Case study research is sometimes only seen as useful as a preliminary stage of an 
investigation, or supplementary to it, but not of value in itself unless linked to a hypothesis 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006). Yin (2009) joins Flyvbjerg in rejecting this, both arguing that casework 
reveals ‘context-dependent’ knowledge that encourages learning maturity from ‘rule-based’ 
to ‘virtuoso’ levels. Flyvbjerg goes on to explain the richness of information in the personal 
case-narrative, and its ability to describe realities which are hard to reveal or define in 
scientific parlance.  Ika (2009 p.15) supports in-depth interviews as allowing: “project 
actors to tell their professional life stories or talk about success factors” and adds the 
rhetorical question, “Are not words, by their very nature, infinitely richer than numbers?” 
 
Aubry et al. (2010) show that mixed-method empirical research designs are usually robust, 
particularly when part of a wider, mixed-method program of research. The combined 
methodologies of literature research complemented an validated through case-based 
fieldwork, though by its nature always incomplete, enable the extraction of several recurring 







The case study as a research method is strongly endorsed by Yin (2009), who describes the 
rigorous methodological approach required for conclusion validity, and usefulness when 
investigating complex phenomena. Yin offers sound advice about when a case study 
approach to research is most appropriate, suggestin that is; when the research questions are 
predominantly ‘how’ and ‘why’; when behavioural control is not required; and when the 
focus is on contemporary events. Further, Yin (p. 9) explains that ‘how’ questions, as 
derivatives of ‘who’, ‘what’, and ‘where’: “are likely to favour survey methods...[and]...are 
advantageous when the research goal is to describe the incidence or prevalence of a 
phenomenon or when it is to be predictive about cerain outcomes”. I have adopted the 
foregoing advice in research for this thesis. 
 
The effectiveness of case study research is becoming increasingly acknowledged at NASA, 
where the method is codified. NASA’s methodology document remarks: “knowledge is most 
useable when it is contextual – when it relates to one’s own experience, and is placed in the 
context of an actual event...[a case study]...is told for the purpose of illuminating the 
decision-making processes and the outcomes of that particular event, so that others can 
learn from past or current projects.” (NASA, 2008, p. 2). 
 
The questions and responses that form the conversation and ultimate narrative that informs 
casework research require careful construction and interpretation – a process known as 
discourse analysis. With an emphasis on reflexivity, discourse analysis inevitably introduces 
the researcher as a component of the discourse, though as a constructive effect (Phillips & 
Hardy, 2002). A key point is that the researcher or analyst should not attempt to interpret 
individual statements or texts, but consider summations of remarks and bodies of texts to 
derive a broader reality. As Phillips and Hardy (200  p. 9) put it: “Content analysis, not in 
terms of a mechanistic counting but in a more interpr tive form, can be used to connect 
textual content to broader discursive contexts.” 
 
 
1.3.2.2 Approach to casework for this thesis 
 
The casework for this thesis, and a vital component of the research, is a series of field 
investigations conducted at 17 large scientific institutions/facilities in Europe, Chile, South 
Africa, Australia, and Antarctica (Table 1-1). The chosen sites each satisfy my chosen 
general criteria of having substantial and specialised infrastructure (i.e. a complex scientific 




astrophysics, particle physics, or nuclear physics. Vi its of 1-3 days were pre-planned to 
ensure access to key project management representativ s, each of whom agreed to an 
interview typically lasting 3-5 hours. Use of a question list (See Appendix A) enabled a 
systematic approach and consistency of topic coverage; however interviewees were 
encouraged to amplify their responses as necessary.  For each case study, a nominated point 
of contact was sent an information and consent letter drafted by my research supervisor, and 
he or she then responded with a signed agreement to participate in the research. 
  
While much casework research on project success is, by and large, quantitative (Ika, 2009), 
this thesis uses essentially a qualitative methodology,  complemented by a Grounded Theory 
(GT) approach enabling the systematic generation of theory from data that contains both 
inductive and deductive thinking (Georgieva & Allen, 2008). GT practice does not attempt to 
test an existing hypothesis, merely offer a method for evolving theory from collected data 
(Schalken et al., 2006). As such, the approach is highly appropriate as a framework for 
extracting empirical data from a broad variety of real-life science facility settings. 
 
In this study and in accordance with Glaser and Strauss’s GT methodology, a variety of data 
sources were considered valid for inclusion, not just theoretical research and planned 
observations. I made extensive field notes (and sometimes audio recordings) from both 
formal and informal interviews, as well as general observations from my experiences and 
observations in the workplace. A few of the cases restricted my interviews to two or three 
senior, well informed personnel (e.g. TOPSAT, OPAL), whereas most others permitted a 
broader survey. Several facilities (e.g. ILC, VISTA) arranged group entry and exit meetings 
to frame my investigations within shared knowledge and experiences.  I finished all 
interviews with a recapitulation  of the key facts and views expressed by the interviewee. 
Although not especially aiming for a phenomenological approach, my conversational style 
(derived from many years in technical auditing) elicited self reporting, accompanied by 
expressive gesture and sometimes strong emotion as described by Whitty (2010). 
 
 The gathered data were coded by topic/question, grouped into similar concepts in order to 
make them more workable and often collated non-numerically – the whole process known as 
axial coding within GT (Schalken et al., (2006). Given the relatively moderate scale of the 
survey, I completed the abstraction and analysis manually. From these concepts, categories 
were formed, which were later developed into theme headings for ease of reference, and 
generally support the research and conclusions of the present study. As emerging theory 
from this thesis, I present these concepts in the form of questions within a practical checklist 




practitioners for their opinion (and is now being applied in one project), validation in the real 
world is not required since, as Georgieva and Allen (2008 p. 45) reason: “the emerging 
theory is reliable and does not require further testing because it comes directly from the real 
world data itself.” 
 
Critics of GT have focused on its misunderstood statu  s theory, as opposed to a method of 
discovering theory; and on the claim that it develops inductive knowledge. Others suggest 
that it is impossible to discount preconceptions in the collection and analysis of data in the 
way that Glaser and Strauss (1967) say is necessary. Goulding (1999) documents these 
perceived shortcomings, and adds the problems of premature closure (leaving the field too 
early), and methodological transgression (not following the prescribed process). Finally one 
must add the inability to practice the approach to the required professional standard and 
thereby minimise erroneous generalisation, and resea ch r bias. To a large extent, these 
problems can be countered through a member-checking process to establish data fidelity and 
credibility. 
 
Curtin University has issued the ethics protocol approval No. RD-25-09 for this work.  Note 
that where case studies are referenced throughout tis hesis, they are shown in full upper 





Table 1-1. List of case study projects, organisations, and interviewees 
Project Acronym 
& web link 
Sponsor 
Organisation 
Description Interview details 








ESO – NAOJ – 
NRAO 
Collaboration 
Radio telescope array of ~66 
dishes located in northern Chile. 
Under construction. 
Dr. Tony Beasley, ex-Project Manager ALMA radio-
telescope project. Discussions on mega-project 
management and risk. Personal interviews, Chile, 19-22 
November, 2007, and Oxford, 28 October, 2010. 
Dr. Lewis Ball, ALMA Deputy Director. Discussion on 
project reviews. Email exchange 24 February, 2010. 














Radio telescope array of 36 
dishes located in the mid-West 
of Western Australia. ASKAP is 
a precursor for the SKA project 
currently under construction. 
Dr. Dave DeBoer, former Project Director - ASKAP 
telescope. Discussion on radio-astronomy project 
management. Frequent Personal interviews during 2007-
2011. Mr. Ant Schinckel, Project Director – ASKAP. 
Several discussions on ASKAP execution. 2010-2011. 













Radio telescope array of 6 
dishes located in northern NSW, 
Australia. Completed in 1988.  
Dr. Ron Ekers, ex-Director Aust. Telescope. Discussion 
on major project success factors. Personal interview, 
Australia, 12 March, 2008. Email exchange 5 February, 
2011. Ex-Director, CSIRO-ATNF, Dr. Bob Frater, 17 
March, 2009. 












ch facility, STFC + 
Partners 
High power laser to demonstrate 
the feasibility of laser-driven 
fusion. Currently in early stage 
planning. Site not yet decided. 
Dr. Chris Edwards, Project Coordinator, RAL. Personal 
interview, Didcot, 15 November, 2010. 













Dual opposing linear colliders of 
super high power. Site not yet 
decided. 
Dr. Wilhelm Bialowons, ILC Global Design Effort 
member. Discussions concerning science project 
structures. Personal interview, Germany, 13 July, 2009. 
US$6.65 






& web link 
Sponsor 
Organisation 
Description Interview details 





(DESY), Germany.  
 
Email exchange 9 February, 2011. Dr. Reinhard 
Brinkmann, DESY-Directorate and Head of the 
Accelerator Division. Personal interview, Germany, 13 









Boeing – Iridium 
Inc 
A constellation of 66 satellites 
providing voice and data 
coverage to satellite phones, 
pagers and integrated 
transceivers over Earth's entire 
surface.  
Mr Steve Miles, Systems Engineer, Iridium Satellite 
Operations Center. Personal interview, Washington DC, 
USA, 8 September, 2008. 













Experimental Reactor that aims 
to demonstrate energy from 
fusion. Under construction in 
France. 
 
Mr. Peter Swenson, Head of Project Office -ITER 
Facility. Discussion on major project management. 
Personal interview, France, 20-21 July, 2009. Email 
exchange 10 February 2011. 
Total interviewees = 5 
Unclear – but 













Large Hadron Collider – a 
gigantic particle accelerator 
located under the border of 
France and Switzerland. Began 
operating in 2010. 
Dr. Lyndon Evans, Project Manager - Large Hadron 
Collider. Discussion on characteristics of mega-projects. 
Personal interview, Switzerland, 23-24 July, 2009, and
Manchester, 24 February, 2011. Email exchange 9 



















A light detection and ranging 
instrument especially configured 
to probe the mesosphere above 
Antarctica, with associated 
logistics. Commissioned in 
2004, and since upgraded. 
 
Dr. Andrew Klekociuk, Leader -Antarctic LIDAR project.  
Discussion on science program management and logistics. 
Personal interview, Antarctica, 1 December, 2004, and 
email exchanges Australia, 16 January, 2009, and August, 
2011. 












& web link 
Sponsor 
Organisation 
Description Interview details 








Radio telescope consisting of 
thousands of omni-directional 
dipole antennas. Centred in 
North Holland, it commenced 
operations in 2010, and is 
continually being expanded.  
Dr. Marco de Vos, Head R&D ASTRON/LOFAR mega-
array. Discussion on science project characteristics. 
Personal interview, The Netherlands, 16 July, 2009 and 27 
January, 2011. 
Dr. Michiel van Haarlem, LOFAR Managing Director. 
Personal interview, The Netherlands, 16 July, 2009 and 27 
January, 2011. Total interviewees = 8 
 
€83M cash 








SKA South Africa Radio telescope array of 7 
dishes (to be expanded to ~80) 
located in the Northern Cape of 
South Africa. MeerKAT is a 
precursor for the SKA project 
currently under construction. 
Ms Anita Loots, Ass. Director Project Management. 
Personal interview, Cape Town, 26 February, 2009. 
Mr Willem Esterhuyse, MeerKAT Project Manager. 
Personal interview, Carnarvon, Northern Cape, SA, 20-2  
February, 2009. 
















A state-of-the-art 20 mega-watt 
open-pool research reactor 
located in south Sydney, 
Australia. Commissioned in 
2009. 
Dr. Ross Miller, Project Manager OPAL nuclear reactor 
project. Discussion on approach to project governance. 
Personal interview, Australia, 7-8 Oct, 2009. Email 
exchanges 17 November, 2009, and 23 February, 2011. 











The SKA Program 
Development 
Office, UK. 
A giant radio telescope with 1 
million square metres of 
collecting area using thousands 
of receptors, in early design 
phase. Location is either 
Southern Africa, or Australasia. 
Prof. Richard Schilizzi, Project Director – SKA Prog am 
Development Office (SPDO). Discussions concerning 
project establishment conditions. Personal interview, UK, 
autumn, 2010. 
Meeting of Domain Specialists, Manchester, UK, 2010 












A particle accelerator 
accommodating 30 beamlines, 
located in Melbourne, Australia. 
It began operations in 2007. 
Australian SYNCHROTRON, Dr. Dean Morris, Head of 
Operations - Aust Synchrotron. Discussion on mega-
project management. Personal interview, Australia, 4 








& web link 
Sponsor 
Organisation 
Description Interview details 










A micro-satellite with advanced, 
down-looking, imaging cameras. 
Launched in 2005. 
Prof. Richard Holdaway, Director - Space Science and 
Technology Department, RAL. Personal interview, 
Didcot, 20 May, 2010. Email exchange 5 February 2011. 












A visible and infra-red survey 
telescope located in northern 
Chile. Commissioned in 2009. 
Dr. Ian Bryson, Head of Strategic Management, and Dr. 
Alistair McPherson VISTA Project Manager, Personal 
interview, Edinburgh, 27 January, 2010. Email exchange 
22 February, 2011. 










X-Ray high power free electron 
laser 
Dr. Hans Weise, Deputy Project Leader, XFEL. Personal 
interview, Germany, 14 July, 2009. 





Table 1-2. Interviewees for Task Force survey (ref section 5.1.4.2 Managing task forces) 
Name Affiliation 
Mr. Charles Adler Senior Systems Engineer, Boeing Company. 
Mr. Robin Sharpe Ex-Senior Director – Strategy and Technology, NXP Semiconductors 
(subsidiary of Philips Semiconductors). 
Mr. Brett Biddington Ex-Space Team leader, ASIAPAC, Cisco Systems Inc. 
Dr. Allan Paull Research Leader, Applied Hypersonics, Air Vehicles Division, DSTO. 
Dr. Richard Schilizzi Director, Square Kilometre Array Program Development Office. 
Dr. Peter Hall Prof. Of Radio Astronomy Engineering, Curtin University; Deputy 
Director, ICRAR 
Dr. James Bradfield Moody Executive Director, Development, CSIRO 
Ms. Dawn Schaible  Manager, Systems Engineering Office, NASA Engineering & Safety Centre 





1.4 Structure of the thesis 
 
Following the introduction of the research question a d description of the research 
methodology in chapter one, chapter two discusses th  historical and contemporary context 
for success and failure of large science/engineering projects. The body of literature is 
described, and a working definition is given for high-tech mega-projects as ‘multi-million 
dollar enterprises with a challenging science goal and substantial infrastructure component.3 
The performance expectations in terms of innovation and technology outcomes are then 
probed in terms of project success factors, the challenge of complexity, and some of the 
broader ‘scene-setting’ aspects and actors are discussed. 
 
Chapter three looks at pre-cursors to project success, and examines the effectiveness of 
project shaping activities including structure, the establishment of contractual and 
procurement arrangements, and the building of project resilience. 
 
Chapter four contains the ‘meat’ of the research wit in an in-depth review of success factor 
studies and a findings regarding key success drivers from casework conducted in Australia, 
Chile, South Africa, and Europe. Here I apply scientific method and enquiry to test the 
hypothesis that it is possible to detect and refine success factors, such that they become 
reliable success drivers and thus predictive indicators of high-tech project success. 
 
Chapter five examines in more depth several less obvious aspects concerning project 
manager traits, dubious practices, and the all-important project reviews and lessons-learned 
practices. In the next chapter, the Checklist for High-tech Project Success (the CHiPS Tool) 
is introduced, informed by the preceding research and conclusions. 
 
Chapter seven aligns and applies the study findings to the SKA project, examines how these 
factors might be implemented in project strategies, planning, and execution, and posits ideas 
for lessons learned. Finally chapter eight presents the conclusions of this thesis, and suggests 
further research areas. The logic and flow in sequencing the chapters and content in this 
thesis is shown in Fig. 1-1. 
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Fig. 1-1. Research flow adopted for this thesis 
 
The quest to research, analyse and present factors in high-tech project success covers many 
aspects of classic project management, technical execution, and human behaviour. Inevitably 
I touch on several topics many times as they are appro ched from differing perspectives. For 
this reason, I include a subject index after the ref rences section. 
 
Finally, I note that section 3.3 (resilience), chapter 4 (success drivers), and section 5.1 
(project manager characteristics) are slightly edited versions of papers accepted for 
publication in International Journals. Section 3.2 (procurement) is published on-line as a peer 
reviewed technical memo within the international SKA project website. 
 
 
1.5 Statement of originality 
 
In the preparation of this thesis I personally researched some 250 professional papers from 
high impact peer reviewed journals, consulted over 40 topical books and management texts, 
and read more than 80 related articles and miscellaneous publications. Case material from 
investigations at many big-science facilities provides a source of contemporary experience, 
as do conference papers, especially those from the in ensive NASA Project Management 
Challenge event that I attended in 2009. I returned to the same forum in 2010 to present an 
invited paper based on the present research work. Much of the research material is 
summarised within the very thorough literature review, however it is the  body of the 
manuscript that demonstrates how I have used this resea ch to contribute intellectually to the 





There is a good deal of (mostly disjointed) information in the published literature about 
project success and lessons learned, and many authors have covered the general topic of 
mega-projects. There is considerably less material concerning the specific management 
requirements of high-tech projects. Each of these topics (sometimes in combination) also 
features in conferences, workshops, and reports. Thi  thesis is believed to be the first attempt 
to draw together this material, add richness through primary field research, and present the 
reader with a practical tool for increasing the likelihood of project success. To quote 
Grossmann (2010, p. 4): “It is clear that ITER-like projects are different – there is currently 
no Body of Knowledge that adequately addresses management issues associated with these 
projects.” 
 
In the process of researching and writing this thesis, three papers have been prepared and 
accepted for publication in peer-reviewed international journals, and another (also peer-
reviewed) added to the official SKA project memo series. I have also presented these papers 
at several conferences and colloquia (Refer Appendix K). 
 
The material in this thesis has not previously been submitted for a degree in any university, 
and to the best of my knowledge, contains no material p eviously published or written by 





Chapter 2 – Research context 
2.1 The rationale for research: a short modern history of high-tech projects 
 
As high-tech projects have grown in size, cost and risk, so has the challenge in realising 
success. To understand the problem and set context, I briefly review the recent history of 
project success, the response in terms of mega-project management, and indicate where the 
knowledge gaps remain. 
 
Ika’s (2009) study of articles related to project success within the leading project 
management journals identified three recent eras tht describe a changing focus across the 
decades and span the core period of research source used in this thesis. Table 2-1 shows how 
the basic parameters of project success have been augmented over recent historical periods. 
 
Table 2-1. A view of general project success parameters across time (after Ika, 2009 p. 11) 
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The post-WW2 years have seen a notable change in the mode of mega-project funding, 
approval, and leadership style. The first half of the 20th century saw ambitious undertakings 
in science and engineering usually championed by visionaries (Miller & Lessard, 2000) 
recognised for their personal knowledge, discoveries, and influence. The latter half of the 
1900’s saw increased complexity of machines and the project structures to build them. Such 




more often identified with the host institute (e.g. NASA, CERN) than with a single 
champion. 
 
This development in management is epitomised by the case of the giant Mount Palomar 
optical telescope opened in 1949. Its undoubted driving force was George Hale whose style 
reflects the age of the ‘Great Man’ projects, as Florence (1994, p. 92) notes: 
“a round of handshakes was enough to inaugurate the largest scientific project ever 
undertaken”, and “the committees met from time to time, but most of the 
decisions...emerged in notes and memoranda from Hale...[who] kept his fingers in 
every pie”. 
 
However Florence (1994) notes that even superb project champions have their limit (p. 91): 
 
“Not even Hale at the peak of his abilities had theenergy to manage this project 
alone. The two-hundred inch telescope was one of the irst ventures into big science. 
No one had tried to research so many aspects of technology simultaneously, except 
perhaps [in wartime].”  
 
In the UK, this experience was echoed by (now Sir) Bernard Lovell in The Story of Jodrell 
Bank (1968). In this classic account of building a post-war iconic radio-telescope, Lovell tells 
of the personal burden of dealing with ever-increasing budget demands, crises management, 
contractor issues, government inquiries amid the need to maintain confidence and urgency. 
His personal exhaustion, and eventual relief when a Nuffield Foundation grant met the 
project’s debt, is understated when Lovell (1968 p. 244) writes: “It was a fairy-tale ending to 
the years of anxiety the depths of which were probably known only to my family.”         
 
Systematic management of projects emerged in missile projects in the 1950s such as ATLAS 
and POLARIS. Around this period the US Navy launched its Program Evaluation and 
Review Technique (PERT), and in the civil arena, DuPont created the Critical Path Method 
(CPM). These methodologies continued to proliferate in o defence and civil works through 
the 1960s and 1970s, capitalising on advances in computing platforms (Archibald, 2009). By 
1990, project management was effectively professionalised and great science and engineering 
endeavours in the realm of physics research, computing, aerospace, and communications 
became established within modern organisational structu es, along with their attending 





My research shows that complexity factors, and the associated project budget, is a major 
factor that tests both the stamina and purses of funding stakeholders, and demands project 
leadership competence. Whereas traditional scientific endeavours on small or intermediate 
scales (i.e. <$100 million) have often been directed by charismatic science leaders, boldly 
leading highly motivated teams in a spirit of self-su ficiency and improvisation, this approach 
is empirically shown to falter when project budgets nter the $ billions. A modern OECD 
(2010, p. 32) report goes further, saying: “if a distinguished scientist is chosen as Director 
[of a major science project], it could be wise to hire a highly experienced project manager as 
well, and to give this person the appropriate authority, staff and resources.” 4 
 
High-tech projects in the commercial sphere are not immune to poor outcomes, especially 
when attributed to incompetent business capability, sa s Ellis (2008). His statistical analysis 
of performance in 100 high-tech companies revealed only a 32% probability of project 
success by design, with 50% of firms carrying “runaway” projects in terms of time and cost. 
 
The apparent maturing and professionalization of high-tech project management towards a 
holistic theory-based approach has not led to a corresponding improvement in project 
success, and despite practitioner effort and application of scientific activity, stakeholders 
remain disappointed with project performance and investment returns. (Ika, 2009; Winch, 
1996; Turner, 2004; Cooper, 2006; Eveleens & Verhoef, 2010; Cerpa & Verner, 2009; 
Cooke-Davies, 2001; Grün, 2004; Shenhar & Dvir, 2007; Thomas & Mengel, 2008). 
 
Is there any evidence that investment in technology research is linked to successful high-tech 
outcomes? Edgerton (2006) looks at invention, and with appropriate caveats, analyses the 
statistical information on patents. He finds the ovrall rate of patent lodgement has not altered 
in recent decades, and concludes that R&D expenditure is decoupled from patent numbers. 
Innovation extends invention to commercialisation (Dodgson et al., 2008). China’s recent 
innovation efforts supported by a 10% per year increase in R&D and 28% per year growth in 
patent applications implies that its domestic policies are successful (Ernst, 2011). However as 
Ernst explains, only 26% of China’s patent applications are actually inventions, as opposed to 
utility models and industrial designs. 
 
Notwithstanding China’s top-five ranking in high-tech industries and computing, its stock of 
134,000 patents is just 2% of the world total, of which 95% are enforceable only in China 
                                                           





(Ernst, 2011). Further, there is nothing to link this data to project success. Fig. 2-1 shows that 
both China and India have some way to go to reach the R&D investment levels of Japan and 
the USA that, in terms of applied resources of scientists and engineers and monetary 
investment, are the basis for a successful modern technical economy. 
 
 
 Fig. 2-1. The world of R&D investment (Ernst, 2011 p. 6 - Australian data added by the 
author) 
Only exploration of new ideas and applications leads to economic and social progress, albeit 
against ‘real-world’ challenges, as put by Dodgson and Gann (2010 p.12): 
 
“Innovation is what happens when new thinking is successfully 
introduced...Innovation involves deliberate preparations, objectives, and planned 
benefits for new ideas...It is the theatre where the excitement of experimentation and 
learning meets the organisational realities of limited budgets, established routines, 





Edgerton (2006) makes the point that the sheer number of 20th century inventions and 
innovations leads to reported high failure rates, and cceptance of this enables freedom to 
innovate without success pressure, stating (p. 210)that: “the key problem in research policy 
should be ensuring that there are many more good ideas, and thus many more failed ideas”. 
Similarly we should not make the assumption that ideas are smarter simply because they 
come later. Söderlund and Lenfle (2011, p. 1) believ  that this ‘scholarly form of hubris’ 
based on simplifications of the past is flawed, and: “a better understanding of history might 
create an improved understanding of the difficulties n creating, shaping, and managing 
projects”. 
 
One attempt to assemble a worldview of large high-tech projects is captured within a recent 
OECD report (OECD, 2010), shown in tabulated format in Table 2-2. The reality of 
challenges, motivations and strategies for dealing with project complications are some of the 
key areas addressed within this thesis. 
 
Table 2-2. The potential benefits and complications f large international projects (adapted 
from OECD, 2010 p. 4) 
Potential Benefits Potential Complications 
Realisation of projects that exceed the 
funding capacity of individual countries 
Delays and expenses associated with protracted 
international negotiations, and the requirement for 
(non-scientific) experts (e.g. lawyers, government 
officials, etc) 
Optimisation of the global inventory of 
state-of-the-art scientific facilities while 
avoiding duplication 
Adoption of sub-optimal technical solutions due to 
juste retour (geo-return) contracting, or multiple 
sources for infrastructure components 
Access to a unique geographical 
location, or other unique local resource 
Creation of sub-optimal financial or organisational 
arrangements due to the diverse reporting, 
oversight and authorisation requirements of 
international partners 
Assembly of the best scientists, 
engineers, and technicians 
Exclusion of certain national scientific 
communities whose countries are not part of the 
collaboration 
Access to data and other project 
resources or outcomes 
Inhibition of competition in scientific fields wher 
it has traditionally been vigorous and productive 
International experience for early career 
scientists and engineers 
Creation of new administrative structures that may 






Managerial characteristics leading to success or failure is a widely researched topic, though 
with little focus on the managerial challenges of high-tech organisations. Management theory 
in this respect has matured to reflect the social structure and demands of project delivery. 
Nonetheless, a discriminatory set of managerial qualities remains elusive (Gadeken, 1986).5  
 
A fundamental question that I explore concerns the approach taken by project management in 
establishing processes and systems to execute the project. High-tech mega-projects, by their 
nature, are high-risk endeavours having great technical uncertainties and demand skills and 
approaches far beyond the traditional management techniques embodied in traditional 
practice guides and Books of Knowledge (e.g. PMBOK® Guide, 2008). Early-stage high-
tech projects (including mega-projects) are singled out by Cooper (2006) as likely to 
encounter difficulties in achieving technical success without an enlightened approach. Even 
so, Cooper warns us that commercial prospects may yet remain unclear. 
 
There is, therefore, a clear gap in the subject knowledge where practical wisdom, gleaned 
from modern history and empirical research, can be applied usefully to aid project formation 




2.2 Extant literature 
 
This thesis research is underpinned by material published from the mid 1970s to the present, 
an era broadly covering the professionalisation of pr ject management, and a full cycle of 
strong and depressed global economic activity. Studies in this period often highlight earlier 
classic mega-projects such as the Sydney Opera House, the Channel Tunnel, Concorde and 
space missions as examples of massive time/cost over-runs or performance failure. However 
the dataset is rich with examples of both successes and failures to learn from. 
 
In considering the components of project success, subject authors (e.g. Morris & Hough, 
1986; Yu et al. 2005; de Wit, 1988; Williams, 1995) mention the triple constraints of scope, 
time and cost, and often extend this to include quality, risk, and more recently sustainability 
factors. Several writers add other factors such as contractor success (Morris & Hough, 1986); 
personal growth (Dvir et al. 1998); and project safety (Lim & Zain Mohamed, 1999). 
                                                           





Atkinson (1999) notes the maturing of project success factors, yet points to the paradox of 
projects still being judged against the ‘iron triangle’. Shenhar & Wideman (1996) include 
client/user aspects, market share creation, and new technologies/product lines. Procaccino et 
al. (2002) investigate early risk factors and their effect on software project success, finding 
importance in committed sponsorship, and the level of confidence felt by users in the project 
team. 
 
Several authors are prolific in the general subject of project success, e.g.  Shenhar & 
Wideman (1996) on mapping  success to project type; Pinto’s useful Project Management 
Profile workbook, and collaborations on critical success factors for specific type projects 
(Pinto & Slevin, 1989); Cooke-Davies (2001) frequently cited work on project success; and 
Morris & Hough’s research into preconditions of project success (Morris & Hough, 1986). 
 
Many writers (Yu et al. 2006, Dvir et al. 1998 and 2003, Roy et al. 2003, Belassi & Tukel, 
1996) have applied statistical techniques to their research to support conclusions, whereas 
others (Westerveld, 2003; Lim & Zain Mohamed, 1999; Winch, 1996; Erno-Kjolhede, 2000; 
Turner, 2004; de Wit, 1988; Rubenstein et al. 1976) investigate project success from the 
management theory standpoint, complemented by experi nc s in the application of project 
management techniques or models. More targeted publications (Procaccino, 2002; Weck, 
2006; Ferratt et al. 2006; Pinto & Slevin, 1989; Moody & Dodgson, 2006; CSIRO, 1998 and 
2003; NASA, 2000 and 2008; Hill, date unknown) have ddressed project success factors 
specifically in high-tech projects. 
 
The nexus between success factors, and how project suc ess is judged, has importance in 
shaping project drivers (de Wit, 1988; Cooke-Davies, 2002a). Many writers discuss the 
multi-dimensional and multi-criteria nature of project metrics, pointing out dependencies on 
personal viewpoints and perceptions (O’Brochta, 2002; Crawford, 2000; Muller & Turner, 
2007; Westerveld, 2003; Dvir et al. 1998). However work by Shenhar & Dvir (2007), 
Crawford (2000), Atkinson (1999), Shenhar & Wideman (1996), and Dvir et al. (1998) 
reaches consensus surrounding technical performance, project performance, and 
internal/external (stakeholder) satisfaction as success criteria. 
 
Publications from the project management professional organisations (e.g. ‘Books of 
Knowledge’ or BoKs) also touch on project success, but are aimed more at project 
structuring and execution and are largely based on contemporary practice, not research 
analysis (Morris et al. 2006). Nevertheless, the Project Management Institute’s Standard for 




projects, as well as mentioning the benefits of lesson  learned. The widely referenced Project 
Management Book of Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide, 2008) also mentions the use of a 
‘lessons learned knowledge base’ for collecting histor cal information. However Cicmil et al. 
(2006), from the Rethinking Project Management study (see below), point to omissions in 
the PMBOK® Guide and are critical of suggested actions in response to project 
perturbations that fall short of the ‘lived experienc ’ of competent project managers. 
Compared to the amount of project management practice guides, Books of Knowledge 
(BoKs), and ‘how to do it’ literature, written project management theory is much less 
apparent and perhaps more correctly described as a collection of techniques and best practice 
than a scientific treatment of the topic. 
 
The US NASA organisation publishes a substantial amount of literature concerning high-
technology research-based mega-projects and programs, much of it freely available from 
NASA websites. Importantly, NASA makes available a considerable library of lessons-
learned and case study material (NASA, 2011a) concerning high-tech projects and 
management systems. In addition to drawing on this public-domain canon, I was fortunate in 
being given many documents for study purposes that further inform this thesis. 
 
One important initiative in adding to the literature is the UK Government funded research 
activity called Rethinking Project Management (RPM) ( aylor, 2006). Involving a number 
of leading project management academics and senior practitioners from industry, the 
network followed a research program framed to question mainstream ideas, the output of 
which was published in a special issue (no. 24, 2006) of the International Journal of Project 
Management (IJPM). The present study cites several papers from that publication. The first 
paper in the compendium (Winter et al. 2006) offers a useful summary of findings and extols 
the need to embark in new research directions (beyond the rational and intellectual 
foundations often underpinned by the cost-schedule-scope (or triple constraints) paradigm) 
and link more directly with project management practice. Of particular note is the need for 
increased recognition of human issues, and exogenous factors, as potent success drivers. In 
looking at IT projects, Sauer & Reich (2008) concur with the RPM findings and endorse a 
pluralistic approach to project complexity beyond the conventional wisdom characterised in 
the PMBOK® Guide. 
 
Many of the notable writers on the subject of project success consider the traits of the project 
manager, and the impacts these have on the overall success of the project (Baker et al, 1988; 
Cooke-Davies, 2001and 2002a; Disterer, 2001; Gratton e  al., 2007; Grün, 2004; Morris & 




specifically at the topic over a wide range of project types (Clarke, 1999; Erno-Kjolhede, 
2000; Geoghegan & Dulewicz, 2008; Laufer & Hoffman, 2000; Müller & Turner, 2007; 
Verner & Evanco, 2005), again linking behaviour and competence to project success 
outcomes. Müller & Turner (2010) look deeply into leadership competencies of successful 
project managers using a global questionnaire, while Keegan and Den Hartog (2004) 
examined transformational leadership. 
 
The RPM initiative also notes the need for increased recognition of human issues, the social 
nature of projects, and resulting challenges for management. One five-year study (Crawford, 
2000) foreshadowed the approach taken in this paper, by anking project success factors 
from post-1995 literature in relation to project manager competence and delivered 
performance. 
 
Although there is a great deal of written material concerning general purchasing strategy and 
approaches there is little that focuses on procurement success factors for high-tech mega-
projects per se. Much of the extant literature resides in management texts and guides, and is 
centred on the transaction.  Several authors (Jaakkola, 2004; Morris & Hough, 1986; 
Blanchard, 1990) offer solid advice regarding strategic contract policy and procurement 
management, linking contract management success to project and business performance. 
Winch and Gil (2010) go further by considering theori s for complex project contracting 
strategies and present approaches to deal with the dual problems of contractor selection, and 
motivation. Tender evaluation criteria and contractor selection is an area deeply researched 
by Watt et al. (2009), and Zeydan et al. (2010) who offer a mathematical model for supplier 
selection and performance analysis. Supplier selection is described in detailed practical terms 
by Blanchard (1990). Both the UK National Audit Office (NAO), and the Office of 
Government Commerce (OGC) publish a range of busines  guides including the NAO’s 
Improving Procurement manual (NAO, 2004), and OCG’s Contract Management Guidelines 
(OCG, 2002), both containing much practical advice. 
 
More specifically, design and execution of contracts in the engineering field is tackled by 
Nicholas (2004) and the published proceedings of the UK’s Major Projects Association offer 
relevant case material. Virolainen (1998) undertakes a theoretical study of procurement 
strategy for industrial firms, emphasising the importance of the buyer-supplier relationship 
over a mix of approaches. Schill’s (1979) examination of the topic in advanced technology 
organisations acknowledges the growing strategic and entrepreneurial importance of high-
tech procurement. Carnegie Mellon’s Software Engineeri g Institute issues the CMMI for 




high-tech acquisition. Finally, the procurement section of this thesis is generally informed by 
institutional and project based material e.g. CERN’s research into technological learning 
through project procurement (Autio et al., 2003), SKA Memo 80 on industry liaison (Hall & 
Kahn, 2006), and the NEON organisation Project Acquisition Plan (Ashley, 2009). 
 
Specifically in relation to early phase project management and building resilience, Erno-
Kjolhede (2000) tackles the management of research p ojects, addressing the underlying 
concepts of complexity and uncertainty at the conceptualisation phase, and the balancing of 
risk-taking and failure. Difficulties with early stage risk assessment in relation to over-
reliance amid uncertainty are examined by Bakker et al. (2010); Flyvbjerg et al. (2003); and 
Geraldi et al. (2010). Project shaping as a management craft is investigated by Smith & 
Winter (2010) who show clear links to project success, while Miller examines episodic style 
project shaping as a competitive advantage (Miller & Lessard, 2000). Blanchard (1990) and 
Cook-Davies (2002) discuss the people aspects of new projects and the pivotal role of 
management a human resource, while new work by Jani (2010) asserts that self-efficacy 
enables resilience in IT project teams. Nonetheless, attitudinal factors for project shaping and 
context setting have yet to be set out in relation to high-tech projects specifically. 
 
A number of early critical success factors (CSF) are proposed by Elenbaas (2000) who notes 
the crucial conditions and complex environments within project start-ups. The much 
referenced authors Shenhar & Dvir (2007) emphasise the need for early tailoring of project 
success measures and dimensions. In their examination of project peripety (an abrupt turn of 
events), Engwall & Westling (2001) explore assumptions around linear project processes and 
the limiting effects of articulating imperfect knowledge at project start-up. Lechler & Dvir 
(2010) offer recent work on linking project management structures to project success, 
arguing for serious attention to early organisational structure. Weston (2007), Fellows & 
Alexander (2010), and Fisher (2010) each touch on early stage risk of immature technologies 
and the gap in understanding between industry and institutions.  
 
While these (and other) authors address diverse facets of early stage project conditioning, 
there remains a gap in the literature for an empirically based summary of early stage 
conditioning factors concerning resilience (the quality of robustness and the ability to 








2.3 Defining high-technology mega-projects 
 
Archibald (2003, p. 4) defines the high-technology project as: “a complex effort to produce 
certain specified, unique results at a particular time and within an established budget for the 
resources that it will expend or consume”. Further, he qualifies this by saying: “the project 
is not the end result [but] the process of creating a new end result”. Cooper (2006, p. 24) 
emphasises the special nature of high-tech projects in industry, provocatively describing 
them as: “the breakthroughs, disruptive technologies and radic l innovations that create the 
huge growth opportunities and superlative profits.” 
 
The precise parameters of very large projects (also known as ‘mega’, ‘macro’ or ‘giant’ 
projects) are not specified in this thesis, except to say that these endeavours typically have 
multi-million or even billion dollar budgets, time-frames measured in years, and attract a 
high level of public and/or political attention. Moreover, they often exert a substantial direct 
and indirect impact on the community and the environment. With one smaller exception 
(LIDAR), the case studies examined on-site ranged in budget between $50 million and $6 
billion and comprised a construction life of typically 5-10 years.  Apart from the IRIDIUM 
program, all were institutional endeavours in the physical sciences and technologically 
innovative. 
 
Such endeavours may seem to have little in common with mass production projects (Miller 
& Lessard, 2000) but the economics of large engineer g/science global projects (e.g. the 
Square Kilometre Array, Large Hadron Collider) are now setting aside this division. High-
tech mega-projects add complexity by involving research and development, a reliance on 
IT/science/engineering effort, and having a significant infrastructure requirement. 
 
Flyvbjerg (2008, p. 1) sets a useful framework for mega-projects by stating: "mega also 
implies the size of the task involved in developing, planning, and managing projects of this 
magnitude. The risks are substantial and cost overruns of 50% are common”. 
 
Sykes (1990, p. 160) offers a comprehensive description of what he terms ‘macro-projects’, 
applying the characteristics paraphrased below: 
• Owned by government or business consortium (or both) by nature of size 





• Shortage of experienced senior people, leading to diminished chance of success. 
This is not widely, or well, understood 
• Generally indivisible endeavours 
• Construction period is > 5years, following investiga ory/approval period of >4 
years. 
• Located in remote, harsh places, yet requiring large, skilled workforces 
• A strain on suppliers and transporters, and due to sudden, brief supply demands, 
may cause absorption problems in the market 
• Sheer size and complexity imposes special risks, mot n tably on the proponents 
• Vulnerable to economic recessions and storms that can massively increase costs 
• Difficult to finance. 
 
The above definitions usefully frame the general chracteristics of large high-tech projects in 
a mechanistic sense, but fail to provide a real world view of life within these very large 
enterprises. I present a brief word picture of such projects below, illustrating some 
dissimilarity between industrial and institutional approaches. 
 
Mega-projects that are bid, developed, executed and supported by industry (e.g. defence 
prime contractors) are managed within a very strong budget-schedule-milestone environment 
(BAE SYSTEMS, 2009). Reporting of project status is frequent, with brief ‘traffic light’ 
type updates at team meetings, and numeric/mileston data generated through corporate 
project management IT systems. Earned value management systems (EVMS) commonly 
underpin progress payment claims to the customer (Boeing, 2004). The project office may be 
centralised at the delivery site, or for dispersed projects, corporately headquartered. Either 
way, these are very busy places, with project teams highly mindful of delivery commitments, 
and staffed with an experienced core group (Fig. 2-2) including the Project Manager, and 
Project Engineer, and supported by functional managers in charge of technical competency 
within their disciplines and for executing project tasks relating to their functional 
department. (Nicholas, 2004). Disciplines typically will include a mix of engineering, 
science, project management and control, finance, and production, as driven by the needs 







Fig. 2-2. Typical make-up of the project office (after Nicholas, 2004 p. 492) 
 
Contractual and legal negotiations are practiced very formally, often by embedded 
professionals. Commercial project leaders/managers operate largely autonomously, and 
quickly establish both formal and informal communicat on channels to ensure prompt and 
reliable intelligence. Project audits and reviews are seen as serious procedural events, not 
only as a measure of achievement against plan, but also as a reflection of team reputation. 
Failed ‘gate’ reviews may result in pausing, or terminating the project (BAE SYSTEMS, 
2009). Under-performance within industry projects is tackled swiftly (strategically where 
appropriate), and under close scrutiny of senior management. Satisfactory performance is 
celebrated, often including team rewards. 
 
Large institutional high-tech projects funded from the public purse (e.g. nationally funded 
science) exhibit a somewhat different nature. High technical risk is inherent, with the project 
organisation (which may be a collaborative entity) being responsible or involved in the 
engineering design concept development, in response t  extensive consultation driven by the 
science goal(s). The innovative character of new high-tech mega-projects implies that many 
new technologies and components need to be developed. To mitigate risks (especially cost-
risk), a firm technical understanding of core components and their influence on the whole 
system may be required (European Commission, 2010). A substantial preparatory phase is 
necessary to deliver this understanding, sometimes undertaken by academia under blurry 
funding arrangements that can complicate in-kind support claims. Continuation of funding 
itself can temporarily dominate effort, unlike commercial projects (SKA, 2010). Central 
project authority is aspired to, but often largely titular, with major participants maintaining 
highest allegiance to their own institute or department. Nevertheless, a highly consultative 
culture is inherent, and frequent international face-to-face meetings require a robust 




stretch-type goals are the strongest drivers, meaning that late design improvements may be 
accepted at the cost of adherence to a delivery parameter. Project reviews are also seen in a 
different light to their industrialised equivalents, being less procedural, usually led by experts 
drawn from project stakeholders, and less demanding in terms of formal corrective action 
(SKA, 2010). Project termination is rare though descopes may occur. A feature of 
institutional mega-projects is the perceived lack of consequences by the collaborative teams 
in cases of non-conformance (e.g. to delivery promises) – a consequence of weak project 
authority. 
 
However, institutional mega-science projects have a notable discriminator - the higher 
proportion of exceptional people who work in them. An early feature that emerged from the 
casework for this thesis, conducted across 17 large sci ntific and engineering projects in 
Europe, Chile, South Africa, and Australia (see Table 1-1), is the formidable intellect and 
practical ability of the managers and teams involved. Without exception, the people both 
observed and interviewed displayed professional respect and outstanding technical rigour, 
though usually missing the benefits of formal project management training that notably lifts 
industrial scale project performance. While the prioritisation of home-institution tasks over 
promised deliverables can cause irritation at project headquarters, one cannot question the 
enormous goodwill and project spirit exhibited. 
 
Unlike industrial project development which mostly relies on expert contractors to produce 
physical components, much of the technological apparatus for institutional projects is 
designed and fabricated in-house, drawing on combinatio s of co-located specialist skills. 
Examples from radio-astronomy are shown in Figs. 2-3a and 2-3b, illustrating the standards 
of quality and precision required for both mechanicl and electrical fabrication. A further 
notable characteristic among team members is the ability to bridge the science-engineering 
gap, with scientists well-informed in relation to the engineering challenges (often 
contributing to the technical design), and many of the engineering staff adept at 
understanding the science challenges in terms of practical design of experiments and 













2.4 Characterising success 
 
2.4.1 What is success? 
To expose the key drivers for project success, we must understand what is meant by success, 
and its underpinning factors. The search for critical success factors (CSFs) began in the 
1960s in response to the management crisis wrought by the speed of organisational change. 
The concept is usually credited to by D. Ronald Daniel of McKinsey & Company, USA. 
European publications discussed success as a project management topic in the late 1980s, 
with North American publications introducing the con ept a decade later, soon followed by 
the Scandinavian school which started to define project success within a more granular 
framework (Jugdev & Müller, 2005). The quest to distil a definitive set of CSFs still 
occupies investigators, practitioners and organisation l theorists (Dvir et al., 1998) and much 
has been written post year 2000 with results continuing to disappoint stakeholders. As Ika 
(2009, p. 7) succinctly puts it: “Arriving at a definition of project success would appear to 
represent an enormous challenge to investigators”. In the context of this thesis, CSFs are 
broadly defined as: “those levers that project managers can pull to increase the likelihood of 
achieving a successful outcome for their project” (Westerveld, 2003, p. 412). Success is 
achievement of stated success metrics. 
 
 
2.4.2 Success, and critical success factors (CSFs): a deep r perspective 
 
Papke-Sheilds et al., (2010, p. 651) examine CSFs from a project management perspective, 
and endorse Milosevic and Patanakul’s definition of “characteristics, conditions, or 
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variables that can have a significant impact on thesuccess of the project when properly 
sustained, maintained, or managed”. Papke-Sheilds et al. also note the well reported 
correlation between the presence of CSFs and successful project performance. 
 
Fortune and White (2006, p. 53) adopt Rockart’s seminal descriptions of CSFs including: 
 
“...the few key areas where things must go right for he business to flourish. 
... areas of activity that should receive constant and careful attention from management. 
...the areas in which good performance are necessary to ensure attainment of 
[organisational] goals”. 
 
In considering project success, many writers and practitioners begin by referring to the triple 
constraints of scope, time and cost (commonly termed th  ‘iron’ or ‘golden’ triangle) and 
often extend this to include quality, risk, and more recently sustainability factors. Recent 
authors add other useful information such as contracto ’s commercial success (e.g. profit or 
new business); personal or team development; and project safety. Shenhar & Wideman 
(1996) list 13 success dimensions, including several client/user aspects such as the extent of 
customer use, customer satisfaction, market share creation, and new technologies/product 
lines. Procaccino et al. (2002) suggest that success for one stakeholder (e.g. project 
management) is not necessarily success in the eyes of another (e.g. the client) thereby 
illustrating a need to consider, or at least align, the project goal or mission as a CSF. A failed 
high-tech mega-project can draw little comfort from running a well managed project 
administration that may mean nothing for the public funder or user. 
 
Several researchers (O’Brochta, 2002; Munns & Bjeirmi, 1996; Wateridge, 1998, de Wit, 
1988, Cooke-Davies, 2002a) highlight the difference and juxtaposition of project success, 
and project management success, further complicating what is actually meant by success in 
projects. When discussing the success assessment of projects, Meskendahl (2010) suggests 
that this should cover both the execution performance, and the result. Dvir et al., (1998, p. 
920) write: “the success of defense projects, and possibly of all kinds of projects, should be 
evaluated only, or mostly, by the benefits to the customer and by meeting design goals”. This 
stance is supported in the present study on the basis that it is operational outcomes that 
matter most within the context of large and expensive high-tech projects. Decoupling real or 
apparent management success from project failure offers no sanction for the practitioner. 
“The projects profession is hazardous. An argument tha ‘I have done my duty and followed 
the procedures’ rarely has much leverage in a discipline where failure is inevitable followed 





In seeking to understand success in high-tech projects, we must also look at whose opinion 
matters. Differing viewpoints were investigated by O’Brochta (2002) who notes the widely 
differing perspectives about project success from a survey of American CIA (technical) 
project managers. At the portfolio level O’Brochta finds that project reviews and decisions 
are made with reference to contribution and risk for the organisation’s program, whereas 
departmental managers often link success with meeting the delivery schedule. On the other 
hand, individual managers view projects more personally, with success linked to possible 
career advancement.  Variability of opinion is illustrated by the case of the 1960s U2 spy 
plane project, often touted by American historians as a huge success in terms of its 
development and mission accomplishments. However th downing of a U2 over Soviet 
territory and subsequent international embarrassment over American truthfulness could be 
interpreted as mission failure. The final answer is that it was both a success and failure 
(Wateridge, 1998), depending on whose opinion is beng sought. This dichotomous view is 
shown to be common among high-tech mega-projects, where a period of successful service 
life can sway opinion. As Jugdev and Müller (2005, p. 24) state: “Once the project is 
complete, short term memories fade and the focus shift  from completion criteria , ‘are we 
done?’ to the satisfaction criterion, ‘are we happy?’” 
 
Black Knight was Britain’s first ballistic rocket launched in 1958. None of the launches were 
considered a failure although many went wrong; the root cause being the difficulty of 
replicating the hostile space environment when testing on the ground (Hill, 2007). High-tech 
mega-projects face equivalent challenges today in terms of stakeholder acceptance that 
experimental ‘pathfinder’ work must inevitably include stage-failures that themselves shape 
the success trajectory of the project. 
 
Fortune and White (2005) undertook a review of 63 publications that examined CSFs from a 
mix of theoretical and empirical studies embracing successful and unsuccessful projects. 
While their research accords well with the conclusion  of this thesis in terms of ranking 
success factors, Fortune and White’s work did not sh w similar alignment within the study 
itself, with only 17% of the reviewed publications citing all three top ranked CSFs - this lack 
of consensus among researchers and authors being noted by many (e.g. Papke-Sheilds et al., 
2010; O’Brochta, 2002, Cooke-Davies, 2002a), and emphasising the wide range of views 
regarding which CSF actually matter. 
 
Fortune and White also concur with Pinto and Slevin (1989) when pointing out two further 




practitioners to view them as discrete challenges, and perhaps miss the inter-relationships. 
Second, it ignores the potential for an individual factor to have different levels of importance 
across the project lifecycle, against which the authors offer a conceptual Formal 
Management System as a framing device to aid practitioners in overcoming these problems 
(Fortune and White, 2005). The application of CSF frameworks to project phases over recent 
decades is shown in Fig. 2-4. 
 
PROJECT LIFE CYCLE 
Conception Planning Implementation Handover Utilisation Close Down 
 Period 1:  project 
implementation 
and handover 
(1960s – 1990s) 
 
 Period 2:  CSF Lists (1980s – 
1990s) 
 
 Period 3:  CSF Frameworks (1990s – 2000s)  
Period 4:  Strategic Project Management (21st century) 
 
Fig. 2-4. Measuring success across project phases (Jugdev and Müller, 2005 p. 23) 
 
Another dimension to consider is the continuing validity of success indicators as the high-
tech project dynamically changes from experimental design to realisation routines. 
Organisational theory describes the main difference between a project and a pure repetitive 
operation in terms of resolution of uncertainty by decisions in the former, and standard, 
stable and repeatable tasks in the latter (Davies et al., 2009). Megaprojects are organised to 
(a) minimise the risk of known uncertainties from occurring, and (b) perform project routines 
to manage predictable and known operational circumstances; each requiring specific success 
markers. Davies et al. (2009 p. 11) continue: “a megaproject must also be organised to 
provide innovative and unique solutions to unknown events or unique happenings that 
cannot be predicted at the outset, but must be resolv d...[for]... successful completion.” 
 
Ika (2009) also undertook a study of peer-reviewed journal articles on project success 
published between 1986 and 2004 and finds diversity in success characterisation. Ika’s work 
shows an emphasis in the literature on success factors rather than criteria, but as Fortune and 
White (2005) discovered, fails to fully explore the links between the two. Nevertheless, 




‘ambiguous and multi-dimensional’, he notes the continuing effort of management science to 
improve our understanding of CSFs. He also endorses future qualitative type research that 
involves in-depth interviews and experiential input that supports my approach in this thesis. 
 
Grün (2004, p. 68) takes a strategic view of CSFs in complex organisations, pressing for 
success factors which: “avoid disasters, emphasise the interests of the project owners, 
influence the causes of failures, and do not overtax the capacity of the project owners and 
the project management”. In this context, Grün joins Jugdev and Müller (2005) in arguing to 
purposefully limit the number of CSFs, and suggest just four subject areas to address: 
 
• Goal formulation and change of goals 
• Basic design (of the project) 
• The socio-political environment, and 
• Management structure and capacity 
 
Pertinent to the international scope of the present tudy is the work of Atsu et al., (2009) who 
examined the success factors of ICT projects in developing nations, especially noting the 
relevance to Sub-Saharan African nations which is relevant to the SKA mega-project. Their 
largely qualitative (interview based) research of 30 projects demonstrates that some of the 
success factors widely agreed to be most important in the developed Western world, ranked 
relatively low in the study (e.g. user involvement, clear requirements, formal project 
methodology, and risk management). Conversely, training and motivation ranked third and 
fourth respectively, behind availability of funds, and top management support. 
 
The importance of ‘soft’ goals which underpin sustainable social and economic development 
is emphasised by Khang and Moe (2008) in their review of success criteria and factors for 
international development projects. They point out the difficulties in measuring success in 
development projects where goals have a degree of subjectivity, however they present a 
generalised table of success criteria and factors derived from a questionnaire survey (n=368) 
mapped against project life-cycle phases. Kang and Moe’s results highlight the importance 
of competency (highest ranked), inter-relationships and mutual understanding (consultation), 
and needs fulfilment, in project planning and execution, together with effective resource 
mobilisation and institutional capacity. Their statistical analysis also reveals the importance 
of sustained outcomes on perceived success judgement. Risk management does not appear, 





There is little extant work on project success factors specifically within large high-tech 
projects (except IT projects), however Dvir et al., (1998) examine 110 recent defence 
projects covering electronics, computers, aerospace, and munitions as part of a study into a 
typology theory of projects. By employing multivarite analysis, they find project-specific 
managerial variables critical to the success of industrial projects (though of varying potency), 
concluding that any list of success factors is dependent on project type. For example 
software (SW) projects are shown to be very sensitive to a priori factors, whereas technical 
and operational specifications, and project control, are crucial for hardware (HW) projects. 
Interestingly, they also assert that prototypes, while important for customers, have minimal 
impact on meeting large HW or SW project design goals. Human processes leading to 
success in research projects are examined from a theoretical standpoint by Ernø-Kjølhede 
(2000) who emphasises the importance (to project managers) of freedom to self-manage. 
Moreover, the creation of mutual trust between stakeholders provides a confidence 
framework that underpins the project manager’s credibility, especially in environments 
where official authority is weak or missing (e.g. universities, collaborations, etc.). 
 
The topic of success being a matter of perception in high-tech projects is raised by Müller 
and Turner (2007) and by Crawford (2000) whose review of historical CSFs identifies 
measures beyond schedule and budget performance as omponents of the project success 
construct. Using a ‘break-point’ of the mid-1990s, Crawford determines that the personal 
traits of the project manager (communication skills, knowledge, competence) have risen in 
importance post-1995, whilst technical performance has decreased in importance as a 
success factor. Communications, as a subset of information management is mentioned in 
Hyvari’s (2006) study into (largely) technical projects, and noted as the highest ranked factor 
in project management effectiveness.6  
 
Information technology (IT) projects present particular challenges around defining and 
achieving success, with one UK study into IT project management (RAE, 2004) reporting 
only 16% of projects as successful.   Frese (2010) looks further into IT project success 
research, and finds general concurrence with the frequently cited Standish reports that list 
user involvement as the first ranked contributor to pr ject success, and the lack of user 
involvement the top indicator in ‘challenged’ IT projects. Wateridge (1998), in a survey of 
132 IS/IT project managers, sponsors, users and analysts across 12 projects, discovers a 
significant discrepancy between what project managers b lieve to be important (basically the 
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‘iron triangle’) and what users consider important which relies less on meeting precise 
budgets and schedule, and more on satisfaction with the functionality. 
 
IT projects also present particular problems due the rapid expansion of technology platforms, 
complexity of applications, and consequent difficulties in managing scope and cost. Jiang et 
al., (1996, p. 49) found the pressures facing the system development manager quite daunting, 
provocatively adding that “addressing all of the factors leading to success may not be 
feasible in the current development environment”. Their study postulated 13 success factors 
which were then sent to 78 IT professionals to rank by importance. As might be expected, 
clearly defined requirements came out as the top factor, followed by personnel factors. 
Factors concerned with user involvement ranked centrally, with programmatical factors 
ranked lowest. 
 
The high scoring of management and team issues underlines the ‘people-centric’ nature and 
needs of high-tech IT projects – an aspect not always intuitively recognised. De Bakker et 
al., (2010) conducts a meta-analysis (n=29) of the value of risk management (RM) to IT 
project success as reported in journal papers of the last decade. They are critical of a 
generally narrow understanding and practice of RM within the IT project genre, and note the 
discord between wider definitions of success by practitioners, and those factors reported in 
the literature. De Bakker et al. (2010), conclude that attention paid to RM is seen as more 
influential on project success than following a RM process, a finding unsupported by an 
earlier survey of Australian software developers which found no correlation between 
managing risks and project success (Verna & Cerpa, 2005). The benefit of formal risk 
management to IT projects therefore remains theoretically undecided; however two 
examples of failure illustrate the practical cost to projects. The first concerns the well-
reported loss in 1999 of NASA’s Mars Climate Orbiter spacecraft, brought down by a 
rudimentary software interface failure (NASA, 2000). The second incident, eight years later, 
concerns the US Air Force’s F22 Raptor jet fighters that lost all navigation capability at the 
moment of crossing the 180th meridian – the International Date Line. The failure was traced 
to a ‘partial line of code’. A retired Head of the US National Guard commented that: “I  used 
to be [aircraft] tails falling off, now it’s [programming] typos that ground a fighter” 
(O’Hare, 2009, p. 124). 
 
Another survey of software practitioners yields a different perspective with success linked 
most strongly to project management competency, and behavioural factors (Verner & 
Evanco, 2005). Success is also positively associated with team motivation and rewarding 




viewpoint, complete and consistent requirements is seen as highly important, 
notwithstanding comment that almost 50% of respondents’ projects began with incomplete 
requirements and encountered predictable scope changes, especially for larger projects. 
Applying logistical regression, Verner and Evanco (2005) conclude that ‘project manager 
vision’, and ‘good requirements’ are the best software project success factors, and when 
combined, predict 82% of successes overall. Procaccino’s (2002) investigation of 21 
software development projects adds useful depth to Verner and Evanco’s work, especially 
concerning requirements. They find that neither the absence of a requirements gathering 
methodology, nor a change in scope, increased the perc tion of project success. 
 
Casework interviews with project teams (LIDAR, 2009; MeerKAT, 2009; DESY, 2009) 
strongly indicate the benefits of creating a formal document to capture the agreed project 
success criteria, although these artefacts were missing (or captured early and dormant) in 
most of the field cases examined for the present study. The benefits of capturing success 
factors is supported by O’Brochta (2002), who adds that an early review of project CSFs for 
some high risk opportunities led to some projects being avoided, thus increasing net program 
success rates. Revisiting the CSFs at project mileston  and decision gates, with stakeholders 
including customers, can lift team confidence, and permit formal adjustment of CSFs to 
better match project direction. 
 
A final perspective is the impact on success of funding sources and mechanisms, shown to 
be especially important in institutional hosted mega-projects. From the funding agencies 
viewpoint, project success is centred on adherence to ost and schedule budgets, rather than 
technical performance. Discussions with Project Directors from the case studies (SKA, 2010; 
ALMA, 2007; CSIRO, 2008; ITER, 2009) indicate that the security of funding occupies 
much time and effort throughout the project lifecycle; a situation exacerbated when that 
process is made iterative by the funding agencies. Interview evidence suggests that this 
situation stems from academic administration practice, where rolling funding (being 
dependent on government budgets) is rarely taken as certain. Conversely, the idea of 
‘piecemeal’ funding is unacceptable in industry, with funding implicit through high level 
‘gate’ type reviews around the contract acceptance/mobilisation stage (BAE, 2009). Still, 
Edgerton (2006) asserts that academics prefer government funding and to be independent 
from commercial development, but is unconvinced by the widespread belief that academic 
research has led to the bulk of new and successful technologies. 
 
High-tech mega-projects are difficult to finance. The long term nature of the effort, 




institutional funders especially are naturally guarded when it comes to financial guarantees. 
Extreme examples of big-science budget cuts are notable in the USA, where the SSC and 
Constellation programs demonstrate the power of Congress to cease the financial investment. 
Sykes (1990, p. 164) writes: 
 
“The cost to commitment-point on a mega-project can be daunting. These costs 
typically fall within the range of 2% to 5% of final capital costs in real terms, but 
some projects have greatly exceeded this range. Even so, spending $75 to $150 
million investigating a $3 billion project is clearly an enterprise only for the 
strongest”. 
 
While this thesis offers theoretical and empirical evidence to support a set of success drivers 
derived from a wide range of CSFs and environmental scenarios, there will always be an 
overriding component of opinion that very much depends on the observer’s (or 
stakeholder’s) standpoint. Ultimately, “there is probably no such thing as absolute success 
in project management: there is only the perceived success of a project” (Ika, 2009, p. 7). 
 
It is, of course, one thing to examine success factors essentially from a historical perspective, 
but quite another to conclude causality. This topic constitutes the central thrust of this thesis. 
 
 
2.4.3 Project success criteria 
 
CSFs should not be confused with success criteria – the metric(s) against which success can 
be measured, and from which CSFs are determined (Müller & Turner, 2007). Project success 
criteria are metrics based on dependent variables, may be quantitative or qualitative, and be 
expressed as longer term objectives, or more near-term targets. 
 
Müller & Turner (2007) maintain that project success criteria vary from project to project, 
and that what may be acceptable in one project (for instance performing a hardware upgrade 
at a terrestrial radio telescope within 3 weeks) may be entirely unacceptable in another (e.g. 
an overnight upgrade of a bank transactional processing system). Stakeholders have different 
views of success, and have diverse positions in terms of interest, power, attitude, and 
requirements (British Computer Society, 2006). Each project’s set of performance measures 
is thus unique, and cannot be considered in a generic s nse. We can also learn something 
from Müller & Turner’s work (2007) in regards to how project managers rate success criteria 




managers of highly complex projects rate the importance for customer, supplier and 
stakeholder satisfaction significantly higher than those of low complexity projects. In 
medium complexity projects, managers assign significantly higher importance on their own 
success criteria and customer satisfaction, whereas managers of high complexity projects 
rate their own success criteria significantly higher than medium complexity projects. 
 
Further, Miller & Turner (2007, p. 303) conclude that: 
 
“Project managers in high complexity projects, when compared with medium 
complexity projects assign significantly higher importance to the satisfaction of 
customers, end-users, and other stakeholders. Compared with low complexity 
projects they assign significantly higher importance to team satisfaction, other 
stakeholder satisfaction, and their own success criteria. Project managers in medium 
complexity projects, when compared with low complexity projects, assign 
significantly more importance to team satisfaction, ther stakeholder satisfaction and 
self defined criteria.” 
 
In seeking to formulate a new approach to successful project execution, Shenhar & Dvir 
(2007) posit that a holistic technique is required when setting success criteria. Their model 
involves at least five fundamental dimensions (or metrics): 
• Project efficiency 
• Impact on the customer: meeting requirements and achieving customer satisfaction, 
benefits, and loyalty 
• Impact on the team: satisfaction, retention, and personal growth 
• Business results: return on investment, market share, and growth 
• Preparation for the future: new technologies, new markets, and new capabilities 
 
Shenhar & Dvir (2007) assert that each dimension may contain sub-measures, and differ 
from project to project (due to variables such as project scope, uniqueness and complexity), 
an idea supported by Ika (2009) who adds the further dimension of project phases. 
 
Success criteria in the form of objectives or targets are normally set early, and may be 
quantitative, qualitative, or logical. A considerable benefit in early declaration of success 




especially early on where project re-shaping, or even termination, is cheapest (Cooper, 
2006). 
 
Fieldwork for the present study revealed mixed attention to success measures, with general 
objectives more prevalent than precise targets. For example the SKA pre-cursor projects 
(ASKAP and MeerKAT) were clear in their expectations of system development and 
implementation, whereas the XFEL and LHC colliders gauged progress more by results.  In 
specifically looking at high-technology projects, Archibald (2003) supports the application 
of concrete metrics tied to specific milestones (including when the project deliverables will 
be available), though recommending the addition of soft criteria. These, he says, should deal 
with the more subtle expectations of the user/customer, such as how the work will be done, 
skills transference, and managing the project for continuous improvement. 
 
 
2.5 The complex world of high-tech mega-projects 
 
The scientific problems, technical challenges, and logistical/environmental hurdles that face 
the type of projects I consider in this thesis are daunting, even for seasoned practitioners. Yet 
it is these very challenges, with their obstacles and interdependencies, and potential rewards, 
which drive nations and organisations to commit years of resources to the quest. Why? 
Perhaps President Kennedy’s ‘moonshot’ speech captures a key driver: “because [these 
things] are hard, because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our 
energies and skills, and because that challenge is...one we are unwilling to postpone” 
(Logsdon, 2010, p. 1). 
 
Theoretical support for the mega-project as an organisational form is based on exploitation 
of economies of scale (Merrow, 1998), and critical mass to deliver the undertaking. 
Advanced science and engineering challenges require larg  and complex facilities which are 
increasingly difficult to support by one country and which need international collaboration, 
commonly called “mega-science” (Matsuzaki, 1993; Johnston, 2003). More recently, the 
global influx of government stimulus money has seen a: “blitz of multi-year, ultra-expensive 
endeavours...wrapped in promises to spur growth, create jobs and extend infrastructure. If 
they succeed that is (PMI, 2011 p. 28). Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) address thi last statement by 
identifying a “megaproject performance paradox” within their theory. Put simply, they posit 
that project risks remain unacknowledged by stakeholders and that project performance 





Not all mega-projects are complex, but the large scale high-technology endeavours 
considered by this thesis are evidently so. Complex systems theory describes degrees of 
complexity ranging from highly complicated to almost chaotic, and which have components 
of experimentation, and collaborative leadership (see Fig. 2-5). Complex systems are defined 
on the basis of their different attributes, yet have practical difficulties with their theoretical 
modelling and simulation. Given their many interconnected components, the science of 





Fig. 2-5. The continuum between control and chaos (Remington, 2011 p. 18) 
 
System complexity tends to grow in response to ever mo e demanding applications and 
science investigations, especially regarding performance, capacity and reliability. Davies and 
Hobday (2005) point to Whittle’s original turbojet ngine design with one moving part, as 
compared to today’s complex jet engine with 22,000 parts, many of them customised, and 
each requiring procurement, manufacturing data, configuration management, and lifetime 
traceability. An equivalent picture emerges for telecommunications networks. For large 
high-tech projects that embody a site requirement (e.g. nuclear plants, ground-based 
telescopes, particle colliders, etc) institutional factors begin to add material complexity, as 
well as stakeholder interests (Helmsman, 2009). A repo t from the International Complex 
Project Management Task Force (ICCPM, 2011, p. 18) characterises complexity as: 
“embodying uncertainty, ambiguity, dynamic interfaces and significant political or external 
influences. Such projects also tend to run longer than the lifecycle of the technologies 
involved.” 
 
The extent of project complexity itself shapes the c aracter of the project. While the project 
office may hold the status of project integrator, the prime contractors too must be capable of 




subcontractors. For cutting-edge programs, the system integration activities alone pose 
serious challenges in terms of industrial skills and capabilities for project realisation. Much 
of this how-to knowledge is not codified. Remington a d Pollack’s (2008, p. 1) study of 
complex projects revealed that: “there is a growing recognition amongst highly experienced 
project practitioners and academics that particular projects seem to be much more than just 
difficult; [they] have special characteristics that pose extraordinary management 
challenges.” 
 
Hector (2011) points to a deeper challenge, arguing that modern engineering practice is to 
construct models without challenging the validity of underlying scientific theories, and is 
reductionist in character – tending to reduce complexity to produce a workable design. He 
also describes engineering practice as inductive – extending existing systems on the 
assumption that theories hold true, and tending to exclude non-technical influences (e.g. the 
extended project environment). This general approach is classed as logical positivism by 
Hector (2011) and introduces flaws around interrelated systems and values that can disrupt 
major engineering projects and are only addressed through a new philosophy of engineering. 
At the outset, there are clear points of tension in big projects where the engineering team 
must design and build a machine which is partly experimental. 
 
Sometimes badged as CoPS (complex product and service) projects, Davies & Hobday’s 
(2005) definition includes any high-cost, engineering-intensive, system or subsystem, 
network, software system, or high technology servic, supplied by a temporary project-based 
organisation. Thomas and Mog (1997) concur with Williams (2004, p. 274), who holds that: 
“a complex system is one in which the behaviour of the whole is difficult to deduce from 
understanding the individual parts”. In other words, it is not intuitively obvious how the 
impacts on a complex project may affect the outcomes. While much data is known, true 
understanding is elusive without modelling the causes of dynamic behaviour. Discussions 
with system engineers at Boeing’s Iridium Sat-phone control centre (IRIDIUM, 2008) 
revealed the difficulty of forecasting precise consequences when unanticipated changes 
occur to one or more of the 77 orbital communications satellites – each an autonomous 
system within a networked constellation. One damaged satellite, for example, might trigger a 
load shedding sequence highly dependent on the spatial relationship and individual trajectory 
of the entire constellation at the precise moment, a d is inherently unpredictable. 
 
As Hobday (1998) describes, complexity has its origins in the military literature, with 
Hughes first grouping products into assemblies, components systems and arrays (Table. 2-3). 




unless connected by a network. By contrast, a component is always part of a larger system. 
Systems are defined by three characteristics: components, a network structure and a control 
mechanism. An array (or system of systems) is a collection of interrelated systems, each 
performing independent tasks but organised to achieve a common goal (Shenhar and Dvir 
(2007). 
Table 2-3. Project complexity levels, after Shenhar & Dvir (2007) 
Complexity Type Descriptor 
Assembly Projects 
Single component, device, assembly. Single function project 
performed by small team in one location. Limited formality. 
Examples include: GPS receiver, stand-alone software 
application, residential solar power system. 
 
System Projects 
More complexity than assembly projects. Entails product or 
facility itself, plus training systems, test equipment, maintenance 
tools, and detailed documentation. Uses a single Project Office 
with links to subgroups and contractors. Examples include: 
Bespoke communications network, military missile, natio al 




Highest complexity with dispersed collection of systems that 
function together. A system of systems geographically spread, 
possibly across several countries. Large in scale, evolutionary in 
form and development. Project is run under an umbrella 
organisation responsible for administration and execution, often 
a public institution. A central masterplan controls executions 
and operations. Documentation is comprehensive. Examples 




2.5.1 What makes a project complex? 
Managers of multi-dimensional and multi-aspect projects may generically label their work as 
complex, however true complex projects exhibit particular features that cause defined 
reactions. Investigations by Cook (2000) at the Cognitive Technologies Laboratory, Chicago, 
reveal characteristics of complexity, and the human response to it, as paraphrased below: 
• Complex systems are defended against failure (th  high consequences of failure lead 
to multiple layers of defence e.g. back-ups, training, regulatory measures) 
• Catastrophe requires multiple failures (overt complete failure occurs when small, 




trajectories are blocked, usually by operators but the potential for catastrophic 
failure is ever present) 
• Multiple flaws are always present ( hese are regarded as minor factors during 
operations. Eradication of all latent failures is lmited and probably futile) 
•  Complex systems always run as broken systems (the system runs because it 
contains many redundancies and because people make it function despite flaws. 
System operations are dynamic with components failing and being replaced 
continuously) 
• Attributing failure to a root cause is fundamentally wrong (because of multiple faults 
there is no isolated cause. The seeking of a root cause reflects a cultural need to 
blame specific forces or events for outcomes) 
• Hindsight biases post-failure assessments (knowledge of the outcome makes it seem 
that events should have appeared more obvious than was really the case. Hindsight 
bias is the primary obstacle to failure investigation, especially when human 
performance is involved) 
• All operator actions are gambles (overt failure often appears to have been inevitable 
and the result of wilful disregard. However all operator actions in complex systems 
are actually gambles in the face of uncertain outcomes) 
• Human operators are the adaptable element of complex systems (operators and 
front-line management actively adapt the system to maximise performance, on a 
moment by moment basis. Large complex systems require constant tuning) 
• Human expertise in complex systems is constantly changing (human expertise in 
system operation changes in character as technology changes, and to replace 
experts who leave. Training and skill refinement is actually one part of the complex 
system)  
• Change introduces new forms of failure (low failure rates may offer confidence to 
introduce changes to further reduce low consequence sub-failures. These changes 
actually create opportunities for new, low frequency- high consequence failures. 
Because these new events occur infrequently, it makes it hard to see the contribution 
of technology to the failure) 
• Post-failure remedies limit the effectiveness of deences against future failures 
(because remedies for ‘human error’ are predicated on blocking events that can 




fact the likelihood of an identical failure is already low because the pattern of latent 
failures changes constantly) 
• People continuously create surety (failure free operations are the result of activities 
by people who work to keep the system within the boundaries of tolerable 
performance. These activities are part of normal operations. Human operator 
adaptations create system surety form moment to moment, sometimes through de 
novo creations of new approaches) 
• Failure free operations require experience with failure (Failure recognition requires 
intimate contact with failure. More robust system performance is likely to occur in 
systems where operators can discern the ‘edge of the envelope’) 
 
Armed with this broad picture, a comparative view can provide context – such as the 
complexity assessment model offered by the Helmsman Complexity Scale (Helmsman, 
2009). The tool is empirically derived from research across multiple industry sectors and 
underpinned by scientific and technical rigour. The scale (see Fig. 2-6) is based on 
complexity data which is normalised through forced ranking, ranges from 1 to 10, and 
mimics the Richter Earthquake scale in terms of significance. The Helmsman scale has been 
successfully used to evaluate the Australian Defenc Project portfolio. It clearly places 
international high-tech mega-projects such as the SKA in the highest levels of complexity 
ranking. 
 





The International Centre for Complex Project Management7 offers a Project Complexity 
Assessment (PCA) tool designed to create broad awareness at the early stages of projects of 
an organisation’s capacity to deliver. The PCA tool comprises an online questionnaire of 100 
statements, and is designed to include Second Order dynamics exhibited in complex project 
management, where additional approaches are needed to understand the wider project 
environment. These include adhocratic leadership, complex contracting models, outcome 
management, system integration management, and experi ntial learning. Following 
consensus analysis, the grouped questions are then weighted to evaluate their contribution to 
the general complexity drivers and project specifics, within the framework of complexity 
characteristics or questions. 
 
From these weighted outputs a scatter diagram is produced identifying responder feedback 
along axes of competence and complexity. This provides a collective understanding of the 
consensus around the likely success of the project. This scatter diagram is then overlaid with 
a complexity assessment matrix dissected in to fourquadrants ranging from ‘Buy In’, 1st 
Order PM, Exit or subcontract to 2nd Order PM. The matrix allows the practitioner to gain 
an understanding of the cost effectiveness of potential alternatives for project activities. 
 
Mathematical models for project complexity are looked at in a white paper by Sessions 
(2009), who expresses both the dangers and opportunities of IT complexity. He estimates the 
annual world cost of IT failure at around US $6.18 trillion, or over US $500 billion per 
month (he shows his workings). Sessions attributes this frightening sum largely to software 
complexity which he relates indirectly to functionality via Glass’s Law, (that for every 25% 
increase in the complexity of the problem space, thre is a 100% increase in the complexity 
of the solution space.) Through his equations and extrapolations, Sessions shows an almost 
linear relationship of complexity to failure rates. His formulae for calculating system 
complexity begins with defining a standard complexity unit (SCU) i.e. a system with only 
one function – the least complex system possible. His principal equations are shown below: 
 
For a given system with bf number of business functio s, and cn number of connections, the 
number of Standard Complexity Units (SCU) is shown by: 
 SCU 10.
 10.
   [2-1] 
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As Sessions points out, most systems are actually ‘systems of systems’ and arranged within a 
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) with multiple srvices, each with a complexity rating. 





   
[2-2] 
 
Where bfi = number of functions in the ith service and cni = umber of connections in the ith 
service. 
 
Running the above equations with real data offers a str ightforward way to compare the 
complexity of system architectures. If one solution gives an SCU score of 1000, and another 
500, the first is twice as complex as the second, a Sessions claims, ‘twice as likely to fail’. 
 
Thomas and Mog (1997) tackled the question of why complex engineering systems are so 
hard to build, defining complexity as resulting from the interactions between system 
components, rather than from the components intrinsic complexity. Thus their approach to a 
quantitative metric of system development complexity derives a return on technology 
investment, based on system interactions over time plus technology readiness and 
programmatic risk. Their equations include: 
 




Where λ(t) = a (time dependent) technology development complexity/maturity function, 
representing a payoff rate for investing in a certain level of technology. 
 
In Equation 2-4, programmatical risk is represented by σ(t). Cij(t) is the covariance between 
technologies i and j over the development duration. 
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In Equations 2-3 and 2-4, n = number of technology investments made. Wi(t) = relative 
investment weight for technology i. E[ri(t)] = expected return on investment for technology i 
over the development schedule represented by t. 
 
Thomas and Mog (1997) apply their methodology to a NASA X-ray observatory project 
resulting in complexity measures as functions of cost, schedule, technology, architecture, and 
organisation. They claim the emergence of new understanding of the efficacy of resources 
utilisation, and the identification of system components that are contributing the most risk 
relative to payoff. The application of their model is clearly non-trivial and reliability is 
currently untested across a range of project scales. Intuitively, the equations imply over-
sensitivity to some inputs. Nevertheless, the example is included here to show perhaps an 
extreme method of grappling with quantifying system complexity. 
 
Complexity is apparent in projects in many dimensio. Bosch-Rekveldt et al., (2010) 
present a useful TOE (technical, organisational, enviro mental) framework to group the 
elements of project complexity, especially at the start-up phase (see Table. 2-4). They also 
note the influence of increased uncertainties as a complexity factor, with its attendant 
impacts on budget and schedule. Indeed without uncertainty, a project could only be 
described as complicated. Table 2-4 identifies dependencies and interdependencies adding a 
further complexity dimension that Grossmann (2010) highlights as an important issue for the 
ITER project. He asserts (p. 7) that conventional project scheduling simply does not account 
these dependencies, which are only overcome through: “value-based coordination practices, 
leading to structured information architectures, sustainable activities, and system level 
awareness”, and shows how this approach quantifies the tightly coupled nature of complex 
projects. 
 
Table 2-4. The elements of complexity in high-tech mega-projects (adapted from Bosch-
Rekveldt et al., (2010). 
Technical Organisational Environmental 
No. of goals Project duration No. of stakeholders 
Clarity of goals Size in CAPEX8  Stakeholder perspectives 
Size of scope Size in engineering hrs Political influence 
Uncertainties in scope Size of project team Internal support 
Quality requirements Size of site area Required local content 
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No. of tasks No. of locations Interference 
Variety of tasks Resources, skills availability Climate and weather 
Dependencies between tasks Experience in parties Remoteness of site 




methods & tools 
Dependencies  on 
stakeholders 
Conflicting Standards Contract types Strategic pressure 
Innovation level No. different nations Project stability 
Experience level No. different languages Level of competition 
Technical risks Cooperation JV partner Environmental risks 
Technical dependencies Interfaces between 
disciplines 
 
 No. of financial resources  
 Trusted relationships  
 Organisational risks  
 
 
Other dimensions of complexity include multiple goals and risks, a multiplicity of 
stakeholders, and successful project knowledge transfer (Bakker et al., (2010). The many 
stakeholders typical of large science/engineering projects add “an inherent level of 
unpredictability [driven by] divergent interests; long time scales and vulnerability to 
external environmental changes; and internal interfaces [ripe] for technical surprises” 
(Pavlak, 2004a, p. 3). This latter point brings in technical complexity that captures factors 
which affect project duration e.g. the testing plan, additional resources for technical 
coordination, and managing technical uncertainty (Cao & Hoffman, 2010). 
 
IT projects, by their nature tend to mask complexity from the programmatic view since, 
unlike (say) science infrastructure, there is no tangible artefact to observe being constructed 
or changed (ABC, 2011). A British Computer Society (2006) report asserts that complexity 
in IT projects goes beyond the technology – extending to the organisational, micro-
environmental, and macro-environmental project landscape. 
 
 
2.5.2 Complexity in large high-tech projects 
 
The International Centre for Complex Project Management lists the demands of complex 
project management as: “vision and motivation; empathy; attention to relationship building; 
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the ability to take a holistic view; consummate communication skills; practical application of 
experientially-derived wisdom; and perhaps most of all, ...the courage to speak the truth, 
and take good risk” (Cavanagh, 2009, p. 4). 
 
The ‘needs statement’ above is useful in understanding the nature of complex projects, but 
too broad a description to draw conclusions regarding inherent high-tech project complexity. 
A more compelling test is to apply Sykes (1990) descriptors of mega-projects (refer section 
2.3) against the complexity elements presented by Bosch-Rekveldt et al., (2010) (refer 
section 2.5.1). By determining sufficiency of match (t rough comparative judgment) high-
tech mega-projects are shown to be inherently complex (see Table 2-5). 
 
Table 2-5. Matching of descriptors for high-tech mega-projects, and complexity. 
High-tech mega-project 
descriptors  
(from Sykes, 1990) 
Elements of complexity 
From Table 2-4, (adapted from Bosch-
Rekveldt et al., 2010) 
Sufficiency 
of match 
( = Yes) 
Owned by government or 
business consortium (or both) 
by nature of size 
 
Political influence. Size in CAPEX. Size in 
engineering hrs. Size of project team. 
Cooperation JV partner. Dependencies on 




involvement is inevitable due 
to impact on the economy 
and/or environment 
No. of stakeholders. Stakeholder 
perspectives. Political influence. 
Interference. Dependencies on stakeholders 
 
 
They suffer form a shortage 
of experienced senior people, 
leading to diminished chance 
of success. This is not 
widely, or well, understood 
Resources, skills availability. Experience in 
parties. Experience in the country. Interfaces 
between disciplines. Trusted relationships 
 
 
They are generally 
indivisible 
Size in CAPEX. No. of locations. Interfaces 
between disciplines. Technical 
dependencies. Dependencies between tasks 
 
 
Construction period is > 
5years, following 
investigatory/approval period 
of >4 years. 
Project duration. Resources, skills 
availability. Trusted relationships. Internal 
support. Dependencies on stakeholders. 
Project stability. Environmental risks. 
 
 
Located in remote, harsh 
places, yet requiring large, 
skilled workforces 
 
Quality requirements. Experience level. Size 
of site area. No. of locations. Resources, 
skills availability. HSSE awareness. No. 
different nations. No. different languages. 







They impose strain on 
suppliers and transporters, 
and due to sudden, brief 
supply demands, may cause 
absorption problems in the 
market. 
Quality requirements. No. of tasks. 
Conflicting Standards. Size in CAPEX. Size 
in engineering hrs. Contract types. Trusted 




Sheer size and complexity 
imposes special risks, most 
notably on the proponents 
 
No. of goals. Size of scope. Uncertainties in 
scope. Interrelations between technical 
processes. Innovation level. Technical risks. 
Size in CAPEX. Organisational risks. 




Vulnerable to economic 
recessions and storms that 
can massively increase costs 
 
Size in CAPEX. Size in engineering hrs. 
Size of project team. Resources, skills 
availability. Contract types. No. of financial 
resources. Project stability 
 
 
Difficult to finance. 
 
Uncertainties in scope. Technical risks. Size 
in CAPEX. Experience in parties. No. of 
financial resources. Dependencies on 
stakeholders. Project stability. 




2.5.3 Can high-tech mega-projects be too complex? 
 
Given the inherent complexity of high-tech mega-projects, the question may be posed – can 
they be unmanageably complex and therefore become ‘wicked’ problems? First defined by 
Horst Rittel and Melvin M. Webber in 1973, wicked problems seem to defy rational 
description or solution. Indeed, each attempt to create a solution changes the understanding 
of the problem and therefore cannot be solved in a traditional linear fashion, thus showing 
some affinity to extreme software engineering.  Partridge’s (1981) definition of wicked 
problems may be summarised as: 
 
• Every wicked problem is essentially novel and unique. 
• Every solution to a wicked problem is a 'one shot operation' 
• The problem is not understood until after the formulation of a solution. 




• Wicked problems have no given alternative solutions. 
• Wicked problems have a ‘no stopping’ rule. The problem solving process ends when 
you run out of resources. 
 
While the above list contains features of all high-tech mega-project challenges, a more 
analogous picture is presented by Russell Ackoff, an American organizational theorist and 
pioneer in the field of operations research, system thinking and management science. 
Ackoff (1974) writes about the difficulties of complex problems, explaining that every 
problem interacts with other problems and becomes an interrelated set, or a system of 
problems. He defines this concept as a ‘mess’ (a descriptive, not disparaging term). The 
“messy organisational realities of innovation” are included in Dodgson and Gann’s (2010, 
p. 27) theoretical explanations for complex innovation. Horn and Weber (2007) unpack this 
further, saying that complexity - systems of systems – make messes resistant to analysis and, 
more importantly, to resolution. These authors present the following characteristics of 
messes which I place into two groups: 
 
Group A 
• No unique “correct” view of the problem 
• Different views of the problem and contradictory soluti ns 
• Most problems are connected to other problems 
• Data are often uncertain or missing 
• Multiple value conflicts 
• Ideological and cultural constraints 
• Political constraints 
• Economic constraints 
• Numerous possible intervention points 
• Considerable uncertainty, ambiguity 
 
Group B 
• Consequences difficult to imagine 
• Great resistance to change 
• Often a-logical or illogical or multi-valued thinking, and 
• Problem solver(s) out of contact with the problems and potential solutions 
 
The present study suggests that the items in the Group A list above resonate closely to the 




cursor instruments (ASKAP and MeerKAT) are certainly ‘messes’, but can be distinguished 
from wicked problems that often come from the areas of public planning and policy: e.g. 
global climate change, and nuclear energy.10 
 
2.5.4. Implications and management of complexity 
 
While the number and scale of complexity factors is shown to generally indicate project 
execution difficulty, several interviewees from the case study facilities mentioned positive 
aspects coming from these dimensions such as; team diversity, spreading of risk, and varied 
sources of experience  (ALMA, 2007, ATCA, 2009, DESY, 2009, LOFAR, 2009). These 
findings aligned with an Australian study of large D fence projects (Helmsman, 2009) that 
looked at project performance against complexity factors in terms of schedule, budget, 
outcome, and reputational damage (see Fig. 2-7). Clearly an understanding of specific 
complexity factors and their likely challenging, orindeed positive, effect is helpful in 




Fig. 2-7. Correlation between project performance and complexity factors  
(Helmsman, 2009, p. 11) 
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Sydney, Australia which continues to test Government decision-makers by uncertain and conflicting 
data concerning adequacy of water storage levels, rising planning and design costs, undecided court 
hearings regarding land acquisition, undeterminable future water prices, and demands and losses in 






Koppenjan et al. (2010) investigate management appro ches to large engineering projects 
and reason that complexity has two distinguishable aspects – structural and dynamic. 
Structural complexity refers to the interacting technological parts, and dynamic complexity 
describes the project elements subject to change. Th y find that the reality of managing a 
complex project requires a synthesis of Type I management – predict and control, with Type 
II style – prepare and commit. The practical impact of these approaches is shown in Table 2-
6, and provides a basic palette from which to select strategies to suit project profiles. 
 
Table 2-6. Predict-and-control versus prepare-and-commit (Koppenjan et al, 2010 in print) 
 
 Type I Type II 
 Predict-and-control Prepare-and-commit 
Terms of reference Blueprint Functional 
Task definition Narrow for best control Broad for best cooperation 
Contract Task execution Functional realisation 
Incentives Work-task based System-output based 
Change Limit as much as possible Facilitate as much as needed 
Steer Hierarchical Network 
Information management Limited, standardised Open, unstructured 
Interface management Project management task Shared Task 
 
One avenue to meet the growing demand for improved high-tech project performance is to 
attempt to better prepare project managers for complexity through educational programs. 
Thomas and Mengel (2008) looked at new perspectives and concepts for advanced project 
management training, especially in dynamic and complex project environments. Their 
findings show that (a) the professional institution training and certification programs (e.g. 
PMI) do not go beyond their practice guide (e.g. PMBOK) level, (b) practitioners usually 
discuss complexity as a state or condition, rather an a complex systems theory, and (c) 
managers pay insufficient attention to emerging small ch nges and non-linear subtle changes 
that demand new levels of competency. Thomas and Mengel suggest training of project 
managers to a Master level is required, including the ability to diagnose situations, adapt 
tools and techniques, and learn continuously – competencies above that required of the 
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 The topic of project complexity is further touched on in section 3.3.3.3, and again in relation to 




2.6 The challenge of international collaborations 
 
Large, high-tech projects are most commonly collabor tive enterprises, often involving 
multinational groups to share and exploit resources in order to execute projects that are 
beyond any single participant organisation’s financi l and/or technical capabilities (Sykes, 
1990). Intuitively, this pooling of knowledge and resources should ease the path to project 
success, yet often proves troublesome. 
 
Collaborations may be formed as project consortia, joint ventures, alliances, and strategic 
partnerships, and can even occur between different organisational departments (institutional 
or industrial) as well as between organisations and suppliers (Matsuzaki, 1993; Davies & 
Hobday, 2005). By overcoming the difficulties of physical and perceptual distances and 
effectively engaging participants the project may be enriched through sharing of knowledge, 
resources and responsibilities (Aronson et al., 2010). 
 
However multiple parties also introduce an uncertainty factor associated with the project 
management infrastructure and achievement of project p rformance. Atkinson et al. (2006) 
highlight this in their exploration of project uncertainty, including specific concerns 
regarding; the objectives and motivation of each party; the quality and reliability of work 
undertaken; and the abilities and availability of the collaborators. Differing perceptions of 
risk, and appetite for sharing information augments the list. 
 
Sykes’ (1990) investigation into the need for interational cooperation in macro projects 
begins by tackling the matter of multiple ownership (p. 157) which he says “gives rise to the 
need for special political skills to manage what is, in effect, a major, but temporary, 
alliance”. Sykes notes the challenge of collaborations to obtain simultaneous approval, 
coordination, and enthusiasm, needing the utmost (sometimes exhausting) dedication, 
concluding (p. 162) that: “for a [collaboration] to succeed, it must be in the best interests of 
all key participants, i.e., it must be and remain superior to any other practical 
courses...including doing nothing”. In other words, there must be both genuine commiten  
and demand – a topic exposed further in section 5.2. Khang and Moe’s (2008) research into 
successful international development projects puts compatibility of policies and priorities of 
key stakeholders, and effective consultation squarely mong the factors at the planning stage 
for achieving overall project success. 
 
From a people perspective, research by Aronson et al. (2010) asserts that behaviour which 




collaborative responses, i.e. a sense of common purpose via interactions, and the sharing and 
coordination of information and activities. Moreover, Aronson et al. emphasise the 
importance of trained and interpersonally skilled laders of high-tech projects with the 
autonomy to create project spirit. Collaborative teams by nature have different masters, 
making decision-making protracted, and sometimes thwarted by simply not having the right 
people at a meeting. Managing large collaborations s a rare skill within project management 
(Sykes, 1990). Work by Gratton and Erickson (2007) on collaborative teams reveals an 
interesting paradox. Large, virtual, highly educated and diverse teams are found to be crucial 
to success, yet those same characteristics tend to undermine progress by preferring to work 
autonomously and without shared goals. 
 
International collaboration in mega-science is only sparsely represented in the literature. One 
document that does contribute to the subject of structu ing big-science facilities is the 
ASPERA report ‘Linking of existing infrastructures’ (Katsanevas et al., 2009). It offers 
much sound advice referenced later in this thesis, yet opens (p. 3) with a caution that 
structural linking of science projects should not be mistaken as a method to force 
cooperation, and that: 
 
“Collaboration building for a large science project is a process that should be 
initiated by the researchers themselves and be followed by funding agencies to assess 
whether the collaboration is able to build the project. Many successful projects 
...demonstrate that this process works and funding agencies should intervene only in 
difficult situations.” 
 
Matsuzaki’s (1993) paper addresses similar ‘hard’ issues of collaborative high-tech 
organisations including the start-up process, and management problems concerning the 
leverage of decision-making power though financial shareholding. He finds that a one-vote, 
one-country system (equal voice) creates negative atitudes by large nations towards small 
countries, and suggests an expense-percentage arrangeme t as being preferable. Whilst an 
analysis of financial models and schemes to ensure fai  return (e.g. juste retour) to the 
collaborative partners is beyond the scope of this the is, it is clearly a success sub-factor, and 
worthy of further research. 
 
Experience drawn from contemporary casework demonstrate  the real-world challenge of 
managing high-tech collaborations. A lessons-learned workshop conducted by the Gemini 
telescope collaboration (NRC, 1999) confirmed the ne d for an active management approach 




perceptions of equal status are important, though capabilities vary. A ‘soft’ or neutral 
language tone from the project office is shown to be beneficial, as are periodic surveys of 
partner satisfaction levels. The SKA project (SKA, 2010) found Domain Specialists 
frustrated through a laissez-faire approach by project collaborative teams in relation t  
information exchange activities e.g. teleconferences and meetings. Institutional project 
partners not receiving payment for specific tasks (in other words providing in-kind 
contributions) are often described as unmotivated to eliver promised output in terms of 
product and/or schedule (SKA, 2010; HIPER, 2010; ITER, 2009).When pressed, 
interviewees speculated that the cause for this apathy is largely the lack of real consequences 
or penalties. 
 
Collaborations with industry are shown to be fruitful, as demonstrated in Australia by the 
Australia Telescope Compact Array and the OPAL reactor, indicating an industrial model of 
project management is likely to be more successful overall (CSIRO, 2008; OPAL 2009; 
LOFAR 2009, TOPSAT, 2010). Projects with a large proportion physical equipment 
provided through an in-kind collaborative arrangement are prone to schedule upsets through 
interdependencies (ITER, 2009; ALMA, 2007). Finally, a report addressing US decadal 
science planning (Fellows and Alexander, 2010), explored the cost risks in relation to 
international collaboration, noting NASA’s decision (as a risk mitigation tactic) to rely less 
on European contributions. The report also refers to the Galileo spacecraft, noting the cost 
impact of the purely German propulsion system against the international team responsible 
for the Huygens probe success. The report authors express concern that outsourcing of 
technology development between countries lessens domestic capability, however make the 
point that international collaborations achieve scien e benefits beyond matters of cost. 
 
Samuel (2009) looks specifically at the SKA mega-project, finding that collaborative 
challenges in institutional mega-science projects were broadly similar to commercial 
counterparts, with three interesting exceptions. First, she found mega-science projects more 
accepting (some even welcoming) of individualism, with survey respondents associating this 
as a positive attribute aligned with drive and vision. Second, mega-science is almost always 
funded through the public purse, as against sharehold r capital. Lastly, Samuel (2009, p. 5) 
posits that the construction of science mega-project facilities usually lasts at least a decade, 
and remarks that: “Commercial projects have a more immediate need for meeting deadlines 
and delivering a return on investment on projects...thus affecting the speed at which these 
progress”.  This conclusion hints that, other factors being equal, a commercially focused 





The interlinked nature of high-tech collaborations is addressed further in section 2.8; suffice 
to say here that the dimensions and flows around mega-projects bring a dynamic quality to 
the problem of management. The operations of inter-firm R&D projects (utilising e-
transactions and e-delivery) is examined by Weck (2006) through the lens of five 
collaborative R&D projects within the telecommunicat ons industry. Weck finds a fairly 
conventional list of difficulties associated with commercial collaborations (conflicting 
planning and management methods; poor joint governance and reporting; differing 
interpretations; and unclear responsibilities). More interestingly, the theoretical framework 
adopted for the research shows that well-scoped customer needs lead to a genuine win-win 
outcome for all parties, and this in turn increases the anticipation of value among 
participants. Moreover, knowledge heterogeneity is derived from integrating both market 
and technical knowledge, though this is strongly dependent on complementary knowledge 
bases. 
 
Collaborative R&D projects offer lessons-learned beyond the common a priori project 
success factors. The development of a true win-win situation is shown to lead to additional 
cooperation after the R&D project is complete, and an integrated approach to the work 
(using parallel phases) pays dividends through enhanced iterative interaction. The quality 
and fit of knowledge-based resources means that project partners engage in mutual 




2.7 High-tech project funding 
Once the legal form of the high-tech mega-project is established, and the total budget agreed, 
the vital matter of the partner contributions must be settled. For institutional projects, the 
technical and sovereign deliberations surrounding this extremely important (and often 
complex) step are likely to be protracted and usually conducted at Ministerial level in 
government. In the commercial arena, funding is comm nly from a Board approved capital 
allocation, or from the customer (e.g. Ministry of Defence). 
 
Funding and contribution arrangements are complicated hrough issues surrounding 
procurement rules, inflation, currency exchange, attitudes to contingency, personnel 
                                                           





placements, and geo-return (juste retour)13. A detailed coverage of this complex and 
specialist topic is outside the scope of this thesis; however the following outline offers the 
main points where a shared understanding reached early can avoid later confrontations 
(adapted from OECD, 2010): 
• Agreement for provision and deployment of cash or in-kind contributions, and 
valuation of in-kind contributions. 
• Agreement for deciding the scale of partner contribu ions (e.g. a formula) 
• Agreement on the instruments that represent the partners’ shareholding (shares – 
possibly computed to an accepted variable such as GDP, with minimums and 
maximums specified) 
• Agreement on the currency used for defining shares, po sibly a ‘project currency’ (e.g. 
ITER ‘kIUA’ Units) with an agreed exchange world rate 
• Defined stages of the project (including the operation l phase) aligned to calls for 
contributions, and the consequences for defaulting partners 
• A clear statement of financial risk to inform participants of the probabilities and 
consequences of potential perturbations 
•  Any special contributions or discounts falling to particular partners (e.g. the host 
country) 
• How cost efficiencies will be implemented in terms of global spend, split 
procurements, and dispersed procurement 
• Processes and controls to drive financial robustnes and guard against delays and 
overruns 
• Processes to supervise financial governance (e.g. through a common fund), and 
accounting for any juste retour (economic benefit approximating a nation’s 
contribution) 
• Expectations regarding national benefit(e.g., non-project benefits, local R & D, access 
to IP, human capital growth, juste retour) 
 
Casework for this thesis shows that juste retour (or geo-return) is strongly coupled with the 
cash/in-kind ratio, in the sense that partner organisations that suspect weak commitment to 
juste retour policies will naturally argue for increased in-kind contribution to better assure 
domestic economic returns. Moreover, it may be thatan in-kind contribution is the only 
pathway to gain approval from a national government to participate, due to a treasury policy 
of funding science and engineering endeavours only through institutional allocations. In-kind 
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support does carry risks however, since the central project office is effectively dependent on 
the contributing partner to deliver as promised – a situation that has negatively impacted the 
ITER project where 90% of the contributions are in-ki d (ITER, 2009). The classification, 
and valuation, of in-kind support in the form of personnel can expose a thorny problem, and 
rates should be agreed up-front, including on-costs such as pensions, relocation costs, etc. 
 
 
2.8 The principal actors 
 
Delivery of a successful high-tech giant project is dependent on a complicated and 
competent network of inter-related players, activities, and flows (see Fig.  2-8). Typically, 
the project office will receive (or at least manage) the capital allocations, and distribute 
funding directly to contractors, or via project partners tasked with defined work packages. 
Some arrangements provide local funding to project partners as a component of in-kind 
project support. Goods and services flowing from funded groups are delivered to the project 
facility location, in some instances via the project partners, or even through the project office 
itself. 
 
Customers (or users) gain access to the facility after commissioning, however it is typical in 
high-tech projects for the users to be involved in the development, testing and 
commissioning processes, possibly as part of an in-kind contribution. Section 3.2.4.4 
introduces possible permutations for contracting arrangements. 
 






Fig. 2-8 illustrates the central importance of the project office in managing and coordinating 
workflows and associated information exchanges. Robust mechanisms for tracking project 
information and data and coordinating supply logistics are crucial, and of equal importance 
to good systems engineering in terms of maintaining project control (see section 3.3.4.3). 
 
The degree to which the project office can be centralised is a fundamental issue for each 
project, and not unconnected with ‘empire building’ (Archibald, 2003). Certainly there are 
some functions concerning overall processes, systems, tools, etc that clearly require 
centralised control, but the planning and control of sub-projects, their reporting relationships, 
supporting services, and local schedules can be more successfully managed closer to the 
work execution. 
 
Samuel’s study (2009) of global partnerships surrounding the SKA project includes a 
stakeholder map shown in Fig. 2-9, which illustrates the potential decision-making influence 
of Governments and funding agencies. When interviewed, SKA Program Director, Prof. 
Schilizzi (SKA, 2010) expressed the view that “there is no doubt that the funding agencies 
want to feel they are influential and being heard, especially so in early technical meetings”. 
However the present research found no substantive ev d nce of funding agencies influencing 









2.9 Chapter Summary 
 
In this chapter I have introduced research context by describing the how understanding of 
success parameters has changed through the modern history of mega-projects, yet success 
itself remains uncertain regardless of global R&D investment. 
 
There is substantial literature covering project success and failure, and much practitioner 
material concerning science/engineering project management. However there is a gap 
relating to the combined characteristics of large, high-tech projects, of the type that involve 
large infrastructure. This thesis defines that niche, and attempts to fill the gap. 
 
Success was examined as a parameter, and as an outcome of defining critical success factors, 
measured against success criteria and metrics. High-tech mega-projects are shown to be 
inherently complex whether assessed by scale comparison or mathematically, and that 
complexity influences project performance. 
 
The way large high-tech projects are supported by effective collaborations, and the 
challenges this can bring, was reviewed. The benefits of an industrial project execution 
model were shown, and the impact on success of funding approaches, juste retour, and 
project stakeholder relations was presented. 
 
In the next chapter, I look at project inception, operating structures (including the important 





Chapter 3 – Pre-cursors of high-tech mega-project success 
 
3.1 Project inception 
 
High-tech mega-projects usually begin life as a notio , discussed informally among 
scientists and engineers, and often gaining a unique designator using an appropriate 
acronym. As the concept and technical challenge gains interest and attention, groups are 
formed to steward more formal discussions, draft technical papers, and canvass institutional 
participation. These early stages are funded, in effect, by the employers of the early 
participants and volunteered time. 
 
At some point, assuming the proto-project is neither dismissed nor shelved, it must become 
recognised as a potential real enterprise – a process known as projectification (Smith, 2007). 
The timing for this can be crucial so as to ensure controlled delivery without damaging 
creativity (Smith & Winter, 2010). In the case of projects procured from the industrial sector 
(e.g. a defence or civil mega-project) a tender specification is prepared and released and the 
winning bidder or consortium executes the project acording to contractual terms and 
procedures most often through a conventional entity and standardised project structure. 
Mega-projects prosecuted through national or internatio al institutional arrangements are 
less straightforward; characterised by the presence of at least one funding agency, and the 
absence of a traditional customer. Nonetheless, a leg l entity and organisation must be 
designed and formed to realise the project goals. 
 
 
3.1.1 Operating entities for high-tech mega-projects 
 
In terms of an entity, a recent European (ASPERA) repo t investigating the potential benefits 
of linking new science endeavours with existing infrastructures (Katsanevas et al., 2009) 
conducted a useful study to better understand the initial conditions required to efficiently 
start a big science project. The report investigated both international infrastructures (CERN, 
ESO, ESA), and laboratory facilities in 11 nations, a  well as project efforts linked between 
the two. Despite the European emphasis, the report offers a useful general portrait of 
workable entities. 
 
The creation of a legal identity is a pre-requisite for any complex high-tech project, in order 
that staff may be employed, procurement undertaken, and premises secured. Legal 




effort (and for enforcing performance penalties) are lso required (Matsuzaki, 1993). Such 
legal identities can be formed as inter-governmental (treaty/convention), or inter-agency, 
agreements; a subsidiary body; or a stand-alone corporate entity. The latter option permits 
several structural choices depending on laws applicable in the country selected for 
incorporation; some offering favourable taxation arrangements, speedy set up, and flexible 
operating arrangements. The ASPERA report (Katsanevas t al., 2009, p. 41) describes the 
practical advantages of linking to an existing organis tion, arguing that: “Setting up a 
completely new organisation will always be a substantial task, the more so when a number 
of participants have to reach agreement on every aspect of its structure and operation”. This 
advice is echoed in a study of Australian participation in multilateral mega-science projects 
(Johnston, 2003, p. 57): “building on existing resources can avoid many potential problems 
and costs”. The same study posits that formal Treaties, with their long gestation times, do 
not offer any meaningful advantages over an MoU14 enabled at significantly lower direct and 
indirect costs. 
 
Nevertheless there might be good reasons to establish some form of new independent 
organisation, despite the probable lengthy delays until the agreements are signed by all the 
partners, including the tasks assigned to governments a d their agencies (Sykes, 1990).  In 
‘Taming Giant Projects’, Grün (2004) writes about Multi-Organisation Enterprises (MOEs), 
claiming these to be the most demanding of project categories, made highly complex through 
involvement of various constituencies, and prone to er sive competition limiting project 
learning. The inherent goal conflicts require the cr ation of a project-specific company, 
shared by all project owners. This has the added benefit of separating project risk from the 
parent organisations. The formation of the legal entity ot only gives the project identity, it 
also enables practical transactions and is recommended to occur sooner rather than later. The 
Giant Magellan Telescope chose to incorporate early (GMT, 2011)15; whereas the SKA 




3.1.2 Engaged partnerships 
 
Having a formal entity in place does not by itself make collaborations effective; something 
only enabled through tangible involvement, commitment, and investment by full members. 
Johnston (2003) describes this as ‘deep influential engagement’ requiring nothing less than a 
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 Memorandum of Understanding – a document describing the promised intent of the parties, though 
not usually legally binding. 
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seat at the Board table. More colloquially, case study interviewees couch this as ‘skin in the 
game’ 
 
Johnston (2003, p. 58) makes the salient point that: “mega-science agreements are driven, 
and operate in practice through, a shared commitmen to scientific objectives and the 
excitement of scientific progress. If these are not present, no amount of careful wording can 
make the agreement work”. Even so, finding the right legal framework is a difficult problem 
requiring consultation of legal and administrative experts.16  
 
The topic of what makes effective partnerships was raised at the Gemini telescope ‘Lessons 
Learned’ workshop (NRC, 1999, p. 25), which listed he following items as most important: 
 
i. focus on needs/wants 
ii. agreement on approaches 
iii.  clear, common expectations 
iv. well defined budget, schedule, deliverables 
v. appropriate sharing of costs, risks, benefits (buy-in) 
vi. contracts to record obligations, expectations 
vii.  frequent ongoing contact, collaborations, communication 
viii.  effective project management 
ix. professionalism (delivery) 
x. periodic surveys of partner satisfaction levels 
xi. post project impact evaluation. 
 
While many items in the above list are intuitive, item (vi.) is especially interesting. It hints 
that past contractual documentation was deficient i properly scoping the exact 
responsibilities and anticipated performance between th  partners, and highlights a potential 
critical weakness. 
 
Fieldwork interviews for this thesis (ILC, 2009; VISTA, 2010; ALMA, 2007) revealed that 
the initial partners in most big (institutional) hig -tech projects tended to be self-selected, i.e. 
                                                           





the employers or host institutes of the project proponents. From this core group other 
organisations are invited by invitations channelled through professional relationships; these 
often developed through past collaborations. Sykes (1990) notes that some technically 
achievable and financially sound mega-projects fail to be launched, essentially due to the 
(large) number of key participants. Interviewees shared the view that there is likely a point 
where the number of participants (and therefore interfaces) detracts from optimum 
efficiency, and compatibility. The consensus view numbered this between 10 and 20. 
 
 
3.1.3 Funding through collaborative contributions 
 
High-tech mega-projects managed in the commercial world are generally assured of funding 
when procured through government agencies (e.g. Defenc , Infrastructure, etc), or private 
capital sources when risk and return is justified. Giant institutional (and often multi-national) 
projects however, must convince participating organis tions to commit to years of funding, 
often in an environment of competitive national resourcing. Without tied funding, no project 
of any size will be supported for long. 
 
The machinations surrounding collaborative funding of big science and engineering 
endeavours are complex, prolonged, and usually political in nature. Matsuzaki (1993) 
compares the case of the HERA colliding accelerator with the Superconducting Super 
Collider (SSC). HERA is shown as setting an effective example of consultation with 
scientists who were influential in their own countries in order to obtain international 
financial commitment. In contrast, the US government moved to construct the SSC largely 
autonomously, seeking financial support after construction commencement, and eventually 
abandoning the project. 
 
The ASPERA report (Katsanevas, 2009) concludes there is no single best way of dividing 
contributions among international collaborations. Amounts based on GDP have been used, 
though the method neglects national aspirations and strategic interests. Setting contributions 
using a percentage of project budget (e.g. ESO) has advantages for the project office 
accounting, but brings uncertainties for those partners who sign up early, and carries 
exchange rate risks. An alternative approach is to require fixed contributions in one currency. 
In-kind contributions have their place, although valuation of effort can be problematic, and 
too high a proportion of in-kind contributions can result in insufficient working funds. 
Considered an initial strength of the ITER project, the kIUA credit units have led to poor 




accountability for in-kind contributions (Grossmann, 2010). To counter this in any multi-
lateral project, a cash reserve amount known as project (or risk) contingency may be 
established.17  
 
An underlying feature that can impinge on the contribu ions of collaborative partners is the 
principle that the value of contracts awarded within a member state should closely reflect the 
amount of money that it subscribes. Known as juste retour (or geo-return), the principle is 
enshrined in ESA's terms of reference where it completely differs from other European 
collaborations such as CERN that are free to award contracts purely on merit.18 
 
Having access and control of the project purse (i.e. in the manner of commercial mega- 
projects) is shown to be highly desirable to strengthen management control in institutional 
projects. Interviewed in 2010, SKA Director Professor Schilizzi lamented the decision of the 
Executive Committee to permit the SKA Consortia to self-manage their project support (by 
means of institutional effort) rather than formally contribute cash to a central fund, saying: 
“Any sense of obligation to deliver against agreed r quirements was highly diluted, leaving 
the [project HQ] with no real power to demand compliance to agreed action plans” (SKA, 
2010). A similar situation occurs in the ALMA project early construction phase, where 
money from the partnership agencies flows around the central Joint ALMA Office, not 
through it (Schreier & Webber, 2010). The fractured management structure of ALMA 
continues to frustrate the organisation. 
 
 
3.1.4 Project structures 
 
Project structures, in terms of hierarchy and interactions most often portrayed as 
organisational charts, are multifarious and at the detailed level unique to each project. 
Investigation of the specific positioning of roles and departments and their respective 
interactions is a research topic outside this thesis, however both the literature and case 
experiences offer useful intelligence when considering the formation of governance and 
working structures for high-tech enterprises. 
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Institutional mega-projects (e.g. formed under an MoU) will require a Governing Board (or 
Executive Committee) to serve as the principal decision-making body, although the MoU 
itself may not confer legal powers to the Governing Board (Katsanevas et al., 2009). A 
secretariat function, either separate or co-located with the project host, embodies the 
necessary legal entity, and is headed by a Director whose responsibilities are set out in the 
MoU. The relationship between the collaborative project and its host country are established 
through a country agreement. These relationships are hown in Fig. 3-1. 
 
 
Fig. 3-1. The relationship between governance elements of an international mega-project 
(ASPERA, 2009, p. 44) 
 
Large domestic high-tech projects can take advantage of leaner top level structures, 
especially when the project integration task is placed with a single contractor e.g. Australia’s 
OPAL project, and the US National Ignition Facility- NIF (NASA, 2011b). The NIF was 
implemented through an existing Department of Energy Management and Operating 
contract, and considered so successful, it won ‘Project of the Year’ from the Project 
Management Institute. 
 
Governance activities are often informed by a project Steering Committee which requires 
very careful establishment and framing if it is notto be dysfunctional. A Steering Committee 
can be a strongly beneficial arm in maintaining alignment of the project team and 




refer to such a group as a Core Team, described by Graham and Englund (1997) as essential 
to effectively executing the project, minimising project cycle time; often with dramatic 
results. Governance Bodies of institutional big scien e projects frequently enunciate their 
intent to execute their programs along such ‘industrial lines’, then proceed to appoint ‘status’ 
members, or worse, establish a notional but disempowered Steering Committee that simply 
creates a burden for the project. In response, a noted IBM project manager offers high-tech 
project managers the following (adapted) descriptors f  successful Steering Committees 
(Elenbaas, 2000): 
 
• The project sponsor/project champion is represented, an  some key business people 
who must play an active role on the project 
• There is representation from experts in all critical project domains, including 
programmatics 
• The project manager controls the agenda and preferably chairs the meeting 
• The main role is to arbitrate on issue/change/decision management, on issues raised 
and supported by the project’s key stakeholders, including overall change control for 
scope, schedule, cost, quality, risk, and performance reporting 
• The Committee is a forum where open, honest and frank discussion can occur, based 
on the real project picture (which may not always be pretty) 
•  Meetings are scheduled frequently, more than monthly. 
 
Allied to the project Steering Committee, and certainly within the purview of the Project 
Manager, is the concept of the project Task Force(s).19 
 
At the project execution level, the interrelationship  between departments and personnel are 
normally set out in a project organisational chart (o  organogram). Over the past decade there 
has been a general movement away from traditional functional-based organisations (Fig. 3-
2a) with largely vertical reporting and control and ostensibly only limited ability for project 
ownership by functionaries, towards matrix style structures (Fig. 3-2b). Conceived in the 
1960s within aerospace industries, matrix management was a response to the need for a 
project oriented system that linked ‘horizontal’ project resource groups directly to top 
management, essentially forming orthogonal lines of command and communication, with 
                                                           





many staff coming under both a department head (or functional manager) and a project 










Fig. 3-2b. Showing matrix styled project organisation structure. 
 
While theoretically the matrix organisation should deliver a suite of advantages including; 
improved ability to access resources, better coordination across the organisation, faster 
decentralised decisions, and improved communication nd coordination, these are difficult to 
quantify. Work by Kuprenas (2003) found increased communication and flexibility while 




unaccountable time. He also found performance benefits in the public sector harder to define, 
with no measurable difference at the project level, although 50% improvement at the 
program level. Graham and Englund (1997) found more problems than benefits for projects 
under a matrix model, their main complaint being the perceived marginal change from the 
traditional (hierarchical) model, leading to conflicting priorities and reward systems 
mismatched to organisational goals. In fact, the matrix should represent a whole different 
way of managing projects, and requires reinforcement through two dimensional information 
systems and managerial behaviour to support dual reporting relationships (Nicholas, 2004). 
 
The choice of which organisational design to apply need not be purely binary. When 
considering an optimised design for high-tech organisations where expertise is critical, 
Galbraith (1971) posits a fully sliding scale for cross-functional forms (see Fig. 3-3), while 




Fig. 3-3. The range of alternatives of a matrix organisational form (Galbraith, 1971 p. 37) 
 
Research for this thesis revealed a further intriguin  design for a cross-dimensional 
organisation. Referred to as a Solar Organisational System (see Fig. 3-4), it originated from a 
1971 paper discussing management practice at The Manned Spaceflight Centre at Houston. 
Although shown here as a novelty, it does bring forward the idea that there are organisational 
representations for projects yet to be explored. Moreover, the concept of groups as planetary 







Fig. 3-4. Manned Spaceflight Centre solar organisational system (after UAI, 1971) 
 
Many large high-tech organisations now adopt the concept of Integrated Project Teams 
(IPTs). IPTs are cross-functional teams formed for the specific purpose of delivering a 
project or product, or main component of same, for an external or internal customer. IPTs are 
staffed by groups with complementary skills and committed to a common purpose for which 
they hold themselves mutually accountable. While endorsing the benefits of IPTs in 
supporting the defence acquisition process, a UK Ministry of Defence report (MoD, 2002) 
recommended a review of best practice in IPT roll-out, learning lessons from comparator 
organisations, being rigorous in setting hard and stretch targets that are robustly reviewed, 
and a continuation of implementing an IPT Maturity Model to identify and promulgate 
success factors for IPT performance. The ASKAP project found inconsistent reporting 
quality from IPT leaders, indicating some form of calibration is required (ASKAP, 2010). 
The MoD report clearly identifies that establishment of IPTs must be complemented by a 
continuous improvement process based on lessons-learned – a theme that pervades this entire 
thesis. 
 
Within the high-tech projects investigated for the pr sent study, it is clear that teams at all 
levels were diverse in the sense of age, nationality, cultural background, training and 
experience. Tony Spear, project manager NASA’s successful Mars Pathfinder, described his 
team as: “a mix of scarred veterans and bright, energetic youth”  (NASA, 2011b, p. 27). 




primarily on the basis of qualifications and capability, and the expectation that the people 
who seek the challenges of big science and engineering ndeavours, are willing to relocate to 
participate. Anecdotal evidence from interviewees was strongly positive regarding the social 
and innovation benefits of working in an international team (ALMA, 2009, ATCA, 2008, 
LHC, 2009). In terms of cognitive diversity (varying education, cultural values, and 
attitudes) the response was more mixed, with some cav ats concerning perceived status 
equality. Australians, for example are generally very galitarian, whereas team members 
from an Asian background may be more deferential by nature. This view is supported by 
research showing that cognitive diversity can interfer  with knowledge transfer, or hinder 
adoption of advanced processes (NASA, 2010c). The solution rests with proper integration 
of skill sets, respect for diversity, and team knowledge. 
 
Alongside the setting out of organisational structures and teams, responsibilities and 
authorities must be clearly set out, and be commensurate with the position. Saunders et al. 
(2003, p. 367), investigating management success predictors in space projects, conclude that: 
“responsibility, authority, and accountability need to be matched, and the decision-making 
process clear to all...many development problems can be attributed to confused lines of 
authority.” Overall day-to-day project control and organisation falls to the person commonly 
titled Project Manager or Project Director (although some projects distinguish between these 
labels). NASA is most clear that: “the single greatest contributor to a project’s success is 
the person on whom final responsibility rests, the project manager. He or she is responsible 
for executing the project within the [organisation’s] guidelines” (Nicholas, 2004, p. 45). 
There is consensus among the case studies for this thesis, and within project management 
articles, that shorter, co-located, management chains, work better. A re-baselining of the US 
NIF project after major cost and schedule deficienci s were exposed, eventually led to 
creation of a Federal Project Director designation being established. This move compressed 
the authority lines between the government and the project contractor, and improved focus 
on project priorities (NASA, 2011b).20 
 
Responsibilities, and associated authorities and accountabilities are naturally devolved 
through the project structure, and crucially, must be formally documented, and announced 
throughout the project organisation. Special effort is required to communicate delivery 
responsibility and information control authority to any collaborative partners, since 
experience shows that distance from project headquarters can dilute perceived obligations in 
terms of strict project procedural compliance and observance of deadlines. A study of ICT 
                                                           





success factors in developing nations (Atsu et al, 2009) offers evidence that 50% of the 
project office personnel surveyed do not take full ownership responsibility for the project, 
citing lack of motivation associated with non-empowerment to exert the necessary authority 
because of the bureaucratic organisational structure. A similar frustration is expressed by the 
Domain Specialists within the SKA Program Development Office (SPDO). 
 
 
3.1.5. Project location 
 
The need to access competencies and funding, and relise institutional inclusivity, drives 
multinational collaborative high-tech project ventures, especially in science, aeronautics, 
automotive, and telecommunication industries. Siemens, for example, handles more than 
1,000 projects in a distributed mode at any one tim (Bourgault et al., 2008), and almost all 
mega-science endeavours are multi-national. However dispersed projects create challenges 
for effective decision-making and processes do not always adapt well when applied globally. 
One quantitative study of success determinants in distributed teams (Bourgault et al., 2008), 
clearly demonstrated a link between successful management of dispersed project groups, and 
team autonomy in executing project activities. Moreover, the quality and formality of project 
decision-making processes are both highly important to a successful outcome. 
 
The physical location of high-tech project infrastruc ure may be determined by the location 
of the principal protagonist (e.g. LOFAR), pre-existing infrastructure (e.g. LHC), or by the 
special needs dictated by the science goals (e.g. LIDAR, ALMA). Giant science and 
engineering projects with multi-national partners may decide to locate the governance 
offices, and in some cases the project headquarters, in a different location to the project 
infrastructure itself (e.g. SKA). Again, Elenbaas (2000, p. 5) offers his experience with big, 
high-tech industry facilities, describing the physical location as an ‘extremely high’ impact 
factor for shaping success, and suggesting that: 
 
“Projects are about communication, communication, communication. At the very 
least, try to bring sub-teams/key team members together in close physical proximity 
(this includes key business people). Spend big money  temporary relocation if 
necessary (you’ll save much of it on reduced travel costs and it will pay huge 
dividends.) Don’t get fooled by modern communication media – nothing replaces 






3.1.6 Power and discipline 
 
Like any very large enterprise, the world of high-tech mega-projects is never 
straightforward. While project management texts may convey an idealistic, aspirational 
picture of calm and steady progress through staged milestones towards a satisfying outcome, 
the reality is much closer to the edge of chaos depicted by Smith (2007) and illustrated 
through the raw realities of the project manager struggling with disorder, disruptions, and 
complexity. The seemingly endless task then of the project manager is to unflaggingly revise 










The human element of projects that contributes significa tly to the unpredictability of events 
and responses is mostly observed in the social interactions of project ‘tribes’. Smith (2007) 
posits that understanding tribal groups and their characteristics, as viewed through the lens of 
a social model, can aid our understanding of what is really going on within projects. He 
offers a table of tribal categories reproduced as Fig. 3-5, which is useful in understanding the 








Fig. 3-5. Categorisation of project tribes, and their characteristics (Smith, 2007 p. 33) 
 
Smith and Winter (2010) view the topic of tribal power through the perspective of projects 
emerging through the manoeuvres of diverse groups, each with disparate agendas. In 
multinational projects, power is diffuse and negotiation is required to satisfy power 
imbalances. For example government targets might over-ride the creative efforts of 
knowledgeable teams and individuals in order to meet a bureaucratically based time limit. In 
other cases the technical tribe may be over-ruled by the powerful finance tribe. Energy 
expended in tribalism saps project vigour, a situation only met by: “the project shaper 
[acting] as an expert player in this social world, endeavouring to facilitate and create 
projects with a [common] drumbeat” (Smith & Winter, 2010, p. 54). 
 
Finally in this section, I consider the relative merits of professional background and 
experience for those leading the high-tech mega-projects. Should the governance and project 
manager role fall to well known and respected scientists, previously associated with like-
projects, and mainly interested in optimising performance? Or a professional engineer with 
formal project management training and who is likely to apply a programmatical discipline 





This dichotomy of culture for project leadership is addressed by Riordan (2001) through an 
examination of the Superconducting Super Collider (SSC), and epitomises the problem. The 
issue at stake is whether physicists, or engineers, are best placed to manage the construction 
phase of large scientific projects and thus be ableto influence the quality of relationships 
between the project execution teams and the laboratory. 
 
As Riordan tells it, (Riordan, 2001) under wartime conditions, control of the workplace had 
been ceded to engineers. Physicists may have made the crucial intellectual contributions to 
building weapons technology, but they ultimately reported to (or through) the engineers and 
project managers in charge. However at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Centre (SLAC) and 
the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (Fermilab) this relationship was reversed in the 
project structure. From the outset, physicists designed, built, and managed these successful 
high-energy physics laboratories; they stepped into important engineering roles or occupied 
the key decision-making positions, and the engineers r ported to physicists. These past 
power wrangles erupted between high-energy physicist  and engineers hailing from the 
military-industrial era, during the abortive construction of the Superconducting Super 
Collider (SSC) and became another episode in this continuing struggle. At the multibillion 
dollar scale of the SSC, powerful forces came back into play that had not figured at the 
hundred-million-dollar scales of Fermilab. The impact of these influences continues to 
appear in contemporary mega-projects above a certain scale, and is a salient reminder of 
where conflict can arise21. 
 
 




In the world of science and engineering mega-projects, the breadth and pace of technology 
advances and demands for improved success brings new importance to professional 
management of procurement. This challenge embraces te hnology identification and access, 
supply channels, cost control, and industrial relationships (Schill, 1979). 
 
                                                           
21 The characteristics of mega-project managers are further explored in section 5.1 
 
22
 This section is drawn from the author’s peer reviewed paper published as SKA Memo 129, Crosby, 
P., (2011). Procurement strategies enabling success in high-tecnology mega-projects: Preparatory 




The procurement of goods and services for projects has traditionally been seen as largely 
administrative or operational rather than having strategic importance (Virolainen, 1998; 
Schill, 1979). However project complexity is driving a more strategic approach (Jaakkola, 
2004), and recognition of forces other than purely transactional show a maturing of approach 
to the contracting problem (Winch & Gil, 2010). 
 
In this section, I show that procurement strategy and practice are vital precursors to the 
success of mega-projects. Through a study of large scale procurement practices relating to 
big science and engineering projects (with particular relevance to the Square Kilometre 
Array project) I show that effective procurement underpins planning, acquisition, and 
execution processes to help assure value-for-money, and contribute to project success. 
 
The term ‘procurement’ is used in its wider sense to cover the process ranging from 
establishing the requirements, global sourcing, placing of the contract, overseeing execution, 
and in some cases dealing with through-life support (Hall & Khan, 2006). 
 
Modern procurement management in the high-tech enviro ment is more reliant on buyer-
seller partnerships than a traditional contractual based approach. These relationships tend to 
be longer term, ongoing, and risk-sharing, and strive for win-win outcomes at lower cost 
(Virolainen, 1998). Within procurement, the key task of contract management itself can be 
broadly grouped into three areas: service delivery management, relationship management, 
and contract administration. “All three areas must be managed successfully if the
arrangement is to be a success [and] good preparation and the right contract are essential 
foundations for good contract management” (OGC, 2002, p. 5). Contract execution 
procedures, administration and specific documentation are of course vital to procurement 
outcomes, though beyond the scope of the present study. Suffice to say that the “light legal 
touch” suggested by Hall & Khan (2006, p22) is consistent with the key, yet simple 
principles offered in this thesis. 
 
 
3.2.2. Scope, data sources and study method 
 
In the following sections, I mostly address the institutional (publicly funded) procurement 
environment, contracting models, procurement specifications and terms, general contracting 
instruments, tender evaluations, supplier relations, planning, and risk. Input is drawn partly 
from referenced research papers, and project management texts and articles. While such 




mega-project procurement, the finer points of procuement strategy development and 
execution for high-tech enterprises are effectively sourced from case experience. To this end, 
I have incorporated research material from my fieldwork case studies listed in Table 1-1. 
 
The main body of this part of the thesis (section 3.2.4) adopts a discursive style in order to 
present the broad range of high-tech procurement issues, informed through the lived 
experience of project personnel. The aim of the section is to go beyond a priori elements of 
procurement, and present the essential ingredients of a sound procurement strategy for 
success in contracting within high-tech projects. 
 
 
3.2.3. Framing procurement as a precursor to project success 
 
Acknowledging the strategic nature of procurement means giving proper and early attention 
at the project preparatory stage to policies, processes, and resources. Jaakkola (2004) points 
out that the process of establishing contract management in an organisation can take years, 
and should be viewed as an on-going process designed to generate cost savings. By 
documenting the process, the steps and interactions may be clarified. (Refer the example 
shown for the SKA in Appendix B). 
 
In considering modern procurement challenges, a Major Projects Association seminar 
concluded that the following questions can help organisations decide on a procurement 
approach through better understanding of the determining factors (adapted from MPA, 
2009); 
 
• What is vital for success? 
• What is the funding (and how secure is it)? 
• What are the possible risks to (procurement) success, and what risk must be managed 
by the organisation? 
• How will those risks change, or how can they be mitigated over time? 
• What experience requirements are needed for other parties to manage risk, and what 
reward/commitment incentives can be put in place? 
 
These questions, and other related issues, are discussed within nine topic headings below. 
Each topic informs an associated key strategy as summarised in Table 3-1, and is a suggested 




Table 3-1. Nine topics of procurement success and their associated key success strategy 
 
 
Topic heading in section 3.2.4 
 
Key Success Strategy 
The procurement office 
Establish early the procurement office 
structure, resources, processes, roles and 
responsibilities, and information 
management systems. 
Procurement strategy, policy and planning 
Formally approve procurement policies, 
strategies, and plans, and document these 
within a concise approved Project 
Procurement Plan.  
Informed contracting with industry 
Obtain full understanding of global 
capability scouting information, and employ 
appropriate approaches and instruments 
with terms and conditions supporting project 
goals.   
Contracting models 
Establish the contracting model, aligned 
with the legal entity. Develop relationships 
with principle contractors and the supply 
chain.   
Ensuring competitiveness 
Ensure competitiveness in contracting, 
through carefully planned pricing strategies, 
and a ‘value for money’ approach.  
Procurement specifications 
Apply purchasing specifications that are 
appropriate to the goods or services 
required, are flexible for optimal outcomes, 
and developed with input from industry. 
Tender evaluations and contractor selection 
Understand and actively manage 
procurement risk, including the critical early 
stage engagement phases.  
Procurement risk 
Evaluate and select project contractors using 
a fair and balanced process, executed 
against standardised procedures, and 
focussed on criteria weighted in favour of 
mission success parameters.  
The purchaser-supplier relationship 
Implement fair and transparent procurement 
processes, and exploit open strategic 
partnerships while allowing for evidence 








3.2.3.1 The legislative environment 
High-tech mega-project procurement will almost certainly be a global endeavour, and aside 
from the giant aerospace/defence contractors, is likely to occur in the institutional (or public) 
domain. 
 
Public funding for such science/engineering projects or programs requires that procurement 
complies with appropriate and agreed codes or regulations e.g. the European Procurement 
Directives, the World Trade Organisation rules, as well as national legislation (Hall & Kahn, 
2006). In the USA, public purchasing is enshrined within FAR Part 12 (NASA, 2009c). The 
technicalities of global trade environments, and procedures (especially related to maintaining 
open competition), demand expert attention. 
 
The self-contained treaty organisations adopt strict procurement rules. In CERN’s case the 
FIDIC Conditions of Contract are embraced, incorporating an industrial return coefficient for 
member states. The legislative impact, including its taxation status which impacts directly on 
procurement instruments, will depend upon the legal identity of the project. 
 
Deciding on the legal structure for international mega-projects requires expert advice to 
review the viable options. However useful experience comes from contemporary examples. 
Treaty organisations (e.g. CERN, ESO) are generally satisfactory entities although 
bureaucratic and take a long time to establish. The I ER treaty model with a Supervisory 
Council appears less effective. Similarly, the European Research Infrastructure Consortium 
(ERIC) entity takes a long time-to incorporate (at least nine months), and being a relatively 
new construction, has some uncertainties and likely difficulties for an SKA type endeavour 
(Chance, 2010). Whatever the final model, the governance, management, and supervisory 
structure must have clearly defined authorities (European Commission, 2010). 
 
Formalised collaborations under an MoU (e.g. AUGER, HESS) are simpler and succeed in 
an environment of goodwill, while the ill-fated BEAGLE 2 consortium was founded on a 
“gentlemen’s agreement” with each partner funding its own activities (ESA, 2004). 
Commercial-like structures such as LOFAR (formed as a special limited partnership under 
Dutch law) and XFEL (established as a German limited liability Company) enable a legal 
trading entity to be quickly created (DESY, 2009). Research by ASPERA concluded that 
‘high-tech’ collaborations are complicated and lengthy to realise, and linking between 
unequal partners is intrinsically difficult; it may be more cost effective to link to an existing 




concluded that (i) a Dutch foundation (stichting), (ii) a UK company limited by guarantee, or 
(iii) a US not-for-profit corporation in Delaware, are equally suitable for the purposes of 
effectively executing an SKA-like project (Chance, 2010). 
 
 
3.2.3.2 Global sourcing 
 
Rendleman and Faulconer (2011, p. 20) discuss the importance of: “closing the gaps 
between available technologies and customer needs bfore beginning an acquisition [so as 
to] put programs in a better position to succeed.”  Schill (1979) also points out the strategic 
liaison role played by procurement to ensure that suppliers remain competitive and at the 
forefront of technology, as well as realise better cost and product performance. Moreover, he 
assigns strategic responsibility for materials and technology identification both to the buyer, 
and the market – an important tactic identified in the SKA Capability Assessment Model 
(Crosby, 2010). This approach addresses the concept of ‘scaling up’ in terms of industry 
capability, where science-based mega-projects may demand hundreds or thousands of an 
item previously produced only as a speciality part. Even so, there may be no ongoing 
commercial market. 
 
The strategic identification, stimulus, and utilisat on of global capability (Virolainen, 1998) 
may be ‘kick-started’ by a formal scouting process which may itself be coupled to 
preliminary vendor screening; the focus being on determining which suppliers are (actually 
or potentially) qualified, and have the capacity and/or talent to perform the work (Blanchard, 
1990). The NEON organisation identifies this phase  ‘pre-solicitation/evaluation’ in their 
technology procurement plans (Ashley, 2009. 
 
 
3.2.3.3. Internal-external procurement 
 
In high-tech projects many of the outcomes are entirely dependent on high risk, new 
technologies that must be demonstrated to ‘proof of c ncept’ level (e.g. the SKA 
pathfinders) before production quantities can be considered. Even then, commercial factors 
may limit procurement choices. For example, a lifecycle cost/benefit analysis should be 
conducted between the alternatives and/or competitive offers to determine the best option for 
specified performance at least cost (perhaps including a ‘make or buy’ feasibility decision) 




given to intellectual property ownership, as well as the long term cost-benefit impacts of 
‘high-tech’ outsourcing. 
 
In NASA’s case, most of its funding is spent on contracts; however its strategic plan outlines 
the need to maintain institutional capacity and core competencies through having its 
workforce perform some of the hands-on work. The advantages and disadvantages between 
in-house and contracted work was recently reviewed for the MMS spacecraft project, with 
the conclusion that both approaches have significant strengths and weaknesses, while 
acknowledging clear benefits in maintaining a level of in-house competency (NASA, 2009a). 
 
 
3.2.4. Strategies for high-tech mega-project procurement 
 
Rendleman and Faulconer (2011, p. 51) write frankly about aerospace acquisition programs, 
claiming problems to be endemic, and intrinsically linked to high-tech project failures. They 
characterise the ‘acquisition death spiral’ (see Fig. 3-6) as: “a rapid compounding of 
external influences, systems engineering, and management failures.”, and emphasise that 
project managers must be able to spot and counteract the early signs of project downfall 
which they list as (adapted from Rendleman and Faulconer, 2011, p. 55): 
 
• Failed systems engineering; 
• Unrealistic funding realities, including incomplete budgets or volatile program 
funding; 
• Unreasonably pushing the technology envelope, with unstable requirements; 
• Overly optimistic planning estimates, with weak program cost and schedule reserves; 
• Launch vehicle selection driving program complexity; 
• Unreasonable “sunk-cost” arguments; 
• Government/customer is not acting and thinking strategically; 
• Faltering industrial base; 







Fig. 3-6. The acquisition death spiral (Rendleman & Faulconer, 2011, p. 55) 
 
The huge financial investment, and long lifetimes of high-tech mega-projects mean that 
strategies necessarily enacted early have both short-term tactical influence, and long term 
ramifications, and are clearly important to get right. The following topics describe key areas 
where wisdom from subject authors and case-work experience can help shape strategies for 
procurement success, as a precursor to project succe s. 
 
 
3.2.4.1 The procurement office 
 
Given the lead times involved with high-tech mega-projects, the establishment of a 
functional procurement team should be considered early. Underpinning the strategic 
arrangements, Jaakkola, (2004, p. 1) states: “The first step is simply to get the basic contract 
management operations established. These include…a centralised contract repository, 
appointment of person(s) responsible…a contract management handbook, contract 
templates”. The procurement system, in terms of software tools and processes integrated to 
the project management, also require early and careful s lection and management. 
Roles and responsibilities require definition and approvals assigned, ideally with an 




Commerce (OCG, 2002, p. 7) advises: “The importance of contract administration to the 
success of the contract, and to the relationship betwe n customer and provider, should not 
be underestimated”. The American styled Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) model has 
showed functional success in procurement for the Australian SKA pathfinder (ASKAP, 
2010). 
Successful management of any enterprise relies on effective communication and no less so in 
procurement, especially between the procurement department and design team during the 
early phases. The conveyance of information concerning emerging technologies, forecast 
changes, financial analyses of upfront costs and investments, and cash flow risks, when 




3.2.4.2 Procurement strategy, policies and planning 
 
Procurement strategy provides a management framework for obtaining products and services 
via contracts. Sometimes it is necessary to probe outside sources in order to gather sufficient 
information to formulate an acquisition strategy. This may be some form of active capability 
scouting, or by issuing a Request for Information (RFI) to industry and other parties. The 
aim is to obtain information about technology maturity, technical challenges, capabilities, 
price and delivery considerations, and other market information that can influence 
procurement strategy decisions. NASA’s System Engineeri g Handbook (NASA, 2007a 
p218) contains much detail to inform high-tech procu ement processes, and suggests the 
acquisition strategy should include: 
 
• Objectives of the acquisition—capabilities to be provided, major milestones; 
• Acquisition approach—single step or evolutionary (incremental), single or multiple 
suppliers/contracts, competition or sole source, funding source(s), phases, system 
integration, Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) products; 
• Business considerations—constraints (e.g., funding, schedule), availability of assets 
and technologies, applicability of commercial items versus internal technical product 
development; 
• Risk management of acquired products or services— major risks and risk sharing with 
the supplier; 





• Contract elements—incentives, performance parameters, rationale for decisions on 
contract type; and 
• Product support strategy—oversight of delivered system, maintenance, and 
improvements. 
 
The overall approach to the high-tech acquisition program is captured in the procurement 
plan; itself linked to the project master plan/system timeline.  The procurement plan sets out 
top level policies for sourcing, tender management, contract evaluation and approvals, juste 
retour, as well as the regulatory environment, responsibilities and authorities, procurement 
strategies, and pointers to detailed procedures and guidance. The procurement plan may be in 
the form of a public document (Crosby, 2008a), enabli g industry and other stakeholders to 
understand and prepare for project opportunities, and possibly an internal version created for 
the project (Hall & Kahn, 2006). 
 
Strategic planning of mega-project procurement willinc ude research and monitoring of lead 
times of major system components (see example Appendix C), and relating this information 
to the procurement timeline (see example Appendix D). This is crucial for all stakeholders 
understanding. Procurement plans may be complemented by national or international 
industry participation plans describing the intent of procurement policies in relation to fair 
competition, strategic capacity building (regional development), and local involvement 
(Crosby, 2008b). 
 
Such plans need not be large documents, an example being the NEON Project Acquisition 
Plan, covering references and scope, procurement strategy, functional responsibilities, and 
procurement plans succinctly within its nine pages (A hley, 2009). LOFAR’s plan covers 
similar topics in 11 pages (de Geus & Kahn, 2002).  Plans for specific type acquisitions can 
be referenced and separate, as can general institutional purchasing manuals, regional rules, 
and Conditions of Contracts. 
 
 
3.2.4.3 Informed contracting with industry 
 
The level and method of industry interfaces will vary ccording to the stage of the project 
e.g. preparatory and construction phases, through to operations. Perna et al. (2009, p. 21) 





• “High level engagement, at the concept level, to discover new technologies or 
industrial information and skills 
• R & D contracts for prototyping & design 
• Global price enquiries for COTS requirements 
• ‘In-kind’ contributions of personnel, tools, technical services, or other resources” 
 
These engagement options, and later construction phase activities, will normally lead to 
selection, approval, and a contract using instruments such as a collaboration agreement, 
Request for Information (RFI), Request for Quotation (RFQ), or Request for Tender (RFT). 
These processes build on, and are informed by, the global industry ‘scouting’ process which 
takes account of the regional/country capabilities o the appropriate extent. Mega-projects 
may choose to be more proactive; ITER for example, r -announces each year’s intended 
procurements for next 24 months (ITER, 2009). 
 
Although RFTs may be restricted to project member institutes/states, open RFTs are most 
common for science/engineering supply acquisitions (as used in ESO). This method more 
likely guarantees both the largest number of industry enquiries, and a fair approach in 
gathering industrial information, and supply offers. Price enquiries and R&D contracts 
performed via open tenders provide the following advantages (Perna et al., 2011): 
• guarantee of  full access to a worldwide market to identify the best available 
technologies, free from any geographical boundary restrictions; 
• continuous monitoring by project stakeholders for fairness in the industrial 
involvement. 
• the ability to look strategically at regional capability for possible ‘chunking’, bundling 
or split of contracts, or to address ju te retour issues.  
 
The contents of RFTs and other issued documents are no mally closely scripted by 
institutional templates validated by legal professionals. However experience gained from 
CSIRO’s ASKAP project means that care is needed to ensure that standardised language and 
text does not mask or generalise either the specific need or overriding objectives of the 
procurement (CSIRO, 2009). 
 
RFTs will ordinarily require bidder details concerning product, price and performance, 
however Blanchard (1990) identifies several issues for which tender documentation should 





• A detailed plan of execution (to ensure the scope is understood) 
• An overall staffing chart, and project schedule with critical path defined 
• A ‘labour force’ load chart indicating committed and available resources  
• Resumes of key staff with at least one alternative each 
• A choice of contractor’s project manager 
• An estimate of the number of engineering plans to be supplied 
 
Whilst open requests for information or offers have dvantages, and are usually a legislated 
requirement in public procurement for high-tech mega-projects (LHC, 2009; OPAL, 2009; 
VISTA, 2010), there could be benefits in a more direct approach. Partnership sourcing, 
where the buyer and supplier develop a close and log term relationship resulting in lower 
total costs, can enhance dependability and overall supplier quality (Virolainen, 1998). The 
arrangement encourages early strategic supplier engag ment and recognises distinctive 
value. Blanchard (1990, p. 113) also promotes direct negotiation through the question: 
“When a company is seeking to convert a concept or idea into a reality...why not get the best 
[firm] that is available?” Once that vendor(s) is known, discussions can begin arly, and 
eliminate much of the time and cost of the competitiv  bidding process. Blanchard (1990, p. 
113) continues: “administrative niceties have crept into the execution of projects...and are 
indicative that we may have lost sight of the real objective – to convert a concept...into a 
reality and to begin returning the investment as rapidly as possible”.  Whichever mode is 
selected for supplier contracting, it should be subject to cost-benefit analysis, and risk of 
long term innovation and costs being sacrificed for expediency. 
 
Terms & Conditions - Contractual terms and conditions (T&C) will largely be set by the 
governance model adopted, and with advice from project funding agencies. Nevertheless 
guidance can be drawn from documented experience gen rally, and also from many of the 
major contemporary science and engineering facility projects. Below are set out certain 
contractual aspects of particular relevance to high-tec  mega-projects: 
 
Penalties – While penalties are commonly applied to contracts t the general level, or against 
specific deliverables, some care is required with their construction. The nature of mega-
science programs usually entails both design modificat ons and unexpected events that can 
cause delays which may (even inadvertently) trigger p nalty clauses invoking liquidating 
damages within supply chains. Expert legal advisers are needed to draw up such clauses so 




circumstances of supplier failure. Notably, T&Cs for the OPAL nuclear research project 
required that disputes are not permitted to delay delivery of contracted goods or services 
(OPAL, 2009). 
 
Delivery Timing – Procurement programs will be based on project master plans that will 
almost certainly be amended over time. Contractual documents will therefore need to 
incorporate some avenue to adjust schedules of procured goods and services (particularly 
within ‘just-in-time’ arrangements). Failure to do this may lead to delivery of goods at 
incorrect project phases, causing delays or requiring storage, and resulting in cash flow 
problems from unsynchronised contractor billing. 
 
Payment – Extended contracts will usually incorporate payment milestones. Ideally, 
payments should only be made against measurable, and tangible deliverables, or otherwise 
verifiable earned value (RAE, 2004).23 Field interviews suggest that clawing back over-
payments is a very management intensive task, and leads to breakdown of goodwill across 
the supplier base. 
 
International Pricing – To facilitate proper competitive procurement, and ensure fair 
evaluation, contracts should require price offers to be in a single, universal currency. To 
enable this, a foreign exchange (FX) conversion methodology will be required, and 
directions given regarding the application of duties and tariffs. An alternative is to 
implement some form of project currency unit, with published FX rates for all project 
collaborator currencies. 
 
Guarantee – Contracts stating or requiring guarantees against goods or services 
performance, delivery dates, or compliance need to be very explicit regarding the extent of 
the warranty issued, and remedies for failing to meet it. Compensation must not only include 
rectification of the fault or breakdown, but also any costs or associated effort on the part of 
the buyer’s organisation to restore performance. In the case of large, high-tech mega-
projects, systems and components may well approach r exceed their advertised warranty 
period prior to entering service. Procurement contracts should seek to delay the 
commencement of the warranty period until the goods are operational, or extend the period 
to cover any such delay. 
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Ethical standards – Not all countries and regions have equivalent ethical standards. These 
should be overtly stated in contractual documents ad made clear in all dealings. This is 
especially important concerning hospitality, gift giving, and passing of information. It is not 
suggested that such policies should prohibit social ustoms or observance of business 
courtesies, merely that these customs be conducted op nly, be of an acceptable scale, and 
transacted without prejudice. 
 
Environmental awareness – The project may consider taking an official positi n on global 
impacts and environmental standards by incorporating a ‘green’ policy (as per GEMINI) into 
its procurement function. This could take the form of addressing issues such as 
anthropological climate change, landfill, and pollution through business policies concerning 
packaging, shipping-miles, favouring firms employing sustainable systems, and using fully 
electronic purchasing systems. 
 
Subcontractor conditions – Contracts must address the topic of subcontracting, stating 
clearly the conditions and approvals required. (E.g. SO’s contractors require authorisation 
before subcontracting). Ideally, any subcontracts will be ‘back-to-back’ with the prime 
contract for all terms and conditions, and be especially clear on the requirement to mirror 
quality assurance and performance requirements fully down the supply chain e.g. CERN ( 
LHC, 2009). Subcontractors must be identified within tender offers, and their credentials 
verified. 
 
Intellectual Property (IP) – The management and treatment of foreground, background, and 
project generated IP and copyright material should be addressed through a project specific IP 
policy. This must take into account international legislation, and be known, practiced, and 
conveyed to suppliers through the procurement process. This is especially important to allay 
the tensions over IP ownership reported by industry when dealing with research institutions 
such as universities (Hertzfeld et al., 2006). 
 
 
3.2.4.4 Contracting models 
 
Various contracting arrangements are possible for SKA-like projects, and several models are 
shown in Appendix E, Figs. a-f (adapted and extended from Morris & Hough, 1986).  The 
actual structural links between the project organistion and suppliers may vary over project 
phases, and in accordance with contract size, geographic spread of members, funding shares, 





The prime contractor–subcontractor relationships shown in Appendix E also embrace the 
concept of supply chains, where suppliers can usefully engage with SMEs to exploit niche 
capability. 
 
Contractual relationships are unlikely to remain stable over the entire project, being subject 
to company buy-outs, change of key personnel, and even change of business focus. 




3.2.4.5 Ensuring competitiveness 
 
High-tech mega-project acquisition both enables and benefits from market competitiveness 
framed by the strategic approaches described previously. However a cautionary note comes 
from Rendleman and Faulconer (2011, p. 13) who reason that, due to the skyrocketing value 
of aerospace contracts, the US government effectively fosters ‘death bids’ from firms who 
find “it is better to be on contract and under bid than o the street”, thus creating viability 
risk. Nevertheless, there is good experience for high-tech mega-projects to learn from, as 
presented in the project procurement policies and initiatives, as described below: 
 
Pricing - The offered price for any good or service reflects the contractual risk involved, and 
is therefore to some extent influenced by the buyer’s policy. “If the risk is large (say more 
than about 10%) the price becomes unnecessarily high, especially if there is no real 
competition”, say Hall & Kahn (2006, p. 20). They further explain that if the risk is under-
estimated, cost-cutting can ensue, thus working in a highly detrimental way for complex 
scientific projects, and most dangerous when the contract was won with an artificially low 
bid dependent on profit recovery through post-contract variations. These concerns are also 
voiced by Nicholas (2004) who describes ‘fixed price with determination’ to counter the 
tendencies described above. Blanchard (1990) posits that risk and contingency for 
uncertainty should not exceed 5% of the total expected ost for fixed price contracts. 
 
Even under a stated ‘best value for money’ procurement approach, price remains a key 




reimbursable’24, a fixed-price basis, or somewhere in-between. Since bidders will build 
contingency in their offers commensurate with their p ception of the risk, each offered price 
will contain a combination of costs, profit margin, and risk money. In R&D type projects 
(e.g. aerospace) it is not uncommon for early contracts to be on a cost-reimbursable basis, 
and later production or site execution orders to be firm price contracts – the latter requiring 
much lower procurement management effort (Winch & Gil, 2010). 
 
Fixed price contracts are most common in mega-projects (ESO, VLT, and LOFAR) 
generally, though Morris & Hough (1986, p. 217) argue they are “clearly inappropriate in 
high risk situations,” Contracts may incorporate financial incentives forachieving or 
exceeding defined project objectives e.g. delivery date, performance, etc. Damages may 
apply for failed performance, but as shown in the VISTA project, and in MoD reports, are 
not always effective (MoD, 2009). Buyer-driven changes in scope can be accommodated, but 
generally at a cost, with a premium value attached for any contract variations. 
 
Cost reimbursable contracts involve payment to the contractor for legitimate expenses for 
completed work, plus a profit margin. Financial ince tives may be applied. This type of 
contract is useful for flexibility in directing the contractor when the precise scope of work 
cannot be defined at the start, and may well be applicable to a mega-project environment. 
Moreover, some price certainty is possible with cost caps in place. Simplified cost 
reimbursable contracts are often useful for R&D work and are conducted on a ‘time and 
materials’ reimbursable basis using a pre-agreed schedule of fees. 
 
Economic price adjustments, tied to a reliable financi l index, are commonly applied to large 
project procurements that span a period of years. A special provision is included allowing for 
pre-defined changes to the contract price due to changed conditions e.g. inflation, exchange 
rate variation, or changed commodity values (e.g. CERN’s Contract F template). 
 
A novel approach taken by some large scale technical integrators is to take the stance of 
price-setter rather than price taker. Referencing Dell Computers as an example, Gans (2006) 
describes this method for modelling competition for ders prior to procurement 
negotiations. In this case the tender documents will include either (a) fixed price per item, or 
(b) a variable price per item based on quantities offered, or (c) a price cap representing the 
maximum price that will be paid, encouraging competition beneath that figure. 
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Split buying - For procurement of high quantity parts, split-buying offers the advantage of 
spreading the production risk over two or more suppliers. This can be appropriate in cases 
where each supplier indicates an individual production capability beneath that required by 
the project, and especially where sharing of tooling s practical. Apart from raising 
competitiveness, split-buying is also appropriate where the purchaser has a policy preference 
of not becoming the dominant or exclusive customer of the supplier. Counter to this, 
spreading a quantity order over too many suppliers will reduce any economies of scale. 
 
COTS Purchasing - Another way to encourage competitiveness is to specify Commercial-
off-the-Shelf (COTS) products (where possible) within tender documents. The GEMINI 
telescope project experience tells us that COTS products are always cheaper to acquire, 
support and upgrade, and are often available from several sources, sometimes via global 
channels (NRC, 1999). 
 
Industry Consortia - To better understand and potentially service the needs of major high-
technology projects, local or global industry consortia may be formed, either as regional 
(possibly government) initiatives, or encouraged by the project itself. Such teaming 
arrangements are usually beneficial in allowing industry to more efficiently work together to 
address mega-project needs, as well as spawn spin-off collaborations or opportunities to 
service adjacent markets. 
 
Mega-projects should be alert to the formation of cartels, especially where there are 
restricted numbers of bidders. A cartel is a formal organisation of suppliers that agree to 
coordinate prices, marketing and production, and are anti-competitive. The EU's competition 
law explicitly forbids cartels and related practices in its article 81 of the Treaty of Rome. 
Long Term Partnering Arrangements (LPTAs) with key v ndors offer strategic pathways for 
global procurement. 
 
Broader Outcomes - Overlying project acquisition strategies for capability deployment, and 
application of juste retour, may modify price-based decisions in terms of allowing for the 
non-financial benefits of technology transfer and exploitation, and regional capacity 
building. The importance of this latter item is recognised for the SKA project, and explored 
and reported through a recent COST initiative (COST, 2010). 
 
Value for money (VfM) comes from the effective, efficient and economic use of resources. 




numerically or subjectively quantified (OGC, 2002). A VfM bid assessment not only 
provides lower overall cost benefits, but also the common ground for very different offers to 
be compared. The simplistic ‘lowest price’ criterion is unable to grant neither the lowest total 
cost of ownership (costs over the whole life cycle) nor project life performance. The VfM 
decision criteria must consider project quality and performance, in relation with other 
requirements including economic value, reliability, supportability, purchase risk, and price 
(Perna et al. 2009). 
 
 
3.2.4.6 Procurement specifications 
 
The purchase of products, materials, software, tooling, systems, and other tangible needs for 
complex high value projects requires focused attention on defining the specification. This 
can be done through (a) documented designs (blueprints), controlled engineering drawings 
and notes, prototype examples, and supplemented by part numbers; or (b) a detailed 
performance specification where the inputs, outputs, design constraints and tolerances are 
stated, but not the precise physical design. Both approaches are validated with test plans 
against performance criteria. In the former, the contractor will be expected to deliver an 
exact version in every respect to the designs provided. In the latter, the contractor has some 
latitude to develop and construct/create the item(s) as long as the performance criteria and 
design constraints are met. It is not uncommon for both approaches to exist within high-tech 
mega-projects. 
 
Linked to this concept is the notion of manufacturability (or ‘design for manufacture’). It is 
essential that designs intended for large scale production are developed with input from 
industrial experts so that contracts can be issued with the benefit of knowledge from 
practical production techniques and limitations. The procurement function has an important 
role facilitating this, as well as ensuring that industrial specifications are established and 
approved for fabrications – even when it is expected that accepted professional standards 
will apply. By way of illustration, a combination of ineffective chafing guards and an 
abundance of flammable materials contributed to the fire that killed three astronauts at Cape 
Canaveral, despite the contractor being a recognised and highly experienced aerospace firm 
(Young et al. (1969). 
 
Another vital consideration is ‘upgradeability’ – the application of production expertise to 
ensure that future production runs can be modified to accommodate improvements in the 




great savings later. A procurement policy is also required to cover the specification 
requirements of professional services. 
 
Contemporary cases offer useful advice. CERN commend flexibility and innovation in 
procurement, suggesting for example that sets of spare  should be procured initial as part of 
the construction procurement to avoid potential commissioning delays. CERN’s LHC project 
leader, Dr. Evans, expressed in interview: “If a strategy doesn’t work as planned because of 
unforeseeable conditions, you have to be prepared to change strategy. Be aware of possible 
‘grab and run’ attitude by suppliers” (LHC, 2009). 
 
Australia’s OPAL program mostly used a performance sp cification, and noted that a pre-
solicitation ‘scouting’ process reduced cost and time overall. LOFAR experience from the 
Netherlands warns of underestimating the specification difficulties of mass production and 
systems integration. A general recommendation was th t he combination of processes 
forming the leanest model that meets the requirements of the project is best adopted. 
 
 
3.2.4.7 Procurement risk 
 
The procurement process and fulfilment of the contract may be endangered by several kinds 
of risk as listed below, only some of which are within the provider’s control (adapted from 
OGC, 2002, p13); 
 
• Poorly drafted contracts 
• Inadequate resources assigned to contract management 
• Customer team not matched to the supplier team in terms of either skills or experience 
(or both) 
• Wrong people put in place, leading to personality cashes 
• Context, complexities and dependencies of contracts not well understood 
• Failure to check supplier assumptions 
• Unclear authorities or responsibilities relating to commercial decisions 
• Lack of performance measurement or benchmarking by the buyer 
• Focus on current arrangements rather than what is pos ible or the potential for 
improvement 
• Failure to monitor and manage retained risks (statutory, political and commercial) 




• Loss of supplier’s key staff 
• Change of supplier’s business focus 
• Financial insecurity and force majeure. 
 
Risks are heightened by procurement itself, with a dependency on one or more external 
providers, leaving the buyer with reduced ability to command and manage variables (Schill, 
1979). Even when a risk is notionally subrogated to the supplier it cannot be dismissed: 
“ transferred risks…cannot be forgotten about simply because the contract obliges the 
provider to deal with them. A key point is that busine s risk can never be transferred to the 
provider” (OGC, 2002, p. 25) 
 
In discussing advanced technology organisations, Schill (1979) specifies nine specific risk 
areas; concluding that high-tech procurement is especially prone to a wide risk front when 
requiring development of new materials, components, or equipment. He cites time overruns 
of some 180% and cost overruns of 200-300% on R&D Government contracts. 
 
Risk of pre-competitive relationships (lock-out) 
(adapted from Hall & Khan, 2006) 
 
As a general principle, potential bidders should not be given foreknowledge of contractual 
requirements and it is good practice to avoid direct contact between contracting personnel 
and potential bidders once a purchase action has commenced. In high-tech mega-projects, 
this is not always easy, as there is often contact between project personnel and industry; 
nevertheless policies must be observed and a culture of internal discipline is required. Such a 
policy poses major problems for large scale, long term projects with considerable R&D, 
since public procurement rules are not always in sympathy with the specific needs of such 
projects. 
 
An example is where a company is involved in an early ( nd vital) stage of the project there 
is a risk that the (potential) bidding firm might be excluded from subsequent participation 
precisely because of its prior knowledge (also know as ‘lock-out’). This could mean 
exclusion of precisely those organisations that have specific relevant knowledge or skills 
from the early stages of a project. This situation creates difficulties for the strategic 
engagement potential for early involvement in multi-million Euro ‘high-technology’ projects 





Another extreme example is when one of a number of potential bidders for a contract has 
already been given a contract for a prior phase of the work. The advantages are obvious and 
include a better understanding of what will be needed, reduced costs through familiarity of 
system interfaces, and the possibility of customer developed hardware. 
 
However, it is possible to operate properly within the rules and still do what is technically 
and scientifically necessary (as shown by ‘real world’ examples) but it does require a lot of 
care, forethought and advance preparation regarding the procurement scheme. 
 
In practice, the LOFAR project found success with software correlator development largely 
because of effective nurturing and management of industry collaboration with IBM 
(LOFAR, 2009). The ALMA radio telescope also features pre-competitive engagement with 
industry mostly via conventional contracts. 
 
Some of the approaches that projects can take include: 
 
• Crafting the legal entity, so that specialist contrac ors can be legally engaged. 
• When placing a study or technology development contract, do this on the basis of a 
competition, thus providing a justification for continuing relations with the contractor. 
• Assign the study or R & D work with provision for the results to be made available to 
all potential bidders for the main contract. 
• Employ parallel competitive studies. These can sometimes produce better results, as 
well as justifying the further selection of one contractor, though cause added expense. 
• Seek contractors for early stage work who do not have the capacity or desire to engage 
in large scale manufacture. A contractual condition ca  be that the contractor agrees to 
be available as a potential sub-contractor to any future potential main bidder. 
• In extreme circumstances a developed technology that is regarded as vital can be 
treated either as customer furnished equipment or as an imposed sub-contract. This 
has the disadvantage that it entails considerable customer responsibility for the results. 
 
 
3.2.4.8 Tender evaluations and contractor selection 
 
The evaluation of potential contractors for public, high-tech mega-projects demands close 
attention, especially for high value prime contracts. Blanchard (1990) favours a two-stage 




final’ offers to a few qualified firms narrows the choice and lifts the quality, though possibly 
results in higher prices. He suggests the compromise is to restrict tender invitations to four or 
five for very large projects, but no less than three. 
 
Practitioners agree that effective contractor evaluation requires an approved, transparent 
procedure, and should be conducted against pre-determined criteria (Hall & Kahn, 2006). 
The application of the ISO 9000 Quality Management Systems has seen useful 
standardisation in this, and advocated for space satellite projects by Saunders et al., (2003). 
However while supporting the principle, Crosby (1996) calls for sensible application of such 
standards, particularly in the area of approved supplier lists, where completion of a 
questionnaire often falls well short of the intended diligence. Project Directorates should 
ensure that funding is allocated for an appropriate lev l of quality audit as well as technical 
compliance checking for each major procurement contract, and that this ‘mission assurance’ 
aspect is documented within tenders and acknowledged by bidding firms. 
 
The process by which the main contractors for any high-tech mega-project are evaluated 
requires careful attention, transparency, and adherenc . Appeals by dissatisfied vendors can 
absorb valuable resources, as can probity audits (ASKAP, 2010). Scrutiny of the much 
lauded Apollo program by Young et al., (1969) revealed falsehoods over the selection of 
North American as the first choice contractor (the fabricator of the fatal 012 capsule). The 
company’s bid of $400 million was ultimately a ninth of the final sum paid.  
 
A study undertaken by Watt et al. (2010, p. 59) contributes interesting data from 222 
engineering project cases concerning the relative importance of tender selection criteria. 
Their research shows that: “past project performance and technical expertise were of almost 
equal importance, but twice that of tendered cost. These, coupled with project management 
expertise contributed to a combined importance >85%”  of the nine measured criteria. 
Blanchard (1990, p. 47) concurs, saying: “Nothing can replace the experience with suppliers 
as a determinant of the probability of on-time deliv ry”. Experience from the GEMINI 
project recommends active checking of past work and competency, not simply relying on 
contractor assertions (NRC, 1999). 
 
 
3.2.4.9 The purchaser-supplier relationship 
 
A close partnership style relationship is crucial for publicly funded science/engineering 




viewed as equal success indicators to project outcomes. Nonetheless, the procurement 
activity must be impartial, formal, and transparent, and with the expectations of each party 
clear and actively managed. 
 
In long term mega-project contracts, where interdependency between buyer and provider is 
inevitable, both parties have an interest in a fruitful relationship, though the profit motive 
must not be overlooked. The three key factors for success are trust, recognition of mutual 
aims, and communication (OGC, 2002). In discussing information flows in procurement, the 
UK Office of Government Commerce argue strongly fora change of paradigm in 
information sharing and suggest that fear of exposing the buyer’s thinking, position, or 
concerns should be modified by adopting: “a realistic balance between openness and 
reserving negotiating positions” (OGC, 2002, p. 30). 
 
The relationship between some suppliers and the proj ct ften begins at the project inception 
and early R&D phase where technologies and niche capabilities are being investigated, 
products tested, and experiments conducted. Companies (particularly large ones) are 
sometimes open to (or volunteer) early stage collabrations or other strategic synergies such 
as personnel exchanges, expert advice, or free/loand tools and technology. The procurement 
department needs to be aware of these pre-contract a rangements to ensure that ‘lock-out’ 
situations don’t develop (see section 3.2.4.7), and that such opportunities are agreed to fairly 
and are transparent to the industrial community. 
 
Once contracts are awarded in the construction phase, the relationship between suppliers and 
the project must be formalised under a contractual framework that maintains this positive 
interaction and openness. This is especially vital concerning inspections and acceptance of 
work which lessons-learned from major high-tech projects suggest can be a defining point in 
procurement success. ESO asserts the right to inspect and verify goods anytime, whereas 
both ITER and CERN undertake planned inspections of work at suppliers (VISTA, 2010; 
CERN, 2009; ITER, 2009). OPAL participates in witnessing of hold points defined in test 
plans, and collaborates in commissioning (OPAL, 2009). LOFAR emphasise close relations 
with suppliers; using the process to guarantee quality (LOFAR, 2009). Their procedures 
include installing inspectors in suppliers’ factories. CERN goes further, swapping inspectors 
between suppliers and choosing not to rely on ISO 9001 certification or supplier’s QA 
records (CERN, 2009). However close and positive the relationship, the VISTA project 






Another important aspect to supplier relationships is the amount of dependency involved, 
and a project policy decision is required regarding l mitations to the size of order in respect 
to any given company’s size or turnover. This decision will take account of the balance 
between desired level of reliance of the firm on the contract, and the buyer risk attached to 
highly geared contracts. CERN takes the standpoint of preferring not to be >20% of the 
supplier’s business (CERN, 2009), while NASA (NASA, 2009c) promotes multiple suppliers 
as both a risk mitigation strategy and competition driver. 
 
A point made strongly by the UK’s National Audit Office report ‘Improving Procurement’ 
(NAO, 2004) is the need for sound client capability, particularly senior management 
leadership skills, and paying particular attention t  enhancing key aspects of procurement 
capability. These are: 
 
• raising commercial awareness, having better, more up to date management 
information particularly on current market prices 
• more joint purchasing between departments, and more proactive management of 
suppliers 
• managing the risk of relying on too small a number of suppliers for key commodities, 
and 




3.2.5 Recommendations and conclusions 
 
In fast changing technological situations, effective acquisition strategies can help decrease 
risk, shorten lead times, reduce investments, and improved response to project needs. An 
informed, holistic approach to procurement can improve the effectiveness of the process, and 
underpin more productive and open relationships with suppliers. In particular, nine key 
strategies are suggested as being necessary in order t  position the procurement function as a 
precursor for high-tech project success. These are shown in Table 3-1 above. 
 
Competent procurement management is vital to the success of mega-projects, being both 
shaped, and the shaper of, the high-tech environment, and influencing how much R&D 
vendors do. Schill notes US Air Force Commander Schriever’s comment: “The pacing 
factor in acquiring technologically-based modern aerospace systems is management, not 






3.3 Project shaping and building resilience25 
 
In this section I argue that project success, unlike project planning, (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003) is 
not indeterminate by nature, and that undertaking certain activities, coupled with application 
of particular policies and launch conditions at thefront end, positions a project for success 
and resilience. As Archibald (2003, p. 31) puts it: “the seeds for success or failure are 






Although the project management literature touches on uccess factors identified throughout 
this thesis, evidence of continued failure (e.g. Standish, 1995; Proccacino et al., 2002) 
indicates that a deeper examination of project practice is warranted. A recent task force 
report (ICCPM, 2011, p. 33) claims that: “resilience is the reward for maintaining diversity 
within the PM system”, referring to the tension between efficiency initiat ves (Just in Time, 
Lean Systems, etc) and less vulnerable processes and pr ctices.  The aim of this section is to 
present research into nine areas that are shown to contribute to early stage project shaping, 
robustness and resilience. This section focuses on high-technology (hi-tech) mega-projects, 
and draws on both recent literature and fieldwork t distil a fuller understanding of the more 
subtle factors behind project success beyond the basic ‘givens’ of project structure, 
requirements, funding, tools, and plans. 
 
Resilience is defined here as being akin to robustnes  in the sense of building strength and 
the ability to recover from, or adjust easily to, misfortune or change. 
 
 
3.3.2 Study approach and methodology 
 
In this section I draw from peer-reviewed papers, books and reports, largely published 
between 2000 and 2010. Discussions at relevant confere ces and workshops offer further 
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insights; in particular the topics of peripety, optimism, and mission assurance which were 
prominent at the 2010 NASA Project Management Challenge, an annual best practice 
networking event. 
 
As described in section 1.3.2, I also undertook research into mega-project management at 
several large scientific projects in Europe, Chile, South Africa, and Australia. These projects 
typically have specialised infrastructure, > US$100 million budget, and a science goal 
concerned with astro, particle, or nuclear physics. I onducted formal interviews with project 
management representatives, each typically lasting 3-5 hours and loosely structured to 
permit the gathering of salient learning aspects from each case. The fieldwork study list is 
shown in Table 1-1. Following comparative analysis of themes and trends, the data gathered 
enabled the lived experience of project practitioners to be benchmarked against the literature 
sources. 
 
This research effort focuses on eliciting resilience factors beyond a priori programmatical 
processes, resources and artefacts (such as execution plans, project funding, Work 
Breakdown Structures, etc.). The findings are grouped into three ‘attitudinal’ factors, and six 
‘conditioning’ factors described in Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 respectively, and defined as 
‘special’ factors to distinguish them from traditional programmatical factors. Attitudinal 
factors are those which require an intellectual stance or approach, whereas conditional 
factors are realised through purposeful activity. 
 
Finally, having resolved these ‘special’ resilience factors, they are examined empirically 
against three contemporary mega-science cases in section 3.3.5, and the findings used to 
inform the conclusions of this thesis. 
 
 
3.3.3. Attitudinal project shaping 
 
3.3.3.1. Balancing enthusiasm with realism. 
 
A necessary component of any high-tech project funding bid is the enthusiastic belief by the 
protagonist(s) that it can be executed on time, on budget. This often leads to inaccurate 
estimates, most disappointing when over-selling is used to win favour with funders. Grün 
(2004) talks of project proponents, project managers, contractors, and planning experts who 




“tendency to underestimate the difficulties of achieving the technical goals… the operation 
& maintenance costs, and the costs caused by the changing of technical goals.” 
 
Evidence of optimism is not hard to find. A lessons-learned workshop from the Gemini 
telescope project revealed that the effects of science drivers on cost and schedule led to 
overly optimistic estimates, resulting in a 300% over-budget in one instrument (NRC, 1999).  
Observations in a radio astronomy technology White Paper describe overly optimistic cost 
and development time estimates as the most frequent cause of project de-scoping (Fisher, 
2010) – the JWST being the latest gross example (Siegel, 2011). In the early 1980s, a four 
nation Euro-consortium announced the commencement of the Eurofighter jet, expected to 
cost $20 billion and be flying by 1997. After 20 years of technical problems and unexpected 
costs, project costs had risen to $45 billion by 2003 (Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003), with 
production aircraft not delivered until 2008. A recent UK defence report lamenting a £205 
million cost increase over 20 projects admitted: that “on far too many projects, the 
Department is over-optimistic and sets unachievable cost, time and performance objectives” 
(MoD, 2009, p. 5). The procurement function can be similarly affected, with aerospace 
acquisition failures linked to overly ambitious technical readiness and resources estimates, as 
reported by Rendleman and Faulconer (2011). 
 
The cost-schedule paradox is a formidable enemy. A US Defense Acquisition office 
investigation concluded that once past 15%, an over-budget program is ‘highly unlikely’ to 
recover original projections and the final overrun will get worse (Butts & Linton, 2009). 
Over-optimistic budget and schedule expectations are shown to inhibit project success, and 
are especially likely on projects with institutional difficulties (Murphy et al., 1974). IT 
projects appear to be especially vulnerable (Verner & Cerpa, 2005). 
 
NASA officials, seeking to boost congressional support, sought to emphasise the Space 
Shuttle’s apparent low development cost. Such optimism proved flawed, as the program 
encountered delays of three years and cost overruns of 60% prior to its first mission loss in 
1986 (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007). When interviewed, NASA Director, George Morrow asserted: 
“a major pitfall is being overly optimistic early in the project lifecycle.” (NASA, 2009a, p. 
31). 
 
Lovallo and Kahneman (2003) investigated this planning fallacy that leads managers to 
make decisions founded on delusional optimism, and ttribute the phenomenon to two 
sources - cognitive biases, and organisational pressu . The former exhibits itself in a 




potential for error or mistakes, and to underestimate levels of control. Why is this so? 
Lovallo and Kahneman (2003, p. 4) reason that: 
 
“The cognitive biases that produce overoptimism arecompounded by the limits of 
human imagination. No matter how detailed, the busine s scenarios used in planning 
are generally inadequate. Any complex project is subject to myriad problems—from 
technology failures to shifts in exchange rates to bad weather—and it is beyond the 
reach of the human imagination to foresee all of them at the outset. As a result, 
scenario planning can seriously understate the probability of things going awry.” 
 
Organisational pressures are felt in every project, and are accentuated in the high-tech, high-
risk ventures discussed in this thesis. As project budgets rise to reflect ever-growing 
challenges, so competition for contracts (ICCPM, 2011), money, and other resources 
becomes intense (whether from the public or private purse) and pressure to remain within 
cost-caps increases. This results in a cost-risk paradox where the project with the highest 
likelihood of budget failure (because of budget tightness) is chosen for investment. Yet the 
tendency to understate has always pervaded the institutional high-tech project world, as 
evidenced in a quotation from engineer and astronomer Robert Hanbury Brown in 1987: “In 
my experience most major programs of scientific research would never have got started if 
the people who proposed them had not greatly underestimated the cost, time and amount of 
work involved” (Robertson, 1992, p. 132). Hanbury Brown’s comment r veals a further 
source of inherent optimism – the belief that project funding will continue unchecked, 
simply due to institutionalised resistance to closing a project mid-term. Thomson et al. (2011 
p. 5) concur, finding a tendency in military equipment projects to respond to overruns: “by 
delaying the project rather than cancelling it, thereby rewarding the optimism bias.” 
 
How then might we recalibrate our thinking without losing the all-important project 
enthusiasm? Blanchard (1990) claims objectivity may be the only defence against the 
snowballing effect of eagerness, and suggests that, as a balancing process, project proponents 
should also develop a case for not proceeding. Research shown by Lovallo and Kahneman 
(2003) supports this stance, arguing that an ‘outside v ew’ (sometimes called reference-class 
forecasting), insulated from cognitive bias, is essential. Realistic estimates and plans (i.e. 
neither optimistic nor pessimistic) would seem a correct approach, but Erno-Kjolhede (2000) 
argues that this could lead to project participants failing to innovate, and result in second-
best performance. He recommends a tone of ‘highly ambitious’, or ‘challenging’ planning, 
driving stretch goals underpinned by factual data. Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) strongly support 




realistic view to curb against ‘appraisal optimism’. The Acquisitions Defence RUSI Group 
offers practical advice to break the ‘conspiracy of optimism’ including transparency, realism, 
de-risk programs and interfaces, and ultimately consider cancelling programs (Weston, 
2007). 
 
Butts & Linton (2009) who investigated NASA’s cost estimation performance, conclude that 
undershooting cost and schedule projections is a well verified NASA phenomenon, being 
rooted in an historical practice of over-optimism. In response, their report introduces a 
hybrid model (the ‘Joint Confidence Level - Probabilistic Calculator’, JCL-PC) for 
accurately estimating cost and schedule reality in complex science and engineering 
environments where maturing technologies are present. The adoption of sophisticated cost 
tools (e.g. the Square Kilometre Array Cost Engine), managed by trained and experienced 
project personnel, perhaps heralds a maturing attitude o cost realism. 
 
 
3.3.3.2. Checking for relevant lessons learned 
 
The value of recording lessons learned from past projects, and the investigation of 
experiences from like-projects during early stage hi h-tech project planning, seems obvious. 
However casework and the literature reveal little effort is applied to these valuable activities. 
Many of the facilities investigated for this study almost totally relied on the collective 
experiences of project staff and management rather than any formal survey of analogous 
projects, thereby failing to learn of others’ mistakes (ALMA, 2010; ASTRON, 2010; 
CSIRO, 2009). 
 
Authors consistently promote the need to learn from project experience, and cite this as vital 
for continuous improvement as well as evidence of pr ject management maturity (Cao & 
Hoffman, 2010; Verner & Cerpa, 2005; Cooke-Davies, 2002b; Kerzner, 1998; Williams, 
2004; PMI, 2008; Fisher, 2010). Disterer (2002, p. 512) concludes: “only a few firms 
manage systematically to identify and transfer valuab e knowledge from projects to 
following projects [so that people can] apply it tofuture tasks”. Smith & Winter (2010) 
directly link ‘front-end’ management with project success and promote the idea of 
deliberately exploring insights and implications flowing from past project perspectives, and 
crafting appropriate action responses. 
 
Formal lessons learned capture mechanisms are needed to avoid ‘project amnesia’, including 




learning from experience and cite the Boeing approach of applying the results of past project 
investigations, thus delivering: “the most successful and error free market launches... 
accomplished in the history of Boeing”. Industry are more adept at systems to capture and 
retrieve previous learnings, experience put to great use in lowering costs in orbital satellite 
projects (TOPSAT, 2010). 
 
Within organisations, project staff have opportunities to learn and reuse lessons (Davies & 
Hobday, 2005), and post-mortem results can be stored within knowledge systems, or 
communicated directly to other teams (Collier et al., 1996). Mapping techniques that show 
chains of causality are useful in transferring lesson -learned to other projects (Williams, 
2004). For the high-tech planner in single project organisations effort is required to access 
and locate such learnings (CSIRO, 2009). Schalken et al. (2006) address this problem with a 
(highly qualified) method based on Grounded Theory t  deal with qualitative information 
from project reviews. An alternative is to access public databases such as NASA’s 
Engineering Network (NASA, 2010b), and the Software Program Manager’s Network 
(SPMN, 2010). Whatever method is used, lessons-learned and wisdom applied from 




3.3.3.3 Embracing complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty 
 
High-tech mega-projects are characterised by risk, complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty, 
not just related to technology, but introduced via multiple collaborative parties, and often a 
dispersed infrastructure. At project start-up, uncertainty surrounds performance levels, 
objectives and motivations, capabilities, stakeholder expectations, and political 
environments. Knight’s classic work (1921) distinguishes between economic risk where the 
outcomes were unknown but governed by probability distributions, and uncertainty where 
the outcomes were likewise random, but governed by an unknown probability model. 
 
High-tech mega-projects are always complicated, and almost always (by adding uncertainty) 
complex. Not only through the abundance of programmtic interfaces, but also because of 
the interactions between systems. Complex systems as understood in the contemporary sense 
are testing of management (Crosby, 2012a), and havean inherent level of unpredictability 
(Pavlak, 2004a; Miller & Lessard, 2000). Grasping this complexity, and preparing the 
                                                           





project for it, demands early stage agile and adaptive management (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007). 
To respond strategically, project management will likely develop more than one (possibly 
several) management strategies (Crosby, 2006; Pich et al., 2002), before down-selecting the 
final way forward. Beinhocker (1997, p. 8) supports this approach, saying: “In a complex 
adaptive system, a focused strategy…is necessary for day-to-day survival, but [is] not 
sufficient in the long run…strategies must be robust [and] perform well in a variety of 
possible future environments”. Thus project shaping is as much about keeping options open, 
as about trouble-proofing. 
 
Traditional project management practice as outlined i  the Project Management Bodies of 
Knowledge (PMBOKs) applies a rational probability-based approach to management, but is 
poorly equipped to deal with project uncertainty (Pender, 2001). Atkinson et al. (2006) 
characterise uncertainty as the incompleteness of inf rmation, a normal situation for early 
stage high-tech projects that requires tolerance from development teams, and may only be 
mitigated by trust in management. 
 
The early stages of R&D (high-tech) projects are dominated by long periods of ambiguity 
where solutions (and even problems) are not clear and where change is incremental. There 
follows a short period of peripety (Engwall & Westling (2001), where one solution (or a set 
of solutions) becomes the obvious candidate as the legitimate path forward. Peripety is a turn 
of events leading to cognitive transition from ambiguousness into a less daunting state of 
uncertainty, often recalled as a time when real achievement occurred. It is not simply a 
change of fortune, but a change of understanding of all that has gone before (Smith & 
Winter, 2010). 
 
In dealing with uncertainty, Smith (2007) invokes the pragmatic skills of ‘ProjectCraft’ 
starting with uncertainty spotting, and alerts the project manager not to delegate this to risk 
managers. He suggests we pose the critical questions: are we confident in our assumptions, 
and if wrong, could the impact be serious? Moreover h  supports uncertainty workshops, 
stating that (p. 134): “we must spot the potential frauds, and shake the tre o find out what 
is not secure”. However the fieldwork for this thesis suggests that such analysis is rare. 
 
Based on the literature and casework, high-tech project managers can lift confidence by 
addressing ambiguity through preliminary studies (e.g. pathfinders) and by using new 
knowledge to improve sense-making and thus refine the way forward. When interviewed, 
TOPSAT’s project leader claimed that: “our US$250K prototype was crucial in proving 




(TOPSAT, 2010). LOFAR’s Technical Support Manager (N. Ebbendorf) described 
prototyping more bluntly: “So painful, it was worth it” (LOFAR, 2009). Engwall and 
Westling, (2001) posit that uncertainty can only bereduced by acquiring necessary 
information through explicit questions, while Denyer and Kutsch (PMI, 2011) find that 




3.3.4. Launch conditioning 
 
3.3.4.1. Project mission & success definition 
 
While the setting of time and budget limits at project commencement is problematic (Bakker 
et al., 2010), no project should start without at least a broad objective(s) aligned to 
stakeholder expectations and priorities.  The IPMA Project Manager’s BoK (Caupin et al., 
2006) list objectives, mission, and project charter in its start-up guidance. However Atkinson 
et al. (2006) warn readers of ‘premature definition’ based on insufficiently defined 
specifications, especially in novel, one-off high-tech projects. Having a well-defined project 
mission was ranked #1 in the project definition stage by Hyvari (2006), and ranked #2 in a 
recent meta-study of high-tech project success drivers (Crosby, 2012b). When linking 
success to project types (including high-tech), Shenhar & Wideman (1996, p. 9) assert: “As 
part of every project’s front-end planning...agreement should be reached on the project’s 
principal success criteria having regard to its project type”. In software projects, Verner & 
Cerpa (2005) found that the start of a project offers greatest chance of quality improvement 
through better requirements setting. O’Brochta (2002, p. 1) draws on CIA technical project 
experience to conclude that: “ he earliest phases of the project life cycle have th  most 
dramatic impact upon the odds that projects will be vi wed as successful”. Shenhar & Dvir 
(2007) strongly support project success measures to be integrated with planning at project 
initiation, and suggesting inclusion into the project team’s charter. 
 
The fieldwork findings I undertook for this research agreed that statements around the 
mission and science goals were often established early (driven by funding applications and 
collaboration approaches), but project success definitions were less obvious in early planning 







3.3.4.2 Reporting and decision-making policies and structures  
 
A common characteristic of large high-tech projects is the distributed nature of the technical 
and governance committees. In the commercial world this is evident through strategically 
located research nodes (e.g. Boeing’s virtual PhantomWorks) and global procurement 
management. Institutional mega-projects frequently assemble executive and technical 
committees from world-wide nominations, and from a third stakeholder group – the funding 
agencies which pay for, but do not benefit from, the project output (Khang & Moe, 2008). 
This coming together of diverse people and interests to achieve a common purpose requires 
perceived and actual distances to be overcome, and responsibility to be shared (Aronson et 
al., 2010). Ideally, all this happens in a spirit of effective communication and coordination, 
active participation, trust, and common expectations (Samuel, 2009; NRC, 1999). 
 
Such challenges prove difficult to meet in practice. Interviews I conducted within several of 
my case studies exposed tensions where operative proj ct managers felt frustrated by a lack 
of decision or feedback on project shaping proposals (ASKAP, 2010; DESY, 2009; SKA, 
2010). Project staff also reported irritation when committees made pronouncements or aired 
concerns regarding matters considered outside their remit, especially when related to early 
stage technology selection, and several interviewees thought their committees were too large 
to work effectively (DESY, 2009; SKA, 2010; LOFAR, 2009). Similarly, an independent 
review reporting on the ASKAP project cited the frust ation of several interviewees 
concerning delays and confusion around decisions (Schoening, 2009). 
 
Davies & Hobday (2005, p. 261) write: “Different organisational cultures, problems in 
contractual relations and the need to integrate different domains of knowledge make 
collaborative projects very difficult to execute.”  Recent European Government reports 
addressing start-ups of science infrastructures emphasise the need for clear decision-making 
processes with one body/person having final say (European Commission, 2010; Katsanevas 
et al., 2009); the latter rejecting a 50:50 sharing of decision-making (e.g. ALMA) as 
ineffective. Lessons learnt from the ASPERA report encourage early formation of a 
Management Board, supported by a core management group, interlocked to the researchers 
and administration through a clear (documented) decision-making and reporting hierarchy. 
 
A frequent point raised incidentally during casework interviews for the present study was 
around poor understanding of decisions taken at upper levels in project organisations. Hector 
et al. (2009) describes such ‘natural decision-making’ as second-generation behavioural 




uncertainty, and shows them to be strongly influenced by personal beliefs and values, 
thereby often defying logical analysis and emphasising an imperfect process. 
 
Decision-making theory, founded on the concept of rational causality is a frequent feature 
within both project management and management science. Until the 1940s, decision theorists 
focused on how decisions should be made, rather than understanding the process itself. 
(Hector et al., 2009) discuss how actual behaviour was observed to be markedly different to 
theoretically predicted behaviour, and how these normative approaches (such as game theory 
and Bernoulli’s notion of utility) have more recently evolved into behavioural decision 
theory. This emerged from the work, among others, of Herbert Simon (Hector et al., 2009) 
whose theory of bounded rationality places limits on human decision-making by virtue of 
finite time, information, and cognitive capability, thus restricting optimal choices. 
Remington (2011) describes work by experimental psychologists that finds that humans 
violate the basic logic of decision-theory, i.e. choosing among alternatives to realise an 
optimal outcome. She points to developments in neuroscience that are revealing greater 
understanding of how the brain integrates complex information in conditions of  uncertainty.     
 
Complexity is sometimes seen as a mere series of first order problems in a reductionist 
attempt to simplify tasks and get on with the job. This loss of granularity of information, 
creates side effects which can undermine decisions. A report by ICCPM (2011) finds efforts 
to reduce the ‘noise’ of extraneous information canmask many of the complex system’s vital 
emergent properties, leading to decision-making on the basis of pre-existing belief rather 
than empirical evidence, and so losing the opportunity to learn lessons from the mistakes. 
 
A review of decision-making in the (now cancelled) NASA Constellation program found 
that it can only be as efficient as the roles, respon ibilities and authorities are clear and 
understood. Investigations revealed unilateral changes (including the deletion of a test flight) 
were rife at project start-up, and things only improved once the program integration function 
was operational. However in spite of attention by top management, the decision-making 
process remained problematic due to poor delineation of accountability and loss of multi-
decadal focus, often leaving certain stakeholders dis atisfied. The lesson learned by NASA 
was to clearly define decision-making processes, and support this with constant vigilance, 
time and energy to maintain currency and comprehensiv  control (Rhatigan, 2011). 
 
In establishing clear reporting and decision-making, top management can either help or 
hinder a project. Several authors (Hayfield, 1985; Baker et al., 1988; Rubenstein et al., 1976; 




management, citing ‘interference’ and ‘meddling’. Conversely, fieldwork revealed protracted 
decisions as the only real complaint of management efficacy, with only the (German) XFEL 
project identifying the need for total management rs ructure (DESY, 2009). 
 
 
3.3.4.3. Project information control 
 
Large projects generate a vast amount of information. Much of this, especially the formal 
project procedures, plans, and records, is usually documented and organised within some 
form of centralised Project Management Information System (PMIS). Computer based PMIS 
not only store large amounts of data, but can intell gently manage, sort, back-up and report, 
timely (sometimes predictive) information of immediate use to managers. Most importantly 
for high-tech mega-projects, modern packages will integrate complex data relationships 
between scheduling and network planning, resource management, budgeting, cost control 
and performance analysis, and risk burn (Nicholas, 2004). As NASA has found, the ability of 
current technologies to deliver precise information exactly when needed is still imperfect 
(NASA, 2010a), however it clearly makes sense to esabli h a PMIS of appropriate scale and 
capability early, and enforce its use. Scott Samuelson from the US National Ignition Facility 
(NIF) believes effective project oversight actually revolves around access to current relevant 
data, saying: “I got lots of numbers and pieces of paper [showing] whether milestones were 
being met. That’s all good. But it’s the ability to determine whether...what you’re seeing 
matches what’s really going on” (NASA, 2011b, p. 58). 
 
Case interviews (CSIRO, 2008; ASTRON, 2009; DESY, 2009; ALMA, 2007) show that the 
discipline required to create, register and link all re evant project documentation within a 
controlled environment is rarely maintained outside of xternally audited (usually industrial) 
projects. Observations during fieldwork show a mixed attitude to centralising plans and data, 
with personal storage practices representing the highest risk. An independent  gap analysis of 
one of my case study projects (ASKAP) identified the ‘sketchy’ understanding of each IPT 
status between project teams as the most significant finding (Shoening, 2009). This lack of 
inter-project communication is shown as being a serious flaw, since conflicting demands are 
not resolved – simply because they are not raised. Moreover, ASKAP managers are reported 
as unable to obtain timely information about budgets, and effort expended by work package. 
 
Of at least equal significance to the successful project execution is the abundance of 
information exchanges that take place around the project, internally and externally, and often 




wide) science and engineering meetings, and project bro hures – all aimed at maintaining the 
necessary high profile (CSIRO, 2008). Information traffic flow includes face-to-face 
meetings and conferences, telephone and video meetings, emails and presentations, each 
sometimes involving arms-length groups. 
 
 
Fig. 3-7. Showing the social media Universe as at early 2011 (source: 
http://www.theconversationprism.com/) 
The plethora of channels now used between individuals and groups (fostered by mobile 
communication services and devices) is daunting in terms of choice and management, and 
requires strong management (see Fig. 3-7). 
 
As the project community grows through the conception stage through to execution, the risk 
of misalignment of working group effort, misunderstandings of priorities and changes, and 
misinformation to external parties grows accordingly. Moreover, exercising weak control 
over these ‘satellite’ information channels leaves aspects of the project imperfectly recorded, 
leading to inefficient external reviews and limiting the usefulness of central repositories as 




identifies that customer demands, or other external stakeholders (e.g. joint venture partners) 
may require integration of corporate project data beyond the core programmatic metrics. An 
effective PMIS must be capable of linking and displaying this extended information set, 
especially time-related resource data. 
 
How should early phase project managers address thi situation? Implementing a project 
management framework based on an accepted professional guideline (e.g. PMBOK® Guide) 
may go some way to instilling the required practices. Similarly, implementing a certified 
(independently audited) management system (e.g. ISO 9001) will demand compliance with 
organisational procedures designed to apply control of information flows, as well as instigate 
corrective and preventive action for process failures. 
 
In NASA’s Constellation program, communications bandwidth was broadened considerably 
through two initiatives. First, ‘Communities of Practice’ were formed to aid communication 
flows in particular technical areas. Second, IT tools such as Webex, LifeSize, ICE/Windchill 
were used extensively to enhance information flow (Rhatigan, 2011). Communication is seen 
as a vital component of change management in IT projects. A British Computer Society 
(2006, p. 58) report puts the case succinctly as: 
 
“Not only does it allow change procedures to happen smoothly, it helps trigger 
change by effective communication networks that encourage two-way 
communication about the project goals, and innovative proposals and actions to 
meet these objectives. It helps all of the stakeholders understand the changes that 
are being implemented, regardless of whether these changes are within the 
project, or in the macro environment.” 
 
In this study I conclude that the most effective means of establishing a disciplined 
information controlled environment is to introduce it early, drive it through management 
example, and most importantly, dedicate resources to maintaining it. In its most mature form, 
this might involve a Project Information Office (PIO) as central controllers of project 
information, documents and data (i.e. the PMIS); and holding responsibility for arranging 
and recording meetings and teleconferences, moderating official on-line networks, wikis, and 
blog sites, and managing communication outputs. The PIO would hold authority for approval 
and recognition of any satellite group information needs, including the use of project 
templates, branding, intellectual property (IP), and single point management media 
interfaces. Clearly, the adoption of such a concept r resents a radical move towards the 




As an example, the early phase UK HIPER project is already benefiting from a distinct Work 
Package entitled Public Relations and Communications. 
 
Experience from the LOFAR project suggests that extensive formalisation (PIO-style) early 
in the project was viewed unfavourably (ASTRON, 2010). However the increasing drive for 
industrial class high-tech mega-projects (as opposed to technical institution models) is 
demanding greater rigour from the institutional sector. When interviewed, a LOFAR senior 
manager suggested that a balance might be struck by providing a Wiki-type document 
environment where early stage documents and concepts from scientists and engineers can be 
assimilated less formally (LOFAR, 2011). 
 
 
3.3.4.4. Risk, contingency and descopes 
 
High-tech projects have inherent risk as a consequence of their raison d’être, and higher risks 
must be consistent with higher contingency (Fisher, 2010). A common approach to dealing 
with project execution risk (seen in each of the fieldwork case studies) is a register type tool 
using a rating system to score anticipated risk based on the likelihood and consequences of 
the defined event occurring (British Computer Society, 2006; GMT, 2011; ASKAP, 2010). 
Residual risk is assessed after controls are considered. Management decisions are then taken 
to accept, mitigate, or remove those risks. Conventional approaches to risk assessment (e.g. 
cause/likelihood matrices) are somewhat problematic be ause of the perception that 
resilience has been instilled to deal with all unexpected events (Pender, 2001), whereas it is 
actually most reliant on experiential hindsight as  risk predictor. Furthermore, most 
attention is applied to technical risk; largely ignori g emerging environmental, social, and 
political risks that are just as important in terms of project success (ICCP, 2011). 
 
Nevertheless, the approach is reasonably effective at the project start-up for the known 
knowns and unknown knowns, but takes little account of the unknown unknowns27 – events, 
circumstances or outcomes that are invisible to the project, yet almost certainly will arise and 
are often ‘outside the rulebook’ (PMI, 2011)28. Placing the full possibilities in matrix form 
(Fig. 3-8), we can see that even in the absence of data or effective modelling techniques, 
                                                           
27 “There are known knowns; the things we know that we know. There are known unknowns; the 
things that we know we don’t know. There are also unknown unknowns; the things we do not know 
we don’t know.” Donald Rumsfeld, former U.S. Secretary of Defence, Brussels, Belgium, 2002. 
28










Fig. 3-8. Options for analysis of known-unknown event combinations (Zurich, 2010, p. 13) 
 
Work in NASA by Saunders et al., (2003, p. 369) shows that: “all development programs 
will encounter unforeseen events and problems”. One Boeing expert asserts that risk 
management works well provided we can foresee the risk. Unfortunately, unforeseen bad 
things happen (Schoening, 2009). Howell et al. (2009) link ‘consequences’ to risk by 
asserting that extreme uncertainty (chaos) equates to a 100% probability of an unexpected 
event. 
 
Geraldi et al. (2010, p. 548) contend that in projects: “it is not a question of if, but when, 
unexpected events will emerge”. These perturbations may include transactional issues such 
as exchange rate fluctuations, market changes etc. (Nicholas, 2004). Miller & Lessard (2000) 
report that, on average, projects encountered five unexpected events in the formative stages 
and some were confronted with as many as 12. The ALMA telescope gas energy supply 
interruption being one example where an early assumption appeared fully reliable, only to be 
unexpectedly revoked. 
 
The American approach, epitomised in NASA’s Space Flight Program and Project 
Management Handbook (NASA, 2010b), is to derive a budget contingency against risks, 
including unknown unknowns,  identified through integrated risk analysis. This contingency 
is part of the cost baseline and is separate from the management reserves for unknowns. 
NASA’s codified processes offer the project manager several choices for managing funding 
reserves (a) allocate the reserve to specific subsytems and subprojects (b) hold the entire 
reserve at the project level but allocate it for trubled subsystems, or (c) embed the reserves 





As an example, NASA’s Mars Pathfinder allowed for 40% of project budget to be kept as 
contingency against the: “inevitable surprises and adjustments the ambitious new technology 
program would bring” (NASA, 2011b, p. 26). Every element of the project was cost-capped, 
with no extra funds to draw on if they overspent. But even NASA can get it wrong as shown 
in the case of the JWST where Siegel (2011, p. 7) reports: “the mismanagement was 
primarily not keeping enough cash-on-hand to deal with unexpected issues when they came 
up”. 
 
NASA’s System Engineering Handbook (NASA, 2007a) comprehensively deals with 
processes to identify and manage risk in high-tech projects.   NASA’s methodology 
introduces risk scenarios that, along with consequences, likelihoods, and associated 
uncertainties, make up the complete risk triplet (wi h total risk as a set of triplets-scenarios). 
The triplet concept (see Fig. 3-9) applies in principle to all risk types, and includes the 




Fig. 3-9. Total high-tech project risk expressed as a set of triplets (NASA, 2007a p. 141) 
 
If the substantive risk to the project is unknown, how might we deal with it at the project 
formative stage? This study suggests a dual response: applied contingency, and threat 
readiness. 
 
Project contingency (rather than specific threat contingency) includes those external factors 
or events that cannot yet be pinpointed but will seriously jeopardise the project when they 
materialise. However quantifying contingency is non-trivial. The PMBOK® Guide mentions 
reserves and contingency but not how they are computed or applied within the project 
(Pender, 2001). Nicholas (2004) offers a calculator and further suggests an overrun 
allowance in some circumstances. NASA has developed th  ‘Joint Confidence Level – 




hold many unknown risks (Butts & Linton, 2009). The GMT project takes the lowest level of 
the WBS to estimate contingency values, claiming this is the most effective method (GMT, 
2010). 
 
The US Department of Energy’s Cost Estimating Guide (DOE, 2011) also ties contingency 
and management reserves to specific project confidence levels of 70-90% based on (but not 
limited to) risk assumptions, complexity, and project size. In their model, quantitative 
methods are used to objectively analyse project coningency, through an aggregation of 
probability and consequences of individual risk. Risk analysis of budget and schedule uses 
statistical modelling techniques such as Monte Carlo simulation, sensitivity simulations, 
influence diagrams, decision trees, and other stochastic methodologies. The results are used 
to establish the cost and schedule contingency for the equired confidence level. Each risk is 
assigned a probability, each cost impact is attributed a dollar amount, and each activity is 
given a schedule impact. The concept is expressed a the equation below (source: DOE, 
2011, p. 51): 
 
 EV  ∑ P* x CI*  or SI* [3-1] 
Where: EV = Expected value of cost impact (or duration impact) of all risks29 
 PRi = Probability distribution function of a risk occurrence 
 CIRi = Cost impact distribution function of a risk occurrence 
 SIRi = Schedule impact distribution function of a risk occurrence 
 
For the Project Manager, the potential problem with the quantitative method above is the 
possible errors in the underlying assumptions, and careful analysis and testing is required for 
validation. Inaccurate estimates of underpinning qualitative scores (i.e. for risk impact or 
likelihood) will give erroneous outputs leading to incorrect values of contingency and 
confidence levels. It should also be clear that the unknown unknowns are not taken into 
account, and appropriate allowances will need to be estimated for unexpected threats from 
outside the project. 
 
Whatever approach is applied, early budgeting for appropriate (cash) reserves is clearly 
indicated as one strategy for resilience, and reserv  anging from 20% - 25% (Fellows & 
                                                           
29 Note that ∑ is not the summation of individual expected values for each risk, but represents a 
stochastic process (e.g., Monte Carlo simulation) using the collective probabilities and cost/schedule 
impacts for all identified risk events, and can be us fully expressed in graphic form (e.g. a bar chart) 





Alexander, 2010; JPL, 2010) upwards to 50% - 100% (NASA, 2009; ASKAP, 2009) are not 
considered unrealistic in the high-tech mega-science environment. Flyvbjerg (ABC, 2011) 
seriously suggests that firms embarking on major IT projects assure themselves of being able 
to withstand a threefold cost increase before approval. 
 
NASA’s Kepler spacecraft represents successful contingency management, despite the 
project following a disappointing but familiar path of cost increases and schedule slippages. 
Ultimately, when faced with yet a further funding request of $42 million, NASA Science 
Chief, Alan Stern refused and called for a workable plan to avoid cancellation. By reducing 
project length, amending test plans, and streamlining management, the original budget was 
maintained. Most importantly, analysis showed no increase to mission risk (Rendleman & 
Faulconer, 2011). 
 
One other avenue of contingency that arose from the present study’s casework, is the 
possibly of descoping, in terms of the project physical facilities (e.g. reduced quantity or 
performance of procured devices) coupled with lowered aspirations (e.g. less experiments). 
In the case of the BEAGLE Mars lander, system tests were even descoped to maintain 
schedule, almost certainly contributing to its failure (ESA, 2004). However this mode of 
(potential or actual) cost saving in order to fund unexpected risks or cost increases does not 
necessarily equate to project failure (PMI, 2011), but the quantum of saving requires careful 
analysis against both the loss in overall project performance, and the perception it gives to 
stakeholders. When interviewed, Prof. Holdaway from the TOPSAT project said: 
“Descoping of science goals is the proper way to achieve budget control. [But] everybody 
must understand what is being achieved for the money and what is being delivered/lost" 
(TOPSAT, 2010). 
 
Saunders et al. (2003, p. 368) offer their experience from space missions: “Descope plans 
are a necessary part of the risk management plan, but these should be used as a last resort. 
When descope plans are developed, it is very important to identify for each item the...effect 
on the mission”. Descopes have their own dangers, as evident in the troubled AEHF30 
system. Budget blowouts from technical problems and l unch slips caused deletion of two 
satellites based on the justification that AEHF would become an interim system to the 
TSAT31 program. TSAT was itself first restructured, then cancelled (Rendleman & 
Faulconer, 2011). 
 
                                                           
30
 Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite System 




The NASA Space Flight and Project Management Handbook (NASA, 2010b, p. 34) offers 
further practical advice: 
 
“Descopes must not cut a project below the minimum success criteria needed to 
carry out the missions in the program. If a descope is invoked, it is necessary to take 
a systems view to ensure that all potential interactions are identified. It is important 
to identify potential descopes early and to get spon or buy in. It is also important to 
identify the risk associated with taking potential descopes. Many potential descopes 
are possible and beneficial when taken early in the program life cycle but may be 
much less useful or even increase overall program or pr ject risk when taken late in 
the life cycle.” 
 
Confirmation of project scope at any point in the project lifecycle is paramount; however an 
early period of grace may be appropriate for high-tech projects where the final performance 
is highly dependent on some nascent R&D. Once agreed (or changed), the project scope 
must be documented, announced, and defended. The LHC project leader, Lyn Evans, put it 
bluntly to me at an on-site interview: “scope creep is your biggest enemy” (LHC, 2009). 
 
Since the unknown cannot be planned in detail, an altern tive method is to plan for 
everything (the Napoleon approach) expecting that something will go wrong and that a 
solution will be needed as the challenge emerges. When referring to the aggressive, 
revolutionary high-tech F117 Stealth Fighter program, Nicholas (2004, p. 325) writes: 
“Expecting the unexpected is often better preparation for coping with risk than preparing 
extensive plans and believing that the unexpected has been eliminated.” 
 
General managerial alertness is clearly required to scan broadly for potential threats. Smith 
(2007) describes ‘uncertainty spotting’ skills; theearly seeking out and challenging of threats 
and assumptions. An expert gap analysis of the ASKAP project identified lack of planning 
for ‘really bad program events’, and suggested the same preventative approach though 
appointing specific people, who are only loosely connected with the project, as sentinels 
against trouble (Schoening, 2009).  In their study of tools for complex projects, Remington 
and Pollack (2008, p. 4) discuss non-linear risk events requiring early decision-making about 
communications and governance, so that even if managers cannot directly predict the source 
or possible ramifications, an “atmosphere of preparedness develops”. Certainly, being 






Coupled with this are task force response teams (aka ‘tiger’ or ‘cheetah’ teams) that are 
shown to operate effectively to contain and direct events (Crosby, 2012b). The strength of 
the task force lies in their combined expertise, detachment from the project, and freedom 
from project bureaucracy (LHC, 2009). Power is concentrated through limiting numbers and 
very careful participant selection (Pavlak, 2004b). However, task forces take time to 
establish and become effective. Ibbs and Kwak (2000) found, when investigating risk 
management approaches, that such groups are formed after the problem has arisen, which is 
too late. Rendleman and Faulconer (2011) describe a ‘tiger team’ formed to address cost 
blowouts at Falcon Air Force Base, explaining that e project overrun was around $1 billion 
by the time the task force was assembled. I posit that one or more task force panels might be 
anticipated, assembled virtually during project start-up, and periodically offered a project 
‘health’ report so that a dormant state of readiness is maintained. In the event of an 
unforeseen disruption, a panel of previously enrolled experts are far better placed to begin 
problem solving than a bricolage type response. 
 
In addition to applying contingency and maintaining a quiescent threat readiness, wise 
project managers will practice skilful early stage planning to try and avoid unplanned events. 
Howell et al. (2010) warn us of the spiralling effect of plan deviations, leading to hasty 
replanning, improvisation, and ad-hoc responses, reulting in yet more uncertainty and 
surprises. Activities including response readiness, stakeholder negotiation skills, avoidance 
of panic and over-reaction, and speedy approval processes, all serve to strengthen resilience 
(Geraldi et al., 2010). 
 
 
3.3.4.5. Project environment 
 
Whatever their size or structure, projects exist within a larger financial, geo-political, and 
governance framework (project environment) that can both enable and constrain the 
enterprise (Blanchard, 1990; Archibald, 2003). The high-tech projects considered in the 
present study generally require physical space for infrastructure, often in underdeveloped 
areas prone to host site sensitivities. Gaining approvals for large engineering facilities, often 
involving decades of operations, can be a slow process fraught with challenges. Merrow’s 
(1988, p. vi) study of 52 mega-projects concludes: 
 
“Cost growth and schedule slippage...are driven primarily by conflicts between the 
projects and host governments, i.e., institutional problems relating to environmental 




procurement controls. The importance of institutional factors clearly distinguishes 
mega-projects from their smaller cousins.” 
 
Projects encumbered by excessive government restrictions or involvement showed a strong 
negative relationship to success in a study by Murphy et al. (1974), while Pinto & Mantel 
(1990, p. 274) add: “change in the project environment beyond the contrl of management” 
as a cause of project failure. A high level European Commission report alerts project 
managers to the consequences of decisions inspired by political considerations rather than 
technical and scientific requirements (European Commission, 2010). Large IT projects are 
similarly vulnerable (British Computer Society, 2006). 
 
Systematic periodic scanning of the high-tech project environment is strongly endorsed by 
Archibald (2003), who presents a comprehensive pie-chart to help guide the strategic 
engagement process (see Fig. 3-10). The idea is to identify both the key actors, and the key 




Fig. 3-10. A pie-chart of project environmental factors with potential to affect project 






The project environment may also prove challenging  terms of recruiting talent. 
Assembling the best people at the facility site, or even in a less remote headquarters office, 
must inevitably mean consideration of visa, tax statu , spouse and family issues 
(employment and school), insurance, and pension provisions. Mega-projects frequently have 
the critical mass to negotiate privileges such as tax advantages and certain immunities, thus 
offsetting the upheaval of relocation and impacts on personnel lifestyle (OECD, 2010). 
 
 
There is advantage in establishing the project within known, coherent and mature 
institutional arrangements. Miller & Lessard (2000, p. 23) write: “Projects shaped in 
incomplete and shifting arrangements have a hard time taking off: they require deals and 
agreements that may not stand for long”. In the $3bn Accelerator Production of Tritium 
(APT) project, project management successfully adopted the concurrent engineering 
approach, integrating design, planning, and operations teams early on, and conducting up-
front analysis driven by environmental (NEPA) requirements. Consideration of these early 
resulted in significant changes to design and operability of the plant (Laufer & Hoffman, 
2000). 
 
Fieldwork interviews for this thesis indicate that  proactive approach to government 
negotiations offers real benefits. By leveraging the infrastructure investment, the ALMA 
project not only won significant concessions, but also eased visa processes for foreign 
workers (ALMA, 2011). Through tight links with European Government heads, the SKA 
project has been relieved of substantial logistical costs of international meetings, and is soon 
to re-locate to new purpose built premises adjacent to the UK’s Jodrell Bank facility. 
 
Similarly, the Antarctic LIDAR project leader explains the benefits of early liaison with 
authorities: 
 
“We submitted a comprehensive environmental assessment early which was accepted 
without restriction. This covered installation of the infrastructure and on-going 
operations. In 2005 we changed the configuration of the transmitter and reviewed 
our procedures in discussion with our aviation and communications sections. Since 
then we have not had any significant restrictions to our summer operations - we still 
have safety procedures in place, but pilots now fully accommodate our operations. 
All of our procedures have been reviewed by ARPANSA, and this process has not 





However, failure to fully understand regulatory compliance can be costly. For example, the 
Australian ASKAP radio telescope encountered unanticipated delays in achieving 
government approval for land use, requiring significant diplomacy and skilled effort from 
project personnel (CSIRO, 2007-2009). Blanchard (1990) urges early attention to regulatory 
approvals, and states that the cost of compliance with environmental and special interest 
groups needs must be factored into project cost estimates. 
 
A 2007 report of major astronomy project surveys warns readers of changing political 
agendas, agency priorities, budget pressures, as well as unanticipated disasters, and scientific 
results. It recommends to: “start with a more realistic sense of agency budgetary and policy 
environments...so that [project] surveys can be more resilient” (Fellows & Alexander, 2010, 
p. 3). The world beyond the project is neither benign nor complacent, and early stage 
investment into securing a legally compliant, socially cceptable, and affordable project 
deployment plan pays dividends. 
 
 
3.3.4.6. Mission assurance 
 
While conducting field investigations for this thesis, I identified a particular characteristic of 
certain project managers; an unwavering sense of purpose in making mission success the 
highest priority at all levels of the project (ALMA, 2007; ASKAP, 2009; ITER, 2009; 
SYNCH, 2009). The adoption of this ‘mission assurance’ mindset is captured compellingly 
within aerospace industry reports (e.g. NASA, 2000) which encourages institutional line 
management to become more engaged in the execution of the project and be held 
accountable for mission success. 
 
So important is this viewed at NASA, it now promotes and maintains specific safety and 
mission assurance offices with their functionality embedded in key project management 
literature. For example, the NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management 
Handbook (NASA, 2010b, p. 95) describes the focus of mission assurance to monitor the: 
 
 “established design criteria and standardized contrl design practices to ensure 
that the design is capable of:  
• Functioning properly during the required mission lifet me 




• Permitting ease of assembly, test, fault isolation, repair, servicing, and 
maintenance without compromising safety, reliability, quality, and 
performance 
• Allowing for access requirements that might arise during assembly, test, and 
prelaunch checkout, and 
• Utilizing such analytical techniques as Design Trade-off Analyses, Failure 
Modes Effect and Criticality Analyses (FMECA), Parts Stress Analyses, 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), and Worst Case Analyses”  
 
An expert panel inquiry of budget problems of the James Webb Space Telescope underlines 
this approach by including the recommendation (among many) to restructure the JWST 
project office to emphasise mission assurance. Its focus should be lowest cost to complete, 
launch readiness, and science requirements at the implementation phase, coupled with 
assigning project accountability to the centre management (JPL, 2010). 
 
The implementation of a mission assurance function (part auditor, part advisor, part ‘devil’s 
advocate’) means placing this vital resource outside of mainstream project delivery, yet close 
enough to have ready participation in critical testing, meetings, and reviews, and with access 
to project management. The role is principally one of questioning and checking that 
activities, deviations and changes, particularly at project interfaces, pose no unrecoverable 
threat to execution and performance. 
 
Created at project start-up, the mission assurance function is best placed to conduct a project 
audit after the definition stage but before execution begins. Graham & Englund (1997, p. 
192) describe this as: “like a group of expert consultants...review the plans and proposals 
before the project team begins...and provide feedback on the technical and managerial 
feasibility of the plans...using their knowledge and experience to foresee problems.” NASA 
links early examination of the mission architecture to technical success, claiming that: “in
early stages of concept development it is not uncomm n for teams to develop architectures 
which have elements that do not work well together. The criticality of this mistake is 
dependent on...technical, schedule, and cost margins” (Saunders et al., 2003, p. 363). 
 
When questioned, many of the interviewees for this study claimed that external panels 
fulfilled the niche of mission assurance while conducting design reviews and other early 
activities, but the temporary nature of these panels is never equivalent to a project-bound 




deployment team, there needs to be a distinct mission assurance role assigned at the project 




3.3.5 Brief qualitative assessment 
 
Having drawn out the more subtle, though highly influential, attitudinal environmental and 
launch conditions shown to be important for project success, it is useful to examine how 
these nine factors are addressed in practice. 
 
For this, I selected three large radio-astronomy projects from the fieldwork studies detailed 
in Table 1-1. Although being similar in terms of being remotely located giant radio 
telescopes with large and complex information technology (IT) requirements, they are 















Fig. 3-11. Key Project Data – ALMA, ASKAP, and the SKA 
 
In preparation for the comparative assessment, I examined the data collected during on-site 
investigations, as described in the approach and methodology for this thesis. The data were 
sorted to expose relevant examples of situations or events that fell within the special 
resilience factor categories identified in this section. Against each factor, I describe a 
challenge that faced each of the three cases, and the method and extent of the response from 
    Identifier Budget Infrastructure Location Stage 
Atacama Large 
Millimetre 
Array (ALMA)  
US$1.4 
billion 
50 dish high-frequency 
radio telescope array, plus 











36 dish mid-frequency 
radio telescope array and 












250/3000 dish low & mid 
frequency radio 
telescope, with control 
and data processing 
centre 
Southern Africa 
or Australasia (to 
be confirmed) 
Transition from 







each project. Table 3-2 shows this work tabulated to enable ready comparison and 
contrasting of challenges and responses between the case projects, and reveal commonalities. 
 
A summary review of the data in Table 3-2 presents useful insights. Cost, schedule and 
performance optimism was universal, and each project introduced constraints to meet 
budgets. Little effort was evident to learn from analogous high-tech projects. All three cases 
struggled at some point to deal with project ambiguities and uncertainties, though responses 
showed these challenges are surmountable. Some disconne t was apparent between lofty 
science goals and practical execution, later bridged through individual project initiatives. 
Both reporting and decision-making processes, and project information control, were 
competently managed, but with room for maturation t industry standards. Risk and 
contingency factors were handled only moderately well, exposing the ASKAP and SKA 
projects especially to the effects of unforeseen disasters. While the important external project 
landscape was managed well in all cases, the potential advantages of a formal mission 





Table 3-2. Comparative assessment of three case studie  against resilience factors 





• Expectations of a networked 64 dish array in 
original (2001) budget. Bottom up costing 
revealed significant project costs overlooked 
• Underestimates of cost and resources to 
develop receptor (PAF) technologies 
• Possible descope impact due to budget trade-
offs. Stakeholder expectation issues 
• Underestimates of cost, time and resources to 
meet software and computing requirements  




• Re-baselining exercise in 2005 triggered call for 
additional funding 
• Descope to 50 dishes pre-construction 
• Project now proceeding 
• Consultation with industry regarding volume 
production costs 
• Revised plan / funding proposal developed to 
show viability with alternate project pathway 
• Use existing code wherever possible 
• Top-down ‘cost-cap’ budget ‘as a design 
constraint’ approach to development 
• Use first order parametric estimating models 






• Domain knowledge considered held within the 
partners (NSF, ESO, NAOJ) through specific 
capabilities. However weakness emerged for 
industrial integration capabilities 
• Domain system engineering knowledge held 
tacitly by individuals. 
• No formal systems to codify, archive, or 
transfer lessons learned  
• Domain system engineering knowledge held 
tacitly by individuals. No formal systems to 
codify, archive, or transfer lessons learned.  
The level of coordination and hence 
collaboration is impacted 
 
Response 
• Level of stakeholder investment meant major 
decisions not optimised 
• Therefore all decisions still not ideal or based on 
researched experience 
• Currently no formal lessons learned 
mechanism evident 
• Some effort made to consult developers and 
operators of like-projects, however highly 









• Deep technical domain knowledge for major 
system components and software, but project 
interfaces less defined and complex 
• Push for technology break-throughs, 
especially in PAF’s, computing, and ‘green 
‘energy 
• These are complex, inter-related problems 
with unclear solutions  
• Unfolding science goals and ‘proof of 
concept’ TRLs causing ambiguity 
• Complex Exascale computing capabilities do 
not yet exist, and may be unaffordable 
 
Response 
• Large investment in system engineering 
resources to continually resolve interface issues 
• Project leadership instilled culture of ‘relay-race’ 
rather than ‘marathon’ 
• Highly intensive and frequent technical and 
planning meetings held 
• There is some sense-making emerging, but 
peripety has yet to occur 
• A more modest Phase1 SKA design released 
• Science ambitions scaled to computer power 
budget (flops and watts) 
•  ‘Moore’s Law’ uncertainty remains  











• Science high-level goals considered fixed 
objective, with clear vision of project success. 
However re-baselining meant compromise 
• The broad project goal is clear; however 
some divergence is apparent between long 
term and short term objectives  
• Development of a mega-project mission 
within an international collaboration and 
funding framework 
• Scope creep 
 
Response 
• Re-scoping of project largely maintains 
achievement of science objectives through 
adjusted operations  
• A group is assigned to bring certainty to the 
long term purpose of ASKAP 
• Overcoming shorter term technical barriers is 
the present mission 
• The SKA now has stated science goals 
against a top-down budget, a Design 
Reference Mission, and a Phase1 pre-







• Need for strong and clear project reporting and 
execution structure, in face of 50/50 ownership 
• Decision structure and process must be 
consistent and workable  
• ASKAP resides within a well defined project 
management structure. Reporting at the 
Integrated Project team (IPT) level is less 
consistent, though competent 
• Reporting and decision-making structures are 
complex and variable, typifying the science 
community decision-making behaviour 
• Participation in committees and at decision 
meetings is inconsistent 
 
Response 
• ALMA project structure well defined and 
implemented at work-site level 
• More prone to compromise and decision-delay at 
higher management levels 
• Third partner added (NAOJ) 
• Major decisions need lengthy discussion at Joint 
Alma Office (JAO) level 
• Fine tuning the project structure to reflect the 
project team site location is in process. 
• Project reporting is enhanced through 
migration and automation of reporting 
processes to DAPTIV© platform  
• Efforts to lift effectiveness and integration of 
meetings and decisions mostly unsuccessful 
• Task Forces work effectively 
• The planned move to a project office 
structure will ‘normalise’ reporting and 






• Project information control extremely important 
to maintain project control, and effective 
procurement systems 
• Possible mismatch between ASKAP 
execution, industry, and large institutional 
framework 
• IP requires specialist management 
• SKA design and cost data yet to be brought 
under a formal control system, and there is no 




• JAO maintains strict controls on project technical 
data, procurement data, system engineering 
documents and Standards, and PR material 
• Major meetings administered centrally 
• Some reluctance by NAOJ to announce problems 
early 
• ASKAP project information is under 
dispersed control. IPT leaders maintain 
technical data control 
• Industry consortium established 
• IP is periodically identified through active 
scan and appropriately managed 
• Appointment of a Systems Engineer under a 
Project Manager is starting to create 
information discipline 
•  The planned move to a project office 











• Need for full identification and tracking of 
project risk, despite mixed contingency and 
risk culture within the major project owners 
• Propensity to focus on tactical risks, and 
downplay need for contingency, despite 
evidence of significant likely cost-growth 
• Propensity to focus on tactical risks, and 
downplay need for contingency reserves, 
despite past experience in mega-science  
 
Response 
• American approach to risk adopted 
• Comprehensive risk register, risk ‘burn’ 
reports, and contingency established and 
tracked - 15.8%, later reduced to 9.2% 
• Task forces readily established (e.g. antennas 
specification problem) 
•  Little overt acknowledgement of, or pre-
planning for, unknown risks 
• Recent moves to address project and 
corporate risk and contingency in new 
business plan 
• Recent costing strategy foreshadows a 
contingency component 
• Growing awareness of importance to 
acknowledge unknown risks within the 
professional team, yet specific cash reserves 







• Construction and operation of a mega-science 
facility in the Chilean Andes 
• The location is harsh and remote 
• Need for skilled and unskilled workers during 
construction phase 
• ASKAP will be situated in remote Australia. 
There are indigenous people sensitivities, 
some environmental fragility, and 
competition from mining companies. 
Electrical quietness requires legislation 
• Deployment of a large infrastructure project 
in sensitive geographic location requires 
lengthy and careful planning in conjunction 
with approval authorities 




• Substantial planning and site negotiation with 
Government at early stages 
• Landowner on ALMA Board 
• Specific ‘Astronomy Site’ legislation enacted 
• Tax-free ‘diplomat’ status for foreign project 
personnel. Project has sales tax-free status 
• Substantial effort and cost is being applied to 
ensure compliance (in spirit and in fact) with 
land use policies 
• Radio-quietness is under legislation 
development 
• Negotiations underway with mining interests 
• Some team awareness of project 
environmental aspects - mostly funding 
scenarios and site host issues. These are 
handled by relevant Domain groups, and 
overseen by the SKA Project Executive 





Challenge • Requirement for project ‘watchdog’ role to 
ensure vigilance and prompt response against 
threats to mission goals 
• Implementation of project ‘watchdog’ role to 
ensure vigilance and prompt response against 
threats to mission goals. 
• Implementation of project ‘watchdog’ role to 
ensure vigilance and prompt response against 
threats to mission goals.  
 
Response 
• ALMA Advisory Committee charged with 
taking longer term project perspective, to 
identify potential dangers to project delivery 
• No specific in-project role identified for 
NASA- style Mission Assurance 
• The establishment of a ‘mission assurance’ 
(MA) function is unfamiliar to Australian 
based science projects 
• There is no role assigned in ASKAP for a 
specific mission assurance function 
• The establishment of a MA function is 
unfamiliar to European science projects  
• Current budget restrictions preclude 
establishment of a formal MA function 
•  Internal and external engineering reviews 




3.3.6 Conclusions and discussion 
 
This study of special resilience factors illustrates that for most high-tech projects, both 
attitudinal and launch conditioning factors remain  challenge, no less so for large and 
complex IT projects. The nine factors are: 
 
 Attitudinal  
• realistic, fact based 
• a lessons-learned culture 
• ambiguity-tolerant 
 
Launch Conditioning  
• mission and success clearly defined 
• clear decision structures 
• strong information control 
• risk preparedness 
• external environmental awareness 
• mission assurance implemented. 
 
Schedule and cost optimism especially is a well known phenomenon, yet it continues to be 
neglected by high-tech project management. The issue results partly from failure to forecast 
project costs accurately and partly through competitiv  funding environments where 
underestimates in time and/or cost have traditionally been tacitly accepted or even 
encouraged. Anecdotally, current global economic conditions indicate reducing tolerance to 
this approach in the face of stricter funding priorities (Matson, 2010). Use of lessons-learned 
has been historically weak, and remains patchy. High-tech mega-projects especially should 
formally plan for at least a degree of up-front research to inform the major challenges and 
decisions ahead. Early ambiguity in projects can frustrate project groups used to a more 
industrial model, yet are overcome through trust building – itself dependent on effective and 
frequent project team communication. 
 
In regard to launch conditions, the benefits of defining the project mission and success 
definitions early are strongly evident, as are clear and consistent structures for reporting and 
decision-making. I advance the concept of a Project Information Office (PIO) with a remit 
covering not only information, documents and data, but also the broader responsibility for 




flows. As such, the PIO would be the central coordinator of project community information 
needs, including project templates, branding, IP, and single point management media 
interfaces. 
 
Risk management in high-tech projects is typically dealt with programmatically and often 
views projects as a deterministic process, but this approach fails to fully consider unknown 
unknowns. To address this epistemic uncertainty in high-tech projects, a two-pronged 
approach is suggested: (i) estimating and establishing an identified contingency reserve, 
ideally integrated to dynamic risk ‘burn’, and (ii) the early appointment of one or more 
‘proto’ task forces panels kept in dormant readiness to offer expert advice against 
unanticipated events. 
 
The execution of large infrastructure projects carries compliance obligations involving 
national authorities. Even with State blessing, these xternal negotiations are rarely simple, 
and need careful and dedicated stewardship at (or before) project start-up. Internally, the 
formation of a mission assurance function working alongside project management, 
supporting the project teams and reporting at Director level improves success through 
enabling peripety (Engwall & Westling, 2001). Integrated at the conceptual phase, the 
mission assurance function brings experiential capability and intellectual rigour to project 
definition. Finally, taking time to gain a full understanding of project complexity is essential 
to shape project structure and management approach. The present study advocates a robust 
strategic method through project mapping and development of multiple approaches, before 
committing resources to a focused strategy. 
 
Management of the conceptualisation and planning phases has a pivotal effect on the 
ultimate success of projects. For international high-tech projects especially, the alignment of 
key activities with key players is crucial. It is people, with their talents, attitudes and 
experience, who ultimately deliver the initiatives set out in this study and sponsors should 
strive to hire the best staff available (Katsanevas et al., 2009). This underpinning aspect of 
projects is advanced by Cook-Davies (2002, p. 189) as: “people perform every process, and 
it is the people who ultimately determine the adequacy”. 
 
 
3.4 Planning and baselines, project lifecycles, budgets and schedules 
Finally in this chapter, I look briefly at the programmatical aspects of projects and relate 
these to pre-cursors of high-tech project success. Certainly the commonly held view of the 




performance – is founded on the assertion that the project goals are supported by detailed 
advanced planning (Dvir, et al., 2003). 
 
 
3.4.1 Project planning 
In their analysis of the relationship between project planning and project success in R&D 
projects, Dvir et al. (2003, p. 94) confirm that, despite the claim of too much planning 
curtailing creativity: “there is no argument that at least a minimum level of planning is 
required. In fact, planning is considered a central element of modern project management”. 
They concur with Jugdev and Müller (2005) in pointing to the rather mechanistic advice in 
the PMBOK Guide that informs project managers that although planning does not guarantee 
project success, a lack of planning will probably assure project failure. 
 
Planning itself implies the defining of goals and functional specifications, and 
unsurprisingly, Dvir et al.’s work reveals a strong positive relationship between planning, 
requirements, and end-user satisfaction. Kerzner (1998) posits that in some projects (e.g. 
‘new and emerging technologies’); it may not be possible to have a full definition of the 
project scope prior to commencement. As a result, the project may require planning ‘from 
the middle out’, requiring heavy involvement from the customer/user and a very flexible and 
adaptable approach to refining requirements. Verzuh (2003) develops this idea, pointing out 
the limitations of the planning horizon – the distance you can actually see into the future. 
 
Project planning in all but the simplest systems will incur the creation of a ‘baseline’ 
schedule to capture the project plan at commencement, and enable subsequent tracking. 
Elenbaas (2000) warns against the notion that a useful baseline can be generated within 
project management tools alone, arguing that this vital activity must involve deep 
understanding and commitment from key project stakeholders, ideally involving a walk-
through by the project manager. His reasoning is that t e project baseline, and the detailed 
schedules/plans that it supports, are a bundled set of dynamics incorporating stakeholder 
assumptions and constraints, and form the project ‘touch-stone’ on which success depends so 
much. Interestingly, the GMT project elected to contract out the development of the project 
baseline. While this indicates a readiness to engage professional expertise within the project 






This is not to say that baselines must never change. In his Portable MBA for Project 
Management, Verzuh (2003) raises that likelihood that asks and deliverables will be left out 
of the plan. E.g. the way we will do the work will change; the estimates for cost, schedule, 
and resources will be wrong; and one or more stakehold rs will demand variations to the 
project scope. Verzuh (2003) suggests permitting changes for the very early project reporting 
periods, then freeze the baseline for the remainder of the project. 
 
 
3.4.2 Project lifecycles and phasing  
 
Early mapping of the high-tech project lifecycle offers both task clarity and temporal 
horizons that underpin the schedule. Typically, Phase 1 describes concept generation based 
on an evaluation of alternative ways to achieve the project mission. Phase 2 is where the 
project definition takes place and proto-plans are fo med, ready to take forward. Phase 3 
covers project realisation through detailed planning and design, implementation, and 
execution (Winch, 1996). Further phases may be introduced to span 
commissioning/handover, utilisation (operations and maintenance), and ultimately close 
down and disposal. Khang and Moe (2008) go further in recommending application of a 
result-based framework capturing different sets of success factors against each phase 
allowing improved analysis and next-phase preparation. 
 
The foregoing suggests a serial process with limited opportunity to condense the overall 
project length (Jugdev and Müller, 2005). However possibilities exist to reduce elapsed time 
through overlapping of project phases, although suc concurrency can lead to significant cost 
growth. Winch (1996) discusses the concept of independent work packages that can proceed 
in parallel (essentially organised mini-projects) to accelerate progress, and offers examples 
such as rapid prototyping that is becoming an art in i self. Work Packages are commonly 
mapped onto a project work breakdown structure (WBS), and Verzuh (2003) shows how this 
is used to reduce risk – in one case by choosing a prototyping approach to develop a product 
in response to uncertain user requirements. Archibald (2003) refers to this overlapping as 
‘fast-tracking’ in engineering projects, and ‘concurrency’ in military/aerospace projects, 
while noting the need for strong project management. He also warns readers of the mounting 
cost of lost time recovery for each successive project phase, and shows how a typical 
increase in personnel for high-tech projects leads to an ominous exponential growth in costs. 
 
Archibald (2004, p. 6) looks specifically at high-tech projects and identifies two types of 




adaptability is directly relevant to this thesis, with the model descriptions found in all of the 
examples and casework in the present study and supporting their success: 
 
• Waterfall  (traditional, or top-down): linear ordering of the phases, which can be 
strictly sequential or overlapping to some extent; no phase is normally repeated (e.g. 
OPAL). 
• Prototyping: functional requirements and physical design specificat ons are generated 
simultaneously (e.g. LOFAR). 
• Rapid Application Development (RAD): based on an evolving prototype that is not 
thrown away (e.g. ASKAP). 
• Incremental Build:  decomposition of a large development effort into a succession of 
smaller components (e.g. TOPSAT). 
• Spiral:  repetition of the same set of life-cycle phases such as plan, develop, build, and 
evaluate until development is complete (e.g. LOFAR). 
 
 
3.4.3 Project budgets and cost estimations 
The project budget is the cornerstone of the project plan, encompassing (a) the original 
estimates, (b) the almost inevitable growth as the project is conceptualised, (c) the 
expenditure of funds as execution proceeds, and (d) reconciliation at project close. 
 
 Announcing early estimates of high-tech mega-project costs is fraught with danger. Grün 
(2004, p. 249) recounts that the: “significance of those first, early estimates of time and cost, 
especially when they are used for the authorisation of funds [are taken as the] standard of 
reference in all subsequent discussion. It is no use saying later that it was only an estimate”.  
This view is borne out by managers from several of my case studies who expressed regret 
that early estimates had appeared in reports to funding agencies (ASKAP, 2007; ALMA, 
2007). 
 
Countering this is the momentum effect. Once started, iconic national high-tech mega-
projects have only rarely been terminated completely. A notable example being the Jodrell 
Bank radio telescope where overruns were only reveal d fter large amounts were already 
invested, and to stop it would bring severe loss of face to all involved. The telescope’s 




project saved it from stoppage and disruption” (Howard, 2004, p. 51). Nevertheless, tougher 
global economic times indicate an increase in the likelihood of project cancellation in face of 
cost blowouts (e.g. NASA’s JWST, and Constellation programs). 
 
High-tech project budgets are under constant strain as expenses grow and managers are 
compelled to justify the increases to funding agencies.  This ‘amoebic-like’ growth of 
industrial project costs is examined by Eden et al. (2005), who attempted to better 
understand the surprising nature of overruns, some well beyond what might be anticipated. 
Their first conclusion was that uncertainty is inexp rtly understood or acknowledged, with 
one multi-million dollar aerospace project coming in at 58% above budget; the inherent 
uncertainty level later being calculated (from the estimating notes) as between +70% and -
40%. Other key drivers of cost escalation include engineering changes (sometimes ‘given 
away’ by the project contractor); customer/user demands in terms of extra tests, information, 
and meetings; the futility of trying to bring an errant project under control reactively by 
increasing the labour force (Brooks law); and starting activities out of sequence. 
 
The tactic of attempting to constrain project spend through budget reductions in early years 
is shown to be futile, as a review of NASA’s (now terminated) Constellation program shows 
(see Fig. 3-12). Not only does this cause budget blow-outs in the out-years, it also raises risk. 
 
  
Fig. 3-12. The effect of budget reductions on NASA’s Constellation program spend profile 




The US National Ignition Facility (NIF) project attributed its cost estimation errors to lack of 
a meaningful model offering a basis for comparison. Estimates for the conventional aspects 
of the NIF were accurate, but the ‘first-of-a-kind’ parts of the facility were grossly 
underestimated. Scott Samuelson, then Project Field Director quips: “on these highly 
complex...projects, you make your best estimate...th n double it. Don’t plan on spending the 
extra...until you find out what you didn’t know” (NASA, 2011b, p. 56). 
 
Even with modern tools, techniques and lessons-learned from like-projects, cost estimation is 
a very difficult activity indeed. The International Centre for Complex Project Management 
states: “There is a huge amount [of proof] that even the best stimation techniques will only 
be accurate within a 25% cone of uncertainty, even when detailed requirements have been 
agreed.” (Cavanagh, 2009, p. 3). Notes from the Gemini telescope lessons-learned workshop 
(NRC, 1999) demonstrate general insufficient attention o constraining design goals to meet 
budgets, and poor estimating overall. At the Keck observatory especially, the early effects of 
science drivers on cost resulted in optimistic estima es. Cerpa and Verna (2009), in a study 
of IT projects, found poor cost estimates in 81% of the 70 failed projects, blaming deficient 
requirements as the cause. When interviewed regarding a recent study of global IT projects 
(ABC, 2011), Prof. Flyvbjerg found the average cost blowout to be 200%, with examples 
stretching to several thousand %. Rendleman & Faulconer (2011) report an average cost-
growth of 33% in NASA space and earth science missions. A Major Projects Association 
seminar on management of design and engineering concluded that: “unrealistic budgets for 
engineering design continue to haunt major projects [and] realistic estimates go with a 
mature understanding of the allocation and management of contingency” (MPA, 2007, p. 1). 
 
The US Space Science Support Office (Saunders et al., 2003) conducted research into 
predicting cost success on high-tech projects, concluding that good results are only possible 
with proper analysis skills and tools. They offer a gr phical representation of cost analysis 






Fig. 3-13. Cost analysis hierarchy (Saunders et al., 2003, p. 369) 
 
The US Government Department of Energy joins NASA in recently issuing a practical Cost 
Estimation Guide, offering their staff a 12-step, best-practices manual (DOE, 2011) endorsed 
by industry participants from aerospace, automotive, energy, and the Navy. However, they 
note that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that while these good cost 
estimation characteristics have been known and published for decades, many US agencies 
have yet to apply them successfully in projects due to lack of inherent skills. 
 
Cost estimates cannot be effectively executed alone. Investigations at the ALMA (2007) 
project provide an example of the highly interactive nature of the task. The raw data from 
goods and services cost enquiries must be supplement d by regular consultation with 
schedule planners, project management, risk plans, and checkers, as portrayed in Fig. 3-14. 
Moreover, project estimators need to be on guard against enterism32, inevitably leading to 
overruns (ICCPM, 2011). 
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Fig. 3-14. The interactive nature of effective high-tech project cost estimation 
 
Cost estimation techniques vary according to the purpose and accuracy required. Widely 
accepted cost estimation classifications are published by the Association for Advancement of 
Cost Engineering International (AACEI), and comprise five classes as shown in Fig. 3-15. 
For each class (or broad purpose), a level of project d finition is prescribed, and a selection 
of appropriate costing techniques listed, ranging from best judgement through to definitive. 
A detailed study of cost estimation techniques and their advantages and disadvantages vis-a-
vis various types of high-tech projects is outside th scope of this thesis. However the 






Fig. 3-15. The AACEI cost estimate classification table (DOE, 2011, p. 14) 
 
A response to cost estimation risk is project cost ntingency, where an amount is set-aside 
against a possible shortfall in the cost estimate. Fi ldwork for this thesis concurs with 
Baccarini’s (2005) survey; that a percentage figure derived from past experience is the most 




revisits this topic, exposing serious flaws with the percentage method and offers 11 further 
approaches. In particular, he advances regression analysis as a robust and defendable (yet 
under-researched) method for predicting the final cost of building engineering projects. 
 
 
3.4.4 Project scheduling 
 
As per the American mode, NASA leaves little to chance concerning schedule monitoring, 
with their Space Flight Program and Program Management Handbook (NASA, 2010b) 
insisting on accurate time phasing of work accomplished through an Integrated Master 
Schedule (IMS). This provides a single integrated source of schedule data based on 
tasks/milestones, task durations, interdependencies, project constraints, for in-house and 
subcontract effort. NASA recognises the insufficieny of analysis of schedule variability in 
the early project stages, noting few viable models. For this reason, NASA schedulers are 
required to have a technical background or at least an understanding the technical principles 
just as the project manager needs to understand the basic science behind the project. 
 
Project management performance during execution is principally driven through the project 
schedule, combined with the somewhat intangible project ‘sense of urgency’.33 The creation 
and controlled dissemination of the project schedul underpins a project pace that is shown 
to lift project performance. 
 
Other things being equal, a higher-urgency project is expected to progress faster due to more 
attention received, and shorter turn-around time for pr ject requests and other administrative 
tasks (Cao & Hoffman, 2010). A sense of urgency waslisted third in a table of issues for 
project management success by Attarzadeh (2008). Highly related to limited time, money, 
and other resources, this author recommends regular status checks, meetings, and project-
wide reminders to maintain pace. Howell et al. (2010) were more guarded in their comments, 
arguing that the driving effect of urgency can itself increase uncertainty by limiting the 
resource (e.g. time) available for comprehension and by decisions made on more limited 
information. Nevertheless, managers under time pressu  are shown to be more actively 
involved, and this probably counters any increase in unexpected project behaviour. 
 
Schedule slippage is directly linked to project cost increases, most obviously via the 
‘marching army’ fixed costs, and are probably amplified in high-tech projects (e.g. the 
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JWST) through higher costs generated by senior technical staff and sophisticated machinery 
(Siegel, 2011). Costs for the Mars Science Laboratory are forecast to grow by $400 million, 
simply due to a two-year slippage (Rendleman J D, Faulconer, 2011). 
 
The importance of tracking project schedules is borne out by Andrew Klekociuk’s 
experience with the Antarctic LIDAR (LIDAR, 2004) where he related to me: “early 
slippage should have indicated how long things were going to take. We should have built a 
robust scheduling system early”. Similarly, Dean Morris from the Australian Synchrotron 
explained in interview (SYNCH, 2009) “delays at the start (e.g. recruitment) were never 
made up. It was poorly planned. FX transactions andprocurement had to be learned and 
much time wasted on complex contractual legal clauses that were never enacted, for 
example liquidated damages”. 
 
 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
 
In this chapter, I have examined four pre-cursor areas key to high-tech project success. First, 
at project inception, the operating entity (including structure, location, and management) 
must be chosen very carefully, and the framework fo collaborative partnerships established 
for both funding of, and contributing to, the project. 
 
Second, the arrangements for sourcing and acquiring the project assets need determining, 
taking due account of the international environment. Some non-intuitive features of 
contractual arrangements are listed to show approach and application. Nine key strategies for 
procurement success are advanced. 
 
Third, project resilience is addressed, revealing three attitudinal factors, and six conditioning 
factors shown to be important in building robustness into high-tech projects. These are tested 
through a qualitative survey of three of the case studies, and shown to be relevant.  
 
Last, several of the more programmatical processes ar  briefly covered, including planning, 
project lifecycles and phasing, cost and budget estimates, and scheduling. These four areas, 
supported by compelling evidence from field research, are shown to be crucial as pre-cursors 
to success in large science/engineering projects. In the next chapter, I introduce a meta-study 
of mega-project success factors, and apply scientific analysis to reveal a ranked series of 





Chapter 4 – Detection of predictive success drivers 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This section is central to this thesis and concentrates only on the material presented in the 
author’s paper ‘Key success drivers – meta study findings applicable to large high-
technology projects’34 (reproduced in Appendix K). 
 
In it I draw on case study work and research from the previous four decades, plus 
contemporary mega-project experience to ask: what are the key strategic areas that show 
strong correlation to project success? Data are examined to discover success factors and 
success criteria for large engineering and science proj cts, and I compare these with general 
mega-projects. Findings are presented that contribute new insights for life-cycle project 
management, most applicable at the planning, formation and approval stages, and show 
comparative importance of top ranking high-tech project success drivers. 
 
Much has been written regarding project performance, and the literature is rich in empirical 
studies of tens, and sometimes hundreds, of projects in an effort to distil factors governing 
their success or failure. Case study work, involving report analyses, interviews and 
questionnaires offer much insight through evidential d ta complemented by qualitative 
judgement (Grün, 2004). Other studies have derived conclusions through statistical analyses 
and although meaningful, require more interpretation by the practising project manager. 
 
Many studies stem from a perception that large, publically funded projects, often launched in 
a fanfare of optimism, frequently overrun in terms of cost and time and occasionally become 
fiascos (Grün, 2004). While many notable mega-projects35 are delivered ‘on time, on 
budget’, large projects - especially those underpinned by, or delivering, IT or new 
technology - are very demanding of management capability, resources, and systems 
engineering, and too often fail in one or more performance criteria (Merrow, 1988; Morris & 
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4.2 Research approach 
 
In this chapter I mainly draw from peer reviewed journal publications, supplemented by 
published reports and case study extracts from academic authors. Data were sought from a 
purposely broad range of studies from the Western world covering the past 35 years, 
containing diverse project characteristics in terms of purpose, budget, location, engineering 
innovativeness, and sponsor. The only selection made was to include a representative sample 
(one third) of high-tech projects with some systems ngineering component identified. These 
sources were initially selected from literature searches using the keywords ‘project success’, 
‘mega-project’, ‘critical success factor’, ‘lessons learned’ and ‘project learning’. From this 
search, 29 general studies were selected for examination encompassing 2,820 projects 
(cases), as well as two success factor summaries drawn from other papers. A sub-set of 20 
studies (928 cases) were classed as high-tech. From each study, the presented success factors 
(derived from questionnaires, statistical analyses, or both) were grouped into common 
headings and recorded by frequency. For example, phrases such as “clear project mission”, 
“defined objectives”, “stated project targets” and “documented program goals” were grouped 
as a single key concept. This process resulted in the most common findings being captured 
under 18 distinct headings. Table 4-1 shows the full st dy list. 
 
Table 4-1. List of studies showing number of individual cases 
 








Akkermans (2002)1 General research L n/a*  
Anbari (2008) Post project reviews L n/a  
Belassi (1996) Mixed projects L 91  
Blackburn (1994) Iridium satellite systems project L 1  
Clarke (1999) Various projects L n/a  
Cooke-Davies 
(2002a) 
Variable projects L 136  
CSIRO (1998) Big science projects L 9  
De Wit (1988) UK & US projects L 8  




Dvir (2003) Defence projects N 110  
Ferratt  (2006) ERP Projects N 70  
Grün (2004) Few major projects plus other 
information 
L 4  
Hartman (2004)   Mixed projects L 5  
Honour (2004) Broad range of technology projects N 42  
Hyvari (2006) Mixed projects N 100  
Katsanevas (2009) Survey of physics project managers L n/a  
Kerzner (1987)2 General research L n/a  
Kleinman (2008) Astronomy Survey project L 1  
Merrow (1988) Large civilian projects L 52  
Milosevic (2005) Project Managers N 55  
Morris (1986) Civil and aerospace projects L 8  
Muller (2007) General large projects N 959  
Murphy (1974) Various projects N 646  
Ninin (1997) CERN projects L 4  
Pinto (1989) R&D Projects N 159  
Procaccino (2002) IT professionals N 21  
Rubenstein (1976) Mixed study, some R & D L 103  
Turner (2004) Various projects L n/a  
Verner (2005) Software projects N 122  
Weck (2006) Project practitioners L 5  






1. Extracted from Ferratt (2002)  *n/a = No. of cases not stated 





In the course of research for this thesis, I conducted wide ranging formal interviews with 
project management representatives and teams.36 Discussion concerning success factors 
formed part of these interviews and the opportunity was taken to refine and validate the 18 
common headings for grouping the success factors drawn from this study. The method 
involved note-taking (or recording) of each interviw, and verbal verification of the 
interviewee’s meaning of phrases used. Identical, or similar, meanings were manually 
correlated. The interviewees were not asked to rankthe factors, just agree or disagree with 
the classifications, resulting in minor changes to the common heading terminology only. 
 
Having grouped the success factors, and their frequency of occurrence drawn from the meta-
study of the publications, calculation techniques from the Analytical Hierarchy Process 
(AHP) developed by Saaty (Coyle, 2004) were applied in the form of pair-wise comparisons 
to reveal a ranked set of success drivers, followed by statistical consistency tests to check the 
confidence level of the results. This work is described in detail in Appendix F. No attempt 
was made to pursue the analysis through weighted criteria to a single choice, since clearly all 
18 resulting success drivers are contributors to success, and are highly interrelated. 
The output from this analysis is shown in Table 4-2, which presents the derived project 
success drivers ranked by relative importance for all projects, and high-tech cases. 
 











A Project management (PM) control & execution system  in 
place, with robust policies, planning, procedures, document 





B Clear project definition, requirements, goals, objectives, 





C Mature project communication, information systems; effective 





D (Top) management (or sponsor) support with sustained 
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E Project baseline, estimates accuracy, project phasing, effective 





F Leadership skills, PM experience & stability; motiva ing & 

















I Adequate resourcing of the project 2.31 2.37 
J Aligned perceptions of project goals & success - management 

















M Mature, effective project management change control process; 











O Project Manager  & PM systems matched to project 











Q Full understanding, and early engagement, of host gvernment 





R Right-sized systems engineering; managing and procuring in 






4.3 Key findings and conclusions 
 
The ranked project success drivers in Table 4-2 reveal some valuable general conclusions for 
the project practitioner. 
 
First, a relatively small (though not trivial) number of key project topics and indicators are 
demonstrated to impact significantly on the chances of success. Most significantly, 
implementation of excellent project control systems and processes, and a clearly defined 
project mission are shown to be twice as important s the next ranked driver. These 
considerations are important throughout the project but it is clearly necessary to test the 
intent, robustness, and understanding of these factors a  the conceptual/approval stage. 
 
Second, the rankings show the importance of ‘softer’ indicators such as social capability and 
expectations management that may not have been previously obvious. Selecting and 
appointing the right project management team are clearly vital, taking account of factors 
such as motivation, cultural sensitivity, and instilling the right amount of urgency. Moreover, 
recent studies highlight the need (some following negative events) to invest in effective 
project information control, both internally and ext rnally. 
 
Third, some factors that may be intuitively expected to rank highly e.g. risk management and 
system engineering process (as opposed to the applic tion of systems design as part of goal 
setting etc.), appear low in the table, ranked at N & R respectively. At face value, this 
indicates that while important, these may not be thmake-or-break factors that alone 
determine project success or failure. For risk especially, this was counter-intuitive to 
contemporary experience and is worthy of further enquiry to separate the management 
science approach (the probabilistic future) described as decisioneering (Miller & Lessard, 
2000), and the more applied managerial approach (the uncertain future) that continually 
matches risks with strategies. The topic of risk is revisited later. 
 
Lastly, it will be noticed that, following the analysis, both general and high-tech columns 
rank the success drivers in the same order, albeit with differing importance values. The 
variations, although minor, reflect the character of high-tech projects (often involving R&D) 
where definitions and scope are often less clear, mking top level support and baseline 




engineering process require slightly more emphasis. Overall though, high-tech projects 
clearly rely on the same key success drivers as most other projects. 
 
The combined analysis offers more insight for high-tech project practitioners than contained 
in the 'headline' rankings alone. To extract the key subtleties revealed through scientific 
analysis and the ‘lived experience’, a closer examin tion of the top ranking drivers follows. 
 
 
4.3.1 Project management system 
 
The extent of a formal project control environment is largely a decision taken by the project 
management, in light of organisational policies and practice, type/size of project, and to 
some extent, project leadership style. Observations by the author revealed the application of 
single-machine/small network systems (e.g. MS Project), various tailored project 
management systems (in some instances designed to align with published ISO Standard type 
quality systems), and large corporate management information systems (MIS) such as 
PRIMEVERA, DAPTIV, MRP, and SAP. Findings from this meta-study show that, although 
the project control environment must be well matched to the task in terms of complexity, 
culture, and maintenance, though no one system or product stood out. The key point is that a 
system of some type must be in place. 
 
The importance of standardisation in projects is highlighted by Milosevic & Patanakul 
(2005, p. 189) in their survey of project managers who collectively concluded that: “having 
standardized PM tools helps with project success: more punctual schedules, more satisfied 
customers, better cost-effectiveness, and higher-quality accomplishments.” An empirical 
analysis of the relationship between project planning and project success by Dvir et al., 
(2003, p. 95) found that: “A minimum level of planning tools and procedure use i  also 
important but what kind of tools is of no importance.” A very frank report from the Gemini 
telescope Lessons Learned Workshop (NRC, 1999) contains at least five quotations from 
team members lamenting the lack of, or lateness, of effective project management control. 
 
Atkinson et al., (2006, p. 691) support project tools but with a caution: “tools and 
techniques…are very useful in the right place. However they [can bring] a focus on 
operations…with consequent lack of attention to strategic issues”. Erno-Kjolhede (2000, p. 
31) also qualifies in remarks about project management theory applied to research projects 
when writing “project management tools for scheduling and planning are helpful in 




tools that are continuously adjusted to fit current project reality. They should not be 
regarded as a blueprint for the research project”. An OECD report endorses proven, 
standardised tools to support large science infrastructures, though it points out that some 
partner countries may already have approved management tools and procedures, and their 
use may be mandatory (OECD, 2010). 
 
Ninin & Vanden Eynden (1997, p. 4) investigated the application of project based 
management for high-tech activities at CERN, referencing a 1997 inquiry showing that 
100% of staff involved supported the concept. They conclude that: “project-based 
management has been experienced recently for several controls projects and has proven its 
success from the human, organisational and manageril points of view.” 
 
 
4.3.2. Project mission, definition and goal 
 
Pinto & Slevin (1989) in their compelling report containing 10 critical project success factors 
posit that the project mission, while apparently obvi us, is the most important factor across 
all project phases and argue that if forgotten or unclear, the project will likely fail. Clearly 
the early stakeholders must not only know and agree on the purpose of the project, but also 
ensure that it is defined in the form of a documented and socialised scope containing 
technical objectives and goals, supported if appropriate by a business case. 
 
Hartman & Ashrafi (2004) in their paper on SMART project planning recommend the 
establishment and agreement of success criteria at the outset, claiming this to be the single 
most important contributor to project success. Similarly, in ‘Taming Giant Projects’ Grün 
(2004) argues that goal formulation is one of four s ccess factors that (inter alia) influences 
the causes of [project] failure. 
 
A Royal Academy of Engineering report addressing complex IT projects asserts: “Prior to 
commencing there should be a clear definition of the benefits to be derived from the project 
[without which] a project is destined to fail before it has begun.” (RAE, 2004, p. 21).  
However, not all large high-tech projects are able to have their mission, requirements, scope 
and goals precisely defined, especially in the early stages. In looking back over 30 years of 
project management, Winch (1996) discusses the difficulty of looking over the cognitive 
horizon, and how the political, economic and regulatory environment may result in project 







4.3.3 Project communication 
 
Competent information management throughout the project was found to be crucial (Clarke, 
1999) to effective execution in two principal domains. The first area concerns 
communication with parties external to the project team, for example; users/customers, 
advisory committees, arms-length sponsors, political m sters, suppliers, and the general 
public. Casework consistently reports the dangers of unofficial pathways for project 
information which may be interpreted (at best) incorrectly or (at worst) cause upset, or even 
financial or commercial strife, through premature announcements. The solution lies in the 
establishment of a project communications position early, and implement of firm policies for 
information approval and distribution, especially in relation to problems, procurement, or 
discoveries. 
 
The second area concerns internal communications, with examples of commonly reported 
deficiencies represented pertinently by the Mars Climate Orbiter Investigation Board 
(NASA, 2000). Their report investigated factors leading to the loss of NASA’s $125 million 
spacecraft: “as a result of a mistake that would shame a first-year physics student – failing 
to convert imperial units to metric” (O’Hare, 2009, p. 123). Under the general finding of 
inadequate communications between project elements during its development and operations 
phases, the Board lists specific inadequacies as contributing causes of software programming 
errors leading to mission failure: 
 
• inadequate communications between project elements l d to a lack of cross discipline 
knowledge among team members; 
• a lack of early and constant involvement of all project elements throughout the project 
life cycle (e.g. inadequate communications between th  development and operations 
teams); 
• project management did not develop an environment of open communications within 
the operations team; and 
• inadequate communication between the project system el ents and the technical line 
divisions at the partnering research institution. 
 
The weaknesses in the above example offer good lessons and reflect typical project 






4.3.4. Top level support and commitment 
 
Appearing as the fourth most important in high-tech project success, this driver is relevant to 
most business endeavours. Pinto & Slevin (1989) echo ot er writers when they identify the 
responsibility of top management to support and resource a project once authority for 
expenditure has been approved, and also mention top management’s ability to either help or 
hinder a project. Indeed, there is some evidence pointing to the negative effects of too much 
management, citing ‘interference’ and ‘meddling’.37 Procaccino et al. (2002) adds that 
removal of a project sponsor has more detrimental effect on success than starting without 
one. 
 
Despite the dangers of interference, casework reseach demonstrates the powerful benefit of 
committed and concerned senior level interest in a project’s execution, and of a readiness to 
act supportively when needed. This is validated through the often referenced Apollo project 
studied by Seamans and Ordway (1977) who table as one of their lessons from Apollo: “In 
the final analysis, the presence or absence of [toplevel] support is the single, most crucial 
element that spells success or failure”. I conclude that top level commitment is vital for 
success, but note there is an important distinction between ‘support’ and ‘interference’. 
 
 
4.3.5. Project baseline, phasing, and performance monitoring 
 
The purpose and importance of a project baseline is threefold: (a) as a basis for cost and 
schedule estimation for project approval, (b) to establish a performance measurement 
reference, and (c) to establish appropriate expectations of project management and team 
prior to project initiation. Carried out in the context of project scope and budget, the baseline 
supports the project launch decision and the inevitable trade-off decisions by project 
management during the project. Surprisingly, a documented baseline such as this is 
frequently missing from projects (Shenhar & Wideman, 1996). 
 
Cost and schedule estimation is held as part science, part art, and is notorious for poor 
assumptions and inaccuracies, especially in IT projects where optimism bias can drive severe 
underestimations. Project estimators must take into consideration project based, and external, 
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events on an historical probabilistic basis, and allow for the calculated contingency that Butts 
and Linton’s casework (2000) show is so often understated. 
 
Breaking large projects into phases and sub-projects, and the defining of work packages, is 
reported by Clarke (1999) as one of the most important tasks in new or development 
projects. Her study cites benefits including greater ownership by project teams; spread of 
responsibilities and accountability across a greate number of people; and easier delegation, 
objective monitoring, communication, problem identification and change management. This 
idea is developed further by de Wit (1988) in calling for specific objectives for different 
project phases, such that project success can be more usefully monitored and determined on 
phase performance. 
 
The benefits of periodic project reporting is a common finding in studies of project success 
as Turner (2004) found when defining reporting as a critical condition of project success, and 
its absence as a route to failure. Kerzner (1998) similarly lists ‘uniform status/monitoring 
reporting’ as a critical success factor, especially in the growth stage of projects. Reporting 
systems should be internally consistent and ‘fit for purpose’ in that they should contain only 
sufficient, clearly presented data (supporting the modern ‘dashboard’ approach), avoid 
duplication and, where possible, be automated. 
 
 
4.3.6. Project leadership and management 
 
It is of course people who deliver projects, not processes and systems. Without competent, 
intelligent, and dedicated teams and individuals it i difficult to imagine any project finishing 
successfully. However, having the talent is not enough, and projects require both leadership 
(of people) and management (of processes and systems); these two attributes may not always 
reside in the same individual (Crosby, 2006). 
 
Muller & Turner’s (2007) large study of project managers and their influence on success, 
points out positive correlations between project success and older, more experienced 
managers, and also warns against assigning managers to p ojects below their capabilities. 
Project managers should be appointed early, lead the project through to the commissioning 
stage, and ideally work in their own culture. No performance difference was detected 





Individual leadership qualities and their effect on projects are less tangible. Thompson (in 
Ashby & Miles, 2002) sets out three basic skills as predictors for success – capacity 
(knowledge and basic intellect, or innate ability), authenticity (the genuine article), and 
motivation (eloquently coined as: ‘influence many, control few’). In a project with a history 
of problems, a weariness of change and lack of commit ent, Clarke (1999) found that an 
absence of these qualities contributed to a general lack of motivation in people, especially to 
be a part of project changes. Clarke cites management example as one of the best ways to 
raise confidence and awareness of what can be achieved. As awareness increases of what is 
happening in their organisation, people become more involved and committed, and as a 
consequence, better motivated. 
 
In the high-tech area smaller teams may work more effectively than in general projects, as 
Moody & Dodgson (2006) argue in their study of a complex aerospace project. They 
describe a single small, committed team with overlapping and complementary skills, made 
up of a proportionately large number of systems engineers with specialist knowledge across 
blurred project phases. This flexibility of implementation phases - which they suggest can 
only be done with a small team that can be across everything – is presented as a key to 
success. 
 
Recruitment and nurturing of individuals cannot be ignored, as Rubenstein et al., (1976) 
show in their studies on influencing innovation success. Fieldwork indicated that certain 
people had played (often informal) roles in successful project initiation, progress, and 
outcomes. 
 
Project managers and leaders have plenty of responsibilities and their selection can be 
pivotal to project success. However many high-tech research projects are cross-
institutionalised and the project manager has only very little formal authority over project 
participants who are essentially peers, and who may onl  have a part-time commitment to 
the project. Erno-Kjolhede (2000) examines what ‘power’ to lead remains in such 
circumstances. He concludes that whilst accountability, commitment, information, influence, 
network control, and personal powers are attainable, formal authority must give way to 
persuasion and negotiation flair. He further argues that in high-tech projects, this is not 
necessarily a drawback. This approach to effective leadership and project success is more 
associated with knowledge, commitment, team-building, vision, and treating people as peers 





Gratton & Erickson’s study (2007) of 55 collaborative teams isolated eight human resource 
(HR) practices leading to project success,  highlighting the benefits of capitalising on the 
trust residing in skilfully managed ‘heritage’ teams. Their research indicates that when 20% - 
40% of the team members are already connected throug  past associations, strong 
collaboration was evident at the start. 
 
There are indications from the research that project manager profile, especially more subtle 
traits, has a significant effect on project outcomes. Indications are that high-tech projects 
present special challenges worthy of psychological and psychometric investigation, and are 
suggestive of further research. 
 
 
4.3.7. Other drivers 
 
Following the most consistently highest ranked project success drivers, there are other 
strategic project dimensions in which early attentio  can materially influence success. Some 
of these areas, e.g. project manager competence, client/user expectations, and adequate 
resourcing, are well documented elsewhere. Other drivers have more subtle aspects 
reflecting specific research and are discussed below. 
 
Urgency - Taking into account the caution concerning the potential harmful effects of 
urgency from Morris & Hough’s (1986) thorough study into precursors of success, the 
weight of evidence from more recent casework is that time pressure is a crucial variable for 
project success or, at least for avoiding project disasters. In this vein Grün (2004, 
introduction) alerts us to the: “inherent silent power of time”. Pinto & Slevin (1989) also 
emphasise urgency as having important implications for success in R&D projects, 
encouraging the project manager to instil a sense of pace into the team, on the basis that 
urgent projects demonstrate a greater ability to secure resources than projects viewed as 
routine, or even dull. However, it is possible to go too far, as the NASA investigation into 
project management of the failed Mars Climate Orbite  (NASA, 2000) showed. At the time, 
a ‘faster, better, cheaper’ (FBC) strategy pervaded NASA’s space projects, however the 
tipping point where increasing scope met downward diven schedules and costs was 
unforeseen, to the extent that unmanaged project risk was dramatically increased, ultimately 
inducing failure. A specialist report into the FBC approach from that time concluded that a 
major cultural shift was required to maintain the viability of FBC the approach (Spear, 
2000). It should be noted that the Mars Pathfinder was an FBC success story from that era 





Client/Supplier Involvement - Customers (often described as ‘users’ for high-tech fa ilities) 
can have a profound influence on project outcomes, as described in Procaccino’s study 
(2002) showing that success is directly related to the level of customer confidence in the 
project management and development team. Grün (2004) addresses the same point, 
describing it as the ‘worst case’ when no permanent users are nominated to be involved in 
the planning phase, resulting in the operation and maintenance phases being ‘left to chance’. 
In studies of R&D projects (Pinto & Mantel, 1990) and IT projects (Taimour, 2005), client 
participation is clearly identified as a leading success indicator. 
 
Supplier engagement through the procurement process is similarly important, beginning with 
the industry engagement strategy (Schill, 1979) and implementation of a project contracting 
policy (Morris & Hough, 1986; MPA, 2009). In high-tech mega-projects involving R&D, 
pre-contractual relationships are both common and essential, and can pose a problem known 
as ‘lock-out’ which could mean exclusion of precisely those organisations that have specific 
relevant knowledge or skills from the early stages of a project (Hall & Kahn, 2006). Such 
situations require expert management to avoid impedim nts to successful project delivery. 
 
Change Control - Findings from this study elevate the subject of change management from a 
project tool to a strategic success driver ranked (M) just above risk in Table 4-2. Both the 
literature casework and study fieldwork demonstrate that handling of deviations found 
through testing, failures, or inspection must not only be tackled systematically, but also be 
properly managed through corrective and preventive processes linked to configuration 
control systems. When discussing design changes in crewed space programs (where the 
impact can be potentially counted in lives) at NASA’s 2010 Project Challenge conference, 
one speaker expressed the view that ‘there’s no such thing as a small change’. Robust change 
management not only avoids repetitive errors: it is a foundation for continuous improvement 
through problem tracking and recording via a lesson-learned system and is thus a vital 
component of the project management system. 
 
Risk - The topic of risk management has become ubiquitous in our society and the world of 
project management. This is reflected in contemporary PM literature and studies that offer 
modern approaches that attempt to match growing project complexity (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; 
Harris, 2009). An example is the recently released Standards Australia draft handbook 
(Standards Australia, 2011) that revisits the relationship between risk management 
principles, framework, and process, and offers 19 techniques for risk assessment, including 





It is standard practice for projects of all kinds to create or adopt a risk management plan, 
evaluate project risk(s) by applying some form of score matrix, and establish a risk register 
to document the results. NASA’s System Engineering Handbook (NASA, 2007a) points to 
the limitations of risk assessment methods underpinned by scoring matrices, listing these (p. 
145) as: 
 
• “Interaction between risks is not considered. Each risk is mapped onto the 
matrix individually. 
• Inability to deal with aggregate risks (i.e., total risk). 
• Inability to represent uncertainties. A risk is assumed to exist within one 
likelihood range and consequence range, both of which are assumed to be 
known. 
• Fixed trade-off between likelihood and consequence. 
• Using the typical ‘likelihood-consequences’ matrix, the significance of different 
levels of likelihood and consequence are fixed and unresponsive to the context 
of the program.” 
 
Nonetheless, fieldwork interviews reveal that this process at least helps identify and 
categorise risk (albeit often subjectively), as well as encourage risk mitigation techniques 
and/or controls (including the shifting of risk along the value chain). In the better examples, 
(e.g. the ALMA project) effort is made to plot the risk in terms of phases and value, thereby 
enabling risk retirement (or ‘burn’) to be tracked, although risk in projects is never reduced 
to zero (Thomson et al., 2001). Nonetheless, studies show that this pays off, as in the work 
by Voetsch et al., (2005) who concluded that 53% of the respondents who reported their 
projects conduct risk reviews “Almost Always” report completing projects on time. Voetsch 
et al., (2005, p. 6) adds: “there is a statistically significant relationship between… the 
presence of a project risk management process…and reported project success rate of an 
organisation.” 
 
Given these strong correlations, why does risk management rank relatively low among key 
success drivers? Fieldwork evidence suggests two reasons. First, whilst project practitioners 
agree that risk identification and management is a requirement, too often it is seen as ‘busy 
work’, pulled together largely to fulfil project funding or audits, and rarely consulted as a 




reason is simply that risk management is seen as part of the project fabric, something that the 
project manager practises subconsciously in daily decision-making, and does not report as an 
explicit success factor. Both explanations indicate  lack of serious and active risk 
assessment, at least partly explained by Butts & Linton (2009, p. 47) in their insightful report 
concerning project estimation failures in NASA: 
 
“Often it is not what we know will get us. It isn’t even what we don’t know that bodes 
trouble. It is what we don’t know that we don’t know that hoses (sic) things up. This is 
a cognitive blind spot created by the fundamental nature of knowledge that has not 
yet been encountered.” 
 
It is therefore the very nature of risk that, despite the difficulty in identification and 
quantification, it should drive project proponents and managers to more diligently assess 
significant threats, their potential impact, continge cy, and mitigation. 
 
External environment - Projects are not always self-contained: big high-tech projects in 
particular can require large physical spaces for development or deployment, involve 
regulatory standards, require public funding and/or political support, stakeholder 
engagement, and may rely on social approval before proceeding. Belasi & Tukel (1996), 
when grouping factors for project success, identified this external framework of political, 
economic, and social factors, including marketplace forces. They point out the potential for 
early project termination should such factors be judged too risky or influential. Other factors, 
addressed by the RAND study of 52 mega-projects (Merrow, 1988) stress the potential 
conflicts between projects and institutional problems associated with environmental 
regulations, health and safety rules, labour practices and procurement controls. Fieldwork 
showed none of this has since diminished. 
 
System Engineering - Finally, the concept of system engineering (SE) and its value, 
especially to complex projects, is often raised at the development stage of high-tech projects. 
Prevalent in defence, and large engineering projects, the aim of SE is essentially to apply 
influence at the design phase to enable easier and faster integration and test, ensure interface 
compatibility, and reduce risk, time and cost. SE is a discipline in itself, and where the 
approach is applicable, it is fundamental to project lifecycle management. 
 
Swart and Meiring (2003) examined the application of SE to the SALT telescope, affirming 
its application to such high-tech projects, and describing schedule and technical benefits, and 







Fig. 4-1. System engineering ability to influence cost (Swart & Meiring, 2003 p. 169) 
 
A detailed study (Honour, 2004) of 42 projects and SE practice shows consistent correlations 
between investment in SE and project success (especially regarding over-runs, cost and 
effective risk retirement) as well as subjective rises in output quality. However a one-size fits 
all approach to SE is not indicated and care is needed to avoid over-driving the project with 
SE. Honour’s work (2004) determined that in terms of person-effort, the optimum is 15-
20%, a figure he found corroborated in prior works by NASA and by Kludze (2004), and 
confirmed by the UK VISTA ₤35 million infra-red telescope project. Similarly, when 
describing the large and complex Gemini telescope project, then Engineering Leader Dick 
Kurz believes that: “it takes… professional SE to really carry it off” enabling the project to 
stay on budget and close to schedule (Michaud, 2009, p. 34). Fig. 4-2 shows the distinct 
areas covered by systems engineering and by project control, and the tasks requiring 







Fig. 4-2. The interface/overlap between system engineer ng and project control  
(NASA, 2007a p. 4) 
 
 
4.4 Implications for management 
 
Once the key success drivers are derived and ranked, attention can turn to exploiting the 
knowledge across the project life-cycle. The detaild processes for establishing the project 
organisation, environment, and toolset, are outside the scope of this thesis, however, 
assigning the identified success drivers from Table 4-2 to the project stages and strategies 
shown below ensures that the key concepts may be emdded at a productive point. 
 
Conceptual Planning - This is the time for clarifying the project definition, scope and goals, 
and if required, the business case [B]. Sponsor commit ent must be in place, and client/user 
expectations agreed [D, G]. 
 
Post Concept Approval - At this point strategies are developed for dealing with operations in 
the host environment [Q], key resources are identifi d and secured [I] (including 
management [O]) and a detailed risk review undertakn [N]. 
 
Project Approval - Strategies are implemented for project policies [A], systems engineering, 
site acquisition, procurement [Q], information management (including outreach and Public 





Project Commencement - Planning, execution, and review systems, operating procedures, 
and document controls [A] are now instigated. Project baselines and phases are defined [E]. 
Change management, continuous improvement [P], and configuration control [M] are 
established. Strategic relationships are commenced with key suppliers [R]. 
 
Project team governance is asserted early through the project manager’s approach to 
leadership, motivation, and social competence [F]. Especially important at this stage is the 
assignment of accountabilities [L], aligning staff perceptions of goals and success, and 
instilling a sense of project momentum [J]. 
 
Post-Project Reviews and Lessons Learned – Given clear evidence that, despite the collected 
experience from general and high-tech projects, failures continue to happen, the question 
begs – why do we fail to learn from them? Current practices evaluated by the author indicate 
an understandable focus on achieving the project deliverables, with many time-poor 
practitioners unwilling or unable to find and digest the experience of one or more cases 
relevant to their own project. Lovallo and Kahneman (2003, p. 8) investigate cognitive 
behaviour in projects and conclude that:”the natural way [managers] think about a complex 
project is to...bring to bear all one knows about it, paying special attention to its unique or 
unusual features. The thought of going out and gathering statistics about related cases 
seldom enters a planner’s mind”. 
 
The formal conduct of a post-project review involving at least the core execution team is 
essential and could be viewed as a post-project suce s driver. In at least one major high-tech 
organisation (NASA) the costly failure to learn from past mistakes has been addressed 
through an Agency-wide ‘lessons-learned’ case study initiative. The topics of project 
reviews and lessons-learned are further explored in section 5.3 of this thesis. 
 
 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has presented a broad and deep meta-study of success factors in both general, 
and high-tech, projects reported in the literature. Applying peer judgement derived during 
wider research for this thesis, the most frequently reported success factors were grouped into 
18 common headings, and subject to frequency analysis. 
 
Application of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (pair-wise analysis) shows that project 




by far the most important drivers of project success. Mature information management 
systems rank third in importance, followed by 15 other significantly important factors shown 
to feature markedly in improved project outcomes. 
 
The next chapter builds on the preceding investigations of pre-cursor success factors and 
meta-study derived success drivers by investigating remaining key considerations of high-





Chapter 5 – Project execution – other key considerations 




The head of the management team of any large high-tech project will naturally be selected 
for his or her demonstrated skills and experience i l ading such enterprises.  This section of 
the thesis looks beyond the overt qualities of high-tech mega-project managers, and seeks to 
reveal the less obvious characteristics, traits, and initiatives that lead to project success. I 
examine these characteristics through examples drawn from the literature, and evidence from 
recent and current cases of large, complex projects. I expose the personal and professional 
attributes, skills and exemplar initiatives that are ingredients in project success. 
 
The management of big, high-tech projects has been r peatedly investigated but is not well 
understood (Cook-Davies, 2010), especially in terms of the personal characteristics and 
applied techniques of the project manager. While general competency standards (e.g. the 
PMBOK® Guide) exist, and some high-tech organisations have implemented their own 
codes (e.g. the NASA’s Systems Engineering Competency Framework, [NASA, 2009b]), 
these very much focus on application of vocational skil s. 
 
Early research into managerial characteristics leading to success or failure relied on trait 
theory (inherent personal qualities). Only later was training potential recognised as 
underpinning a situational or contingency theory of management (Müller & Turner, 2010). 
The 1980s popularised the visionary approach (vision and missions statements etc.) focusing 
on organisational change, followed by embracement of the soft leadership factors of the 
emotional intelligence school and more recently the development of the competence school 
(Müller & Turner, 2010). Traditional management theory places greater authority at higher 
organisation levels on the premise that senior managers know more, can make better 
decisions, and adopt command and control responsibility (Nicholas, 2004). However in 
complex, high-tech organisations it is valid to challenge this point, since system complexity, 
coupled with reliance on subordinate specialists, means that managers – especially at top 
leadership levels - are unlikely to know everything needed for complex decision-making.  
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Contemporary high-tech project managers are typically required to work in a number of 
dimensions including project leadership, research supervision, technical realisation 
(sometimes amid a daunting range of deliverables), financial accountability, planning and 
schedule responsibilities, project communications, and the challenging art of people 
management. For those whose forte is essentially project execution, the project formulation 
period especially can present bewildering problems requiring quite different skills and 
characteristics (Sykes, 1990). Adding to the challenge are the complexity and seemingly 
intractable nature of mega-projects. Even where authors have devised success ‘roadmaps’, 
the number of pathways and inter-relationships can be daunting (Murphy et al. 1974; Grün, 
2004). 
 
While recruitment processes are typically diligent when considering experience, background, 
and training of candidate project managers, I attemp  to identify more subtle and deeper level 
characteristics of project managers that might be of practical use for improved selection of 
candidates for future projects. 
 
 
5.1.2 Data, and research method 
 
My research for this part of the thesis includes accounts relating to large high-tech projects, 
and published from the mid 1970s to the present. This period offers rich experience from 
peer reviewed research papers, relevant case studie, and articles from the professional 
management domain. Research also canvassed the popular bodies of knowledge (e.g. the 
PMBOK® Guide, as well as published accounts of specific big science and engineering 
projects. An important initiative from the literature was the UK research activity called 
Rethinking Project Management (Maylor, 2006). Of particular note from this work was the 
need for increased recognition of human issues, the social nature of projects, and resulting 
challenges for management. 
 
Despite the breadth of work around the topic, there r mains a knowledge gap relating to 
specific characteristics of managers with high-tech project success. To help bridge the gap 
by the use of contemporary field data, I conducted a series of investigations at several large 
scientific facilities in Europe, Chile, South Africa, and Australia (See Table 1-1). One aspect 
to this fieldwork was to probe commonalities and application of traits and techniques with a 





Field notes made from formal and informal interviews, general observations from experience 
in the workplace, and expert group meetings all supplemented the research. The combined 
methodologies of literature research validated through fieldwork, though by its nature 
incomplete, enabled the extraction of several recurring themes, each presented as detailed 
findings under sections 5.1.3 and 5.1.4 below, and summarised in section 5.1.6. 
 
 
5.1.3 Project manager characteristics leading to success 
 
Processes to recruit, interview and appoint the necessary outstanding individual to manage a 
scientific and/or engineering project are generally dept at attracting candidates with the 
required qualifications, project management exposure, and general experience. This study 
posits that the successful management of high-tech mega-projects especially, as distinct from 
large projects (Sykes, 1990), is a particular and highly challenging task, requiring a special 
portfolio of attributes beyond those commonly identified at interview. These attributes or 




5.1.3.1 The uncertain nature of mega-projects 
 
A commonality between definitions of a project is that of a broadly definable task, and 
therefore necessarily a temporary endeavour. Mega-projects surviving the often precarious 
‘approval for expenditure’ stage and lasting up to a decade or more may strike hurdles, or 
even get truncated, before reaching an operational phase. Those who run such projects have 
to know when to change course, when to proceed or pause, and above all, when to stop 
(Sykes, 1990). Thomas & Mengel (2008) suggest complex rojects present ambivalence and 
ambiguity of the not-yet-known, with emerging situations that crucially shape meaning, 
interpretation, and social significance. When describing project shapers, Smith & Winter 
(2010) add to this the scanning of project boundaries for unwelcome ‘messengers’, and alert 
us to peripety; the arrival of events that reframe understanding of all that has gone before. 
Moreover, in developing the concept of ProjectCraft, Smith (2007) warns readers of social 
uncertainties in the form of unknown agendas, and emergent and divergent strategies. 
Interviews on this topic within the case studies (AAD, 2009; ITER, 2009; ALMA, 2007) 
confirm a fundamental attribute of the successful project manager – the ability to deal with 






5.1.3.2 Personal authenticity 
 
When asked about characteristics that underpin the respect and loyalty accorded to project 
managers, a common response across most project teams personally interviewed can be 
summarised as “authenticity’ (AAD, 2009; ITER, 2009; CERN, 2009; Samuel, 2009; Kendra 
& Taplin, 2004). Phrases such as: “he’s done this before and draws on that experience”, “ a 
dogged, quiet achiever”, and “he leaves the flag-flying to others and just helps us get on with 
it”, provide useful insight to attributes that are anecdotally linked to successful project 
execution. 
 
In Verzuh, 2003, p. 27-30, Graham and Englund conclude that: “Any lapses by upper 
managers in the authenticity and integrity of their dealing…are likely to have a severe 
impact on the achievement of project goals.” They go on to say: “It is a recurring theme in 
our experience…that authenticity and integrity link the head and the heart, the words and 
the action; they separate belief from disbelief, and often make the difference between success 
and failure”. When discussing leadership, Thompson similarly identifies authenticity (the 
‘genuine article’) among the three basic skills as predictors for success (in Ashby & Miles, 
2002). 
 
The broad appreciation for the success associated with project managers who demonstrate 
authenticity and genuine talent should not be confused with, or offset by, charismatic charm, 
despite its reported benefits within transformational leadership. Morris and Hough’s (1986, 
p. 219) seminal study of project success and failure notes that: “not all leaders are 
charismatic personalities...this in no way diminishe  the significance of their leadership”. 
When considering charisma in his 5-year study of leadership, Collins (Ashby & Miles, 2002) 
found that truly successful managers tended to be modest, humble, and reserved, but 
enormously wilful personalities. Von Braun, the father of Western rocket technology, is 
described as not being an original scientist, or the discoverer of new physical laws, but he: 
“always had this vision [and] enough foresight to exploit a chance of bringing it to 
fulfilment” (Young et al., 1969, p. 23). Smith (2007, p. 83) adds: “You become a leader not 
primarily because of your natural charisma, but because others believe you to be a leader”. 
 
Whilst a Major Projects Seminar (MPA, 2007) concluded that project manager domain 
knowledge increased the chances of success, the attribute of authenticity does not necessarily 
require deep knowledge of the project’s science/engineering technologies and goals (Verner 




high-tech environment, it should not be an overriding ndicator of the effective project 
manager (Blanchard, 1990; Graham & Englund, 1997). In the case of Australia’s nuclear 
research reactor, OPAL, the three project managers spanning the construction phase had no 
specific nuclear experience, but all were judged by team members as being competent 
technical project practitioners, and well matched to the task. Findings within a British 
Computer Society (2006, p. 22) report imply that domain knowledge may be more important 
in the IT realm, suggesting: “IT project managers additionally require sufficient 
understanding of the technology...to identify potential difficulties arising...and to gain the 
respect of their team.” 
 
 
5.1.3.3 Collaborative approach  
 
A feature of modern giant scientific and engineering programs is their global involvement. 
Whereas projects such as CERN’s Large Hadron Collider (LHC), and the coming Square 
Kilometre Array (SKA), physically span country borde s, almost all high tech mega-projects 
are international collaborations regardless of their ost location. To share know-how, risk 
and cost, resources may be pooled in the areas of resea ch and development, project 
planning, and funding. However, as the preparatory SKA work has shown, this is not to say 
that there is always shared agreement of the goals of the collaborative partners. 
 
The project manager, faced with the complexities of international collaborative working, 
requires a sound understanding of mechanisms for cross-cultural, multi-disciplinary groups – 
something only achieved by practical experience. The project manager is likely to be central 
to any high level strategic collaborations and competency is crucial for project success. 
 
Collaborations with external parties also call for experience and skill. Goldratt (1997, p. 173) 
addresses this point in connection with project vendors saying: “Persuading people to 
collaborate is always necessary. The time when you could dictate [to suppliers] is over. If 
you want people to think, to take initiative, you cannot dictate”. 
 
In a contemporary UK study (Samuel, 2009), the practic l coordination of collaborations in 
mega-science is described as particularly difficult, wi h limitations imposed by time zones 
and travel budgets, this having implications for who is seen as the overall leader, and who is 
accountable and responsible for successfully delivering the project. Project directorates need 






5.1.3.4 Balancing leadership with management 
 
Critical observation against modern theory shows that managers do not always transform 
into good leaders, or vice versa. Management is large y about coping with complexity and 
good managers bring order and consistency through processes, plans and structure, and by 
monitoring results. In contrast, leadership is concer ed with directing change and aligning 
people by communicating an inspirational vision, and then helping them overcome hurdles 
(Crosby, 2006). To achieve success, both roles obviously require some capability of the 
other. Laufer and Hoffman (2000, p. xxi) write: “most project management writings stress 
the managerial aspects of projects, failing to recognise the significance of leadership”, and 
conclude that project managers have to assume both leadership and managerial roles. 
  
Müller & Turner’s (2010) research into leadership competencies by industry type revealed 
strong correlations between successful high-tech managers, and critical thinking (intellectual 
quotient); team development (managerial quotient); and influence / motivation / 
conscientiousness (emotional quotient). Another report amplifies these traits, saying: 
“leaders must apply intuition, emotional intelligence and empathy in building relationships 
and maintaining trust while dealing with uncertainty, risk and emergent ambiguous 
‘unknown unknowns’ over protracted time-scales” (ICCPM, 2011, p. 21). 
 
The supervisory demands of high-tech mega-projects, characterised by creative people 
operating in environments of minimal formal structure and reporting relationships resonates 
well with the ‘transformational leadership’ (TL) style. First introduced by Burns and added 
to by Bass (Hötzel, 2004; Keller, 1992), TL describes a leadership approach that transforms 
followers into leaders, inspires extraordinary performance, and exemplifies coaching, 
mentoring and intellectual stimulation. Whereas transactional management reflects a cost-
benefit exchange (plan, negotiate, and reward), transformational leaders articulate an 
attractive vision (excite, inspire, and support). (Stewart, 2006; Keegan et al. 2004). 
 
The effectiveness of TL within the project world was investigated by Keller (1992), who 
formed the view that TL would appeal to well educated workers who desire challenges – 
traits that generally apply to R&D employees. However Keegan et al. (2004) conclude that, 
while project managers are not dissimilar to line managers in terms of TL behaviour, the 
positive effects may be less pronounced in the temporary project environment. Early results 
point to a weakening of effect due to: “the multiple and temporary leader-follower 




meaning that] project managers are unable to make the promises or exercise the same 
influence over career paths” (Keegan et al. 2004, p. 615). However, the nature of complex, 
multi-disciplinary high-tech projects suggests that a TL approach should elicit increased 
performance levels and success, and further research may usefully examine new leadership 
theories and forms of organising project teams to fully realise these gains. 
 
Whilst the literature is replete with examples of leadership qualities and project 
performance, there is little commentary concerning the characteristics of project managers 
relating to project success. Practical handbooks tend o skim over the topic, confining advice 
to the need for general management proficiency, adding characteristics such as knowledge of 
project management, performance accomplishment, and personal traits surrounding attitude, 
personality, team guidance, and driving project objectives while balancing constraints 
(PMBOK® Guide, 2008). 
To round out the picture of practical application of leadership/managerial balance, we can 
look at real-world examples. A striking example came from my visit to the ITER project, 
where it was immediately clear that the new project manager39 had taken a firm grasp of the 
challenge ahead, placed a small number of very capable people as his direct reports, and 
accelerated the awarding of civil works contracts. To paraphrase his remarks: “I want 
scientists, engineers, and administrators to see those trucks moving and dust rising, we need 
to instil a feeling that this project is actually happening” (ITER, 2009). The NASA Space 
Flight Program and Project Management Handbook (NASA, 2010b, p. 86), describes how: 
“ the Galileo PM had two management rules for working with his team: Do what I tell you, 
and don’t let me do anything stupid—and he ensured his team understood that the second 
rule always took priority over the first.” 
 
Case study interviews for this thesis (CSIRO, 2008; CERN, 2009; ASTRON, 2009; ITER, 
2009) offer rich data revealing commonality of views concerning project manager traits as a 
combination of transformational leadership and management skills including: 
 
• Qualified, and experienced, in complex technical projects 
• Knowledgeable and functional in the popular project management applications (e.g. 
PRIMA VERA, MS Project) 
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 At the time of my visit, ITER (an experimental fusion power reactor) had recently come under 
much criticism for rising costs, delays and technical hallenges. The former Project Director was 
relieved, in favour of an American led team that was clearly instilling a sense of pace through tangible 
site preparation. At the time of writing, the program remains in difficulties with completion now 
predicted to be 20 years late, and total cost to exce d € 15 billion, an increase of € 5 billion from the 




• Obsessively mindful of the critical path, and always driving forward 
• Effective delegator, but not afraid to ‘get hands dirty’ when needed 
• Ready and able to do ‘what it takes’ to remove roadblocks 
• Sets the example in terms of ethics, behaviour, and standards 
• Maintains an intellectually demanding environment 
• Maintains a systems engineering view, but is not stuck at that level 
• Knows what to communicate, to whom, and when. 
 
 
5.1.3.5 Persuading and negotiating 
 
Interviewees from the field case studies underlined that, high-tech projects are characterised 
by design challenges including technology changes (e.g. ASKAP, 2009), contractual and 
construction delays and amendments (e.g. OPAL, 2009), commissioning problems (e.g. 
LHC, 2009), internal differences of opinion, and a host of external environmental challenges 
(Merrow, 1988; Eden et al. 2005). In the case of multinational science endeavours, it is not 
unusual for partner contributions to be ‘in-kind’ further complicating the authority hierarchy. 
More than one interviewee likened people management in high-tech projects to ‘cat herding’. 
 
 A key skill then for the successful high-tech mega-project manager is the ability to foresee, 
mitigate, and manage these problems through skilled an  sensitive persuasion and 
negotiation. 
 
When reviewing large, dispersed collaborative projects Erno-Kjolhede (2000) concludes that 
whilst accountability, commitment, information management, influence and control have 
force, formal authority must give way to persuasion and negotiation flair. However he 
suggests that in research (high-tech) projects, thi is not necessarily a drawback. Mega-
project managers will require the confidence that comes with experience and maturity to 
strategically influence outcomes, and understand the advantages of transformational 
management. In a practical sense, there comes a time for each of the high-tech mega-projects 
considered by this thesis where R&D and technology develop must give way to construction, 
fundamentally changing the nature of the project execution. As one LOFAR team leader put 
it to me: “At some point, we need to kick out the scientists” (LOFAR, 2009). 
 
Project Management Institute (PMI) documentation describes several project execution 




2008). These are borne out by fieldwork cases and include the highly demanding task of 
managing stakeholder expectations in terms of likelihood of project acceptance, proactively 
anticipating concerns, and resolving identified issues. To quote the Guide: “Managing 
expectations helps to increase the probability of project success by ensuring that the 
stakeholders understand the project benefits and risks” (PMBOK® Guide, 2008, p. 262). 
 
Mega-project procurement, commonly assigned to a specialist department, will likely have 
some accountability to the project manager, especially when involving any major, strategic, 
or critical path acquisitions. Such activities draw on persuasion and negotiating skills as a 
key characteristic for successful contract execution and procurement logistics. 
 
 
5.1.3.6 Trust, culture and diversity 
 
Trust is a key ingredient (Sauer, 2008) in forming and maintaining collaborative social 
relationships, and several interviewees implied its importance unprompted. Samuel’s 
research (2009, p. 28) draws on Politis (2003), Chowdhury (2005), and Ross (2006) when 
establishing that: “trust is an important condition within any team since teamwork is 
dependent on knowledge sharing, and knowledge sharing is influenced by the degree of trust 
that exists between people”. Samuel continues: “It is difficult to build trust...and whilst this 
is true of any team, the challenges imposed by geographical and cultural dispersion becomes 
particularly important for managing global teams.” 
 
The challenge to build trust within global multi-cultural projects necessarily tests the 
capability of the project manager in dimensions rarely discussed at the project outset. Kendra 
& Taplin (2004) address the subject of project success within different cultural frameworks 
and identify the need to recognise the differing values and the task of developing shared 
value sets to underpin the building of strong project management. Riordan (2001) echoes this 
view for scientific and engineering cultures within mega-science projects while Aronson et 
al. (2010), in their study of project sprit and success, suggest that the project manager has 
responsibility for demonstrating and sharing a set of values which nurture the unique culture 
of high-tech successful projects. In discussing knowledge transfer barriers, Disterer (2001, p. 
4) asserts that: 
 
“Trust results in common expectations of reliability, consistency, and plausibility. 




Likewise…management must act as peers to give an exmple in knowledge 
sharing”. 
 
Perhaps when the stakes are highest, issues of trust and harmonisation of diversity become 
most valued, yet conversely most testing. Following the Apollo program, NASA 
commissioned a ‘lessons for management’ report to ident fy key success characteristics that 
arose from this most complex technical endeavour (Seamans & Ordway, 1977, p. 294). In 
relation to dealing with diversity, the report found: 
 
”NASA was dealing…with all sorts of people from all kinds of disciplines. Many of 
them were not used to working together, much less in the exposed environment 
characteristic of the Apollo program, In addition to engineers, technicians, and 
construction workers, [we had] theoretical scientists, legislators from Congress, 
lawyers, businessmen – a whole gamut of individuals. NASA’s goals, problems, 
failings, had to be explained to all, in a language th y could understand. [We] had to 
encourage all to work in an open, time-constrained, team-oriented, and stressful 
environment that was new and puzzling to many.” 
 
Again from the space engineering sector, Thomas Coughlin (Leader – NEAR asteroid orbiter 
project) ties trust to the successful delivery of a spacecraft within 27 months and US$4 
million under budget. He explains the one-off launch window meant: “I had to let all the 
people involved, including me, do their job, and only their job. This involved a lot of trust”. 
(Laufer & Hoffman, 2000, p. 193). 
 
Finally, Graham & Englund (1997), when identifying environments for successful projects, 
are clear on the need for unprecedented levels of trust and openness, and caution that 
managers may have difficulties when coming from a less trusting organisation. Certainly, 
team leader candidates at large European projects (CERN, 2009; ITER, 2009) are questioned 
closely regarding their skills in nurturing diverse, cohesive teams. 
 
 
5.1.3.7 Personal profile 
 
While contemporary recruitment practices in science and engineering are clear regarding 
non-discrimination by way of age, gender, or ethnic ba kground, it is useful to look at what 
the literature and current experience says about profiles and delivery of project success. 




their profiles (e.g. age range, experience,  gender, nationality) on success, point out many 
useful implications when matching project managers to roles. 
 
First, in terms of the importance of project success factors, the study reported that having 
experience with more complex and challenging projects increases the awareness of success 
factors generally, and that project managers should not be assigned to projects below their 
management capabilities. Contrary to Crawford and Cooke-Davies (1999), whose findings 
show no significant variation in terms of core success factors, some nationalistic variation 
was detected by Müller & Turner (2007). In their work, European project managers rated 
success factors as averagely important, significantly lower than other parts of the world 
(although peaking in middle age).  No differences appeared in performance based on gender. 
 
Müller & Turner looked further at differences by nationality. They point to Wang and 
Huang’s (2006) work showing that project success may be determined differently than in the 
mainstream project management literature. Contrary to an emphasis on time, cost, and 
quality, Chinese project managers emphasise relationsh ps as the main criterion for overall 
success. Research cited on the Indian IT industry (Agarwal & Rathod (2006) identified 
functionality within scope as the foremost success criteria. Overall, project managers with 
greater experience emphasise the importance and influence of team satisfaction on success. 
 
 There are also differences in rating of success criteria, and performance against them by age, 
reflecting a growing of confidence with experience. Older project managers assign higher 
importance to teambuilding, and research in the military acquisition environment (Gadeken, 
1995) strongly links competencies to experience. Müller and Turner (2007) found this well 
supported by Lee-Kelley & Leong, Loong (2003), and Dolfi, & Andrews (2006), each 
finding a significant correlation between project manager experience and project success. 
 
Second, project managers that are capable and responsible for the wider project life cycle 
(not just planning, execution and close-out) tend to be more successful. Project managers 
should therefore be assigned at the earliest stages nd ideally lead their project up to the 
commissioning stage (supported by Murphy et al. 1974). 
 
Third, Müller and Turner (2007) found that project managers working in their own culture 
tend to be more successful than expatriates, implying improved outcomes from local site 





 Gadeken (1986, p. 41) surveyed the profiles and career progression of 1300 engineers and 
scientists and found: “that manager-engineers exhibit the same preference for leadership 
roles that [other] managers do, but do not possess the same level of social poise nor 
enjoyment of human interaction”. Gadeken’s (p. 44) advice that: “engineers and scientists 
need more interpersonal development to improve both their selection opportunity and 
success” remains a valid pointer for today’s recruiters. 
 
Whitty (2010) sees the project manager acting a role through adopting a persona that is 
largely about looking the part, in order to play the part. His broad research characterised 
project managers as fulfilling emotive needs through dressing and behaving in ‘expected’ 
ways, yet finding individuals feeling anxious and tense, yet excited in their jobs. 
 
Finally, an intrinsic quality of the mega-project manager is the intellectual maturity and 
discipline to manage beyond: “the rational, objective, and universal representations of ‘the 
project’ with a phronetic analysis of the ambiguous, fragmented and political reality of 
project situations” (Cicmil et al. 2006, p. 679). For high-tech IT projects, Souer & Reich 
(2008) couple these qualities with the need to exhibit emotional intelligence that reflects 
deep personal identification with project goals. The foregoing notions imply a ‘super-
manager’ with vast experience, and delivering success in the face of great uncertainty, while 
expertly tackling the challenges of the wider economic, geo-political, diplomacy, and social 
aspects of the project (Blanchard, 1990). The present study found it is precisely this rare mix 
of intelligent gravitas, technical awareness, social proficiency, and political confidence that 
sets outstanding mega-project managers apart. 
 
 
5.1.3.8 A sense of mission and urgency 
 
Ultimately a key characteristic of mega-project managers is the enthusiasm and 
determination to keep driving the project forward, and to effectively communicate this ‘sense 
of mission’ throughout the team (Graham & Englund, 1997; ITER, 2009). Mega high-tech 
enterprises have voracious appetites for funds, even during quiescent periods, and 
maintaining progress is crucial, especially when unpla ned deviations occur. 
 
Managers might well consider the analytic approach from Goldratt’s (1997) Theory of 
Constraints (TOC) that contends that any manageable system is limited in achieving  its 
goals by constraints acting on the critical path. Te TOC process seeks to identify the 





NASA manager, Jerry Madden (Laufer & Hoffman, 2000) argues that a critical characteristic 
for project managers is the application of judgement to position stress levels between 
lethargy and team fatigue.  The skill to juggle resources, quickly re-plan, and restore the 
critical pathway requires a special, multi-dimensioal intellect and the ability to maintain a 
balance between unproductive stress and pressure, and motivating urgency. George Morrow, 
NASA’s Director of Flight Projects concurs with Madden, adding: “If we managed the early 
phase of projects with the same sense of urgency as s stems integration and test, we’d be a 
lot more efficient in the overall life cycle” (NASA, 2009a, p. 33).  
 
Grün concurs while tackling a different aspect. He argues that in order to achieve success, 
the project manager must be prepared to limit goals so as to counterbalance the tendency to 
expand the technical scope of mega-projects. Such for es are often hard to oppose in high-
tech projects and: “therefore it is essential to have, or to create time pressure for the 
project.” (Grün, 2004, p. 31). Specifically in the software project area, a sense of urgency 
was strongly linked to regular project checks, and listed third in Attarzadeh and Ow’s list 
(2008) of IT project success factors. 
 
When looking to create positive, and diminish negative, determinants of success, extensive 
research by Murphy et al. (1974) asserts that the project manager should develop 
commitment and a sense of participation and mission among project team members from the 
outset. Seamans & Ordway (1977, p. 275) recount from their Apollo project study that: ‘To 
marshal our resources and order our course is a task of the greatest delicacy which must be 
accomplished under the most relentless urgency’. It is likely that the pace-setter in this case 
stemmed from the Presidential announcement of a lunr-la ding within a decade, itself 
driven by fear of the Russians winning the race to the moon; nonetheless it shows the 
influence of executive level decree (Young et al., 1969) 
 
Finally, my fieldwork interviews from the present study revealed a tangible sense of 
proprietorship at the ranks of senior management, and this was cited among many project 
teams as important in driving the project mission in terms of direction and maintaining pace. 
(CSIRO, 2009; CSIRO, 2008; CERN, 2009; ANSTO, 2009, TOPSAT, 2010). Peter 
Swenson, ITER’s project manager stated in interview: “I got [concrete delivery] trucks 
rolling to show the project was moving and to show a sense of urgency. I wasn’t popular by 
putting the scientists on time recording [but it emphasised] the way to go forward” (ITER, 
2009). Ms. Loots, MeerKAT’s Risk Manager, told me: “We need to keep tension in the 




5.1.4 Managing project initiatives and environment 
 
5.1.4.1. Project structures and teams 
 
The effectiveness of a project to achieve its goals is dependent on the shape and functionality 
of the project structure and operating environment (Graham & Englund, 1997). Miller and 
Lessard (2000) go further, arguing that institutional arrangements and strategic systems are 
greater determinants of success of large engineering projects than project engineering and 
management. 
 
Management structures, and especially the relationsh p between management and 
stakeholders in large high-tech projects, commonly generate tensions for the project. As one 
recent European study (Katsanevas et al. 2009, p. 56) found: 
 
“the existing successful projects demonstrate that a certain degree of structure and 
management is not only necessary, but can also support the success of the science 
project itself. The balancing between enough regulation or structure and too much 
has to be done in a way satisfying both the researchers and the funding agencies”. 
 
Collaborations can also present demands on project structures, especially in the case of equal 
partners. The initial 50:50 division of the ALMA radio telescope project between European 
and American partners (ESO and NRAO respectively), each having a project manager 
operating under a joint Board, naturally slows down and complicates any decision making. 
(ALMA, 2007). 
 
The Australian OPAL nuclear project commenced withou  a formal project manager, 
favouring instead a Management Board drawn from other parts of the ANSTO organisation. 
However this was soon found ineffective and a ‘tradi ional’ project manager role was then 
established, successfully taking the project through to completion. Once established, the 
manager/team relationship clearly worked, with a former project officer stating to me: 
“These were people like I’ve never met before; they n ver took a sick day” (OPAL, 2009). 
 
 Experience from the successful AUGER project, operated under the auspices of Fermilab, 
show that even in loose structures, some rules are needed, and responsibilities need to be 
clear. A noted feature of AUGER’s success was the project manager’s proclination to 
frequently visit the many partners, facilitate exchange of information, and address problems 





The ability to effectively manage team-based structures applies equally in the commercial 
environment. In a report on the success of the 343MW Huntstown CCGT power station in 
Ireland (Garnett & Hatfield, undated p. 5) the authors conclude: 
 
“Open teamwork [between contractors and staff] proved to be a definite benefit to 
the project. With the complexity of construction, there will be no shortage of 
[failures and mistakes] to overcome without having an institutional adversarial 
blood stream running through the project”. 
 
Samuel’s study (2009) concurs with the present study’s fieldwork and with commentary 
from the AUGER project, that in mega-science/engineeri g teams (and academic groups 
particularly) the need for team building activities was considered to be inappropriate and 
largely unnecessary. Each of these sources reason that association with a project having a 
grand science ambition is sufficient basis for a robust common passion. 
 
In the high-tech area smaller teams may work more effectively as Moody & Dodgson (2006) 
argue in their study of a complex aerospace project. They describe a single small, committed 
team with overlapping and complementary skills, made up of a proportionately large number 
of systems engineers with specialist knowledge across blurred project phases. This flexibility 
of implementation phases - which they suggest can only be done with a small team that can 
be across everything – is presented as a key to succe s. 
 
A study by Gratton et al. (2007) of 55 collaborative teams isolated eight HR practices 
leading to project success,  highlighting the benefits of capitalising on the trust residing in 
skilfully managed ‘heritage’ teams. Their research indicates that when 20-40% of the team 
members have past associations, strong collaboration was evident at the start. The success 
rate of ‘heritage’ teams points to an interesting area of future research. 
 
Casework interviews confirmed that team confidence and experience is an important 
precursor to success. R. Ekers, former Director of the Australian Compact Array, stated: 
“We knew we had the best team on the planet at the time to do this...a small number of ‘top 
notch’ systems thinkers... with a median age around 40” (CSIRO, 2008). 
 
The present study found that setting up a standard project management structure within the 
organisation should not absolve the project manager nd/or Directorate from reviewing its 




commenced under a thorough, well documented governance structure, yet was later  
compelled to recommend a taskforce review to deal with the orthogonal nature of external 
entities (DESY, 2009). Projects managers need to beready to embrace such change. 
 
In summary, when selecting potential managers for scientific and engineering projects, 
Directorates should not overlook the matching of characteristics to the operating 
environment and structure. A manager may appear to have failed at one assignment, yet 
could perform well at another with different organisat onal and team conditions. 
Organisational structure, control, systems, and processes are not on their own sufficient for 
successful innovation, and there is overwhelming evidence that the right individual is a 
necessary condition for project success (Rubenstein e  al., 1976). 
 
 
5.1.4.2 Managing task forces 
 
Despite considerable planning, risk assessment and c pable management, it would be most 
unusual for a major scientific and engineering project to proceed to conclusion without a 
significant problem appearing. Occasionally, something approaching a ‘wicked problem’ 
may emerge that defeats normal problem-solving approaches (Partridge, 1981). One study 
found that, on average, projects met five unexpected events during execution, and some had 
twelve (Miller & Lessard, 2000). The handling of problems that threaten the critical path is a 
key test of capability for the project manager, andy recruitment process should carefully 
review the candidate’s approach, experience and performance in relation to major problem 
solving. 
 
The recognition of the need for immediate assistance, convening of specialist personnel 
(physically or virtually), managing the process to s lve the issue, and transferring the 
outcomes to the project team(s) are all vital functions, requiring leadership, mature 
judgement and coordination skills of project managers. Each of the case studies for this 
thesis employed the task force (or’ Tiger Team’) concept, an ad-hoc group operating 
heuristically to deal with a crisis, critical deviation or roadblock (Pavlak, 2004b). 
 
To further explore this aspect, I conducted a mini-survey of eight experienced leaders of 
large scientific and engineering projects (see list in Table 1-2). Each respondent was asked to 
comment using narrative against questions designed to elicit better understanding of the 
operative nature of task forces, and the challenges they pose for high-tech project managers. 




   
a) Overall, how well do you think task forces are effective in achieving their stated goal? 
(i.e. how likely are you, or were you, to set up or join a task force to solve a problem?) 
b) What conditions do you consider necessary for task forces to be successful? 
c) What kind of problems are best suited to be solved by a task force? 
 
The conclusions of the research focus group are shown below, gathered under three aspects: 
 
Membership & Support - The ideal task force team size is between six and te  members. 
Other than support staff, all members should be professional scientists/engineers offering a 
fair representation of skill and opinion. As in other project groups, it helps if members know 
each other and can bond quickly. A mixed gender membership from the same or close 
generation is suggested. An expense budget should be set, and if secretarial support is 
required, this function should be managed only by the leader. 
 
Authority & Scope - The task force must be given a clear mandate in the form of a task 
statement and deadline. The problem to solve must be clearly scoped, and any terms of 
reference should be brief and non-restrictive, other an having task depth and boundaries 
defined. Often, the task force itself will not be given authority to make actual decisions, 
however any authority awarded must match the responsibility/accountability required. 
 
Success factors for task forces  
 
• Task forces operate best when tackling (a) emergent program level challenges to 
enable an effective technical way forward, and (b) addressing deficient organizational 
practices to improve the program. 
• There is a will amongst stakeholders for a situation o be un-stalled, or solved. 
• A deadline or other imperative exists. 
• The task force members are able to ‘roll their sleeves up’, leave their egos at the door, 
and become totally objective. ‘A ‘burn’ on the problem by a small group can often 
break the impasse.’ 
• The group is co-located, appropriately isolated, an really taken ‘offline’. The group is 
given management and organisational support, and is relieved of other duties and 
distractions. 





• The format of the outcome is defined, and the ‘end conditions’ built-in so that closure 
is effective. 
• The results must be capable of being actioned/impleented. 
• The task force leader must have technical expertise and a systems perspective, be 
experienced in the domain, and have the ability to synthesise the outcomes. The team 
leader needs to be smart, objective, build confidence and trust, and be a respected 
‘dictator’. 
 
The survey indicated that, while some delay normally occurs in assembling the members, 
task forces were effective in quickly tackling ‘showstopper’ events. They bring focus to 
wide-ranging discussions (e.g. technology options), simplifying complex problems, and are 
useful to reset the existing pathway to an outcome. Using scenario analysis, task forces can 
explore unfolding circumstances in emergency planning, or as part of strategic planning 
(Standards Australia, 2011). As such, the timely assembly and deployment of a task force in 
response to project stress offers a useful interview topic for candidate managers. 
 
 
5.1.4.3 Project information management 
 
It is one thing to create or shape a project structu e, and another to make this effective 
through communications and information management. High-tech projects have an inherent 
need to convey large amounts of complicated information across a range of domains and 
levels both inside and outside the organisation. 
 
My fieldwork for this study revealed two important areas beyond functional document 
control processes that draw on the characteristics of the project manager – that of managing 
information exchange (the delivery dimension), and managing information dissemination 
(the content dimension). 
 
Technical data, designs, system descriptions, and other evolving documents normally require 
iterations within and outside the project and need careful consideration by management in 
terms of their distribution, especially among collaborative groups. The project manager must 
display firmness in approving circulation lists and meeting participants, yet be ready to 
modify according to circumstances. Case interviews verified that the project manager is 
unable to be involved in every information exchange; therefore clear protocols must be 
implemented that reflect the project needs and management style, as well as the expectations 




engineering projects tend to generate valuable intellec ual property (IP), and project 
management must establish and demonstrate standards in compliance with IP policies. 
 
Managers also declare their character through the quantity, quality, and detail of the 
information they disseminate, and to whom. This especially applies to reports, meeting 
outcomes, and funding matters where the attributes of judgement and discretion must be 
keenest. I found agreement among the case study interviewees that project managers 
releasing information through messages to sub-groups and teams (especially from 
headquarters to sites); need to strike an appropriate tone of leadership rather than 
officialdom.  Trust issues were evident here also, and the experienced project manager is 
expected to display care concerning delicate and cofidential matters. 
 
In a study using success factors to improve project management, Clarke (1999) identified 
communication throughout the project as critical, in particular its influence on the acceptance 
of change. Her research strongly links effective communication with interpersonal skills. 
 
Lastly, Clarke (1999) emphasises the importance of communicating within the final stages in 
a project as opportunities to convey achievement and project learning.  She also proposes 
that one of the best ways to motivate people and make them more confident of what can be 
achieved is through more effective communication. A practical example is NASA’s annual 
Project Management Challenge that includes a formal awards ceremony where group and 
individual achievement is recognised through motivating project story information. 
 
 
5.1.4.4 Adopting mission assurance 
 
A particular characteristic of project managers drawn from fieldwork combines leadership 
with the traits of being ‘resolute’ and ‘fastidious’, and is displayed as an unwavering sense of 
purpose in making mission success the highest priority at all levels of the project. 
 
This single-minded (though not tunnel-vision) approach becomes very apparent during 
deeper investigations of project system management, where integration of technical domains 
often reveals both technical and philosophical inconsistencies at the interfaces. The 
resolution of these tensions can easily lead to outcomes that can potentially compromise the 
sustainability of the project, and it is imperative that the project manager applies fortitude 
and leadership to maintain project focus, and as highlighted in the fieldwork, is supported by 





The adoption of a mission assurance approach is captured most compellingly within NASA 
reports. Following a review of NASA’s ‘Faster, Better, Cheaper’ (FBC) approach to space 
missions in light of a growing failure rate (Spear, 2000), certain flaws began to emerge 
concerning cost cap challenges, taking shortcuts under pressure, and risk conflicts for project 
managers However the recommendations largely missed the root cause. Meanwhile NASA’s 
Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board (MIB) independently concluded that: 
“[FBC] has failed to instil sufficient rigor in risk management throughout the mission cycle” 
(NASA 2000, p. 6), and recommended the implementation of a new paradigm, termed 
Mission Success First. The MIB went further to describe how the Mission Assurance 
function should operate within projects, its rigorous oversight of testing and verification, and 
most importantly, interfacing with project management in driving mission success criteria. 
 
In NASA’s model (NASA, 2000), mission assurance requires that institutional line 
management become more engaged in the execution of the project, and be held accountable 
for mission success. This means project managers asking the right questions at meetings and 
reviews, getting the right people to those reviews to fearlessly uncover mission critical issues 
early in the program, and pursuing their resolution. Given the obvious tensions arising 
between mission assurance and project deliverables, th e are clearly key responsibilities 
requiring valiant project management. 
 
The legacy of past methodologies applied to high-tec /long lifetime projects can remain to 
challenge contemporary project managers, as in the cas  of FBC and the Space Shuttle 
navigation units (Goodman, 2002), and NASA’s Genesis spacecraft program (NASA, 2005). 
Project managers joining existing science and engineer g enterprises need to be capable and 
ready to build latent risk into their mission assurance programs. 
 
 
5.1.4.5 Managing project complexity 
 
Scientific and engineering mega-projects are typically characterised by multiple components, 
multiple functions, and requiring the involvement of multiple organisations (Milosevic & 
Patanakul, 2005; Grün, 2004). They are information r ch (Thomas & Mog, 1997), and cannot 
be designed or communicated by a single expert (Moody & Dodgson, 2006). The 
management of complicated (intricate, of many parts), and complex (interwoven, 
interdependent), projects demands exceptional skills, described succinctly by Shenhar & 





“Managing successful [complex] projects is a serious challenge. Not only must 
project leaders cope with poor communication among managers, designers, and 
customers, but also they are strongly dependent on a complex web of external 
suppliers, complicated procurement systems, and lengthy, detailed contracts … and 
other collaborators.” 
 
Cavanagh (2009, p. 4) captures both the range and essence of what complex project 
management demands of the project manager as: 
 
“vision and motivation; empathy; attention to relationship building, in order that trust 
may be mutually awarded and maintained through difficult periods; the ability to take 
a holistic view; consummate communications skills; practical application of 
experientially-derived wisdom; and perhaps most of all, courage – the courage to be 
able to speak the truth (and hear it!), and to take good risk”. 
. 
In dealing with project performance in large engineering projects, Miller & Lessard (2000, p. 
19) note that: “Their technical difficulties do not condemn them to failure; far more 
troublesome, however, are the difficulties arising from their complexity, irreversibility, and 
dynamic instability.” Such complexity and dynamism lead to unpredictabili y with new risks 
emerging correspondingly with project length. 
 
Commenting on the success of the Gemini telescope proj ct, Dick Kurz tells how the job of 
building such a complex scientific instrument required a new kind of partnership, 
incorporating multiple countries and expert project management. “[It was recognized] that a 
project of this magnitude takes…professional management and professional system 
engineering to really carry it off” (Michaud, 2009, p. 34). 
 
In a recurring theme in this study, mega-project complexity is not restricted to technical 
design, interfacing, and execution; it extends to innovation outcomes (Dodgson et al., 2008), 
structural, social, and exogenous factors that will severely test the less experienced manager. 
Schein (1965) highlights the interplay between individuals, teams, and management that can 
work positively and negatively in a context of personal ambitions, confluences and conflicts, 
and project goals (in Levine, 2002). Cooke-Davies and Teague (2009, p. 7) elegantly 





“delivering a complex project is not so much…knowing what to do and designing a 
system and processes to do it, as a matter of skillully navigating the tides, storms, 
and cross-currents of human beings, with all their d sires, motivations, quirks, and 




5.1.5 The usefulness of practice guides 
 
Since the 1970s, project management institutions have formed around the world, offering 
their membership the benefits (inter alia) of shared information and professional 
certification, based on published ‘Bodies of Knowledg ’ (BoKs) largely developed through 
practice rather than research. The attractiveness of formal recognition is indicated by Project 
Management Institute (PMI) data showing that in 2006 almost 86% of its 210,000 members 
were certified as Project Management Professionals (PMP). (Morris et al., 2006). Other 
BoKs are offered by the UK’s Association of Project Management (APM), the International 
Project Management Association (IPMA) whose Competency Baseline is an amalgam of 
European BoKs, and the Engineering Advancement Associati n of Japan (ENAA). 
 
The role and effectiveness of the BoKs was deeply researched by the UK Rethinking 
Project Management group in 2006, who found that while clearly useful, there are flaws 
in their development. Project front-end management in particular, with its human, 
structural, and external issues so influential on project outcome, is cited as being 
especially deficient in BoKs (Morris et al., 2006). This general view is echoed in a recent 
Position Paper from the International Centre for Complex Project Management 
(Cavanagh 2009, p. 2) which states: 
 
“we have a bagful of well-developed methods and tools, and a reasonably 
comprehensive project management body of knowledge. Ironically, these  
things…aren’t enough, and relying on them alone won’t work”.   
 
Nevertheless, while project management certification against the BoKs principles alone does 
not guarantee good project management execution, a track record of well run projects plus 






The PMI is strongest in terms of spread and influence, and their guide (PMBOK® Guide, 
2008) is the most widely recognised and accepted Book of Knowledge (Crawford, 2000), 
being self promoted (p. 4) as: “a foundational project management reference for its
professional development programs and certifications.”  Although not purporting to go 
beyond the status of practice handbook, it is useful to review the PMBOK in terms of 
alignment with the ideas presented in this study, and test for any epistemic value supporting 
the practical application of the research outcomes; refer to Table 5-1. 
 
Table 5-1. Alignment between the concepts in this sudy, and the PMBOK® Guide 
Characteristic/Attribute/Skill  PMBOK® Guide 2008 Alignment 
 
Authenticity Generally implied only in sections 1.6, 
2, 4.3, and 9.3 
Weak 
Collaborative Approach Touched on in Section 9 and  
Appendix G 
Weak 
Leadership and Management 
Capability 
References in sections 1.6, 2, 9, with 
‘soft skills’ addressed in Appendix G 
Moderate 
Persuasion and Negotiation Referenced in sections 9, 10, 12 and 
Appendix G 
Strong 
Trust and Diversity References in section 9 and Appendix G Moderate 
Personal Profile Not addressed Weak 
Sense of mission and urgency Urgency only addressed in t rms of risk 
in section 11 
Moderate 
Project structures Referenced in section 2, 4, and 9 Strong 
Task Forces  Implied references in sections 5, and 10 Weak 
Information Management Referenced throughout Strong 
Mission Assurance  Implied in section 8, 11 in terms of 
quality and risk only 
Weak 
Project Complexity Scattered mentions in various sections Weak 
 
The conclusions indicate, perhaps unsurprisingly, that he PMBOK® is intended much more 
as a practicing project manager’s handbook than a project personnel assessment or 




and techniques, the publication is less informative concerning the more subtle (e.g. 
interpersonal) characteristics required of project managers that can significantly impact on 
project success, and currently falls short of being strategically useful in this regard. 
Nevertheless, the latest (4th) update begins to address some of the characteristics dealt with in 
this paper, largely listing these in a new appendix (PMBOK® Guide, Appendix G – 
Interpersonal Skills). This is suggestive of recent acknowledgement of the importance of 
these types of factors and offers potential for future expansion. 
 
Archibald (2003) looks at the formalised BoKs, and while he acknowledges their usefulness 
in relation to processes, acknowledges the ‘extreme difficulty’ in developing these practice 
guides to meet the global challenge. He is, however, more confident that contemporary 
project maturity models40 offer a reliable benchmark for integrated project management 
principles and practices, and a useful platform for evaluation of organisational competence. 
An assessment of project maturity models by Ibbs and Kwak (2000, p. 42) similarly endorses 
their use as a: “legitimate and sustainable reference point from which to begin making 
process improvements”. The best known, SEI’s Capability Maturity Model 
Integration (CMMI) provides organisations with the essential elements for effective process 
improvement, and identifies where the greatest payoff exists. 
 
 
5.1.6 Summary and conclusions 
 
This section set out to look beyond the standard set of skills and qualities attributable to 
managers of high-tech mega-projects, and sought to add new knowledge by exploring the 
less obvious key characteristics of project managers that lead to project success. 
 
Data were sourced from the published literature spanning the last 30 years, together with 
extensive fieldwork from nine mega-science facilities, and the personal experiences of a 
selected group in relation to task forces. The data were examined using a grounded theory 
approach, gathering supporting arguments, and drawing compelling and practical inferences. 
 
The limitations of the methodology are acknowledged, and adding a temporal dimension 
with numerical analysis to show management trends would likely yield further conclusions. 
The study also reveals an incomplete understanding of the application of transformational 
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 Maturity models claim to improve organizational performance by  identifying organizational 
strengths and weaknesses and providing benchmarking information. Current examples include CMMI, 
OPM3, P3M3, PRINCE, BPMM, and Kerzner's project management maturity model. There is no 




management in high-tech projects, and the relationsh p between charisma and success, and 
further research is warranted. 
 
Whilst a definitive set of personal qualities is idealistic, the research shows that eight 
personal characteristics, traits, or skills are strongly indicated as subtle, though significant, 
factors in driving success within scientific and engineering mega-projects. These are: 
 
• The ability to deal with the temporary and uncertain nature of mega-projects; 
• Having and demonstrating personal authenticity; 
• Applying skill in the management of collaborations; 
• Having an appropriate balance of management and leadership talent; 
• Motivating strategic influence through persuasion, e couragement, and negotiation; 
• Building trust in a diverse cultural environment; 
• Having a personal profile well matched to the project; and 
• Driving a clear sense of project urgency. 
 
These factors are interrelated and careful consideration is required in the selection of 
someone with the right mix of traits (Nicholas, 2004). A further five factors were shown to 
be positively related to project success in the context of creating, managing successful 
project structures. These are: 
 
• Establishment of an appropriate project and team structure; 
• Deployment of effective project task forces; 
• Effective information management; 
• Application of a mission assurance approach; and 
• Competent management of complexity. 
 
The success drivers described could usefully supplement the discussion agenda at the project 
manager interview stage by exploring the candidate’s approach and experience in these 
subtle, yet vital, pre-cursors of mega-project success. Ultimately, the project management 
must be chosen on the basis of competency, and a range of project management skills 








5.2 Authentic intent in high-tech projects 
 
Despite the real difficulties associated with approval, cost estimation, funding, and execution 
of high-tech mega-projects, it is comforting to imagine that the overall mission is genuine 
and that the protagonists are open and truthful in their intent to successfully deliver a project 
against stated goals. The fieldwork and case literature examined in the course of the present 
research revealed no obviously fraudulent projects; however they do exist, and when 
revealed, make assessment of success largely futile. For this reason I include a brief 
discussion of the phenomenon. 
 
This section does not consider situations of fraudulent project reports, fake data, or false 
discoveries. I also exclude from the discussion the view of philosopher Karl Popper (1902-
94), that science actually advances by falsification (the ability to be refuted), which he 
claims is believed by many scientists. (Corredoira & Perelmen, 2008; Farndon, 2009; Cave, 
2011). 
 
First we may ask: why fund high-tech mega-projects at all? Given the general track record of 
success, it would seem both logical and prudent to confine funding  to those projects that 
demonstrate fact-based confidence in meeting project targets. However this would mean 
only low risk projects would get funded, and as both commerce and governments know, 
without risk, challenge and stretch-goals, a nation d es not progress. What of the more 
esoteric disciplines (e.g. astronomy) that have no readily identifiable benefit to the general 
tax-payer? Howard, in his PhD thesis (2004, p. 247), investigates the legitimacy of 
astronomy and asks: “what arguments, strategies, tactics and rhetoric do astronomy 
advocates use to persuade funding agencies to part with large sums of money?” He answers 
that: “Astronomy successfully...justifies itself...to successfully procure resources from society 
because: first, it has popular support; second, it has an educational role; third, because 
modern societies are ‘scientific’ in that they value science for its own sake”. Howard is 
remiss in not adding the quantifiable benefits of direct contractual involvement by industry, 
and the indirect value of technology ‘spin-offs’s (e.g. Crosby, 2008a). One could argue that 
slipped programs, ballooned budgets, and the debatable societal benefits of big science edge 
towards deceptive practice; however no fraudulent intent was detected in any of the 
fieldwork cases examined in the course of the present study. 
 
There is little in the literature on the topic, though Charles Smith has considered the subject 
in some depth in his book, Making Sense of Project Realities (Smith, 2007). He pulls no 




efforts from those well-meaning, honest groups of people found in academia, private 
research departments, and publicly funded institutions that inadvertently (and perhaps 
naively) see no deceit in misstating or omitting crucial information to project stakeholders. 
However he excludes projects which are plainly incompetent, or created out of stupidity or 
ignorance, thereby absolving incompetent managers. Kruger and Dunning (1999, abstract) 
are less generous, describing such individuals as: “suffer[ing] a dual burden: Not only do 
these people reach erroneous conclusions and make unfort nate choices, but their 
incompetence robs them of the metacognitive ability to realise it”. The US senator Tom 
Coburn (2011) writes about abuse of NSF monies in tr vial research, and gross 
mismanagement of science funding. He voices serious concerns over contracting 
irregularities and malpractices with the loss of millions of dollars with dubious outputs. One 
example revealed $169 million contingency money drawn in advance because no barriers 
existed to prevent it. Coburn reasons that every dollar lost to mismanagement, fraud, 
inefficiency, and duplication impacts scientific adv nces directly by cutting into the budgets 
for astronomy, biology, chemistry, earth sciences, and physics. 
 
Smith (2007) re-tells the factual story of a university project that received Research Council 
funding based on industry collaboration. Instead of offering to close the project when the 
industry partners withdrew, the work proceeded, with the University group delivering a 
theoretical (though related) outcome instead of the promised tool. Remarkably, the Council 
had no problem with this result, conveying the distinct impression that they considered 
University targets met, and early termination may well have jeopardised prospects of future 
funding. Clearly this case fits Smith’s description f a fraudulent project - the victim being 
the tax-payer as shown in Fig. 5-1. However he offers the benefit of the doubt that there 
really was an original shared intent to complete the collaborative effort. 
 
Kirilyuk’s contribution (in Corredoira & Perelman, 2008, p. 139) to an alternative 
publication on how physics and astronomy actually gets done, considers nanotechnology, a 
field he believes to be founded on intellectual fraud, unrealisable promises, and ‘publicity-
driven trickery’. He states that: “the practical reason for that bizarre giga-fraud so easily 
accepted by the most prestigious institutions is the rapid shrinking of the...prosperous field 
of solid-state physics whose adherents have found “anotechnology” as an efficient 






Fig. 5-1. Social interactions – a fraudulent research project (Smith, 2007 p. 63) 
 
Institutional high-tech mega-projects essentially become shams when they fail to deliver all 
or part of the promised outcomes, including unacceptable delays or cost increases, 
performance variations, or dubious (or missing) contributions from collaborators. While 
high-tech research is far from certain in nature and vulnerable to change as the project 
unfolds, the sometimes unrecognised danger is that if external stakeholders believe that 
funds have been falsely allocated or agreed goals have not been met, they are likely to feel 
misled, or even defrauded. 
 
Even NASA’s iconic Apollo moon landing program is not without criticism, and a 
retrospective study by Young et al. (1969) concludes that, despite the principal goal being 
achieved, the much trumpeted spin-offs to science, industry and the economy are at best, 
hard to prove. Moreover, Young et al. (1969 p. 91) point to a ‘truly staggering series of 
falsifications’ concerning programmatical aspects of Apollo’s development. 
 
Cold Fusion is a widely documented case where reseach rs convinced funders to underwrite 
massive project costs despite questionable results. The field originated with reports of an 
experiment by Martin Fleischmann, then one of the world's leading electrochemists, and 




laboratory under a grant from Toyota, but this was clo ed in 1998 after spending £12 million.  
Between 1992 and 1997, Japan's Ministry of Internatio l Trade and Industry also spent a 
further US$20 million in researching cold fusion befor  announcing the end of the program 
in 1997. In the 1990s, India stopped its research in cold fusion because of the lack of 
consensus among mainstream scientists and the US denunciation of it. Experimentation 
continues today in spite of rejection by mainstream science (Condensed from Wikipedia, 
2011). 
 
Group-think can override common-sense in these matters, and I turn again to Smith who 
describes a multi-billion pound defence project offered to a reputable contractor at 30% 
under the firm’s original bid, only after tender ‘rules’ forced the emergence of another bid. 
Despite the implausibility of the competitive offer, the company’s Directors were compelled 
to beat the cheaper offer, and urged senior managers to find a way to deliver the 
requirements. Privately, people shook their heads and said it couldn’t be done, yet the 
reporter tells Smith: “What surprised me most was the alacrity with which this [challenge] 
was taken up”. Project failure was inevitable (Smith, 2007, p. 59). 
 
Protracted government or commercial projects involving large numbers of people and great 
expenditure may be characterised as ‘boondoggles’ where, having realized that the project 
has essentially failed, the participants do not bring this to the attention of the top 
management or funders. Such projects continue "going through the motions" while salaries 
continue to be paid. Sometimes senior management are complicit in this deceit; being 
reluctant to accept the reality of a long-failed project. Sometimes the product or service may 
eventually be delivered, but never work well enough to recoup its development costs. One 
example of a ‘boondoggle’ was the RCA "SelectaVision" video disk system project, hatched 
in the 1960s and continued for 20 years despite cheaper and better technologies. The wasted 
$750 million is considered a factor in RCA’s bankruptcy in 1988. 
 
Institutional science/engineering projects that have diverted from the expected path, and big 
defence projects that have required ‘rescue’ funding, are a cost to the tax-payer. However as 
the budget for typical high-tech projects grows into the multi-millions or larger, customers 
are not above seeking legal remedies for their loss. An example is the case between BSkyB 
and EDS (now part of Hewlett-Packard) concerning fraudulent misrepresentation and 
contract breaches surrounding an IT project. In a landmark decision, EDS’s failure to 
properly analyse project timescales (often traditionally considered a minor programmatical 
detail in R & D projects) was found to be beyond carelessness and was dishonest. Moreover, 




Bond Pearce Solicitors is for project estimators to be extremely careful to ensure that 
representations made in the tendering/funding application process are genuine, especially in 
relation to cost and timescales. The EDS case is important as it establishes a precedent for 
fraudulent misrepresentation in IT projects, allowing the funder to claim unlimited damages, 
in this case £700 million. Such exposure must begin featuring more prominently in risk 
assessments (Bond Pearce, 2010). 
 
What drives intelligent, rational, and often politically adept people to deliberately misstate 
information or ignore agreed plans and goals? In the commercial world there are certainly 
economic pressures to win contracts that lead to offers more aligned with customers' notional 
expectations than reality, and these can backfire (e.g. Boeing’s late delivery of the 
Dreamliner aircraft to India, with consequential US$500 million compensation). The world 
of institutional high-tech mega-projects is more complicated. First, applications to funders 
need to be compelling, with positive outcomes predict  for core science/engineering goals 
and socio-economic impacts (see COST, 2009). These proposals may be ‘tweaked’ with 
features that optimise approval chances, but non-science benefits are soon internally de-
prioritised after project commencement. Second, natio l and regional funding schemes (e.g. 
European FP7 Programme) operate within defined periods, value bands, and priority areas. 
Clearly, any funding application that is heavily manipulated to reflect funder’s stated 
conditions, are by nature counterfeit. Lastly, projects created essentially to recruit or retain 
technical staff without a robust purpose, must be considered phony. 
 
There is one other category of high-tech institutional project that may appear fraudulent or 
bogus at best, but actually has genuine strategic undertones. Unfettered research (sometimes 
labelled ‘curiosity-driven’ or ‘blue-sky’) describes projects where the investigator is 
permitted to choose the problem without having to justify the relevance to his or her 
employer. Odlyzko (1995) examined the decline of unfettered research, concluding that such 
arrangements are beneficial despite their apparent dubious nature, citing electronic 
cryptography as a successful example. Nonetheless, non-tied research funding is becoming 
more limited in both commerce and universities, forcing choices between fields. Odlyzko 
(1995, p. 17) cautions: “Scientists have been notoriously bad in deciding on priorities 
between subjects [and] while scientists usually feel that knowledge is good by itself, the 
public is unlikely to support the large scale research enterprise we have without utilitarian 
justification. Campanario and Martin find (in Corredoira & Perelmans, 2008) that proponents 
of unorthodox project ideas find increasing difficulty in obtaining funding. In times of 




‘blue-sky’ research as a genuine endeavour worthy of serious funding without clear success 
definitions. 
 
How might we rationalise our attitude to large high-tech projects that appear dubious and 
may be fraudulent, but could also herald the next big technological breakthrough? Smith 
(2007) reminds us of the risks and unknowns in high-tec  R & D, and counsels us to accept a 
measure of honest optimism in the form of confidence to achieve lofty project objectives. 
Moreover we need to examine not the mechanistic aspect  of projects for fraudulent purpose, 
but the surrounding management where the vested intrests and political interplays occur. 
Finally, Smith intimates that the real world is not black and white but all shades of grey, and 
that many projects later recognised as a great succe s have likely contained some element of 
fraud at their inception. Kirilyuk calls for systematic change by remarking: “only decisive, 
qualitatively big transition to the unreduced analysis of real, multivalued system dynamics 
can put an end to exponentially growing expenditures for successively failing, practically 
fraudulent giga-projects” (in Corredoira & Perelmans, 2008, p. 140). 
 
In summary, I conclude that institutional large scale high-tech projects are highly susceptible 
to deceitful behaviour. Misstated forecasts at the approval stage, dubious diversions of effort, 
conveniently forgotten baselines, and deviations in terms of budget, schedule, and goals are 
possible, in ways unlikely to be overlooked in their commercial equivalents. However to 
describe this as fraud is misleading. The very enviro ment that shapes and nurtures 
science/engineering programs tacitly permits such deviations from approved plans or 
outputs, often without any perceived consequences. This is epitomised by the SKADS 
project (SKADS, 2005), an international effort focusing on the development of new 
telescope receptor technology. Consensus among many of the SKA stakeholder 
representatives is that most of the planned deliverabl s will not be completed, and a good 
fraction of the €28.5 million budget (of which €10.5 million was EC funded) was expended 
needlessly. 
 
Given the above, the relevance of authentic intent in high-tech mega-project success is 
reduced to the question - how can a project that has been deliberately or naively diverted 
from its initial (and approved) aims, measure or claim success? I assert that the answer lies in 
the fundamental notions framing the project’s critial success factors (CSF) described in 
section 2.4.3. Put simply, unless a full and proper review process takes place to redefine the 
CSFs in response to any material change in circumstances, the project can only be judged 
against the extant metrics. To claim success without deceit, a ‘shifting of the goalposts’ must 





5.3 Project review and close out 
 
Project reviews are key events in the project lifecycle (Cooke-Davies, 2002b). Whether 
highly invasive, or a light appraisal, each offers an opportunity (through fresh eyes) to check 
and adjust the project’s trajectory for success. In this section I examine the efficacy of 
project reviews, close-out and lessons learned activities, and their influence on project 
success. 
 
Any project, purely by definition, is a temporary end avour with an end-date. This might 
imply a winding down of effort and gradual dispersal of resources. Interviews with personnel 
from closed projects within this study’s fieldwork indicated this was certainly not the case, 
and that the approaching termination date presents special challenges in terms of agreed 
milestone achievement, performance reconciliation, a d tensions concerning future 
assignments for project personnel. Archibald (2003, p. 356) agrees, saying: “closing out a 
[high-tech] project is more easily said than done. The project manager has the job of 
literally putting ...the project team out of business. This is a very demanding assignment.” 
 
 
5.3.1 Project review 
 
Projects examined for this study essentially followed a traditional execution path, marking 
progress through periodic sequential reviews, often labelled as ‘stage-gates’ or equivalent 
term (See Fig. 5-2). These types of reviews typically mark the passage of a project through 
life-cycle phases, often coinciding with further investment decisions and possibly becoming 
GO/NO-GO points - especially for industrial mega-projects. Projects containing an R&D 
element (e.g. those making up the casework for this t esis) typically planned for and 
conducted a Concept of Design Review (CoDR), a Preliminary Design Review (PDR), a 
Critical Design Review (CDR), and some form of Pre-Construction (or Baseline) Review in 







Fig. 5-2. Major project execution phases aligned with approval/completion ‘Gates’ (Capex-
Pro, 2011) 
 
Both the literature and the case studies consider each review as a serious exercise, often 
conducted by a mixed panel of peer reviewers and independent specialists. The importance 
of effective review is underlined by the identification of inadequate review function as a root 
cause in the loss of NASA’s CONTOUR mission in 2002 (NASA, 2003).  
 
The review panel’s core task is to evaluate the project against the stated aims and key 
success criteria (Harris, 2009), involving a critical examination of previous achievement, 
identification of strengths and improvement areas (Archibald, 2003), and an examination of 
the viability and risk profile of forward plans. The large-scale timing relationship between 
high-tech project phases and supporting reviews is shown in Fig. 5-3. In this (de-identified) 
example from NASA, the various design reviews are mapped to project phases and their 
associated plans.  
 
Reviews as a whole contribute to effective life-cycle management (Smith, 2007; Anbari, 




In tightening the project scope, NIF management polished the project-completion criteria 
very carefully and incorporated all changes in the project execution plan where they 




Fig. 5-3. The life cycle phases adopted by NASA showing supporting reviews (adapted from 
NASA, 2007b Ch5 p. 2) 
 
Project reviews typically operate at two levels. At the lower end, an in-house Review Board 
will carefully scrutinise progress and performance, and make decisions regarding next steps. 
At the higher end a panel of experts often serves as an independent Review Board to 
examine technical progress, review the design, critique the execution strategy, and offer 
advice and recommendations regarding problems and risk (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007). The 
frequency of review in high-tech enterprises naturally varies. Williams (2008) mentions 
intervals of three months for the Ericsson Company, whereas SmithKline refer to ‘a 
regular...project review process based on milestone.’ BAE SYSTEMS Lifecycle 
Management Framework (LMF) material shows regular reviews to be central in technical 
project execution, and although driven strongly by lifecycle phases, are inferred to be at least 




considerably, lasting anywhere from a few days, to around six weeks in the case of NASA’s 
Mars Pathfinder project, which had more than 100 peer reviews (NASA, 2011b) and 
employed the services of 25 consultants and seasoned NASA/JPL managers (Nicholas, 
2004). The Mars Pathfinder rover review program included six incremental delivery 
demonstrations, emphasising the seriousness of the proj ct review investment. 
 
Fieldwork for this thesis indicates that project reviews can be a tense time (SKA, 2010, 
LHC, 2009, LOFAR, 2009). The exposure of a large, complex, and multi-stakeholder (and 
sometimes highly emotive) enterprise to external asses ment requires careful planning, and 
gathering of accurate and pertinent information. Following my appointment in 2006 as the 
co-ordinator of the Project Review Board (PRB) at the (then) CSIRO-ATNF, I developed a 
‘dashboard’ style of project report in order to improve the efficiency of the review process, 
and the effectiveness of the group’s deliberations. Though not new to industry, the 
PowerPoint based design (Fig. 5-4) with dual ‘traffic light’ style assessment represented 
something of a leap of faith for a scientific institute review panel used to a substantial 
(though inconsistent) range of project reports and data. The dashboard tool also shifted 
responsibility for project data compilation (especially financial data) to the project 
leader/manager, as well as requiring a self-assessment prior to the PRB’s judgement. The 
introduction of the dashboard sparked much debate until the efficacy was demonstrated at 
subsequent Division-wide project reviews, and formally dopted as the preferred tool by the 
PRB Chair.41 
 
Following the implementation of DAPTIV© program management software to CASS in 
2010, more elaborate dashboard-type reports became available, largely auto-populated with 
data extracted from other enterprise tools such as SAP, and Redmine. Despite criticisms 
regarding the security weaknesses of DAPTIV’s ‘cloud’ hosting, and imperfect interfaces 
with other PM applications, the sheer ability to generate fast, comprehensive, and 
informative reports obviously shows the way forward for effective project reporting. An 
example of a DAPTIV report is shown in Appendix G).
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Fig. 5-4. Example of a single-page dashboard style project review report developed by the 
author 
 
While the overtly stated reasoning for progress reviews is to provide a project-independent 
view on progress, tracking, and trajectory of cost, schedule and practical execution, there is 
always the underlying spectre of budget cuts, completion pressure, and a decision point for 
continuing (Nicholas, 2004). Like any investigation r audit scenario, the success of the 
project review (in terms of beneficial outcomes to all stakeholders) lies in the planning (the 
‘charge’ to the panel), an agreed response, and to some extent in the attitude of the parties, 
especially the project representative(s). NASA’s Project Management Handbook offers 
sound advice for high-tech project leaders, including a quote from the (un-named) WISE 
Project Manager at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL): 
 
“I desire tough review board members who really know their areas of expertise. I 
want people who work hard at reviews, ask a lot of questions, and write a lot of RFAs 
(Requests for Action). Reviews allow the project to tap high-quality people with a lot 
of experience. In a sense it’s free labor (sic). These are good people to glean 




There are no rejects or RFAs tagged as advisory. Every RFA is worked to the point 
where the initiator concurs with the closure” (NASA, 2010b, p. 108). 
 
Serving on a review panel is not trivial work, or without its obligations and personal 
challenges. There is an expectation that members will take sufficient time to read the project 
material, review guidelines, and take time (often on a voluntary basis) from busy schedules 
to attend the event. One commentator’s view (Fisher, 2010, p. 6) of project reviews in the 
field of large astronomy intimated: 
 
“[They] usually involve a lot of reports and presentation preparation and travel. 
There is definite value in these reviews, but any scientist...will recognise how 
inefficient the process is and may dread being assigned to...these review committees. 
An additional danger of excessive reliance on the review ‘process’ is that it can lull a 
project into a false sense of security. We cannot review the answer to a question that 
we are not clever enough to ask. Modern radio telescopes are sufficiently close to the 
state of the art that we should at all times admit the possibility of a surprise.” 
 
The output of project reviews is invariably a detail d report, sometimes employing an 
advanced preliminary account summarising the main issues. Anecdotal feedback from 
casework for this thesis indicates that the review findings are most pertinent when delivered 
promptly, and in a form that can be readily responded to (ASKAP, 2009, VISTA, 2009, 
LHC, 2009). To achieve this,  attention must be given to formulating an action plan (possibly 
as a separable appendix to the review report), that clearly states each issue, and the 
objectives for resolving it. Project Management canthen discuss each issue; determine the 
course of action, who is responsible, and a proposed date for close-out. Representatives from 
the project, and the review panel, then sign agreement to the action plan, with copies 
circulated to functional managers. A suggested template is provided at Appendix H. 
 
The action treatment will vary according to the issue, and some matters will require both 
immediate handling, and a longer term response.  The casework for this thesis shows that 
institutional high-tech projects typically do not generally exhibit a sense of urgency or 
obligation around matters of addressing review findings, although in fairness, the assessment 
reports sighted were not well crafted to elicit responses within a specific timeframe. For 




year, whereas an industrial high-tech equivalent would likely be much more time focused.42 
NASA traditionally uses a Problem Failure Report as a generic instrument to record, pursue, 
and track issues. In the case of the Mars Pathfinder craft, the NASA project team collectively 
responded to over 800 of these – this not considered an unusual number (Nicholas, 2004). 
 
 
5.3.2 Post project reviews 
 
Post-project reviews (or ‘post-mortems’) represent the final phase of project execution (other 
than a lessons-learned and knowledge transference phase discussed in section 5.3.3). Indeed, 
the standard project management texts (e.g. the PMBOK, IPMA Competence Baseline, 
PRINCE2, APM, etc.) each highlight the importance of a final review. One would therefore 
imagine that a project ‘post-mortem’ for high-tech mega-projects is an automatic step; a 
welcome activity for the central project players to gather and reflect on both their 
achievements and opportunities to improve (Caupin, et al., 2006). Unfortunately, research 
shows this is not always the case. 
 
Harris (2009, p. 97), when looking at the role of (under-used) risk data during project 
reviews, concludes that: “around 26% of large project organisations may still have no 
formal project review process, and those who do mayhave limited managerial involvement.” 
Cerpa and Verna’s (2009) paper investigates IT project failure factors; the authors remarking 
(p. 130) that: “few project post-mortems are conducted, and little understanding is gained 
from the results of past projects”. Von Zedtwitz’s survey finds that only 20% of R&D 
projects receive a post-project assessment (Anbari, 2008). Verna and Evanco’s (2005) 
collaborative survey of software development projects adds hard data to this view, finding 
that 33% of 42 projects had post-mortem reviews, and that such reviews were significantly 
associated with ‘good requirements and managing risks’. Another survey of 92 IT 
organisations found that: “more than one fifth did no post-mortems whatsoever”, the authors 
mentioning a “grim suspicion that the projects not subjected to post-mortem analysis are the 
very ones we could learn most from” (Collier et al., 1996, p. 66). 
 
Williams (2008, p. 252) in his investigation of hig-tech projects, comments that 80% of all 
R & D projects did not conduct a review at completion and of those that did, most did not 
follow a process. Nonetheless, his work found sufficient encouragement to report: 
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“As firms increasingly become more innovative and project-based, many are 
recognising the need to capture the learning from individual projects, and make it 
available throughout the organisation...learning isparticularly important and 
relevant in new projects where they are at the state-of-the-art level of technology.” 
 
Cooke-Davies (2002b) finds that pressure to close the project, low priority, and other 
distractions present barriers to proper project close ut, however there is little extant research 
as to why post-mortems may not be held. Interviews during casework for this study suggest 
that the atmosphere surrounding high-tech projects which are approaching termination is 
simply not conducive to a formal review activity. Anbari et al. (2008) mention possible 
embarrassment to project staff, and prospective damage to professional relationships. 
Research in Australia involving ranking of importance of project management practices 
relating to project close out showed ‘capturing lessons-learned’ as a poor third activity after 




5.3.3 Post project review processes 
 
The conduct of post-project reviews in the high-tech arena varies substantially according to 
organisational culture (e.g. institutional or commercial), size, geographic spread, and 
management maturity. Schindler and Eppler (2003) describe several methods ranging in 
formality from ‘walk-throughs’ during semi-formal team gatherings, document-based 
reviews, up to the Post-Project Appraisal (PPA) model adopted by British Petroleum - the 
latter being  carried out by a specialised (independent) unit some two years after project 
close and taking six months to complete. Boeing takes a similarly extensive approach, as 
described in section 3.3.3.2. Archibald (2003) posits that the ideal timeframe to conduct the 
post-project review is between one and three months after project closure, allowing some 
perspective regarding the ultimate success of the venture, but not so much time for memories 
to fade or records to be lost. 
 
Collier et al. (1996) offer a five-point process for post-mortem reviews, emphasising the data 
collection stages through personnel surveys prior to a ‘project history day’. Their steps are: 
 
• Project Survey (survey design, methodology for evaluating results) 
• Collect objective information (metrics, tracking) 




• Project history day (problem statement, participants, activities, results) 
• Publish the results (the good, the bad, the ugly). 
 
Anbari et al. (2008) put forward a process model for project post-mortems reflecting 
empirical studies from the literature. Their approach is prefaced with an introduction to 
various quality tools (Quality Function Deployment [QFD], Pareto Charts, cause and affect 
diagrams, etc.) which they suggest helps to prepare and control the review. However 
research for this thesis indicates that most institutional projects do not employ quality 
management specialists, and applying such tools ad-hoc will add little or no value. I assert 
that experienced managers of high-tech projects will have more than sufficient ability to 
organise an effective project review using the process model of the type outlined in Table 5-
2, and which I developed and applied during the post roject review conducted on the Dutch 
LOFAR radio-telescope project (see section 5.4). 
 
Table 5-2. Summary of post-project review process for large, high-tech projects). 
 
 Preparation Output Activity 
Step 1- initiating 
the process 
 
Identify the primary 
and secondary CSFs 

























Step 2 – planning 
process 
 
Consult key project 









Draft plan for the 
review activity 
Announce review 
date and location to 
all participants 
 










assigned in the plan2 
 
Assign activities as 
required 
 
Circulate plan with 
event programme 
Step 4 – Conduct 
the review 
 


















Step 5 – Conclude 
the review 
End of workshop 
summarisation 




project review report 




Decide on audience 








Step 7 – archive & 
add to knowledge 
base 
 








readily retrieved by 





1. Ideally the CSFs/KPIs are identified at an early stage of the project formation. 
Primary CSFs would normally relate to objectives around schedule, cost, and 
performance (plus others), whereas secondary CSFs might include funder 
expectations, quality, mitigation of risk, spin-off technologies, etc. PIs describe 
expectations that may be adjunct to the core deliverabl s (apprentices trained, 
tooling integrated, etc.) 
2.  For example: arrange the venue, prepare workshop materials, invite the personnel, 
circulate any pre-workshop material, provide refreshments, arrangements for 
booking and funding travel, accommodation and local transport. 
3. Approach options include: (a) chronological – by project phase, (b) categorical – 
issues compiled by topic – programmatics, technology, finance, personnel, 
procurement, etc, (c) sequential – working through a logical project flow, or (d) by 
perceived or ranked importance. Whatever the approach, the main questions are: 
What was supposed to happen? What actually happened? Why were there 
changes/differences? How well did we handle things? What can we learn from this 
experience? (Adapted from Schindler & Eppler, 2003 p223). 
Project reviews are not the place to assign blame or punishment for errors, or criticise 
individuals or management (Nicholas, 2004), yet Cooke-Davies (2002b) appeals for honesty 
so that lessons are of real and lasting value. Nor sh uld the focus only be on issues and 
problems; there is likely to be just as much to learn and hand on from project successes and 
positive achievement. Korowajczuk and Almeida, speaking in NASA’s Year in Knowledge 








5.3.4 Post project review analysis 
 
While project perturbations may be individually and usefully examined during the project 
‘post-mortem’, the complexity of high-tech mega-projects is such that a serial examination 
technique may easily fail to link or demonstrate cause and effect. For example, schedule 
slips may result in serious over-spends causing project dynamics to run as positive feedback 
loops (or vicious circles); themselves driving spirall ng costs.  Harris (2009) promotes the 
use of cognitive mapping as a dynamic tool to visually represent causes and effects together 
with risks. Williams (2004) endorses and applies thi concept using a complex high-tech 
electronic design project, immediately defining theproblem as beyond the advice given in 
standard project management texts (e.g. the PMBOK® Guide) which he describes (p. 274) 
as: “insufficient for complex projects where lessons are non-trivial.” He goes on to advocate 
project mapping techniques that show chains of causality. His research finds that the tracing 
of dynamic behaviour, particularly where feedback ocurs, reveals patterns that are hard to 
predict intuitively (see example Fig. 5-5). 
 
Fig. 5-5. Example of mapping of ‘causes’ from project review exercise 





Mapping of chains of concepts during project reviews is shown to add clarity the causal 
analysis, and thus aid understanding, but the technique requires skill and experience for a 
meaningful interpretation. 
 
From their investigation into how large industrial IT institutions learn from past projects, 
Schalken et al. (2006) promote the use of concept hi rarchy trees as a tool to organise project 
factors which show influence on one or more identified success factors. Put simply, their 
method requires breaking up of individual or group remarks (from open questions in the 
review process) into single topics, thereby deriving a list of factors relating to project issues. 
These can then be discriminated by frequency of observation, and organised graphically on 
the ‘tree’ such that related topics appear on the same branch – a process known as 




Fig. 5-6. Simplified example of concept hierarchy tree (Schalken et al., 2006 p. 40) 
 
Schalken et al. go on to describe the interpretation of the project evaluation, importantly 
distinguishing between positive (e.g. aspects that were well executed) from negative 
criticisms. Statistical treatment follows for data reduction and analysis of correlations, 
leading to scientifically derived conclusions likely to apply to projects of similar scale and 
discipline, but generic enough to deliver broader organisational learning. The authors 
acknowledge some threats to the method’s validity, noting that such open-ended evaluation 









5.3.5 Lessons learned 
 
The need for, and benefits of, learning from one project to the next is emphasised strongly in 
the literature, though most authors comment that few organisations manage this 
systematically to any depth, or in a useful format (Schindler & Eppler, 2003; Verner & 
Evanco, 2005; Atkinson, 2006; Williams, 2008; Anbari, 2008). An independent review of 
the ASKAP project found organisational knowledge systems and lessons learned ‘severely 
lacking’ (Schoening, 2009). 
 
Williams (2008, p. 248) looks deeply into the subject, showing that 32% of organisations he 
surveyed have a specific department to drive process improvement through lessons learned, 
but adding: “in practice, projects are often not reviewed at all, or if they are..., methods 
often do not give real understanding, let alone incorporating lessons into organisational 
processes.”. Both Anbari (2008) and Williams (2008) reference K rzner’s (2000) assertion 
that (p. 249): “without lessons learned, a company can quickly reve t from maturity to 
immaturity in project management. Knowledge is lost and past mistakes are repeated”. 
IACCM43 research found that large organisations rarely analyse their experience from 
collaborative or contractual transactions; for example to identify common factors leading to 
claims or disputes (ICCPM, 2011). However the crux of the matter is not simply in realising 
that projects hold lessons for future projects, but in taking practical steps to accumulate and 
disseminate the learning before it dissipates (British Computer Society, 2006). In other 
words, knowledge gained ‘ad-hoc’ will not naturally lead to retention of project insights; a 
condition dubbed by Schindler and Eppler (2003) as ‘project amnesia’. 
 
The accumulation of heterogeneous knowledge in project based organisations can be 
organic, as Salter et al. (2009) found in their study of the impact on innovation of intra, and 
extra-organisational links. Using casework within the Arup organisation to test theory, they 
found the wide and uneven nature of knowledge distribution a central challenge for 
organisations, only solved through intra-organisational ties shown to provide individuals 
with access to knowledge, and increased chances to combine information and help shape 
innovation.   
 
Williams (2008) and Schalken (2006) look at project management Standards, methods, and 
maturity models (PMBOK® Guide, PRINCE2, OPM3, ISO 1006) but find little guidance on 
how learning from projects actually might operate (i. . transference of tacit knowledge) 
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beyond suggesting that reviews are important and that lessons should be documented. More 
recent publications discuss the importance of know-h  (procedural or heuristic 
knowledge), and especially know-why (insights and experiences), favouring narratives and 
case studies rather than numerical data (Schindler & Eppler, 2003). 
 
Processes for capturing lessons from projects range from individual journal entries for 
private learning and reflection through to formal post-mortem events, conducted openly, 
sometimes using trained facilitators. As described in section 5.3.3., these ‘history days’ offer 
the opportunity (if time and culture permit) to go beyond the simple recording of issues and 
their solutions and search for root causes. When practiced competently, the deeper findings 
are recorded as (micro) articles, reports, case studies and in databases. Collier et al., (1996) 
put forward a detailed process employing artefacts that guide the process through formal 
surveys, evaluation, and analysis. 
 
Based on the experience of working with technical mnagement Standards over ten years, I 
support the view that processes for extracting lesson  from post-project reviews need to be 
formalised as auditable procedures. Put simply, I posit that if the process isn’t conducted in 
organised manner, it won’t get done. However casework, and the literature are inconclusive 
on the matter; Cooke-Davies (1996) arguing that there is insufficient evidence to support the 
universal documenting of such processes. Williams (2008) data shows just 62% of survey 
respondents as having a formal lessons capture procdure, but 12% admit to non-adherence. 
Crawford & Cooke-Davies (1999), and Williams (2008), note that people outside project 
management and technical staff are also important co tributors to lessons-learned activities, 




Fig. 5-7. Showing the range of personnel involved in ‘lessons learned’ activities (Williams, 





Practical transfer of lessons-learned into knowledge repositories, or even personal experience 
‘banks’, takes many forms. The case research for this thesis shows that the majority of 
organisations that undertake the activity do so thrugh meetings or workshops (activities that 
Williams (2008) shows to be well correlated with increased perceptions of success). Less 
frequent activities include staff interviews, project audits, and documented 
histories/narratives. Individual presentations are evidence of personal learning, although ad-
hoc in nature. The most mature organisations also ue corporate training, searchable 
databases, and incorporation of lessons-learned throug  improvements to organisational 
procedures. Much less common is the procedural requirement to revisit lessons from 
previous projects as a prelude to new project planning. 
 
The ability to readily retrieve the information is crucial and repackaging/consolidation of the 
data is normally required before reuse (Schalken et al., 2006). IT and web-based knowledge 
systems allow a more sophisticated approach, encouraging stories and possibly expert 
commentary, again fully searchable – a publically accessible example being NASA’s 
Engineering Network (http://llis.nasa.gov/llis/search/home.jsp). The creation of narratives to 
effectively capture both problem and context is obvi usly more onerous than a simple 
database entry. Even so, Williams (2008) argues that narrative thinking is more suitable to 
the task than brief logico-scientific statements because of the complexity inherent with 
motive, causality, and emotion. Moreover, personal accounts offer added value because 
practice often occurs outside approved policies or pr cedures which may constrain shorter 
descriptions. Narratives also better depict subtle project transients and dynamics. 
 
My fieldwork for this thesis discovered a range of activities within high-tech mega-projects 
concerning reviews, syntheses of the findings, and the capture of lessons. The various 
practices found in ten of the casework projects are summarised in Table 5-3. Informative 
comments are presented in the referenced footnotes. The results clearly point to lost 












Table 5-3. A summary of post-project review and ‘lessons-learned’ activity by projects 
























ATCA (CSIRO) No Yes Yes No45 No46 
ASKAP (CSIRO) No Yes Yes N/A N/A 
TOPSAT (RAL et 
al) 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
XFEL (DESY) Yes Yes Yes No No 
LHC (CERN) No No Yes No Yes 
ITER (ITER) ? No Yes N/A N/A 
VISTA (STFC-
ESO) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
OPAL (ANSTO) Yes No Yes No Yes 
ALMA (ESO) Yes47 Yes48 Yes N/A N/A 
SYNCHROTRON Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
                                                           
44 Defined as: problems, errors, opportunities for improvements, or lessons learned captured in 
point or narrative form. 
 
45  “The open learning style culture came to an end at the end of the project.  Partly because many 
key people moved on to other projects, or returned to their old division, partly replaced by a 
culture of success (or proclaimed success) with little enthusiasm for learning from mistakes, 
which meant admitting to them.  I recall one meeting in which some mistakes were being openly 
discussed was considered bad form!  An attempt many years after to hold a ‘lessons- learned’ 
workshop never happened.” (R. Ekers-ATCA). 
 
46 “This depends on your definition of ‘next project’.  After the ATCA we had a period of more 
modest projects (e.g. Parkes 21cm multibeam) and  these benefited greatly from lessons, either 
through personal knowledge of individuals or structures developed and kept because they were 
successful.  However by the time of ASKAP little of this remained, and there was no attempt to 
recover this knowledge.  In corporate CSIRO the situation was even worse with positive measures 
taken to erase the history of past lessons learned.” (R. Ekers-ATCA).  
 
47  “This is generally the case. However, some situations are (substantially) complicated by the 
fact that ALMA is not a legal entity. It can therefore be a challenge to identify who owns some 
issues.” (T. Beasley-ALMA). 
 
48 “In particular we have an openly available Top 10 issues register (currently listing about 30 






What constitutes a barrier to successful learning and transference of lessons? Both Williams 
(2008) and Harris (2009) present organisation culture as the major barrier, and major enabler 
of learning; the former author citing Scarbrough et al. (2004) who drill deeper to reveal 
factors such as project team autonomy, co-location, s cialisation, specialisation, and links 
between sub-units. Other authors list individual authority level, power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, and the (non) desire to learn, as being influential. Atkinson (2006) and Harris 
(2009) mention the temporary nature of projects as a challenge, while Anbari (2008) adds the 
practical barrier of project teams lacking awareness of knowledge codified within their 
organisations. 
 
Factors from the literature, combined with case study research for this thesis, show that the 
project amnesia phenomenon can be related to the four elements suggested by Schindler and 
Eppler (2003) – time, motivation, discipline, and skill , as shown in Table 5-4. 
 
Table 5-4. Elements that constitute barriers for effective post-project learning. 
 
Time Time pressure to complete project, team attention tur ing to new 
tasks/roles 
Motivation Insufficient incentive to learn from others. Previous project team not 
respected, consider that “my project is different”. Team members not 
recognising personal benefit. Past knowledge not seen as valuable. 
Discipline Lack of formal process or procedure. Non-integration of experience 
recording in the project. Problems in coordinating post-mortem event, 
sometimes due to people departing. 
Skills Underestimation of effort, competencies, and understanding of project 
complexities. Ineffective editing/preparation/archiving of data for 
reuse. Lessons described too generically.  
 
 
In the course of research for this thesis, the gathering and dissemination of lessons-learned 
was found to focus around the final project review stage. Received wisdom infers that it is 
the wrap-up and close-out stage of project execution that offers the best perspective and 
opportunity to examine and reflect on issues, perturbations, and improvements. However 
Schindler and Eppler (2003) argue for a more regular g thering and review of key 
experiences, on the grounds that events will be more cu rent, can be recalled more easily, 
and frequent assessment reduces the effort and expense of a major review and archiving 
exercise at project termination. Whether one approach is better than the other offers an 





Finally, what evidence of impact is there from post-mortems, and lessons-learned activities? 
Crawford and Cooke-Davies (1999) report a Working Party’s assessment of the effectiveness 
of lessons-learned activities. This suggests that a ‘fault-line’ runs through the transference 
process (see Fig. 5-8) which materialises when the new project team (Team B) is 
unconvinced of the value of previous experience (Team A). This lack of incentive is shown 
to be strongly linked to a lack of project community within the organisation. Supporting data 
from the Working Party shows ‘effectiveness scores’ of over 70% at the lessons capture 




Fig. 5-8. Obstacles to systematic transference of ‘lessons’ between projects 
 (Crawford et al., 1999 p. 5) 
 
Survey work by Williams (2008) indicates that 88% of project managers assessed their own 
competency to have increased as a result of lessons learned activities, while 61% believed 
that project competency within their organisation had improved. Only 55% thought that 
projects are more successful. Around 48% of those surveyed agreed that lessons learned 
were transferred from individuals to teams, only 36% reported transference to related 
projects (a key weakness), and just over a fifth said lessons benefited the broader 
organisation. Moreover, 89% felt that ‘learning networks/communities of practice’ were 
important, but only 12% of organisations actually had these. Atkinson (2006) contends that, 
even where past performance data exists, managers fail to access it while planning new 
projects. It is reasonable therefore to deduce that proximity to the project under scrutiny, and 




successful cross-project learning, especially for tacit (rather than codified) knowledge. 
Further, the development of a learning culture is crucial to lifting the performance of high-
tech mega-projects and their position when competing for funds. 
 
Although the literature is rich concerning the useflness of organisational and project 
learning gleaned from reviews, a cautionary view comes from Engwall and Westling (2001) 
related to their work on peripety (see section 3.3.4.3)  These writers suggest caution before 
the adoption of late phase practices from successful projects into new projects. Their 
argument is that the processes targeted for possible application in other projects come from 
performance resulting after the peripety period, and may only confuse early stage project 
management.  Nevertheless, the weight of evidence is that the task of capturing, organising, 
archiving, and transferring lessons-learned is crucial to effective project management 
maturity at both the individual and organisational level.  
 
In this thesis I endorse the views of Schindler and Eppler (2003) who promote the integration 
of learning and knowledge management to a strategic priority, and suggest that there should 
always be dual aims: project success, and advancement of learning in the organisation. They 
strongly endorse this for high-tech project success by saying (p. 20): “The risk of a 
knowledge loss at a project’s end is a serious problem for organisations, especially in 
knowledge-intensive industries, such as...high-tech [sectors]”. 
 
 
5.4 The ‘lessons learned’ process – LOFAR example 
 
As follow-on from my investigations of the LOFAR radio telescope at the Dutch ASTRON 
organisation in 2009 and 2011, agreement was reached with the Director of ASTRON that I 
would facilitate a LOFAR lessons learned workshop. This activity was seen foremost as an 
opportunity to gather insight into events that helped or hindered the project, as well as gain a 
broader view of how high-tech mega-projects can be managed better and with a greater 
probability of success. In other words, what can the lessons of LOFAR teach us for future 
large science/engineering projects? 
 
A full report of the LOFAR lessons learned workshop (including the questionnaire, and 
detailed group responses) is shown in Appendix J. A summary appears below. 
 
The planning and preparation of the workshop processes and draft documentation was 




Schalken et al. (2006) offered a basic framework, which I modified to match the LOFAR 
project environment, and compress the main activity in o one intensive day. Logistical 
planning was undertaken by Dr. Albert-Jan Boonstra (ASTRON).49 Detailed planning 
meetings were held at ASTRON on 28 January and 4 April 2011 with LOFAR’s Project 
Director, Dr. Michiel van Haarlem. I devised and followed a detailed 7-step approach to the 
workshop planning. An invitation to participate, together with a workshop outline and 
program, was sent to the entire LOFAR project team. The workshop event was held near to 
ASTRON’s headquarters at Dwingeloo, the Netherlands, on 5 April 2001. 
 
A total of 26 LOFAR staff attended the workshop from all levels/departments of the LOFAR 
project, including Prof. Mike Garrett, ASTRON’s Director. Each participant was allocated to 
one of the following five ‘break-out’ groups: Astron my; Hardware; Software; Observatory; 
and Management and Finance. 
 
 
5.4.1 Workshop Methodology 
 
A simplified diagram of the workshop activity flow is shown in Fig. 5-9.  
 
 
Fig. 5-9. Simplified diagram of the workshop activity flow 
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Prior to the workshop, I developed a questionnaire designed to stimulate consideration of 
LOFAR’s successes and challenges. The first 18 topic headings were drawn from the 
research into mega-project success drivers which are the subject of the meta-study forming 
chapter four of this thesis. These were carefully adapted for the workshop so as to encourage 
broad consideration of the related issues, (i.e. not ‘pigeon-hole’ ideas), and better match the 
LOFAR project. Planning discussions stimulated the addition of topic 19 – ‘LOFAR’s 
technical successes or challenges’, ince it was anticipated that the participants would 
welcome the opportunity to comment. A further undefin d box (topic 20) was added to 
capture any remaining factors that anyone felt strongly influenced project success, or 
constituted a major challenge to LOFAR. It was agreed that the questionnaires would be 
anonymous. 
 
The workshop program was devised around four main activities. In activity #1, the 26 
participants were issued with the workshop questionnaire and asked to independently 
identify LOFAR’s three strongest and three weakest uccess factors, according to their view 
and experience. In activity #2, the group discussed these highest and lowest rated 
performance factors and tendered examples of project ev nts for added insight. 
 
In activity #3, LOFAR’s technical domain performance was examined against the key 
factors confirmed in activity #2. For this session, the five break-out groups were convened, 
using pre-defined staff lists to ensure appropriate demographic spread. For each group, a co-
ordinator/scribe was assigned and given the added brief of ensuring that all members 
contributed actively, though without dominating the vi w. Dr. Boonstra and I circulated the 
groups, acting as facilitators.  Working in their technical domain break-out groups, each 
team was asked to focus on the highest and lowest ranking factors, consider root causes, 
develop lessons-learned, and present these back to the entire workshop group. 
 
Lastly in activity #4, the group recapped the key findings of the workshop (Table 5-5), and 
discussed ways to best capture lessons-learned in ASTRON projects. The participants were 
given an opportunity to describe to the group any personal lessons that they will take forward 









Table 5-5. A summary of key findings from the LOFAR workshop 
Strongest success factors Weakest success factors 
Technical challenges Collaborations, cultures, standards, 
obligations 
Top level commitment and support Resources – human, financial, physical 
Socio-political environment, early 
engagement. Physical, infrastructure, 
Project management systems (PMS) and 
controls, discipline, tools, document 
Procurement & contractor management Project communications and information 
management 
Group Ambivalence 
Project management (all levels) competency, leadership 
 
5.4.2 Post workshop analysis 
 
By applying the comparative analysis technique (post-workshop) LOFAR’s specific 
weaknesses were traced to more strategically useful (in the organisational sense) ‘cause’ 









Common themes from the workshop discussions, presentatio s, notes and narratives were 
linked these topics, and useful lessons-learned emerged for analogous high-technology 
projects. These are set out in Table 5-6. 
 
Table 5-6. Generic lessons learned derived from comm n themes from LOFAR project 
 
‘Cause’ Topic Lessons learned 
Planning • Include a detailed project communications plan 
• Ensure broad input to the plan, including sufficient science 
engagement 
• Be diligent when plotting the timing for major project events 
• Ensure sufficient time and people resources at critical project 
phases, especially the research phase 
• Be extremely clear about responsibilities and authorities of people 
and partnering organisations 
Strategic Approach • Give deep consideration to differing cultures in inter ational 
projects, and the associated risks to the project 
• Be extremely clear about expectations regarding stakeholders, 
especially their direct involvement 
• A ‘mission-assurance’ function could be developed to provide 
added confidence of project trajectory to management. 
Design & Test • Design processes need to be procedurised and optimized 
• Be alert to possible needless duplication in design 
Management • Implement formal management systems for (i) information 
control, (ii) document and data control, (iii) financial management. 
• Management systems need to be ‘right-sized’ for the project 
Training • Early consideration of training needs for the above initiatives, 
where these are not traditional approaches or within e project 
organisation’s current skill set 
 
5.4.3 Applying the lessons 
 
To fully complete the post-project review process, there must be a well-understood link to 
the conduct of future projects in order to turn knowledge into action. The question of how 
this might happen within the ASTRON/LOFAR organisation was asked of the workshop 
participants; however very few suggestions or ideas were forthcoming. 
 
I found this lack of ideas from staff for carrying forth learnings into future ASTRON projects 
was both surprising, and expected. One the one hand, the intellectual power within the 
workshop established an atmosphere of creative problem-solving that came to an abrupt end 
at this question. On the other hand, it reflects and supports the broad research and the 
focused casework of this thesis, in that the conversion of organisational wisdom into 





As facilitator, I then explored what protocols and/or systems are currently implemented at 
ASTRON/LOFAR for control of documents and data, andwhat management meetings might 
be appropriate to consider project management improvement initiatives. The group also 
explored some avenues involving personal learning. Ideas from this session are presented 
below in Table 5-7, as possible future initiatives for ASTRON/LOFAR. 
 
Table 5-7. Suggestions to improve capture and impleentation of lessons learned for future 
ASTRON/LOFAR projects 
 
1. Create a folder or marker within the document management system for project lessons 
learned, and file this report there, together with any prior or subsequent material concerning 
improvements to medium/large scale projects. 
 
2. Create a new (or adapt an existing) project management guide document. This needs careful 
editing to accurately reflect the culture and practices within ASTRON, and most importantly 
have a periodic review to embed lessons learned and updated approaches and procedures. It 
should be released as the official handbook for projects at ASTRON, and be an auditable 
document. 
 
3. An early chapter of the ASTRON project management guide (see above) needs to contain a 
step that ensures that the project manager takes official time to examine previous similar 
projects to obtain information about success or failure factors. The results of this study must 
be documented in the new project execution plan. 
   
4. The results of any project reviews, or lessons learn d activities, should be announced at a 
general staff meeting, and possible presented as a short technical talk. 
 
5. Ultimately, an ASTRON ‘knowledge database’ could be established, with provision for 





5.4.4. Workshop Conclusions 
 
The LOFAR lessons learned workshop worked well from a research tool perspective, and 
judging from the positive post-event feedback, was orthwhile for participants. Anecdotal 
comments to the ASTRON organisers indicate that the participants found the process and 
investigative approach a useful exercise, and that their opinions were heard and noted. The 
ASTRON Director communicated his satisfaction with the event and hinted at further similar 
reviews in other ASTRON domains. 
 
The workshop followed the prepared program which was a satisfactory, though very 
intensive day. Future reviews of this type should allow at least a further hour for activity #3 





In terms of the findings, while the four success factors and four weakness factors were very 
LOFAR specific, the key topics concerning the most important drivers of success in high-
tech mega-projects were in close alignment with the research and conclusions I present in 
chapter 4 of this thesis. However two important differences were noted; first, ‘Mission 
Assurance’ did not arise as a topic or function within LOFAR, although group discussion 
supported the concept. Second, technical competence emerged as a very important factor in 
the successful delivery of LOFAR as an instrument, pointing to the wisdom of adding this 
topic to future post-project reviews, and as an essential success driver to be considered at the 
AFE stages in future high-tech projects. 
 
 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
 
In chapter five, I presented further research into four areas allied to high-tech project 
success. 
 
First, I examined the pivotal and demanding role of the person appointed to be in charge of 
the high-tech mega-project, whether that person is its Director, leader, manager, or some 
combination of these roles. Eight less-explored aspects of this crucial position were 
investigated, as well as the identification of five k y initiative areas that are shown to 
underpin success. 
 
Second, I looked at authentic intent in high-tech projects, and how the dubious nature of 
management, project administration, or success measur s, can signal that the protagonists 
goals may not be fully aligned with partner members or funding agencies. Outright fraud is 
rare, but incompetence and mismanagement likely impacts on the potential returns from 
national investment in science and engineering resea ch. Perhaps most concerning is the 
sinister effects of research groups operating in enviro ments with little or no consequences 
for performance failure, and a focus only on out-year funding that can divert effort. 
 
Next I presented a deep investigation of project reviews, their process, effectiveness, and 
analysis approaches. I show that the post-project review activity especially can offer most 
organisations a handsome return on effort in terms of organisational, and individual, 
learning, and that this knowledge is readily convertible to intellectual property of high value 





Last, I describe the processes and activities associated with a practical example of a high-
tech post-project review workshop, using ASTRON’s recently commissioned LOFAR 
project. In one sense this was an experiment with a willing partner ready to offer a platform 
for expressing many of the research ideas and conclusions within this thesis. Equally 
important, the workshop demonstrated the value of conducting a project history-day, how the 
lessons learned are extracted and made relevant in the organisational context, and the 
importance of linking the learning to systems that permit later interrogation. 
 
In the next chapter, I review all the key ideas resulting from the research effort contained in 
the present study, and build these into a practical ool available to project practitioners, 





Chapter 6 – Checklist for high-tech project success 
6.1 Development and application of the CHiPS tool 
 
Having identified and validated the key indicator areas of high-tech project success, some 
form of practical tool may be derived that can be applied by project practitioners, funding 
approval agencies, reviewing panels, and project auditors. I considered several forms for 
such a tool, including: 
 
• A published article in a professional journal describing the research and reasoning 
behind the success indicators, and supported by a list of success drivers in an 
appendix.  
• A simple checklist document, perhaps with some weightin s applied, that would 
produce a ‘likelihood of success’ score 
• An on-line, or PC tablet style data collector tool, configured to produce some 
graphic representation of achievement across the indicator range. 
 
Further thought and discussions with two ‘ISO Standard’ management system audit 
agencies50 indicated that a self-contained document in the style of a Management System 
Standard would be an appropriate format. The ISO style Standards (e.g. ISO 9000 series) 
were examined, and while these offer a structure against which an effective audit can be 
planned and conducted, they require significant training and experience to apply. A better 
model was found with the UK developed Investors in People (IiP) model51 which although 
not a globally accredited Standard, has gained a solid following in many countries through 
its simple portrayal of principles, indicators, and evidence – all in plain English. 
 
I adopted this general style (though not any IiP content) as a model for development of the 
Checklist for High-tech Project Success (CHiPS) Tool included as Fig. 6-1 in this chapter. 
 
The CHiPS Tool is essentially a carefully constructed, empirically validated, checklist 
document that sets out the key success indicators for high-tech mega-projects, grouped by 
project phase. Against each of the 60 indicators I present example evidence that might 
                                                           
50
 NCS International Pty Ltd, Sydney; and Global Mark Pty Ltd, Sydney. 
51 The Investors in People assessment program is based on a simple, outcome focused, standard. It 
outlines what needs to be achieved, without prescribing how. This flexible approach allows many 





support validation of the indicator being satisfied, and thus performing as a success driver for 
a particular science/engineering project. The tool is most usefully applied at the conceptual 
stage and re-applied at the AFE stage, although the indicators bear review throughout 
execution. The aim is to achieve a repeatable, objective assessment of where the 
requirements are addressed, and where gaps remain. 
 
The version of the CHiPS Tool included in this thesis i  protected by the author’s Copyright, 


























































Chapter 7 – Application of this research to the Square 
Kilometre Array (SKA) project 
7.1 Application of this thesis to the SKA project 
 
The previous chapters of this thesis considered the general principles, problems and 
characteristics associated with the successful planning and execution of high-tech mega-
projects. I now turn to a practical illustration.  In almost every way, the characteristics of the 
Square Kilometre Array (SKA) project typify the kind of high-tech mega-project discussed 
throughout this thesis. Its lofty science goals, massive and dispersed infrastructure needs, 
cutting edge technologies, multi-billion dollar budget, and sheer complexity combine to 
make this global collaboration a very serious challenge indeed. 
 
 
7.2 The Square Kilometre Array (SKA) project 
 
The SKA will be a revolutionary international radio telescope for the 21st Century designed 
to address unanswered fundamental questions about our Universe (Refer Appendix I for a 
fuller description of the SKA instrument and project timelines). 
 
The total collecting area will be approximately one square kilometre giving 50 times the 
sensitivity, and 10,000 times the survey speed, of the best current-day telescopes. With 
receptors extending out to distances of 3,000 km fro  the centre of the telescope, the SKA 
project stretches the limits and risk profiles of several leading edge technologies such as 
phased array sensors, low-noise signal amplification, and computational speed. 
 
More than 70 institutes in 20 countries, together with industry partners, are participating in 
the scientific and technical design of the SKA telescope which will be located in either 
Australasia or Southern Africa extending to the India  Ocean Islands. The site decision, 
based on criteria such as radio-quietness, and infrastructure support, will be handed down in 
2012 from an eminent and independent Site Selection C mmittee. The target construction 
cost will be at least €1,500 million, with preconstruction for stage one (10% SKA) planned 








7.3 Application of findings to the SKA project 
 
In this section I extract many of the most important success drivers shown scientifically and 
empirically to be vital to mega-project success, and draw out strategies, factors, and 
observations for consideration and application to the SKA at the earliest opportunity. 
 
 
7.3.1 SKA governance and project management  
 
Table 7-1, presents seven key areas where management attention is required to establish the 
governance and project management control baselines for the SKA. 
 
 
7.3.2 Special characteristics of the project manager 
 
This section deals with the practical role of running the project. The leadership of the SKA 
project, in terms of a single actual person rather an a guiding Board or Committee, may be 
assigned to a (often notable and charismatic) scientist who is charged with launching and 
directing the project. Case study fieldwork for this thesis indicates that such people, while 
possessing the required ‘gravitas’, political adeptn ss, and technical knowledge of big high-
tech projects, do not often possess the qualifications and experience matching the industrial 
model of projectification that the SKA will demand. Collins (2001) argues that great 
organisations need three people – a leader, a manager, and a financial disciplinarian. In the 
case of an eminent scientific appointee to the role of SKA project figurehead or Director, it is 
strongly recommended that a professional Project Manager also be appointed; someone with 
the proven track record of stewarding very large science-based projects to successful 
fruition, or having the clear potential to do so. Moreover, whatever scope the project head 
may be accountable for, the SKA Directorate should commence recruitment processes as 
soon as possible. 
 
The fundamental skills, experience and qualifications will be determined and built into the 
role description and job profile. However    research within this thesis indicates that eight 
personal characteristics, traits, or skills are strongly indicated as subtle, though significant, 
factors in driving success within scientific and engineering mega-projects. These are shown 





Table 7-1. Governance and project management implications for the SKA 
Key 
Strategy 
Descriptor Thesis reference 
section 
Background context and Management Implications for the SKA Project 
1 
Legal entity & 




A PrepSKA initiated study into viable legal entity options for the SKA project concluded that a 
Dutch foundation, a UK company limited by guarantee, and a US not-for-profit corporation 
incorporated in Delaware were equally suitable for the purposes of the SKA project. Given the 
limited funding from the US at the pre-construction phase, the potential tax efficiencies available in 
the UK, and the ease of transition from the (UMAN hosted) SPDO organisation, the UK is indicated 
as the most appropriate location for at least an interim legal entity and office to conduct pre-
construction procurement activities. International offers were solicited in early 2011, with responses 
from Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. A site at Jodrell Bank (Cheshire, UK) has been 
announced by the SKA Founding Board. 
2 
Establishment of an 
appropriate project 
and team structure 
3.1.4 
Large high-tech projects are shown to function bestin a hierarchical organisation model where there 
is clarity around reporting lines and allocation of resources. That is not to say that matrix type 
organisations are not found or do not work – simply that they actually operate closer to the 
traditional behaviours than perhaps the model name suggests. If a matrix organisation is 
implemented, it should err towards a ‘functional authority’ model (rather than product authority). 
Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) are shown to be effctive groupings for high-tech projects, and 
instil a tribal accountability more likely to deliver against targets. Team diversity has a net positive 
value for teams, with the proviso that any emerging dominance is managed tightly. Teams should 
include a cross-section of shapers, deliverers, and knowledge custodians. Ideally, teams should be 
co-located; however this is unlikely for the SKA. Nevertheless, periodic face-to-face meetings are 






It will be essential for the SKA Project to adopt an integrated project management system, and 
equally important, instil the disciplines associated with its effective deployment and use. No 
particular application or product is recommended from this study; however the following general 






Descriptor Thesis reference 
section 
Background context and Management Implications for the SKA Project 
• Be right-sized for the project, and not be weighted with needless modules, nor incapable of 
required functionality 
• Permit networked use at pre-defined levels of access authorities 
• Be comprehensive i.e. able to hold, manage compute, redict and report by real-time tracking 
and assignment of financial, effort, and materials d ta 
• Be efficient at integrating and alerting in relation t  change management 
• Allow for single entry of any data  
• Be largely intuitive to operate, and require minimal tr ining, especially for report generation 
• Be capable of importing data in formats from other common PM IT platforms 







Task forces are effective structures for tackling specific and unexpected problems, but work less 
well when assembled reactively. The SKA project should, as part of its organisational formation, 
recruit Task Force members in readiness for their in vitable deployment. Task force groups should 






The most effective means of establishing a disciplined information controlled environment is to 
introduce it early, drive it through management example, and most importantly, dedicate resources 
to maintaining it. The SKA should implement a Project Information Office (PIO) as the central 
control of project information, documents and data (i.e. the project Management Information System 
– PMIS). Further, I strongly suggest that the PIO maintain resources and responsibility for arranging 
and recording meetings and teleconference, moderating official on-line networks, wikis, and blog 
sites, and management of communication outputs. The PIO should also hold authority for approval 
and recognition of any satellite group information needs, including the use of project templates, 
branding, intellectual property (IP), and single point management media interfaces. The elevation of 
the traditional ‘Outreach’ department to a full PIO will not only improve information command and 






Descriptor Thesis reference 
section 
Background context and Management Implications for the SKA Project 
6 





The SKA project should appoint a specifically titled Mission Assurance person (or function) at 
project approval for expenditure (AFE) stage. This function (part auditor, part advisor, part ‘devil’s 
advocate’) should be organisationally placed outside of mainstream project delivery, yet close 
enough to have ready participation in critical testing, meetings, and reviews, and with access to top 
level project management. The role is principally one of questioning and checking that activities, 
deviations and changes, particularly at project interfaces, pose no unrecoverable threat to execution 
and performance. In terms of job description, the focus of mission assurance is to monitor the 
established design criteria and standardised control design practices to ensure that the design and 
execution of the SKA is capable of:  
• Functioning properly during the required instrument life ime 
• Minimizing or eliminating potential sources of human or material-induced failures 
• Practical assembly, test, fault isolation, repair, servicing, and maintenance without 
compromising safety, reliability, quality, and performance 








The global, scientific, and political nature of the SKA project requires that serious effort and 
competence is applied to (a) establishing partnership tyle collaborations for the science and 
engineering interactions, (b) industrial style contrac ual arrangements for work-package allocation 
and delivery commitment, and (c) formal, respectful, yet bold engagement with Government 
agencies charged with handling the plethora of legis ation, operating permits, etc. In each of these 
arenas, a balance must be struck between tactful compromise and a sense of urgency in gaining firm 




Table 7-2. Key subtle attributes of the high-tech project manager 
Key 
Attributes  
Descriptor Thesis reference 
section 
Management Implications for the SKA Project 
1 
The ability to deal with the 




The person will likely be drawn following conclusion f a similar scale project, and 
be used to very challenging international assignments running for 5-10 years, often 
with high uncertainties involved. 
2 
Having and demonstrating 
personal authenticity 
5.1.3.2 
The person may not necessarily exude charisma, but demonstrate soundness, good 
judgement under pressure, be au fait with the general science area (but not an 
expert), and have a track record of consistency, fairness, tenacity, and project 
commitment. 
3 
Applying skill in the 




The SKA project manager will be faced with the complexities of an international 
industrial scale project and will require a sound understanding of mechanisms for 
cross-cultural, multi-disciplinary groups. Practical experience, especially in dealing 
with dispersed R&D teams, is essential. Meetings will require skilful preparation 
and management to be effective in obtaining commitment to deliver against 
promised actions. 
4 
Having an appropriate balance 




Managers do not always transform into good leaders, or vice versa. Management is 
largely about coping with complexity and process, and by monitoring results. 
Leadership is concerned with directing change and aligning people by 
communicating an inspirational vision. To achieve success in big high-tech projects, 
a balance between both areas of skill is needed. Managing a project like the SKA 
will demand critical thinking (intellectual [IQ]); team development (managerial 
[MQ]); and influence / motivation / conscientiousnes (Emotional [EQ]).The 
supervisory demands of the SKA, characterised by creative technical people 
operating in environments of minimal formal supervision and reporting 
relationships resonates well with the transformational leadership (TL) style. Such 






Descriptor Thesis reference 
section 
Management Implications for the SKA Project 
performance and results. 
The SKA project will demand a combination of transformational leadership and 
management skills including someone who is: 
• Qualified, and experienced, in complex technical projects 
• Obsessively mindful of the critical path, and always driving forward 
• Effective delegator, but not afraid to ‘get hands dirty’ when needed 
• Ready and able to do ‘what it takes’ to remove roadblocks 
• Sets the example in terms of ethics, behaviour, and standards 
• Maintains an intellectually demanding environment 
• Maintains a systems engineering view, but is not stuck at that level 
• Knows what to communicate, to whom, and when. 
5 
Motivating strategic influence 
through persuasion, 
encouragement, and negotiation 
4.3.6 
5.1.3.5 
The SKA project manager will need to foresee, mitigate, and manage a wide range 
of problems and stakeholder expectations through skilled and sensitive persuasion 
and negotiation flair. Moreover, he/she will require the confidence that comes with 
experience and maturity to strategically influence outcomes. These challenges can 
be usefully grouped into three areas, each requiring deft handling: 
• Procurement, commonly assigned to a specialist department, will likely have 
some accountability to the project manager, especially when involving any 
major, strategic, or critical path acquisitions. Such activities draw on persuasion 
and negotiating skills as a key characteristic for successful contract execution 
and procurement logistics. 
• Funding, where the political landscape will likely change over the project 






Descriptor Thesis reference 
section 
Management Implications for the SKA Project 
• User groups (scientists), which will inherently attempt to drive scope and 
performance change with little appreciation of the implications. 
6 





Trust will be a key ingredient in forming and mainti ing collaborative social 
relationships in the international SKA project. The Project Manager will need to 
personally adopt the task of developing shared value sets to underpin the building of 
a strong project culture, including example-setting in relation to knowledge sharing. 
The SKA project will benefit strongly from capitalising on the trust residing in 
skilfully managed ‘heritage’ teams. This research indicates that when 20-40% of the 
team members have past associations, strong collaboration was evident at the start.  
Trust issues will also be important concerning care with delicate and confidential 
matters.  
7 
Having a personal profile well 
matched to the project 
5.1.3.7 
The SKA Directorate will no doubt implement fair, open, and non-discriminatory 
practices in the recruitment of a Project Manager.  Nevertheless, while observing 
such policies, it may be useful to be informed by contemporary research of the more 
subtle aspects that might (for example) separate two apparently equal candidates. 
• More complex and challenging projects increases the pot ntial of success factors 
generally. Project managers should not be assigned to projects below their 
management capabilities.  
• European project managers rated success factors as averagely important, 
significantly lower than other parts of the world, although no differences 
appeared in management performance based on gender. 
• Project success may be determined differently according to ethnic background. 






Descriptor Thesis reference 
section 
Management Implications for the SKA Project 
Chinese project managers see relationships as the main criterion for overall 
success. The Indian IT industry generally identifies unctionality within scope as 
the foremost success criteria. 
• Age is a factor, with more senior managers reflecting more confidence 
commensurate with experience. Older project managers assign higher 
importance to teambuilding, and link competencies to experience. Many authors 
found a significant correlation between project manager experience and project 
success. 
• Project managers responsible for the wider project life cycle (not just planning, 
execution and close-out) tend to be more successful. Project managers should be 
assigned at the earliest stages and lead their project t  the commissioning stage. 
• Project managers working in their own culture tend to be more successful than 
expatriates 
• The mega-project manager needs the intellectual maturity and discipline to 
manage beyond the rational, objective, and universal representations of the 
project. He/she needs skills to analyse and judge the ambiguous, fragmented and 
political reality of project situations, as well asthe emotional intelligence that 
reflects deep personal identification with project goals.  
The present study found it is this rare mix of intellig nt gravitas, technical 
awareness, social proficiency, and political confidence that sets outstanding mega-







Descriptor Thesis reference 
section 
Management Implications for the SKA Project 
8 





The SKA project, with its typically long construction and operation time, will 
present many opportunities to exhibit actual or potential project disasters. The 
Project Manager must be alert to the ‘inherent silent power of time’ and instil a 
sense of pace into the team on the basis that urgent projects demonstrate a greater 
ability to secure resources than projects viewed as routine. 
 
Ultimately a key characteristic of mega-project managers is the enthusiasm and 
determination to keep driving the project forward, and to effectively communicate 
this ‘sense of mission’ throughout the team. Mega high-tech enterprises have 
voracious appetites for funds, even during quiescent periods, and maintaining 
progress on all possible fronts is crucial to success. 
 
It is critical that project managers apply judgement to position stress levels between 
lethargy and team fatigue.  This is perhaps most obvious when unplanned deviations 
occur. The skill to juggle resources, quickly re-plan, and restore the critical pathway 
requires a special, multi-dimensional intellect and the ability to maintain a balance 
between unproductive stress and pressure, and motivating urgency. 
7.3.3 Procurement strategies 
The SKA project is currently in its preparatory stage (PrepSKA), and expected to begin phase one construction around 2016. At this time, the project 
organisation must be operational and prepared to begin a wide range of procurements across the globe. Th  topics shown in Table 7-3 describe key 





Table 7-3. Key areas for shaping procurement success in high-tech projects 
Key 
Strategy 
Descriptor Thesis reference 
section 
Management Implications and strategic actions for the SKA Project 
1 
Early establishment of 
procurement office structure, 
resources, processes, roles and 





Begin consideration of staffing and other resource equirements for the SKA 
procurement office, including a capital and operating estimate for early approval. 
Commence recruitment.  
2 
Formally approve procurement 
policies, strategies, and plans, and 
document these within a concise 




Drawing on the work of PrepSKA Work Package 5, approve and implement an SKA 
procurement policy and associated strategy, responsibilities and authorities, and 
operating procedures. 
3 
Obtain full understanding of 
global capability scouting 
information, and employ 
appropriate approaches and 
instruments with terms and 
conditions supporting project 
goals.   
3.2.3.2 
3.2.4.3 
Ensure the global industry capability assessment process is completed, and reports 
available to procurement personnel. Develop, review and approve procurement 
instruments. 
4 
Establish the contracting model, 
aligned with the legal entity. 
Develop relationships with 
principle contractors and the 
supply chain.   
3.2.4.4 
7.3.3.1 
Work with SKA governance board to align the SKA legal entity with the adopted 
models for contractual relationships with suppliers.  
5 
Ensure competitiveness in 
contracting, through carefully 
3.2.4.2 
3.2.4.5 
Procurement management to devise acquisition strategies that ensure value for 






Descriptor Thesis reference 
section 
Management Implications and strategic actions for the SKA Project 
planned pricing strategies, and a 
‘value for money’ approach.  
6 
Apply purchasing specifications 
that are appropriate to the goods 
or services required, are flexible 
for optimal outcomes, and 




Procurement management to devise and apply purchasing approaches that match 
required goods and services. Consult with strategic industry partners to the SKA (e.g. 
SoMI signatories).  
7 
Understand and actively manage 
procurement risk, including the 




Devise and implement an active system for identifying and tracking procurement risk. 
Consider contingency reserves.  
8 
Evaluate and select project 
contractors using a fair and 
balanced process, executed 
against standardised procedures, 
and focussed on criteria weighted 




Ensure that a competent system and team is established to undertake formal 
assessment of SKA supplier offers. Implement sound a defensible assessment 
criteria, and records management. 
9 
Implement fair and transparent 
procurement processes, and 
exploit open strategic partnerships 
while allowing for evidence based 
supplier inspections.  
3.2.3 
3.2.4.9 
Procurement management to work with legal advisers in preparation of specific and 






7.3.3.1 Proposed practical arrangements for an SKA-type interim procurement office 
 
During the pre-construction phase of the SKA and onward, there will be a need for an 
operational procurement office to manage industry liaison for supply of goods and services, 
control purchasing data, select and negotiate with suppliers, issue and administer Requests 
for Tender (RFT) and contracts, supervise dispersed purchasing, and arrange payments 
(Perna et al., 2011). The prescriptive nature of the following commentary is acknowledged, 
and offered as advice derived from the research material forming this thesis. 
 
Functionality - The proper and effective functioning of a mega-scien e procurement office 
depends on a professional and disciplined approach. Apart from respecting the 
responsibilities and authorities invested in the procu ement team, the SKA community will 
need to understand and comply with procurement policies and procedures, especially 
regarding the centralised control of purchasing data (e.g. specifications, drawings, et.) 
approved for issue by the SKA Senior Engineer. This is particularly at risk in the case of 
dispersed, and/or ‘in-kind’ procurement in a country other than the procurement office. It 
will be incumbent on the SKA Executive to give early consideration to these matters, and 
firmly explain and enforce the centralised authority of the procurement function. 
 
Funding, and defined authorities - The legal entity for procurement (which may differ 
legally from the SKA project office) will require seed, operational, and transactional funding 
for its proposed UK base. Seed funding will be required to pay for establishment costs (legal 
and incorporation fees, rental bond for premises, capital outlays for office equipment, 
furniture and systems, and sundry support items). These are anticipated to cost in the region 
of £40,00052. Operational expenses (salaries and on-costs, communications, office rental and 
utilities, insurances, expendable items etc) to match nticipated staffing plans are anticipated 
to cost £30,000 per month. Transactional outgoings will reflect procurement contracts, and 
may range from thousands to millions in Euro currency depending on the level of dispersed 
(i.e. through the SKA Consortia) procurement undertaken. 
 
Authorities will need to be defined for expenditure approvals. In particular, for transactional 
approvals of contractual payments, a hierarchy of approval stages is recommended, with 
breaks at defined levels, each requiring a higher (or dual) level of approval. For transactions 
over €1 million, or approval of in-kind credits from member states, Executive approval 
should be required. 
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Policies and procedures and disciplines - Prior to commencement of any interim or pre-
construction procurement activities, the following SKA framework and operational 
documents will be required: 
 
• Procurement strategy (i.e. the procurement approach and guidelines). The SKA 
Project Execution Plan envisages a distributed procurement model, based on Work 
Packages defined and approved at the SKA Project offi e, and awarded on a bid basis 
to SKA Participating Organisations (POs), industrial organisations, or consortia of 
both. Assuming this model (or an alternative) is ratified, a clear documented 
description will be required to ensure the parties have full awareness of their roles and 
responsibilities.)  
• Procurement policies (e.g. ethics, fairness, ju te retour, balancing, sourcing approach, 
management of dispersed and in-kind procurement, mehods of price enquiries, 
jurisdiction of contracts, capacity building policies). 
• Procedures (e.g. interfacing with suppliers, pre-qualifying suppliers, quality assurance 
requirements, tender management, tender selection procedures, contract 
administration, management of dispersed procurement, payment procedures, 
management of purchasing data (specifications etc.), management of SKA records (all 
media), office management guidelines). In the case of dispersed procurement 
(including in-kind member supply models), it will be critical that the processes for 
allocation of work packages, the ongoing monitoring of delivery, and accounting 
methods for tracking earned and claimed value are documented and followed. 
• Templates (e.g. RFI/RFT/RFQ, purchasing agreements and contracts, supplier 
evaluation forms, terms and conditions). 
 
 
7.3.4 Actual and potential resilience of the SKA project 
 
The attitudinal environmental and launch conditions empirically shown in this thesis to be 
influential in project success can be usefully considered for the SKA project53. As a test of 
the research conclusions, and to identify target aras for action, I undertook a review of the 
early phase SKA project by applying the technique of participant-observer (Yin, 2009).  
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Against each special resilience factor from this study, personnel from the SPDO Office54 
were asked (using a Likert scale where 1 = none and 5 = totally) to evaluate (i) the 
importance of each factor to the SKA, and (ii) the extent of current manifestation55. The 
results were averaged and appear in column 1 of Table 7-4. Documentary and oral evidence 
was used to judge the extent of application or acknowledgement in the project, and the status 
captured in short narrative form in column 2 of Table 7-4. In Column 3, I suggest potential 
project initiatives for improvement of factor realisation. 
 
Table 7-4. Summary of ‘special’ resilience factors showing the extent of current 






Current extent of application 
or acknowledgement in the 
project 
3.  









The Team applies a realistic 
approach to costing, with good 
understanding of broad costs 
and risks of optimism. The 
broad schedule is 
acknowledged, albeit with 
acceptance of probable slippage 
considered within the norms for 
such a project. The technical 
challenge of the SKA is known. 
1. Immediately resolve budget 
scope and cost caps for 
Phases 1 and 2, especially 
those concerning site works. 
2. Ensure that costs are fully 
defined, traceable to 
sources, and future estimates 









Limited formal or coherent 
effort to seek lessons learned 
from like-projects, however sub-
teams have done this. Many of 
the Team consult with personal 
contacts (e.g. the ALMA 
project) and draw from self 
experience. Personnel with 
experience from other radio-
astronomy projects populate 
SKA committees. 
1. Appoint an additional 
Systems Engineer and 
commence an immediate 
knowledge ‘roundup’ 
exercise. Implement a 
searchable knowledge 
system tool. 
2. Develop a direct ‘lessons 
learned’ channel with other 
analogous projects (e.g. 





Team members with industrial 
backgrounds find the ambiguous 
requirements challenging, 
however complexity is 
addressed competently across 
the Team. Geographically 
1. Conduct Team based 
workshop to harmonise 
industrial level approach to 
project phases, peripety, 
reporting, and management 
responses. 
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Current extent of application 
or acknowledgement in the 
project 
3.  






institutional groups, charged 
with developing pivotal 
technologies, operate quasi-
autonomously. 
2. Shift to centralised control, 
reporting, and decision 
inclusivity for remote 
groups.  





The SKA has stated science 
goals, a Design Reference 
Mission, and a Phase 1 Project 




1. Define precisely (with 
boundaries) the design and 
cost scope, and trade-offs. 
2. Immediately define and 
declare the critical success 









The reporting and decision-
making structures appear clear 
in documents, but are actually 
complex and variable, typifying 
the science community decision-
making behaviour. Participation 
in standing committees and at 
decision meetings is 
inconsistent. Tiger teams (task 
forces) are formed as required 
but work effectively once 
running. 
1. Implement transition to 
structured and coherent 




2. Create formal process for as-
needed task force formation, 








SKA design and cost data has 
yet to be brought under a formal 
control system, and there is no 
formal PMIS in place yet. 
Domain managers maintain 
personal control of SKA data 
and information, and a 
rudimentary document 
numbering and approval scheme 
is in place. 
1. Acquire and implement an 
appropriately scoped PMIS, 
with surrounding processes. 
2. Establish a project 
information central function, 
to improve control and 
distribution of ‘satellite’ 








Team based project plans 
consider some risks, and a risk 
register is in place. The costing 
strategy foreshadows a 
contingency component. There 
is high awareness of a priori 
risks within the professional 
team, and a traditional approach 
to risk appraisal.  
1. Implement project 
contingency, and proto-task 
forces in readiness for 
unknown unknowns. 
2. Watch for, and formally 
recognise uncertain risks 
within the risk register, and 










Current extent of application 
or acknowledgement in the 
project 
3.  









There is Team awareness of 
project environmental aspects - 
mostly funding scenarios and 
site host issues. These are dealt 
with by the Project development 
Work Packages, and overseen 
by the SKA Project Executive. 
  
1. Ramp up monitoring and 
assisting management of the 
host site environmental and 
regulatory issues to prevent 
slippage on SKA site 
decision.  
2. Through the pre-cursor 
telescopes on SKA 
candidate sites, pro-actively 
identify local approval 









Current budget restrictions 
preclude establishment of a 
formal Mission Assurance 
function. However external 
Engineering reviews and 
internal PDRs, together with 
Project Executive, play some 
role as mission assurance. 
1. As part of the Team 
transition to the SKA 
Project Office, appoint a 
Mission Assurance Officer. 
2. Commence a project 
definition exercise and 
verification audit alongside 








The SKA project is very 
complex technically and 
logistically, and this is 
recognised by the team. The 
SKA community has high 
general awareness of system 
complexity, and there is general 
acknowledgement of the SKA as 
a complex adaptive system. 
 
1. Describe and reflect the 
degree of complexity 
explicitly in project 
structures, artefacts, 
deliverables and strategies. 
2. Define boiler-plate 
responses to system 
engineering challenges.  
 
 
7.3.5 Mega-project success drivers - Implications for SKA management 
 
The key success drivers for high-tech mega-projects are derived and presented in chapter 
four, as the core section of this thesis. These may be usefully considered across the life-cycle 
of the SKA project. Assigning the identified success drivers to the SKA project phases and 
activities shown below, will ensure that the key con epts are embedded at the most 
productive point. The reference letters [X] relate to the full descriptions of the key success 




Implications column of Table 7-5 should be applied as a validator that such aspects and 
actions have received due attention56. 
 












This is the time for clarifying the project 
definition, scope and goals, and if required, the 
business case [B]. Sponsor commitment must 






Post Concept Approval 
 
Strategies are now developed for dealing with 
operations in the host environment [Q], key 
resources are identified and secured [I] 
(including management [O]) and a detailed risk 







Strategies are implemented for project policies 
[A], systems engineering, site acquisition, 
procurement [Q], information management 
















Planning, execution, and review systems, 
operating procedures, and document controls 
[A] are now instigated. Project baselines and 
phases are defined [E]. Change management, 
continuous improvement [P], and configuration 
control [M] is established. Strategic 
relationships are commenced with key 
suppliers [R]. 
Project team governance is asserted early 
through the project manager’s approach to 
leadership, motivation, and social competence 
[F]. Especially important now is the assignment 
of accountabilities [L], aligning staff 
perceptions of goals and success, and instilling 





Periodic Reviews, and Post-
Periodic reviews to report and assess progress 
against planned milestones are crucial. The 
formal conduct of a post-project review 
involving at least the core execution team is 
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also essential. Careful planning for this event at 
around 1-3 months after project (or major 




7.3.6 Documenting the project rationale 
 
The foregoing sections of this chapter set out much of t e detailed thinking, preparation, and 
pre-cursor activity that must be taken into account in order to tune a high-tech mega-project 
such as the SKA for success. However, simply working through the headings, considering 
the management implications, and devising the strategies is insufficient. These prescriptions 
need to be collated within a logical, succinct and compelling project rationale ready to 
present to stakeholders, and especially funders. 
 
Rhatigan et al. (2007) authored a highly informative paper57 that not only elegantly sets out 
the background and contextual direction of a high-tech, high value program, but also deals 
very efficiently with the range of topics required of a compelling project business case 
document. 
 
Drawing on Rhatigan’s (2007) model, the project rationale for the SKA should certainly 
cover the a priori topics of science goals, investment profile, globa collaborations, and 
industry engagement. It should also not shy away from addressing the more difficult subjects 
such as risky transition technologies, budget constraints, collaboration challenges, cultural 
issues, and realism in cost and schedule. It also needs to tackle the project office 
functionality, mission assurance matters, decision-making structures, workforce and project 
tools, requirements setting and procurement. In short, the aspirational topics, and the thorny 
problems, are paralleled in the world of big space missions, and are fully relevant to the SKA 
project. For example, NASA’s Constellation’s Advanced Projects Office is a feature of 
Rhatigan’s project rationale – a concept comparable to the alternate receptor technologies 
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 Their interesting paper researches the reasons and ramifications behind the termination of NASA’s 




7.3.7 Learning lessons from the SKA 
 
Despite incorporating the amassed knowledge contained  this thesis, and applying the 
techniques and controls, strategies and drivers describ d above, the unique character of the 
SKA project will certainly throw up new situations and new challenges which will demand 
novel responses and solutions. 
 
It will therefore be vitally important for the project organisation to design and implement at 
an early stage some form of capture method to add to the pool of wisdom and lessons-
learned from the execution of high-tech mega-projects. The actual solution for this 
requirement will very much depend on the project management systems adopted. 
 
Project review events are particularly targeted as convenient and appropriate points where a 
lessons-learned item can be added to the agenda before the review is considered complete. 
This is especially important for the post-project review (project post-mortem) where time 
and resources should be formally allocated. The design of the post-project review could 
follow that described in section 5.4. 
 
Finally, two actions are recommended at the AFE stage for the SKA: 
 
1. Create a folder or marker within the document management system for project 
lessons learned. File these together with any prior or subsequent material 
concerning improvements to medium/large scale projects. 
 
2. Ultimately, an SKA ‘knowledge database’ could be established, with provision 
for entering of lessons learned by any staff member, with the data searchable by 
topic for easy retrieval. 
 
 
7.4 Chapter Summary 
 
In this chapter, I brought out and referenced the most important success drivers shown 
scientifically and empirically to be vital to mega-project success, and presented these 





Chapter 8 – Summary and conclusion 
‘Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.’ 
Dr. Albert Einstein, Physicist 1879-1955 
 
8.1 Study summary 
 
This study of success drivers in high-technology mega-projects set out to: 
 
• Conceive, design, and conduct investigations via the relevant literature, and at several 
science/engineering facilities, to understand the rel vance of past project experience 
and lessons learned as future success indicators; 
• Identify specific pre-cursors of success  in large high-tech projects that are influential 
in shaping projects and building resilience; 
• Test any causal links to project outcomes in contemporary science/engineering mega-
projects, and identify key drivers for project success; 
• Examine the applicability of key success drivers and high-tech project management 
characteristics to the Square Kilometre Array project; and 
• Develop a plausible, empirically proven, set of predictive indicators of project success, 
and present these as a practical process tool. 
 
The work embodied in this thesis, and in the conclusions presented in section 8.2, contributes 
to the understanding of mega-project success drivers through new analyses and application 
of reported data and phenomena, and from new knowledge extracted and tested through 
casework and newly devised processes. 
 
My research was underpinned by a comprehensive reviw of the published literature on the 
topic of project success and adjacent subjects, as well as broad reading of related project 
management texts, institutional and project reports, recorded interviews, and articles from in-
house and public publications. Motivated primarily by practical imperatives and 
distinguished by the production of working insights, the study has also extended theoretical 
boundaries around success criteria in areas such as the implications of characterising 
complexity, project resilience, decision-making, and project review methodologies. 
 
Importantly, I completed on-site field investigations at many high-tech mega-project sites 
(listed again for convenience in Table 8-1). Evidential data and project artefacts were 




management and staff that was most enlightening, and which cannot be obtained through 
desktop research. This case study material proved immensely valuable in validating the 
conclusions derived from the meta-study of published lit rature. 
 
Table 8-1. List of case study projects and organisations 
 
Project Acronym Location Description 
ALMA Northern Chile Radio telescope array of ~66 dishes. 
ASKAP 
Mid-West of Western 
Australia 
Radio telescope array of 36 dishes, and 




Radio telescope array of 6 dishes completed 
in 1988. 




Site not yet decided. 
 
Hamburg, Germany 
Dual opposing linear colliders of super high 
power. 
X-Ray high power free electron laser 









Light detection and ranging instrument 
configured to probe the mesosphere . 
LOFAR 
Centred in Northern 
Netherlands 
Radio telescope consisting of thousands of 
omni-directional dipole antennas. 
MeerKAT 
Northern Cape of 
South Africa. 
Radio telescope array of 7 dishes (to be 
expanded to ~80), and SKA A precursor. 
OPAL 
South of Sydney, 
Australia. 
20 mega-watt open-pool research reactor. 
SKA 
Either Southern 
Africa, or Australasia. 
Giant radio telescope with 1 million square 




A particle accelerator accommodating 30 
beamlines. 
TOPSAT 
RAL (UK). TOPSAT 
is still in earth orbit 
A micro-satellite with advanced, down-
looking, imaging cameras. 
VISTA Northern Chile A visible and infra-red survey telescope. 
 
This thesis commenced by placing project success philosophy in the context of modern 
history, and with a description of how the professionalization of project management over 
recent decades has spawned its own genre within management science. I showed how 
success definition has altered over time, that failure for some might later count as success by 





Even allowing for failure tolerance as a necessary feature of the risk-taking that produces 
science/engineering breakthroughs, I reasoned that expensive high-tech mega-projects fail 
too frequently, and often in dispiriting ways such as schedule and cost blow-outs, capability 
de-scopes, impacts from unplanned events, or simply ission myopia. The first chapters 
looked closely into what success means for high-tec (including IT) projects, what factors 
are considered critical, and the relevance of project success criteria. I explored the struggle to 
understand project complexity, and the requirements for collaboration management and 
funding arrangements. 
 
Project shaping was examined in chapter three, covering the operating entity, governance, 
and the establishment of effective arrangements for high-tech partnerships and 
collaborations. Project structures, teams, and their ribal characteristics were reviewed. Two 
vital ‘pre-cursors’ to high-tech mega-project success were deeply examined – procurement, 
and resilience building, and each summarised with practical strategies for project success. 
The programmatical aspects of large science and engin ering projects were briefly presented, 
including insights concerning the project management system elements of project planning, 
lifecycle management (phasing), cost estimations, ad scheduling. 
 
In chapter four I presented a meta-study of large project success factors covering 2,820 
cases, of which 928 were classed as high-tech. Following numeric analysis through 
application of the Analytical Hierarchy process (AHP), 18 success drivers were derived and 
ranked by scored relative importance. The highest ranked drivers were further examined, and 
implications for management shown. This separately published work underpins the thesis 
conclusions, validated through field casework. 
 
This thesis then dealt with the remaining important considerations from research concerning 
execution of the project. Considerable attention was given to the project manager topic, 
given his/her profound influence on project realisation and outcome. I especially emphasised 
the more subtle attributes that are highly influential to project success, and which might 
prove useful during project manager recruitment. Topics drawn out in this section include a 
sense of urgency, task force formation, project information management, and mission 
assurance - each attaining significance in my study conclusions. I followed this with an 
examination of authenticity in high-tech projects, and described the risks of mis-stating or 





I concluded chapter five with a detailed study of project review processes, including their 
relationship to project phases, and the efficacy of pr ject reviews. Through an examination 
of processes, I showed that project post-mortems, and lessons learned activities, are pivotal 
to project improvement, and organisation learning.  I closed this chapter by describing an 
experimental post-project review session conducted for the Dutch LOFAR telescope project. 
 
In chapter six I presented my Checklist for High-tech Project Success (the CHiPS Tool). 
This, in effect, is where the learnings from the prsent study are captured as a practical aid 
for project approvers and practitioners. Chapter seven then offered an application analysis of 
how the findings from this thesis may be directly applied to a contemporary science and 
engineering mega-project – the Square Kilometre Array (SKA). I presented a number of 
tables where success strategies and drivers are offered as responses to issues facing the SKA, 
and as an approach to building project resilience. 
 
This final chapter provides a summary of the thesis work, and presents the key conclusions. 
 
 
8.2 Study conclusions 
 
Four conclusions became apparent early in my research: 
 
• Despite considerable literature concerning project failure, and management of large 
projects, there is little published material concering discovery and practical 
application of success drivers for specialist high-technology mega-projects. 
• High-technology projects are increasingly becoming global endeavours of great 
complexity, with budgets frequently extending into the billions of dollars.   
• By and large, stakeholders of large science-engineering projects continue to be 
disappointed by project performance despite the efforts of both researchers and those 
charged with project execution. 
• To understand the challenges and ‘lived experiences’ in complex mega-projects, it is 
necessary to conduct on-site investigations and personnel interviews. 
 
My investigations support the following detailed con lusions: 
 
1. Notwithstanding present financial constraints, the world is currently in an era of 
great innovation realised through many large science/engineering projects (e.g. the 




These breakthrough projects, by their nature, have inh rent high-risk, yet their 
international scale and huge cost implications demand that success measures are 
achieved and project performance maximised. Success criteria must be objectively 
set via analysis of hard and soft critical success factors. Traditional project 
management and execution techniques are insufficient to meet the demands placed 
on high-tech mega-projects, and a fuller understanding of success drivers – 
professionally applied in the early stages – is requir d to lift project performance. 
 
 
2. Large high-tech projects, while not ‘wicked’ problems, are more than just 
complicated and difficult. Their sheer complexity, with inevitable multiple flaws,  
demands constant attention from project systems and people, yet are unlikely to be 
fully understood. However project complexity can be assessed by mathematical 
analysis or an analysis of characteristics, thus offering a useful classification to 
inform detailed project planning. Collaborations introduce another dimension of 
complexity and uncertainty through compatibility and cultural issues (including 
institutional-industry differences), balancing of ind vidualism with group-think, and 
information management. The arrangements for collabrative relationships need to 
be clear, with transparent technical contribution arrangements and with power 
centres identified and respected. 
 
 
3. High-tech mega-projects require their own identity and preferably a separate 
operating legal entity, although a case exists for building on existing institutions 
where this is practicable and early progress is important. Member obligations must 
be extremely clear, with shares, credits, and juste retour policies agreed and formally 
stated. Locating the project headquarters in close proximity to the site is shown to be 
beneficial. Beyond appointment of a governing Board nd Steering Committee, 
project leadership must be determined, and the advantages considered of the role 
being shared between an eminent and influential science/engineering figure, and an 
experienced, respected and qualified project practitioner. While a matrix functional 
structure was commonly reported by high-level management, casework finds high-
tech project staffing to actually operate successfully closer to traditional 
(hierarchical) lines through Integrated Process Teams. In any case, clear 
responsibilities and authorities are essential. It is likely that new, more dispersed 
forms of employment will encourage innovative working systems and methods, 






4. Procurement, once seen as largely a supporting administrative task, is shown to 
strategically important to success, and an essential foundation function of the high-
tech project.  An informed, holistic approach to procurement can improve the 
effectiveness of the process, and underpin more productive and open relationships 
with suppliers. Nine key strategies are identified to position the procurement 
function as a precursor for ‘high-tech’ project success. These are: 
 
• Early establishment of procurement office structure, resources, processes, roles 
and responsibilities, and information management systems. 
 
• Approval of procurement policies, strategies, and plans; documented within a 
concise approved Project Procurement Plan. 
 
• A full understanding of global supplier capability information, and 
implementation of appropriate contractual instruments with terms and 
conditions supporting project goals.   
 
• Establishment of the contracting model, aligned with the legal entity. 
Development of positive relationships with principle contractors and the supply 
chain. 
 
• Competitiveness in contracting, through carefully panned pricing strategies, 
and a ‘value for money’ approach. 
 
• Application of purchasing specifications that are appropriate to the goods or 
services required, flexible for optimal outcomes, and developed with input from 
industry. 
 
• Understanding and active management of procurement risk, including the 
critical early stage engagement phases. 
 
• Evaluation and selection of project contractors using a fair process, executed 






• Implementation of fair and transparent procurement processes that exploit open 
strategic partnerships while allowing for evidence based supplier inspections. 
 
 
5. Project resilience - the building of robustness during project shaping - is identified as 
a precursor to project success. Three ‘attitudinal’ resilience factors are identified 
where a focused effort can lift the chances of project success. Enthusiasm for 
optimising the project picture must be spotted and curbed, and facts faced with 
realism. The use of analogous lessons-learned should be part of up-front research to 
inform stakeholders of the risks and major challenges ahead. Project management 
needs to be cognisant of project complexity, periods f ambiguity, peripety (shifts of 




6. The quality of resilience is also shown to be strengthened through six manageable 
‘launch conditioning’ factors. The early setting ofproject mission and success 
definitions are strongly indicated, as are clear and consistent structures and processes 
for reporting and decision-making. There are benefits to establishing an holistic 
project information office (with a remit extending beyond the technical arena) to 
cover all data and media traffic, including branding matters, conferences, meetings, 
and teleconferences. Traditional risk management practices do not adequately 
prepare the high-tech project organisation for unknowns – those events that cannot 
be pre-identified, but statistically are likely to occur. An effective response strategy 
is to pre-form one or more task force(s) in readiness to act swiftly in the face of any 
threat to mission delivery – coupled with a quarantined contingency reserve. 
Compliance obligations, particularly for infrastruct re in sensitive locations and 
involving national authorities, need careful and deicated stewardship at (or before) 
project start-up. Finally, resilience is strengthened by the formation of a mission 
assurance function to add intellectual rigour to early project definition and 
requirements setting activities. Mission assurance works best alongside project 
management, supporting the project teams and reporting at Director level.  
 
7. While the detailed programmatical aspects of large hi h-tech projects are not central 
to this thesis, the tools and applied techniques of pr ject management are shown to 
underpin the strategy on which to build success. Thorough planning requires the 




stakeholder assumptions, constraints, and a referenc  point from which to plan, 
measure, and if necessary, deviate. To be a supportive tool, the project plan must (at 
least) describe the project lifecycle and contributing phases. A cornerstone of the 
project plan is the project cost and schedule budget, founded on early estimates, and 
which my research shows to be almost always optimistic. Even with cost planning 
tools and techniques, a possible doubling of budget should not be ruled out. The 
premature announcement of project budget estimates of n leads to disappointing 
corrections later as cost uncertainty is reduced. (See Fig. 8-1). Casework shows that, 
even when a sense of pace is instilled, the ‘marching army’ effect of big projects 




Fig. 8-1. Project cost evolution and approval stages (adapted from European 
Commission, 2010 p. 14) 
 
8. The new meta-study of project success factors (based on 2820 cases) that forms core 
work in this thesis concludes that sound project management control and execution 
systems, and a clear project definition and goal set, ar  by far the two most important 
drivers of project success. Competent information ma agement systems rank third in 
importance, followed by 15 other significantly important factors shown to markedly 
improve project outcomes (See Table 8-2). Many of these success drivers are wholly 




motivation, expectations, and team engagement. The findings, each with 
implications for high-tech project management, strongly correlate to fieldwork 
investigations across the case-studies listed in Table 8-1, and are supported by the 
LOFAR lessons learned exercise outlined in section 5.4. 
 
Table 8-2. Success drivers tabled by occurrence within the study population 
literature 
Success Driver Ranking 
Project management (PM) control & execution systems in place, 
with robust policies, planning, procedures, document control, audit, 
etc 
1 
Clear project definition, requirements, goals, objectives, scope, and 
project mission; sound business case 
2 
Mature project communication, information systems; effective 
public relations management 
3 
(Top) management (or sponsor) support with sustained 
commitment, appropriately engaged 
4 
Project baseline, estimates accuracy, project phasing, effective 
project performance (reviews) and measurement 
5 
Leadership skills, PM experience & stability; motiva ng & socially 
capable PM 
6 
Agreed realistic customer / user expectations; frequent customer 
contact 
7 
PM/Organisational understanding & competence in project 
management 
8 
Adequate resourcing of the project 9 
Aligned perceptions of project goals & success - management and 
team; sense of urgency instilled 
10 
Effective stakeholder engagement / partnership (e.g. client, 
contractors, etc) 
11 
Organisational responsibilities assigned to right-sized capable team 12 
Mature, effective project management change control process; 
effective deviations handling & configuration control 
13 






Project Manager  & PM systems matched to project complexity, 
and culturally aligned 
15 
Effective means of learning from experience and continuous 
improvement environment 
16 
Full understanding, and early engagement, of host gvernment 
environment and institutional requirements 
17 
Right-sized systems engineering; managing and procuring in right 
sized project ‘chunks’ 
18 
 
9. More subtle attributes associated with high-tech project success were revealed 
through an investigation of the less obvious characte istics of successful project 
managers. While a definitive set of personal qualities is idealistic, research for this 
thesis points to eight personal characteristics, traits, or skills are strongly indicated as 
subtle, though significant, factors in driving high-tech project performance, and have 
application for recruitment. These are: 
 
• The ability to deal with the temporary and uncertain nature of mega-projects; 
• Having and demonstrating personal authenticity; 
• Applying persuasive skill in the management of collaborations; 
• Having an appropriate balance of management and leadership talent; 
• Motivating strategic influence through persuasion, encouragement, and 
negotiation; 
• Knowledge-sharing and trust-building in a diverse cultural environment; 
• Having a personal profile and competence well matched to the project; and 
• Driving a clear sense of project urgency while managi g deviations. 
 
A further five management initiative factors were shown to be positively related to 
project success. These are: 
 
• Establishment of an appropriate project and team structure and regulatory levels; 
• Creation and deployment of effective project task forces for problem solving; 




• Application of a project assurance approach sensitive to mission threat; and 
• Competent management of complexity, and courage to take calculated risk. 
 
10. Practice guides, often in the form of ‘Books of Knowledge’ (e.g. PMBoK) contain 
much good task oriented material covering the creation of project artefacts, 
deployment of the project against defined resources, and tracking of progress against 
milestones. They also have some application in project manager certification. 
However the guides (and associated qualifications) are of limited use for developing 
and managing success strategies in the very complex environment of high-tech 
projects, especially in areas such as the maturity of experience required for effective 
deployment of task forces, collaborative structures, mi sion assurance functions, and 
competency matching. Recently introduced maturity models (e.g. CMMI, and 
ICCPM’s Behaviour Engineering model) offer more promise as effective 
frameworks for execution and assessment of complex projects. 
 
 
11. Although each of the case studies in this thesis pre ents as an authentic technical 
endeavour, often with a social good and spin-off benefits, approvers and reviewers 
of high-tech projects must be constantly alert to deceit.  Rarely are there cases where 
high-tech success is claimed fraudulently, however doubtful practices do emerge 
where aims are distorted and success metrics meaningless. The literature reveals 
examples such as unrealistic promises, potential fad-science, and report 
embellishment to secure ongoing funding. In times of financial constraint, expensive 
high-tech projects are more closely scrutinised andcourt action is not unknown 
where dubious practice is uncovered. If ‘blue-sky’ research is being undertaken, it is 
essential that all stakeholders are aware of the risks and the basis of project approval. 
 
 
12. Project reviews are not only essential to monitor and measure authentic intent and 
effort, but also to mark progress and allow for important course corrections and 
decisions concerning adjusted or renewed funding.  The present research supports 
the adoption of, or shift towards, an industrial model for project monitoring using 
formal stage gates (rather than the loosely identifi d reviews common in institutional 
projects (e.g.  the SKA). These should be mapped to project phases at defined 




to ensure prompt and accountable responses. Such reviews are efficiently served by 
dashboard style reports, populated with reliable data against fixed baselines. 
 
 
13. Both the casework and the literature show post-project reviews (or post-mortems) to 
be infrequently held. I conclude that a post-project r view reveals extremely useful 
knowledge for both individuals and the organisation, a d it is unwise to ignore this 
valuable avenue of process improvement. In this theis I suggest a process (with 
example report) for the conduct and data analysis of a post-project review, and posit 
that such events should include participants outside the high-tech project team such 
as support staff, contractors and customers (users). For added effectiveness, I 
propose subsequent cognitive mapping techniques using cause-chains to reveal 




14. Although a useful exercise in itself, the post-project review will have limited effect if 
the outcomes are not formally captured within an effective knowledge system or 
database within the host organisation. If project amnesia is to be avoided, the lessons 
learned (tacit knowledge) must be transferred to the organisation so that searches by 
the wider project organisation can readily source and apply the information. 
Research on this topic shows that a learning culture is critical to lifting 
organisational performance, and may prove advantageous when competing for funds.  
 
 
In the introduction to this thesis I stated my research aim in a two-part question: 
 
1. Is there a better, more robust process using theoretical and/or empirical predictive 
indicators derived from the relevant literature and from best practice contemporary 
science projects that can be generally applied to lif  the probability of success of 
high-tech mega-projects?  
2. How might this be useful for perhaps the largest science project to be undertaken 
over the next 15 years – the Square Kilometre Array? 
 





1. Yes. This is supported through completion of a research effort involving a thorough 
and targeted literature review and extensive on-site investigations, with a series of 
conclusions founded on a combination of some new knowledge and many re-
interpreted concepts. 
 
2. The outcomes of this research effort are presented as a practitioner’s aid in the form 
of the CHiPS tool included in chapter six. The practical application of the outcomes 
are highly relevant and useful for the SKA project, as shown in chapter seven. 
 
 
8.3 Future research 
 
The limitations of the present study offer pointers to future areas of research.  
 
The core work on success factor meta-data in chapter four could be built on using further 
contemporary and imminent project related studies. Analysis across modern project 
management technique eras might indicate future directions in terms of success definition.  
As a discrete analysis, more tightly defined success headings, and weighting of sample 
studies (e.g. complexity), would likely strengthen validation of rankings. A deeper (possibly 
numeric) exploration of how different success dimensio s might sway the rankings could be 
tackled in a future paper. 
 
The views of high-tech funding agencies (possibly including Defence Departments) could be 
investigated, focussing on their role and operations, a d  influence on success. The potential 
for exploiting funds and in-kind contributions from commercial or defence ‘offset’ accounts 
resulting from international contracting policies could be explored. 
 
Continued research to benchmark the performance of large high-tech projects (e.g. the SKA) 
against the application of the success drivers identifi d in this thesis would deepen 
understanding of causal factors for project success. This work could also explore and 
compare success drivers in more specific areas, e.g. IT projects, space instrumentation, etc. 
 
The research into project manager characterisation could be broadened through adding a 
time dimension with numerical analysis to show effectiveness of high-tech project 
management trends over recent decades. The study also reveals a yet incomplete 
understanding of the application of transformational m nagement in high-tech projects, and 




various project manager traits are also recommended, as is the success rate of  project teams 
formed from previously teamed members. 
 
Processes to handle intellectual property within collab rative high-tech project structures 
have yet to be broadly examined in terms of project management practice. Further work to 
improve methods of efficiently managing global mega-project site selection is indicated. 
 
The Checklist for High-tech Project Success (CHiPS) tool will be offered to industrial and 
institutional users through publication and professional networking. The widespread 
application of the tool will no doubt stimulate ideas for improvement, most likely including 
refinement of the indicator descriptors. Variants may emerge for specific high-technology 
project situations, e.g. within Treaty organisations. 
 
 
8.4 Final note 
 
Researching the literature and conducting investigations at several of the world’s most 
advanced technology facilities over recent years has been a rare privilege. I was often deeply 
impressed by the capacity and competence of project p rsonnel as they delivered 
science/engineering solutions and infrastructure of extraordinary complexity. However I 
sense the coming decade heralds a new landscape for both medium and large high-tech 
projects. Nations are questioning the societal returns from multi-billion dollar investments 
(e.g. USA’s Constellation Program, SKA), and full funding of some in-progress global 
collaborations (e.g. ITER, JWST) looks in doubt. In an environment of ever more ambitious 
instruments and simultaneous cost constraint (Jones, 2011), it is understandable that the days 
of automatic continued funding of runaway high-tech projects appear to be over. 
 
Addressing this situation requires a fundamental chnge of attitude. For example, courage is 
required to insist on sufficient contingency reserves before project commencement, and it 
takes an enlightened Board to sanction the appointme t of a professional project manager 
alongside the eminent scientist project director.  Project governance must look to industrial 
models where plans are more formally monitored and there are consequences for non-
performance. As I have shown, there are many other strategies to build resilience, optimise 
execution, and ensure that project organisation is a learning organisation. I hope that any 
knowledge I have contributed in this thesis will play some modest part in improving the 
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Principle Science Goal: 
  
Governance & Rules 
Ownership 
Legal Framework 
Board & policy creation 
Approvals regime 
Priority setting 
Host environment issues 
  











Project mgmt system/tools 
Planning/scoping framework 









Industry Engagement Model: 
Supplier Selection criteria? 
Focus? Price, delivery, quality? 
Innovation level: 
  








 Key Research Questions (explored in depth by interview) 
  
Part A, Project Management Practice 
 
A1, Has the project goal remained clear from inception? 
 If the goal varied, what was the impact of this? 
 
A2 , Was a core team established early, or later in the program? 
If the core team has changed, why did this happen? 
  
A3, Was a detailed project plan developed? 
Who participated in developing it? 
Were milestones and deadlines negotiated with sponsors?, 
Did the critical path change? How was that dealt with? 
How is progress monitored and reported? 
How is information management achieved? 
 
A4, What role does top management play in supporting the project? 
Supportive (political/practical), realistic, demanding, meddling? Etc, 
  
A5, Was there customer/user involvement early in the project?, ,  





A6, How are customers/users kept informed of project progress?, 
 
A7, Does the project have a detailed budget? 
How well do project controls help keep the project on budget? 
 
Part B, Critical incidents 
 
B1, What critical incidents occurred on the project? 
Could they have been predicted? 
If negative, what could have been done to avoid/alleviate them? 
 
B2, What success factors were applied to this project, drawn from others?, 
Did those success factors/measures work effectively n this project?, 
 
Part C, Project Performance 
  
C1, Were there any significant deviations to the orginal plan/expectations?,  
 
C2 , What was the cause? 
(Planning? Foresight? Technology? Expectations? Random?) 
 
Part D, Suggestions for the future 
 
D1, What lessons can be learned from this project for; 
Managing major deviations to scope, performance, budget, etc 
Change to design, technology, specifications etc 
Managing socio-environmental matters 
Project management and/or organisation 
 
Part E, Complexity and Perceptions 
 
What areas of the project were initially thought to be complex? 
What areas were actually complex in practice? 
  
To what extent did previous experience(s) from other projects influence this project? 
(Draw out any causal link between previous - & + experiences, and this project. 
How is experience & learning being captured in this project? 
  
What early factors/signs might have suggested or predicted later + or - outcomes? 
Looking back, how should/could the project have responded to those early factors/signs? 
  
How do the project managers describe 'success' in this project? 
How do other stakeholders describe 'success'? 
  
What influence did the project governance have on achievement of success? 





































RF electronics module (RX, LNA, …
RF electronics module (RX, LNA, …













Remote power system (say >1MW)
On-Site infrastructure (buildings, …













































Contracting models for high-tech mega-projects 
                
KEY
O = Owner Organisation
E = Engineering / Design
C = Prime Contractor
S = Subcontractor
M = Management Contractor
I = In-kind support (Member State)
P1 = Project Manager
P2 = Project Services Contractor
 
Fig. a: Owner Organisation Managed - Single Contracor. The Owner organisation has 




Fig. b: Owner Organisation Managed – Multiple Contractors. The Owner organisation has 




Fig. c: Management Contractors. Owner organisation engages a Management Contractor 
(MC) to assist planning, supervise work, and check performance. The MC may direct 





Fig. d: Project Manager. Owner organisation engages a Project Manager (PM) to 
coordinate and supervise the work. The PM has some proj ct performance accountability, 
and contracts are between the PM and Contractors. Highly successful in the case of the 




Fig. e: Project Services Contractor. The Project Services Contractor joins the Owner 
organisation project management team. Staff from the two groups work jointly, but contracts 
are between the Owner and Contractors, with potential loss of contract knowledge. 
 
 
Fig. f: The Owner organisation shares the contractul responsibility with member States 
who have agreed to manage ‘in-kind’ contributions (refer ITER model). Responsibility for 






Method and calculations supporting ranking of success drivers 
 
The process of ranking success drivers uses the mathe ics and calculation techniques 
developed by Saaty (Coyle, 2004) and are described within the generic Analytical Hierarchy 
Process (AHP). This is one approach to multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) that can 
involve qualitative data. The method employs a reciprocal decision matrix obtained by pair-
wise comparisons introduced by Fechner and developed by Thurstone (Alonso & Lamata, 
2006).  In the AHP, the input can be actual values, or cores from subjective opinion such as 
preference, judgement etc. and the approach has unique advantages when elements of the 
decision are difficult to quantity or compare. Decision situations to which the AHP can be 
usefully applied include choice, prioritisation, and ranking by importance (Teknomo, 2007). 
 
Input data were drawn from examination of success factors from 29 general studies of 
project management encompassing 2,820 cases, as well as two success factor summaries 
drawn from cited papers within those general studies. These sources are listed in Table 4-1 in 
the body of this thesis, with numbers of individual c se studies shown for both general and 
high-tech cases. 
 
From each study, the listed or described success factors (derived from questionnaires, 
statistical analyses, or both) were grouped into comm n headings. This process resulted in 
the most common occurring findings being captured un er 18 pragmatically themed success 
drivers which were given designators A through R. These were then tabulated by occurrence 
for all projects, and the sub-set high-tech projects, as shown in Table F-1 below. (For 
convenience, they are sorted by occurrence frequency for ‘all projects’.) 
 
A pair-wise comparison process was then carried out for both 'all data' and ‘high-tech data’ 
by constructing a matrix for each with dimensions n=18, reflecting the number of success 
driver headings. Calculations for ‘all data’ and for ‘high-tech data’ are shown below in Fig. 
F-1 and Fig. F-2 respectively. For each of the 153 possible pair-wise success factor 
comparisons, a value was inserted in the upper triangle of the matrix corresponding to the 
difference in the number of occurrences reported.58 This value reflects either more or less 
support of one success driver over another. The lower triangle of each matrix shows the 
reciprocal value. 
 
Having completed the upper matrix, approximations of the Eigen vectors were then 
computed. This was achieved by dividing each element of the upper matrix by the sum of its 
own column, thus normalising the relative weights which are then correspondingly displayed 
in the lower matrix. The normalised Eigen vectors showing relative ‘weights’ are obtained 
by averaging across the rows.  From this data, ranking is clearly indicated, as well as the 
relative importance of each success driver. 
 
                                                           
58 Since a score of one (1) must equate to zero difference in occurrences, the entered value is actually 





The consistency of the original data was then tested. Aω (the 18 element vector) is obtained 
by summing the products of each input value (by row) with its associated Eigen vector (by 
column). Since AHP theory says that Aω= λmaxω, close approximations for λmax (the 
principal Eigen value) are derived by dividing each result by the corresponding Eigen vector 
value. The mean of these values gives an estimated λmax with which to calculate 
consistency ratios as shown in Fig. F-1 and Fig. F-2
 
Saaty argues that a consistency ratio of >10% indicates unreliability (with a CR >90% close 
to randomness). In this study, the consistency ratios for ‘all’ data and high-tech data are 
7.28% and 4.99% respectively, and are therefore consistent. 
 










Project management (PM) control & execution 
systems in place, with robust policies, 
planning, procedures, document control, audit, 
etc 
A 20 15 
Clear project definition, requirements, goals, 
objectives, scope, and project mission; sound 
business case 
B 20 14 
Mature project communication, information 
systems; effective public relations management 
C 15 11 
(Top) management (or sponsor) support with 
sustained commitment, appropriately engaged 
D 13 10 
Project baseline, estimates accuracy, project 
phasing, effective project performance 
(reviews) and measurement 
E 13 10 
Leadership skills, PM experience & stability; 
motivating & socially capable PM 
F 11 8 
Agreed realistic customer / user expectations; 
frequent customer contact 
G 9 6 
PM/Organisational understanding & 
competence in project management 
H 9 6 




Aligned perceptions of project goals & success 
- management and team; sense of urgency 
instilled 
J 8 5 
Effective stakeholder engagement / partnership 
(e.g. client, contractors, etc) 
K 8 5 
Organisational responsibilities assigned to 
right-sized capable team 
L 7 4 
Mature, effective project management change 
control process; effective deviations handling 
& configuration control 
M 7 4 
Understanding & continuous management of 
risk; visibility of risk register 
N 5 3 
Project Manager  & PM systems matched to 
project complexity, and culturally aligned 
O 5 3 
Effective means of learning from experience 
and continuous improvement environment 
P 4 2 
Full understanding, and early engagement, of 
host government environment and institutional 
requirements 
Q 4 2 
Right-sized systems engineering; managing 
and procuring in right sized project ‘chunks’ 



























SKA Project Review – Action Table  
Review Type (CoDR/PDR/CDR/Periodic Review/Final Review) 
Review Team: 
Review Date: 
Ref# Review Issue Agreed Action & ‘do by’ date Resp Closed Out 
 
1 
There are discrepancies concerning the planned dates and 
intervals of pre-construction activities as shown on 
programme charts in the PEP document and other plans. 
The plans and associated charts will be re-examined a d corrected for consistency. 




2 The panel are concerned that the procurement lead times 
shown on these charts are optimistic 
The procurement lead times will be validated by a further round of industry 





Since the arrays interact with the electromagnetically-
complex ground, and may have aperiodic spacings, it is 
difficult to determine the characteristics of antennas, 
either individually or collectively as part of a 
beamforming system. From the supplied data, we cannot 
see if pattern multiplication yields reasonable results on 
which to base the design. 
The data underpinning the beamforming assumptions will be provided, together 
with modelled interactions between dishes. By 28 March 2011 
Dewdney  
 
Review Team Leader:                                                            Signed ________________ ____   Date ____________ 
Project Director:                                                                Signed _____________________   Date ____________ 
Circulate to: 






















LOFAR Project – post-project and  
‘lessons learned’ review. 


















Evidence from a range of successful and unsuccessful high-technology mega-
projects indicates that much can be gained from examining the experiences from 
previous and/or analogous projects. While these ‘lesson-learned’ cannot avoid all 
problems, and difficulties grow with ever-increasing project complexities, it is clear 
that a formal post-project review can contribute organisational knowledge that can 
be usefully applied in future projects. 
Post-project reviews (also known as ‘post-mortems’) should represent the final 
phase of project execution, and ideally include a lessons-learned and knowledge 
transference activity. All the standard project management texts (e.g. the PMBOK, 
IPMA Competence Baseline, PRINCE2, APM, etc.) highlight the importance of a 
final review; as well as prominent authors on the topic such as Williams (2003, 
2008), Anbarai (2008), Cerpa and Verna (2009), and Crawford and Cooke-Davies 
(1999). NASA too understands the costly failure to learn from past mistakes and has 
addressed this through an Agency-wide ‘lessons-learned’ case study initiative that 
has shown to lift project performance across the organisation. Yet despite the 
obvious benefits of analysing a project’s successes and shortcomings in order to lift 
future performance, post-project reviews remain sporadic.  
Within organisations, post-project reviews offer project staff opportunities to learn 
and re-use lessons (Davies & Hobday, 2005), and post-mortem results can be 
stored within organizational knowledge systems, or communicated directly to other 
teams (Collier et al., 1996). The formal conduct of a post-project review involving at 
least the core project team is an essential post-project success driver for early stage 
future projects, an opportunity to empty old baggage, and can provide a cathartic 
effect for the team.  Post-mortems should not dwell just on problems and failures, 
but also share the learning from successes. 
Project reviews are not the place to assign blame or punishment for errors, or 
criticise individuals or management. Nor should the focus only be on issues and 
problems; there is likely to be just as much to learn and hand on from project 
successes and positive achievement.  
The LOFAR (see Exhibit 1) ‘lessons-learned’ workshop is foremost an opportunity to 
gain insight into events that helped or hindered the project, as well as gain a 
broader view of how high-technology mega-projects can be managed better and 
with a greater probability of success. In other words, what can the lessons of 






Exhibit 1. The LOw Frequency ARray (LOFAR) is a multi-purpose sensor array project 
costing around €120 million (including about 30 million of in-kind contributions). Its main 
application is astronomy at low frequencies (10-250 MHz) but also has geophysical and 
agricultural applications. The array is centered in the Northeast of the Netherlands with 
stations dispersed over the whole country and gradually across Europe. LOFAR was 
developed by a consortium of knowledge institutes, universities and industrial parties, 
led by ASTRON. The telescope is considered an important pathfinder for the Square 
Kilometer Array (SKA) in demonstrating the potential of (sparse) aperture arrays, in 
developing solutions to major calibration issues that are directly applicable to the SKA, 
and in paving the way for the mass-production and operations of such large distributed 




Purpose and Scope 
This highly interactive ‘lessons-learned’ workshop for the LOFAR project aims to: 
a) benefit and enrich the ASTRON organisation by capturing the experiences, 
thoughts and ideas from the LOFAR team in relation to significant positive 
and negative events during the project’s execution; 
 
b) help gain an improved understanding of the project management and 
technical domain ‘lessons-learned’ in a contemporary mega-science project; 
and  
 
c) enable ASTRON to be better prepared to support the SKA project;  
 
The following scope and conditions set the framework for the workshop: 
• The focus of the review was on LOFAR’s project management aspects. The 
number of aspects considered and the depth in which these aspects are 
discussed is obviously limited due to several factors. First, there was limited time 
available (one day) for the face-face workshop. Second, no external parties were 
present at the workshop which meant that relations with the outer world were 
considered only from within. 
 
• A factor which influenced the course of the LOFAR project and which 
complicates the review-analysis is that many external, often non-technical factors 
have influenced the project. As some of the workshop participants may not be 
aware of these external constraints, these were outlined to the group at the start 
of the workshop. A key external factor was a split of the consortium in the early 
phases of development, causing a resource problem due to the transference of 
some of the design activities from previous consortium partners. 
 
• Although the participants represented a fair cross-section of ASTRON employees 
contributing to LOFAR, not all aspects discussed during the day were covered by 
the main players. For example, the external relations were discussed from an 
ASTRON perspective only, and roll-out aspects were not significantly discussed 
at all. For this reason, the LOFAR workshop is considered an evaluation, and 
part of a larger evaluation process. 
 
• People have different knowledge and variable depths of knowledge of different 
aspects of the project. The project management system for example, has 
different branches, not known to all. Moreover, most people were unaware of the 
organisation of the project financial systems, and project planning tools were 
available but used in various degrees of thoroughness. In this respect it, is more 
the way the tools are used than the availabilities of those tools that became 
significant. 
 









Planning and Preparation 
Planning and preparation of the workshop processes and draft documentation was 
carried out by Phil Crosby (SPDO). The review process described by Collier et al. 
(1996) offered a basic framework, which was considerably modified to match the 
LOFAR project environment, and compress the activity into one intensive day. 
Logistical planning was undertaken by Dr. Albert-Jan Boonstra (ASTRON). Detailed 
planning meetings were held at ASTRON on 28 January and 4 April 2011 with 
LOFAR’s Project Director, Dr. Michiel van Haarlem. A detailed 7-step approach to 
the workshop planning was devised and followed, as per Table A. An invitation to 
participate, together with a workshop outline and program (shown in Attachment 1) 
was sent to a broad cross-section of the LOFAR project team. 
Table A – The 7-step approach to planning the LOFAR lessons-learned workshop 









Identify the broad 
critical success 
factors (CSF) to 




personnel to gain 
agreement to 
proceed, and the 










the focus and 
goals of the 
workshop  
 
Prepare a list of 
around 20 CSF 
areas, plus allow for 
a few other areas to 












Consult key project 











Draft plan for the 
review activity 
Announce review 









people to accept 
Roles and 
responsibilities 
assigned in the 
plan 
Assign activities as 
required 
 




   event information 
 
 















Conduct review using 
appropriate approach 
for the organisation1 
 
Step 5 – 
Conclude the 
review 















audience, and best 









Step 7 – archive 
& add to 












readily retrieved by 





A total of 26 ASTRON-LOFAR staff attended the workshop from all 
levels/departments of the LOFAR project, plus Albert-Jan Boonstra who acted as 
Chair and Coordinator and Phil Crosby as Facilitator. Importantly, Prof. Mike 
Garrett, ASTRON Director, was among the participants. Each participant was 
allocated to one of the following five ‘break-out’ teams: Astronomy; Hardware; 
Software; Observatory; and Management and Finance.  
Methodology 
Prior to the workshop, a questionnaire was developed (Attachment 2) designed to 
stimulate consideration of LOFAR’s successes and challenges. The first 18 key 
topics were taken from research into mega-project success drivers undertaken by 
Crosby*, and carefully adapted for the LOFAR project. Since it was anticipated that 
the participants would introduce commentary about the LOFAR’s technical 
successes or challenges, this was added as topic 19. A further undefined box (topic 




project success, or constituted a major challenge to LOFAR. It was agreed that the 
questionnaires would be anonymous. 
The workshop program was devised around four main activities. In activity #1, 
participants were issued with the workshop questionnaire and asked to 
independently identify LOFAR’s three strongest and three weakest success factors, 
according to their view and experience. Once completed, the questionnaires were 
collected and analysed to produce a consensus result. In activity #2, the group 
discussed the highest and lowest performance factors and examples of project 
events to illustrate the findings and associated ideas. 
In activity #3, LOFAR’s technical domain performance was examined against the 
factors confirmed in activity #2. Working in their technical domain break-out groups, 
each team were asked to focus on the highest and lowest ranking factors, consider 
root causes, and develop lessons-learned. Each team was asked to capture their 
ideas on flip-chart paper, and present these back to the entire workshop group. 
Lastly in activity #4, the group summarised the key findings of the workshop, and 
discussed ways to best capture lessons-learned in projects. The participants were 
given an opportunity to describe any personal lessons that they will take forward to 
new projects. 
* Crosby, P. In Print. (2012). Key success drivers – meta study findings applicable to large high-
technology projects, International Journal of Information Technology and Project Management, 3 (2). 
Findings 
The collated results from activity #1 are shown in Attachment 3. Three strongest and 
three weakest success factors were anticipated from activity#1, however four of 
each actually emerged, plus one factor where views were moderately strong, yet 
opposed. The findings are summarised in Table B. 
Table B – The highest ranked strongest and weakest project factors for LOFAR 
Strongest success factors  Weakest success factors  
Technical challenges Collaborations, cultures, standards, 
obligations 
 
Top level commitment and support 
 
Resources – human, financial, physical 
 
Socio-political environment, early 
engagement. Physical, infrastructure, 
technical, economic, social, political 
Project management systems (PMS) and 
controls, discipline, tools, document systems 
applications 
 






Group Ambivalence  
Project management (all levels) competency, leadership 
 
Against each of the successful and the weakest factors, the participants were first 
asked to respond as a group, and then as technical domain teams. (In fact, the 
technical domain teams each chose to focus only on the weakness area). See Table 
C and Table D. 
Table C – Responses from discussion of LOFAR key success factors 





• General agreement that LOFAR did well in tackling technical 
challenges and overcoming engineering design problems, and that this 
was a vital feature of LOFAR’s success 





• The group agreed that support and commitment from senior levels 






• There was an appreciation of the challenges of external forces, and 




• This aspect presented a new challenge for ASTRON for the scale of 
LOFAR, and was considered well managed, especially industry 






















Factor  Group Response  Domain Team  Team Response  Suggested Actions  
Ineffective 
Collaborations 
• Project ‘split’ in 
2003 – conditions 
changed, plus 
delay in handover 
• Different cultures 
meant different 
approaches 





research takes a 
long time 
• Responsibilities in 
group structures 





• ASTRON-University exchange 
should go both ways 
 
• Enforce deliverables 
• Align goals 




• Mismatch of expectation & promises 
• Not optimal design = extra work 
• Allow more time 
• Make clear appointments 
Software  
 
• Double effort ASTRON-USG & BG/L 
–BG/P 
 
• Improve collaborations 
with universities 
   
Observatory  
 
• Involve RO from beginning 
• Integration testing R&D - RO 
• Include Observatory staff 
in design review Prototype 
after major design changes 
Management 
and Finance  
 
• No focus on positive qualities of 
others 
• Poor collaboration ability 





















Factor  Group Response  Domain Team  Team Response  Suggested Actions  
Poor resources 
management  
• Limited number of 
software 
specialists 















• Avoid death by duplication 
• S/W development never ends 
• Don’t avoid hard choices 
• Shift balance from H/W to 
S/W at right time 




• 80/20 phase 1 
• 10/20 phase 2 
 
• Ensure early integration 
Software  
 
• No one with a complete end-to-end 
systems overview 
• Insufficient resources for long term 
research (GPUs) 
 
• Make sure enough people 
for the tasks assigned. 
Observatory  
 
• Shortcuts cause debug problems • Plan resources for testing 
Management 
and Finance  
• Lack of competent S/W development 
management 
• Ensure sufficient number 






Factor  Group Response  Domain Team Team Response  Suggested Actions  
Imperfect project 
management systems  
• A better 
requirements 
management 






optimized in terms 
of searchable data, 
or distribution 
control 








• Need input from astronomers • Need full time 
managers for 
project duration (1 
mgr for 9 workers) 
Hardware  
 
• No issue in H/Ware 
 
• Excel is sufficient! 
Software  
 




• No Issue in Observatory • No comment 
Management 
and Finance  
 
• Project ambitions force ASTRON to 
professionalize 









Factor  Group Response  Domain Team Team Response  Suggested Actions  
Poor project 
communications  
• Too many ways to 
communicate = not 
everyone has all 
required 
information. 
• Wikis not the best 
• Needs a comms 
plan in place 
• People need to 









• Lift inclusivity of the science 
community Can be involved via 
remote comms 
• LSM should be main forum for 
results/info 
• Should be start-up packet for new 
Commissioners 
• Announce project delays and 
descopes 
 
• Install a good 
Videocon system 
• Ensure regular 
group updates at 
LSM 
• Set up for a, wikis, 





• Feedback systems essential 
 




• Need for single information 
management system 




• Better comms would help in trading 
problems 




and Finance  





Analysis and Lessons learned 
The group and domain team responses from Table D offer three types of data: 
(i) ASTRON/LOFAR specific comments and suggested actions (which is left to 
that organisation to determine appropriate responses) 
(ii) Factor specific comments (from the group and domain teams), and 
(iii) Topic specific comments (largely from the whole group). 
 
To convert the elicited data into information that can be quickly and usefully 
understood by the organisation, some consolidation must take place. Comments 
from (ii) and (iii) can be meaningfully examined using the comparative analysis 
technique described by Schalken et al. (2006)*, so as to link common concepts back 
to hypothesised early stage causes of project weaknesses.  
Attachment 4 shows the use of a ‘concept hierarchy tree’ to organise the textual 
data into project factors that influence the identified success factors. Comparative 
analysis began by grouping similar or related remarks from the post-project review 
into common headings. Applying interpretive judgment, lines were then drawn to 
map these project factors to project components (processes, people, systems, etc). 
In this case, the main categories were adapted and expanded from those developed 
for software engineering by Schalken et al. (2006, p40)*. Lines then linked these to 
common nodes representing underlying ‘seed’ or ‘cause’ areas from which practical 
lessons learned can be derived. The goal is to bring out discriminating concepts that 
are neither too broad nor specific. From the analysis, five cause topics were derived 
as shown in Table E. 
* Schalken, J., Brinkkemper, S., van Vliet, H., A method to draw lessons from project postmortem 
databases, Software Process Improvement and Practice, 11, 2006. pp 35-46. 
Table E – Generic lessons learned derived from common themes from LOFAR 
project 
‘Cause’ Topic  Lessons learned  
Planning • Include a detailed project communications plan 
• Ensure broad input to the plan, including sufficient 
science engagement 
• Be diligent when plotting the timing for major project 
events 
• Ensure sufficient time and people resources at critical 
project phases, especially the research phase 
• Be extremely clear about responsibilities and 
authorities of people and partnering organisations 
Strategic Approach • Give deep consideration to differing cultures in 
international projects, and the associated risks to the 
project 
• Be extremely clear about expectations regarding 
stakeholders, especially their direct involvement 
• A ‘mission-assurance’ function could be developed to 





Design & Test • Design processes need to be procedurised and 
optimized 
• Be alert to possible needless duplication in design 
Management • Implement formal management systems for (i) 
information control, (ii) document and data control, (iii) 
financial management. 
• Management systems need to be ‘right-sized’ for the 
project 
Training • Early consideration of training needs for the above 
initiatives, where these are not traditional approaches 
or within the project organisation’s current skill set 
 
Next Actions 
To fully complete the post project review process, there must be a well-understood 
link to the conduct of future projects in order to turn knowledge into action. The 
question of how this might happen within the ASTRON/LOFAR organisation was 
asked of the workshop participants; however very few suggestions or ideas were 
forthcoming. 
The workshop facilitator (Phil Crosby) explored what protocols and/or systems are 
currently implemented at ASTRON/LOFAR for control of documents and data, and 
what management meetings might be appropriate to consider project management 
improvement initiatives. The group also explored some avenues involving personal 
learning. Ideas from this session are presented below in Table F, as possible 
initiatives for ASTRON/LOFAR. 
Table F – Suggestions to improve capture and implementation of lessons learned 
for future ASTRON/LOFAR projects 
1. Create a folder or marker within the document management system for project 
lessons learned, and file this report there, together with any prior or 
subsequent material concerning improvements to medium/large scale projects. 
2. Create a new (or adapt an existing) project management guide document. This 
needs careful editing to accurately reflect the culture and practices within 
ASTRON, and most importantly have a periodic review to embed lessons 
learned and updated approaches and procedures. It should be released as the 
official handbook for projects at ASTRON, and be an auditable document. 
3. An early chapter of the ASTRON project management guide (see above) 
needs to contain a step that ensures that the project manager takes official 
time to examine previous similar projects to obtain information about success 
or failure factors. The results of this study must be documented in the new 
project execution plan.   
4. The results of any project reviews, or lessons learned activities, should be 
announced at a general staff meeting, and possible presented as a short 
technical talk. 
5. Ultimately, an ASTRON ‘knowledge database’ could be established, with 
provision for entering of lessons learned by any staff member, with the data 






From the perspective of a research tool, the LOFAR lessons learned workshop 
worked well. An important success factor was that participants contributed with a 
positive and mature attitude. Anecdotal comments indicate that the participants also 
found it a useful exercise, and importantly, that their opinions were heard and noted. 
The lively discussions, exchanges of views, and the chance to voice opinions in a 
free ‘off-site’ environment meant that learning occurred for both the organisation and 
individuals. 
ASTRON’s Director later commented that the day, and the report, was very 
worthwhile. 
The workshop followed the prepared program which was a satisfactory, though very 
intensive day. Future reviews of this type should allow at least a further hour for 
activity #3 (the break-out groups and feedback presentations). 
In terms of the findings, the key topics concerning the most important drivers of 
success in high-tech mega-projects were in close alignment with research by 
Crosby (2011). While the four success factors and four weakness factors were very 
LOFAR specific, further analysis enabled a generic set of lessons learned to emerge 
that accords well with contemporary research into modern high-tech mega-project 
management and execution. These are: 
Generic Area  Lessons learned  
Planning Plans should take account of broad input (including 
science), and be clear re: timing. Resources need to 
be assured for critical project points, and 
responsibilities and authorities clearly defined. A 
project communications plan is required. 
Strategic Approach Strategic plans and actions need to be cognizant of 
culture variations in multi-national projects, and clear 
about stakeholder expectations. Application of a 
mission-assurance function adds confidence for 
management. 
Design & Test Design processes need to be procedurised and 
optimized. Be alert to wasteful duplication. 
Management Formal management systems and controls are 
essential, but need to be the right scale and complexity 
for the project. 
Training • Consider training needs early, especially for tasks 
beyond the project organisation’s skill set 
 
The organisers, Phil Crosby and Albert-Jan Boonstra, thank ASTRON/LOFAR 






08:30 Arrival and registration 
08:45 Welcome, and presentation by on the LOFAR project, including the history 
and the political, financial and other conditions that have influenced the 
project. (Michiel van Haarlem) 
09:30 Explanation of the workshop by Moderator (Phil Crosby, SPDO) 
09:45 Activity #1 – Perceptions of success of LOFAR programme. Participants rate 
(approx) 20 success factors. (See attached Worksheet). 
10:30 Coffee break 
11:00 Activity #2 – Group discussions of results of activity #1 
         What did the project get right? (Highest performance factors) 
           What did the project get wrong? (Lowest performance factors) 
           Open forum – recording the key points and ideas 
           Summarise lessons learned. 
12:30 Lunch break 
13:30 Activity #3 – Review of technical domain performance 
                       Break into technical groups 
 Each group works on the highest and lowest ranking factors, 
investigate root causes, and develop ‘lessons learned’ 
           Present back to workshop 
15:00 Coffee break 
15:30 Activity #4 – Summing up 
           Re-cap workshop outcomes 
           Discuss ways to best capture lessons-learned in projects 
           Key lessons that people will take forward to new projects 

















Collated results from activity #1  
Topic  () (X) Notes  






Rank #2 Success factor  
2. Project Mission, goals, 








3. Project management systems 
(PMS) and controls, discipline, 






Ranked #3 Weakness factor  









5. Organisation structure, entity, 
governance, responsibilities  & 
authorities (R&A) , staffing 
















Ranked #1 Weakness factor  















Ranked #2 Weakness factor  
9. Project planning & execution, 
baselines, lifecycles, phasing, 









10. Project Reviews 
 
4 1  











12. Risk management, 
contingency 
 
1 3  







Ranked #4 Weakness factor  
14. Task Forces, project 
emergencies 
 
5 1  







Ranked #4 Success factor  
16. External stakeholder relations 
 
1 3  
17. Socio-political environment, 
early engagement. Physical, 
infrastructure, technical, 








Ranked #3 Success factor  
18. Project complexity, dealing 








19. Technical challenges  19 2 Ranked #1 Success factor  
(Other factors from group) 







20. b. Software & hardware 
project management 
 1  
20. c. Mobilising EU radio-
astronomy community 
1   
20. d. Engagement of scientists 
throughout LOFAR 
development 
 1 - Pipeline development & 
interfacing with software 
developers 
- Providing adequate 
access to test data and 
tools to use it 
- Documentation about the 
data products 
20. e. Mismatch of cost allocations  2 - Hardware, software 
science and maintenance 
(50/50 split?) 












Images from LOFAR ‘lessons learned’ Workshop  
     
Activity #1 – rating of key project factors   ‘U’ s hape room format for good interaction 
     
        Break-out group discussions           Prepared PC t ools for fast initial analysis 
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Key Success Drivers – Meta-Study Findings Applicable to Large 
High-Technology Projects 
Phil Crosby, Curtin University, Australia 
ABSTRACT 
Success in project management, and particularly in arge, high-technology/IT projects, is not easily 
achieved. This paper draws together a significant number of case studies and research efforts relating 
to the success and failure of projects from the last four decades, in what is believed to be the only 
modern meta-study of its type. The author posits that ere is a body of knowledge within the 
literature from which a number of key indicators or f cus areas can be derived for practical 
application especially in the early stages of projects. Studies encompassing more than 2,800 projects 
are examined, and the success factors for general, and high-technology, projects are newly grouped 
and ranked as strategic success drivers for use prescriptively by project practitioners and approvers. 
New correlations between success indicators are present d and the principal drivers examined in 
further detail to reveal sometimes less obvious characteristics influencing project success. In a series 
of fieldwork interviews with key staff in high-technology projects, these drivers also emerge 
consistently as important factors in project success. 
Keywords: project success; mega-science; success factor; success driver; project performance; risk 
management;  project urgency; lessons learned; system engineering 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Much has been written regarding project 
performance, and the literature is rich in 
empirical studies of tens, and sometimes 
hundreds, of projects in an effort to distil 
factors governing their success or failure. Case 
study work, involving report analyses, 
interviews and questionnaires offer much 
insight through evidential data complemented 
by qualitative judgement (Grün, 2004). Other 
studies have derived conclusions through 
statistical analyses and although meaningful, 
require more interpretation by the practising 
project manager. 
Many studies stem from a perception 
that large, publically funded projects, often 
launched in a fanfare of optimism, frequently 
overrun in terms of cost and time and 
occasionally become fiascos (Grün, 2004). 
While many notable ‘mega’ projects are 
delivered ‘on time, on budget’, large projects - 
especially those underpinned by, or delivering, 
new technology - are very demanding of 
management capability, resources, and 
systems engineering, and too often fail in one 
or more performance criteria (Merrow, 1988; 
Morris & Hough, 1986; Hartman & Ashrafi, 
2004; UK Ministry of Defence, 2009). 
This paper, drawing on case study 
work and research from the previous four 
decades, plus contemporary experience, asks; 
what are the key strategic areas that show 
strong correlation to project success. Data are 
examined to discover success factors and 
success criteria for large engineering and 
science projects, and compare these with 
general mega-projects. Findings are presented 
that contribute new insights for life-cycle 
project management, most applicable at the 
planning, formation and approval stages, and 
show comparative importance of top ranking 
high-technology (‘high-tech’) project success 
drivers. 
The precise parameters of large 
projects (also referred to as ‘mega’ or ‘giant’ 
projects) are not specified, except that these 
endeavours typically have multi-million or 




usually measured in years, and attract a high 
level of public or political attention, often due 
to substantial direct and indirect impacts on 
the community and the environment. Such 
endeavours may seem to have little in 
common with mass production projects 
(Miller & Lessard, 2000) but the economics of 
large engineering/science global projects (e.g. 
the Square Kilometre Array, Large Hadron 
Collider) are setting aside this division.  
Flyvbjerg (2009) sets an important context 
when he states "mega also implies the size of 
the task involved in developing, planning, and 
managing projects of this magnitude. The 
risks are substantial and cost overruns of 50% 
are common”. In this paper, high-tech projects 
are defined as those involving research and 
development and/or reliance on 
IT/science/engineering effort, and having a 
significant infrastructure requirement. 
 
LITERATURE OVERVIEW  
The present research is underpinned by 
material published from the mid 1970s to the 
near present, an era broadly covering the 
professionalisation of project management, 
and a full cycle of global economic activity. 
Studies in this period often highlight earlier 
classic mega-projects such as the Sydney 
Opera House, the Channel Tunnel, Concorde 
and space missions as examples of massive 
time/cost over-runs or performance failure. 
However the dataset is rich with examples of 
both successes and failures to learn from.  
In considering the components of 
project success, most authors (Morris & 
Hough, 1986; Yu et al., 2006; de Wit, 1988; 
Williams, 1995) point out the triple constraints 
of scope, time and cost, (commonly termed 
the ‘iron’ or ‘golden triangle’) and often 
extend this to include quality, risk, and more 
recently sustainability factors. Several writers 
add other useful information such as 
contractor’s commercial success (Morris & 
Hough, 1986); personal growth (Dvir et al., 
1998); and project safety (Lim & Zain, 1999). 
Atkinson (1999) notes the maturing of project 
success factors, yet points to the paradox of 
projects still being judged against the ‘iron 
triangle’. Shenhar & Wideman (1996) list 13 
success dimensions, interestingly including 
several client/user aspects such as the extent 
of customer use, customer satisfaction, market 
share creation, and new technologies/product 
lines. Others (Procaccino et al., 2002) suggest 
that success for one stakeholder (e.g. project 
management) is not necessarily success in the 
eyes of another (e.g. the client) thereby 
illustrating a need to align the project goal or 
mission as a critical success factor. One five-
year study (Crawford, 2000) foreshadowed the 
approach taken in this paper, by ranking 
project success factors from post-1995 
literature in relation to project manager 
competence and delivered performance.  
Several authors are prolific in the 
subject area, e.g.  Shenhar & Wideman on 
mapping  success to project type (Shenhar & 
Wideman, 1996); Pinto’s useful Project 
Management Profile workbook, and 
collaborations on critical success factors for 
specific type projects (Pinto & Slevin, 1989); 
T Cooke-Davies’ (2000) frequently cited work 
in project success; and Morris & Hough’s 
research into preconditions of project success 
(Morris & Hough, 1986). 
Several authors (Yu et al., 2006, Dvir 
et al., 1998 and 2003, Roy et al., 2003, Belassi 
& Tukel, 1996) have applied statistical 
techniques to their research to support 
conclusions, whereas others (Westerveld, 
2003; Lim & Zain, 1999; Winch, 1996; Erno-
Kjolhede, 2000; Turner, 2004; de Wit, 1988; 
Rubenstein et al., 1976) have investigated 
project success from the management theory 
standpoint, complemented by experiences in 
the application of project management 
techniques or models. More targeted 
publications (Procaccino, 2002; Weck, 2006; 
Ferratt et al., 2006; Pinto & Slevin, 1989; 
Moody & Dodgson, 2006; CSIRO, 1998 and 
2003; NASA, 2000; Hill, date unknown) have 
addressed project success factors specifically 
in high-tech projects. 
Although outside the focus of the 
present study, the nexus between success 
factors, and how project success is judged, has 
importance in shaping project drivers (de Wit, 
1988; Cooke-Davies, 2002). Many writers 




criteria nature of project metrics, pointing out 
dependencies on personal viewpoints and 
perceptions (O’Brochta, 2002; Crawford, 
2000; Muller & Turner, 2007; Westerveld, 
2003; Dvir et al., 1998). However work by 
Shenhar & Dvir (2007), Crawford (2000), 
Atkinson (1999), Shenhar & Wideman (1996), 
and Dvir et al., (1998) reach consensus 
surrounding technical performance, project 
performance, and internal/external 
(stakeholder) satisfaction as success criteria. 
Publications from the project 
management professional organisations (e.g. 
‘Books of Knowledge’ or BoKs) also touch on 
project success, but are aimed more at project 
structuring and execution and are largely 
based on contemporary practice, not research 
analysis (Morris et al., 2006). Nevertheless, 
the Project Management Institute’s Standard 
for Program Management (2008) offers clear 
definitions of success measurement in 
projects, as well as mentioning the benefits of 
lessons learned. The widely referenced Project 
Management Book of Knowledge (PMBOK® 
Guide, 2008) also mentions the use of a 
‘lessons learned knowledge base’ for 
collecting historical information. However 
Cicmil et al., (2006), from the Rethinking 
Project Management study (see below), point 
to omissions in the PMBOK® and are critical 
of suggested actions in response to project 
perturbations that fall short of the ‘lived 
experience’ of competent project managers. 
One important initiative in adding to 
the literature is the UK Government funded 
research activity called Rethinking Project 
Management (RPM) (Maylor, 2006). 
Involving a number of leading project 
management academics and senior 
practitioners from industry, the network 
followed a research program framed to 
question mainstream ideas, the output of 
which was published in a special issue (no. 24, 
2006) of the International Journal of Project 
Management (IJPM). The present study cites 
several papers from that publication. The first 
paper in the compendium (Winter et al., 2006) 
offers a useful summary of findings and extols 
the need to embark in new research directions 
(beyond the rational and intellectual 
foundations often underpinned by the ‘triple 
constraints’ paradigm) and link more directly 
with project management practice. Of 
particular note is the need for increased 
recognition of human issues, and exogenous 
factors, as potent success drivers. In looking at 
IT projects, Sauer & Reich (2009) concur with 
the RPM findings and endorse a pluralistic 
approach to project complexity beyond the 
conventional wisdom characterises in the 
PMBOK®. 
 
DATA & RESEARCH METHOD  
Before describing the collection, reduction, 
and analysis of data employed, it is useful to 
outline the basis to this meta-case study.  
Since the nature of the data is non-uniform, 
this study commenced by considering what 
and how information can be extracted from 
the published literature containing, individual 
assessments (more often than not in case-study 
form) of a variety of projects by different 
writers. 
Conventional wisdom often indicates 
that case study research can be useful as a 
preliminary stage of an investigation, or 
supplementary to it, but cannot be of value in 
itself unless linked to a hypothesis. Flyvbjerg 
(2006) rejects this, arguing that casework 
reveals ‘context-dependent’ knowledge that 
encourages learning maturity from rule-based 
to virtuoso levels. Flyvbjerg goes on to 
explain the richness of information in the case 
narrative, and its ability to describe realities 
which are hard to reveal or define in scientific 
parlance. From Flyvberg’s range of strategies 
for case selection, type B. Information-
oriented selection was chosen to maximize the 
utility of information from small samples and 
single cases. Cases are selected on the basis of 
expectations about their information content. 
The case study as a research method is 
supported by Yin (2009), who describes the 
rigorous methodological approach required for 
conclusion validity, and usefulness when 
investigating complex phenomena.   
The actual dataset is mainly drawn 
from peer reviewed journal publications, 
supplemented by published reports and case 




were sought from a purposely broad range of 
studies from the Western world covering the 
past 35 years, containing diverse project 
characteristics in terms of purpose, budget, 
location, engineering innovativeness, and 
sponsor. The only selection made was to 
ensure a representative and statistically 
significant sample of high-tech projects with 
some systems engineering component 
identified. These sources were initially 
selected from literature searches on the 
keywords ‘project success’, ‘mega-project’, 
‘critical success factor’, ‘lessons learned’ and 
‘project learning’. In total, 29 general studies 
were examined encompassing 2,820 projects 
(cases), as well as two success factor 
summaries drawn from other papers dealing 
with different projects. A sub-set of 20 studies 
(928 cases) were classed as applicable to high-
tech. Table 1 shows the full study list. 
To derive common headings from a 
wide range of factor descriptors taken from 
the studies, the author took advantage of 
contemporaneous research into mega-science 
project management at several large scientific 
projects in Europe and Australia. Each project 
is characterised by having substantial and 
specialised infrastructure, > US$100 million 
budget (except the Antarctic LIDAR), and a 
science goal concerned with astro, particle, or 
nuclear physics. The author conducted formal 
interviews with project management 
representatives, each typically lasting 3-5 
hours. This opportunity permitted topical 
discussion to refine and validate the common 
headings for grouping the success factors 
drawn from this study. For example, phrases 
such as “clear project mission”, “defined 
objectives”, “stated project targets” and 
“documented program goals” were grouped as 
a single key concept. This process resulted in 
the most common findings being captured 
under 18 distinct headings. Appendix B shows 
the interview list. 
Having grouped the success factors 
and their frequency of occurrence drawn from 
the literature, calculation techniques from the 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
developed by Saaty (Coyle, 2004) were 
applied in the form of pair-wise comparisons 
to reveal a ranked set of success drivers, 
followed by consistency tests to check fidelity 
of the results. This work is described in detail 
in Appendix A. No attempt was made to 
pursue the analysis through weighted criteria 
to a single choice, since clearly all 18 resulting 
success drivers are contributors to success.  
The output from this analysis is 
shown in Table 2, which presents the derived 
project success drivers ranked by relative 
importance for all projects, and high-tech 
cases. 
In the course of contemporaneous 
employment funded research into mega-
science management, the author conducted a 
series of investigations at several large 
scientific facilities in Europe and Australia 
(Appendix B). The chosen sites each satisfied 
the criteria of having substantial and 
specialised infrastructure, > US$100 million 
budget (except the Antarctic LIDAR), and a 
science goal concerned with astro, particle, or 
nuclear physics. Visits of 2-3 days were pre-
planned to ensure access to key project 
management representatives. Formal 
interviews were conducted, each typically 
lasting 3-5 hours. Use of a question list 
ensured a systematic approach and 
consistency of topic coverage; however 
interviewees were free to amplify their 
responses as necessary. This timely 
opportunity permitted the author to 
qualitatively corroborate the findings of the 
present study in terms of initial analysis 
(groupings), importance rankings, and highly 
contextual validation using the ‘lived 






TABLE 1 – List of studies showing number of individual cases 
 








Akkermans (2002)1 General research L n/a*  
Anbari (2008) Post project reviews L n/a  
Belassi (1996) Mixed projects L 91  
Blackburn (1994) Iridium satellite systems project L 1  
Clarke (1999) Various projects L n/a  
Cooke-Davies (2002) Variable projects L 136  
CSIRO (1998) Big science projects L 9  
De Wit (1988) UK & US projects L 8  
Dvir (1998) Qualified by P type N 110  
Dvir (2003) Defence projects N 110  
Ferratt (2006) ERP Projects N 70  
Grun (2004) Few major projects plus other information L 4  
Hartman (2004)   Mixed projects L 5  
Honour (2004) Broad range of technology projects N 42  
Hyvari (2006) Mixed projects N 100  
Katsanevas (2009) Survey of physics project managers L n/a  
Kerzner (1987)2 General research L n/a  
Kleinman (2008) Astronomy Survey project L 1  
Merrow (1988) Large civilian projects L 52  
Milosevic (2005) Project Managers N 55  
Morris (1986) Civil and aerospace projects L 8  
Muller (2007) General large projects N 959  
Murphy (1974) Various projects N 646  




Pinto (1989) R&D Projects N 159  
Procaccino (2002) IT professionals N 21  
Rubenstein (1976) Mixed study, some R & D L 103  
Turner (2004) Various projects L n/a  
Verner (2005) Software projects N 122  
Weck (2006) Project practitioners L 5  





                                                   
4. Extracted from Ferratt (2002)  *n/a = No. of cases not stated 
















A Project management (PM) control & execution system  in place, 






B Clear project definition, requirements, goals, objectives, scope, and 

















E Project baseline, estimates accuracy, project phasing, effective 























I Adequate resourcing of the project 2.31 2.37 
J Aligned perceptions of project goals & success - management and 


















M Mature, effective project management change control process; 























Q Full understanding, and early engagement, of hostg vernment 





R Right-sized systems engineering; managing and procuring in right 







KEY FINDINGS  
The ranked project success drivers in Table 2 
reveal some valuable general conclusions for 
the project practitioner.  
First, a relatively small (though not 
trivial) number of key project topics and 
indicators are demonstrated to impact 
significantly on the chances of success. Most 
significantly, implementation of excellent 
project control systems and processes, and a 
clearly defined project mission are shown to 
be twice as important as the next ranked 
driver. These considerations are important 
throughout the project but it is clearly 
necessary to test the intent, robustness, and 
understanding of these factors at the 
conceptual/approval stage.   
Second, the rankings show the 
importance of ‘softer’ indicators such as social 
capability and expectation management that 
may not have been previously obvious. 
Selecting and appointing the right project 
management team is clearly vital, taking 
account of factors such as motivation, cultural 
sensitivity, and instilling the right amount of 
urgency. Moreover, recent studies highlight 
the need (some following negative events) to 
invest in effective project information control, 
both internally and externally. 
Third, some factors that may be 
intuitively expected to rank highly e.g. risk 
management and system engineering process 
(as opposed to the application of systems 
design as part of goal setting etc.), appear low 
in the table, ranking 14th & 18th respectively. 
At face value, this indicates that while 
important, these may not be the make-or-break 
factors that alone determine project success or 
failure. For risk especially, this was counter-
intuitive to contemporary experience and is 
worthy of further enquiry to separate the 
management science approach (the 
probabilistic future) described as 
decisioneering (Miller & Lessard, 2000), and 
the more applied managerial approach (the 
uncertain future) that continually matches 
risks with strategies.The topic of risk is 
revisited later.  
Lastly, it will be noticed that, 
following the analysis, both general and high-
tech columns rank the success drivers in the 
same order, albeit with differing importance. 
The variations, although minor, may reflect 
the character of high-tech projects (often 
involving R & D) where definitions and scope 
are often less defined, making top level 
support and baseline information more 
necessary. Similarly, management of risk, 
complexity and systems engineering process 
require slightly more emphasis. Overall 
though, high-tech projects clearly rely on the 
same key success drivers as most other 
projects. 
As mentioned, the author was able to 
discuss the topics listed in Table 2 with ten 
experienced high-tech project professionals 
(Appendix B). Interview case notes show 
expert commentaries are clearly consistent 
with this study’s findings.   
The combined analysis offers more 
insight for high-tech project practitioners than 
contained in the 'headline' rankings alone. 
Below is a closer examination of the top 
ranking drivers, followed by a brief discussion 
of several others. 
 
Project Management System 
The extent of a formal project control 
environment is largely a decision taken by the 
project management, in light of organisational 
policies and practice, type/size of project, and 
to some extent, project leadership style. 
Observations by the author revealed the 
application of ‘lite’ systems (e.g. MS Project 
running on a single machine), various tailored 
project management systems (in some 
instances designed to align with published ISO 
Standard type quality systems), and large 
corporate management information systems 
(MIS) such as MRP and SAP. Findings from 
this meta-study show that, although the project 
control environment must be well matched to 
the task in terms of complexity, culture, and 
maintenance, no one system or product stood 
out. The key point is that a system of some 




The importance of standardisation in 
projects is highlighted by Milosevic & 
Patanakul (2005) in their survey of project 
managers who collectively concluded that 
“having standardized project management 
tools helps with project success, more 
punctual schedules, more satisfied customers, 
better cost-effectiveness, and higher quality 
accomplishments.” An empirical analysis of 
the relationship between project planning and 
project success by Dvir et al., (2003) 
concluded that “A minimum level of planning 
tools and procedure use is also important but 
what kind of tools is of no importance.” A 
very frank report from the Gemini telescope 
Lessons Learned Workshop (National 
Research Council Canada, 1999) contains at 
least five quotations from team members 
lamenting the lack of, or lateness, of effective 
project management control. 
Atkinson et al., (2006) supports 
project tools but with a caution, “tools and 
techniques…are very useful in the right place. 
However they [can bring] a focus on 
operations…with consequent lack of attention 
to strategic issues”. Erno-Kjolhede (2000) 
also qualifies in remarks about project 
management theory applied to research 
projects when writing “project management 
tools for scheduling and planning are helpful 
in research projects – but also potentially 
misleading. Thus they should be used as 
flexible tools that are continuously adjusted to 
fit current project reality. They should not be 
regarded as a blueprint for the research 
project.” 
Ninin & Vanden Eynden (1997) 
investigated the application of project based 
management for high-tech activities at CERN, 
referencing a 1997 inquiry showing that 100% 
of staff involved supported the concept. They 
concluded that “project-based management 
has been experienced recently for several 
controls projects and has proven its success 
from the human, organisational and 
managerial points of view.” 
Project Mission, Definition & Goal 
Pinto & Slevin (1989) in their compelling 
report containing 10 critical project success 
factors posit that the project mission, while 
apparently obvious, is the most important 
factor across all project phases and argue that 
if forgotten or unclear, the project will likely 
fail. Clearly the early stakeholders must not 
only know and agree the purpose of the 
project, but also ensure that it is defined in the 
form of a documented and socialised scope 
containing technical objectives and goals, 
supported if appropriate by a business case. 
Hartman & Ashrafi (2004) in their 
paper on SMART project planning 
recommend the establishment and agreement 
of success criteria at the outset, claiming this 
to be the single most important contributor to 
project success. Similarly, in ‘Taming Giant 
Projects’ Grün (2004) argues that goal 
formulation is one of four success factors that 
(inter alia) influences the causes of [project] 
failure.     
Not all large high-tech projects 
(except perhaps IT) are able to have their 
mission, requirements, scope and goals 
precisely defined, especially in the early 
stages. In looking back over 30 years of 
project management, Winch (1996) discusses 
the difficulty of looking over the cognitive 
horizon, and how the political, economic and 
regulatory environment may result in project 
trade-offs. He nevertheless advises early 




Competent information management 
throughout the project was found to be crucial 
(Clarke, 1999) to effective execution in two 
principal domains. The first area concerns 
communication with parties external to the 
project team, for example; users/customers, 
advisory committees, arms-length sponsors, 
political masters, suppliers, and the general 
public. Casework consistently reports the 
dangers of unofficial pathways for project 
information which may be interpreted (at best) 
incorrectly or (at worst) cause upset, or even 
financial or commercial strife, through 
premature announcements. The solution lies in 
the establishment of a project communications 




information approval and distribution, 
especially in relation to problems, 
procurement, or discoveries. 
The second area concerns internal 
communications, with examples of commonly 
reported deficiencies conveniently 
summarised within a Report on Project 
Management by the Mars Climate Orbiter 
Investigation Board (NASA, 2000). Under the 
general finding of inadequate communications 
between project elements during its 
development and operations phases, they list 
specific inadequacies as contributing causes of 
programming errors leading to mission failure: 
• inadequate communications between 
project elements led to a lack of cross 
discipline knowledge among team 
members; 
• a lack of early and constant involvement 
of all project elements throughout the 
project life cycle (e.g. inadequate 
communications between the 
development and operations teams); 
• project management did not develop an 
environment of open communications 
within the operations team; and 
• inadequate communication between the 
project system elements and the technical 
line divisions at the partnering research 
institution. 
 
The weaknesses in the above example 
offer good lessons and reflect typical project 
interfaces at which communications 
breakdowns inhibit or prevent project success. 
 
Top Level Support & Commitment 
Appearing as the fourth most important in 
high-tech project success, this driver is 
relevant to most business endeavours. Pinto & 
Slevin (1989) echo other writers when they 
identify the responsibility of top management 
to support and resource a project once 
authority for expenditure has been approved, 
and also mention top management’s ability to 
either help or hinder a project. Indeed, several 
authors (Hayfield, 1985; Baker, Murphy & 
Fisher, 1988; Rubenstein et al., 1976; 
Procaccino, 2002) give some emphasis to the 
negative effects of too much management, 
citing ‘interference’ and ‘meddling’. 
Procaccino adds that removal of a project 
sponsor has more detrimental effect on 
success than starting without one. 
Despite the dangers of interference, 
casework research demonstrates the powerful 
benefit of committed and concerned senior 
level interest in a project’s execution, and of a 
readiness to act supportively when needed. 
This is validated through the often referenced 
Apollo project studied by Seamans and 
Ordway (1977) who table as one of their 
lessons from Apollo “In the final analysis, the 
presence or absence of [top level] support is 
the single, most crucial element that spells 
success or failure”. We conclude that top 
level commitment is vital for success, but note 
there is an important distinction between 
‘support’ and ‘interference’. 
 
Project Baseline, Phasing & Performance 
Monitoring 
The purpose and importance of a project 
baseline is threefold; (a) as a basis for cost and 
schedule estimation for project approval, (b) 
to establish a performance measurement 
reference, and (c) to establish appropriate 
expectations of project management and team 
prior to project initiation. Carried out in the 
context of project scope and budget, the 
baseline supports the project launch decision 
and the inevitable trade-off decisions by 
project management during the project. 
Surprisingly, a documented baseline such as 
this is frequently missing from projects 
(Shenhar & Wideman, 1996). 
Cost and schedule estimation is held 
as part science, part art, and is notorious for 
poor assumptions and inaccuracies, especially 
in IT projects where optimism bias drives 
underestimations. Project estimators must be 
prepared and equipped to allow for project 
based and external events on an historical 
probabilistic basis, and to allow for calculated 
contingency that Butts and Linton’s casework 
(2000) shows is so often understated.  
Breaking large projects into phases 




packages, is reported by Clarke (1999) as one 
of the most important tasks in new or 
development projects. Her study cites benefits 
including greater ownership by project teams; 
spread of responsibilities and accountability 
across a greater number of people; and easier 
delegation, objective monitoring, 
communication, problem identification and 
change management. This idea was developed 
further by de Wit (1988) in calling for specific 
objectives for different project phases, such 
that project success can be more usefully 
monitored and determined on phase 
performance.  
The benefits of periodic project 
reporting is a common finding in studies of 
project success as Turner (2004) found when 
defining reporting as a critical condition of 
project success, and its absence as a route to 
failure. Kerzner (1998) similarly lists ‘uniform 
status/monitoring reporting’ as a critical 
success factor, especially in the growth stage 
of projects. Reporting systems should be 
internally consistent and ‘fit for purpose’ in 
that they should contain only sufficient, 
clearly presented data (supporting the modern 
‘dashboard’ approach), avoid duplication and, 
where possible, be automated. 
 
Project Leadership & Management 
It is of course people who deliver projects, not 
processes and systems. Without competent, 
intelligent, and dedicated teams and 
individuals it is difficult to imagine any 
project finishing successfully. However, 
having the talent is not enough, and projects 
require both leadership (of people) and 
management (of processes and systems); these 
two attributes may not always reside in the 
same individual (Crosby, 2006). 
Muller & Turner’s (2007) large study 
of project managers and their influence on 
success, point out positive correlations 
between project success and older, more 
experienced managers, and also warn against 
assigning managers to projects below their 
capabilities. Project managers should be 
appointed early, lead the project through to the 
commissioning stage, and ideally work in their 
own culture. No performance difference was 
detected between male and female managers. 
Individual leadership qualities and 
their effect on projects are less tangible. 
Thompson (Ashby & Miles, 2002) sets out 
three basic skills as predictors for success – 
capacity (knowledge and basic intellect, or 
innate ability), authenticity (the genuine 
article), and motivation (eloquently coined as 
“influence many, control few”). In a project 
with a history of problems, a weariness of 
change and lack of commitment, Clarke 
(1999) found that an absence of these qualities 
contributed to a general lack of motivation in 
people, especially to be a part of project 
changes. Clarke cites management example as 
one of the best ways to raise confidence and 
awareness of what can be achieved. As 
awareness increases of what is happening in 
their organisation, people become more 
involved and committed, and as a 
consequence, better motivated.  
In the high-tech area smaller teams 
may work more effectively than in general 
projects, as Moody & Dodgson (2006) argue 
in their study of a complex aerospace project. 
They describe a single small, committed team 
with overlapping and complementary skills, 
made up of a proportionately large number of 
systems engineers with specialist knowledge 
across blurred project phases. This flexibility 
of implementation phases - which they suggest 
can only be done with a small team that can be 
across everything – is presented as a key to 
success. 
Recruitment and nurturing of 
individuals cannot be ignored, as Rubenstein 
et al., (1976) show in their studies on 
influencing innovation success. Fieldwork 
indicated that certain people had played (often 
informal) roles in successful project initiation, 
progress, and outcomes. 
Project managers and leaders have 
plenty of responsibilities and their selection 
can be pivotal to project success. However 
many high-tech research projects are cross-
institutionalised and the project manager has 
only very little formal authority over project 
participants who are essentially peers, and 




to the project. Erno-Kjolhede (2000) examines 
what ‘power’ to lead remains in such 
circumstances. He concludes that whilst 
accountability, commitment, information, 
influence, network control, and personal 
powers are attainable, formal authority must 
give way to persuasion and negotiation flair. 
He further argues that in high-tech projects, 
this is not necessarily a drawback. This 
approach to effective leadership and project 
success is more associated with knowledge, 
commitment, team-building, vision, and 
treating people as peers than it is with 
authority, subordination and issuing orders. 
Gratton & Erickson’s study (2007) of 
55 collaborative teams isolated eight HR 
practices leading to project success,  
highlighting the benefits of capitalising on the 
trust residing in skilfully managed ‘heritage’ 
teams. Their research indicates that when 20% 
- 40% of the team members are already 
connected through past associations, strong 
collaboration was evident at the start. 
There are indications from the 
research that project manager profile, 
especially more subtle traits, has a significant 
effect on project outcomes. Further research is 
warranted on this topic.  
 
OTHER DRIVERS 
Following the most consistently highest 
ranked project success drivers, there are other 
strategic project dimensions in which early 
attention can materially influence success. 
Some of these areas, e.g. project manager 
competence, client/user expectations, and 
adequate resourcing, are well documented 
elsewhere. Other drivers have more subtle 




Taking into account the caution concerning 
the potential harmful effects of urgency from 
Morris & Hough’s (1986) thorough study into 
precursors of success, the weight of evidence 
from more recent casework is that time 
pressure is a crucial variable for project 
success or, at least for avoiding project 
disasters. In this vein Grün (2004, 
introduction) alerts us to the “inherent silent 
power of time”. Pinto & Slevin (1989) also 
emphasise urgency as having important 
implications for success in R & D projects, 
encouraging the project manager to instil a 
sense of pace into the team, on the basis that 
urgent projects demonstrate a greater ability to 
secure resources than projects viewed as 
routine, or even dull. However, it is possible 
to go too far, as the NASA investigation into 
project management of the failed Mars 
Climate Orbiter (NASA, 2000) showed. At the 
time, a ‘faster, better, cheaper’ (FBC) strategy 
pervaded NASA’s space projects, however the 
tipping point where increasing scope met 
downward driven schedules and costs was 
unforeseen, to the extent that unmanaged 
project risk was dramatically increased, 
ultimately inducing failure. 
 
Client/Supplier Involvement 
Customers (often described as ‘users’ for 
high-tech facilities) can have a profound 
influence on project outcomes, as described in 
Procaccino’s study (2002) showing that 
success is directly related to the level of 
customer confidence in the project 
management and development team. Grün 
(2004) addresses the same point, describing it 
as the “worst case” when no permanent users 
are nominated to be involved in the planning 
phase, resulting in the operation and 
maintenance phases being “left to chance”. In 
studies of R&D projects (Pinto & Mantel, 
1990) and IT projects (Taimour, 2005), client 
participation is clearly identified as a leading 
success indicator. 
Supplier engagement through the 
procurement process is similarly important, 
beginning with the industry engagement 
strategy (Schill, 1979) and implementation of 
a project contracting policy (Morris & Hough, 
1986; MPA, 2009). In high-tech mega-
projects involving R&D, pre-contractual 
relationships are both common and essential, 
and can pose a problem known as ‘lock-out’ 




organisations that have specific relevant 
knowledge or skills from the early stages of a 
project (Hall & Kahn, 2006). Such situations 
require expert management to avoid 
impediments to successful project delivery.  
 
Change Control 
Findings from this study elevate the subject of 
change management from a project tool to a 
strategic success driver. Both the literature 
casework and study fieldwork demonstrate 
that handling of deviations found through 
testing, failures, or inspection must not only 
be tackled systematically, but also be properly 
managed through corrective and preventive 
processes linked to configuration control 
systems. When discussing design changes in 
manned space programs (where the impact can 
be potentially counted in lives) at NASA’s 
2010 Project Challenge conference, one 
speaker expressed the view that ‘there’s no 
such thing as a small change’. Robust change 
management not only avoids repetitive errors: 
it is a foundation for continuous improvement 
through problem tracking and recording via a 
lessons learned system and is thus a vital 
component of the project management system. 
 
Risk 
The topic of risk management has become 
ubiquitous in our society and the world of 
project management. It is standard practice for 
projects of all kinds to create or adopt a risk 
management plan, evaluate project risk(s) and 
establish some form of risk register to 
document the results. Fieldwork interviews 
reveal that this process at least helps identify 
and categorise risk (albeit often subjectively), 
as well as encourage risk mitigation 
techniques and/or controls (including the 
shifting of risk along the value chain). In the 
better examples, effort is made to plot the risk 
in terms of phases and value, thereby enabling 
risk retirement (or ‘burn’) to be tracked. 
Studies show that this pays off, as in the work 
by Voetsch et al., (2005) who concluded that 
53% of the respondents who reported their 
projects conduct risk reviews “Almost Always” 
report completing projects on time. Voetsch 
adds “there is a statistically significant 
relationship between… the presence of a 
project risk management process…and 
reported project success rate of an 
organisation.” 
Given these strong correlations, why does 
risk management rank relatively low among 
key success drivers? Fieldwork evidence 
suggests two reasons. First, whilst project 
practitioners agree that risk identification and 
management is a requirement, too often it is 
seen as "busy work", pulled together largely to 
fulfil project funding or audits, and rarely 
consulted as a tool-at-hand to assist 
monitoring the project’s exposure to failure. 
The second reason is simply that risk 
management is seen as part of the project 
fabric, something that the project manager 
practises subconsciously in daily decision-
making, and does not report as an explicit 
success factor. Both explanations indicate a 
lack of serious and active risk assessment, at 
least partly explained by Butts & Linton 
(2009) in their insightful report concerning 
project estimation failures in NASA: 
“Often it is not what we know will get 
us. It isn’t even what we don’t know 
that bodes trouble. It is what we don’t 
know that we don’t know that hoses 
(sic) things up. This is a cognitive 
blindspot created by the fundamental 
nature of knowledge that has not yet 
been encountered.” 
It is therefore the very nature of risk that, 
despite the difficulty in identification and 
quantification, should drive project proponents 
and managers to more diligently assess 
significant threats, their potential impact, 
contingency, and mitigation. 
 
External environment 
Projects are not always self-contained: big 
high-tech projects in particular can require 
large physical spaces for development or 
deployment, involve regulatory standards, 
require public funding and/or political support, 




proceeding. Belasi & Tukel (1996), when 
grouping factors for project success, identified 
this external framework of political, 
economic, and social factors, including 
marketplace forces. They point out the 
potential for early project termination should 
such factors be judged too risky or influential. 
Other factors, addressed by the RAND study 
of 52 mega-projects (Merrow, 1988) stress the 
potential conflicts between projects and 
institutional problems associated with 
environmental regulations, health and safety 
rules, labour practices and procurement 
controls. Fieldwork showed none of this has 
since diminished.     
 
System Engineering 
Finally, the concept of system engineering 
(SE) and its value, especially to complex 
projects, is often raised at the development 
stage of high-tech projects. Prevalent in 
defence, and large engineering projects, the 
aim of SE is essentially to apply influence at 
the design phase to enable easier and faster 
integration and test, ensure interface 
compatibility, and reduce risk, time and cost. 
SE is a discipline in itself, and where the 
approach is applicable, it is fundamental to 
project lifecycle management. A detailed 
study (Honour, 2004) of 42 projects and SE 
practice shows consistent correlations between 
investment in SE and project success, 
(especially regarding over-runs, cost and 
effective risk retirement) as well as subjective 
rises in output quality. However a one-size fits 
all approach to SE is not indicated and care is 
needed to avoid over-driving the project with 
SE. Honour’s work (2004) determined that in 
terms of person-effort, the optimum is 15-
20%, a figure he found corroborated in prior 
works by NASA and by Kludze, and 
confirmed by the UK VISTA ₤35 million 
infra-red telescope project. Similarly, when 
describing the large and complex Gemini 
telescope project, Engineering Leader Dick 
Kurz believes that “it takes… professional SE 
to really carry it off” enabling the project to 
stay on budget and close to schedule 
(Michaud, 2009). 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT 
MANAGEMENT 
Once the key success drivers are derived and 
ranked, attention can turn to exploiting the 
knowledge across the project life-cycle. A full 
treatise on establishing the project 
organisation, environment, and toolset, is 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, 
assigning the identified success drivers 
(referenced to Table 2 rankings) to early phase 
project strategies ensures that the key concepts 
may be embedded at a productive point. 
 
Conceptual Planning 
This is the time for clarifying the project 
definition, scope and goals, and if required, 
the business case [B]. Sponsor commitment 
must be in place, and client/user expectations 
agreed [D, G]. 
 
Post Concept Approval 
Strategies are now developed for dealing with 
operations in the host environment [Q], key 
resources are identified and secured [I] 
(including management [O]) and a detailed 
risk review undertaken [N]. 
 
Project Approval 
Strategies are implemented for project policies 
[A], systems engineering, site acquisition, 
procurement [Q], information management 




Planning, execution, and review systems, 
operating procedures, and document controls 
[A] are now instigated. Project baselines and 
phases are defined [E]. Change management, 
continuous improvement [P], and 
configuration control [M] is established. 
Strategic relationships are commenced with 




Project team governance is asserted 
early through the project manager’s approach 
to leadership, motivation, and social 
competence [F]. Especially important now is 
the assignment of accountabilities [L], 
aligning staff perceptions of goals and 
success, and instilling a sense of project 
momentum [J].       
 
Lessons Learned – Post-Project Reviews 
Given clear evidence that, despite the 
collected experience from general and high-
tech projects, failures continue to happen, the 
question begs – why do we fail to learn from 
them?   
One reason suggested from this study 
is the frequent absence of any formal post-
project review or project history session 
(Atkinson et al., 2006; Verna & Cerpa, 2005) 
by the majority of the documented or visited 
cases. Such reviews are recommended in the 
Project Management Institute’s literature, and 
endorsed by Williams (2008), who emphasizes 
the social process and the usefulness of story 
transmission. Anbari et al., (2008) stresses that 
regular collection of lessons learned in 
projects, their careful storage, and meaningful 
utilization in subsequent projects are critical 
elements of project success. Current practices 
evaluated by the author indicate an 
understandable focus on achieving the project 
deliverables, with many time-poor 
practitioners unwilling or unable to find and 
digest the experience of one or more cases 
relevant to their own project.  
The formal conduct of a post-project 
review involving at least the core execution 
team is essential and could be viewed as a 
post-project success driver. In at least one 
major high-tech organisation (NASA) the 
costly failure to learn from past mistakes has 
been addressed through an Agency-wide 
‘lessons-learned’ case study initiative (NASA, 
2008). 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
The failure of notable projects, whether they 
involve high-tech engineering, IT, or science 
endeavours, reinforces the patchy performance 
of mega-project management. Moreover, the 
project success statistics have not improved 
for decades despite the literature being profuse 
with project management theory, research and 
advice.  
Drawing on case study work, 
research from the previous four decades, and 
contemporary experience, the present study 
augments the literature by presenting a 
contemporary evidence-based ranking of key 
success drivers, with particular application to 
large, high-tech projects.  
Analysis shows that project 
management control and execution systems, 
and a clear project definition and goal set, are 
by far the most important drivers of project 
success. Mature information management 
systems rank third in importance, followed by 
15 other significantly important factors shown 
to markedly improve project outcomes.  
The limitations of the present 
research are acknowledged. More tightly 
defined success headings, and weighting of 
sample studies (e.g. complexity), would no 
doubt improve analysis rigour. Article length 
precludes a deeper (possibly numeric) 
exploration of how different success 
dimensions might sway the rankings.  
The study findings imply further 
research to benchmark the performance of 
large engineering and science projects against 
the reported strategic drivers to further our 
knowledge of causal factors for project 
success. This could also drill deeper to 
compare success drivers in more specific areas 
e.g. IT projects. Further investigations of the 
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Method and calculations supporting ranking of success drivers derived from the study. 
 
The process of ranking success drivers uses 
the mathematics and calculation techniques 
developed by Saaty (Coyle, 2004) and are 
described within the generic Analytical 
Hierarchy Process (AHP). This is one 
approach to multi-criteria decision-making 
(MCDM) that can involve qualitative data. 
The method employs a reciprocal decision 
matrix obtained by pair-wise comparisons 
introduced by Fechner and developed by 
Thurstone (Alonso & Lamata, 2006).  In the 
AHP, the input can be actual values, or scores 
from subjective opinion such as preference, 
judgement etc. and the approach has unique 
advantages when elements of the decision are 
difficult to quantity or compare. Decision 
situations to which the AHP can be usefully 
applied include choice, prioritisation, and 
ranking by importance (Teknomo, 2007). 
Input data were drawn from 
examination of success factors from 29 
general studies of project management 
encompassing 2,820 cases, as well as two 
success factor summaries drawn from cited 
papers within those general studies. These 
sources are listed in Table 1 of this paper, with 
numbers of individual case studies shown for 
both general and high-tech cases. 
From each study, the listed or 
described success factors (derived from 
questionnaires, statistical analyses, or both) 
were grouped into common headings. This 
process resulted in the most common 
occurring findings being captured under 18 
pragmatically themed success drivers which 
were given designators A through R. These 
were then tabulated by occurrence for all 
projects, and the sub-set high-tech projects, as 
shown in Table 3 below. (For convenience, 
they are sorted by occurrence frequency for 
‘all projects’.) 
A pair-wise comparison process was 
then carried out for both 'all' and high-tech 
data by constructing a matrix for each with 
dimensions n=18, reflecting the number of 
success driver headings. Calculations for high-
tech data are shown in Figure 1. For each of 
the 153 possible pair-wise success factor 
comparisons, a value was inserted in the 
matrix corresponding to the difference in the 
number of occurrences reported*. This value 
reflects either more or less support of one 
success driver over another. The lower 
triangle of each matrix was then populated 
with the reciprocal value.  
Having completed the upper matrix, 
approximations of the Eigen vectors were then 
computed. This was achieved by dividing each 
element of the upper matrix by the sum of its 
own column, thus normalising the relative 
weights which are then correspondingly 
displayed in the lower matrix. The normalised 
Eigen vectors showing relative ‘weights’ are 
obtained by averaging across the rows.  From 
this data, ranking is clearly indicated, as well 
as the relative importance of each success 
driver. 
The consistency of the original data 
was then tested. Aω (the 18 element vector) is 
obtained by summing the products of each 
input value (by row) with its associated Eigen 
vector (by column). Since AHP theory says 
that Aω= λmaxω, close approximations for 
λmax (the principal Eigen value) are derived 
by dividing each result by the corresponding 
Eigen vector value. The mean of these values 
gives an estimated λmax with which to 
calculate consistency as shown in Figure 1. 
Saaty argues that a consistency ratio 
of >10% indicates unreliability (with a CR 
>90% close to randomness). In this study, the 
consistency ratios for ‘all’ data and high-tech 
data are 7.28% and 4.99% respectively, and 
are therefore consistent. 
* Since a score of one (1) must equate to zero 
difference in occurrences, the entered value is 
actually the value + 1. This is not required to 
















Project management (PM) control & execution 
systems in place, with robust policies, planning, 
procedures, document control, audit, etc 
A 20 15 
Clear project definition, requirements, goals, 
objectives, scope, and project mission; sound 
business case 
B 20 14 
Mature project communication, information systems; 
effective public relations management 
C 15 11 
(Top) management (or sponsor) support with 
sustained commitment, appropriately engaged 
D 13 10 
Project baseline, estimates accuracy, project 
phasing, effective project performance (reviews) and
measurement 
E 13 10 
Leadership skills, PM experience & stability; 
motivating & socially capable PM 
F 11 8 
Agreed realistic customer / user expectations; 
frequent customer contact 
G 9 6 
PM/Organisational understanding & competence in 
project management 
H 9 6 
Adequate resourcing of the project I 8 5 
Aligned perceptions of project goals & success - 
management and team; sense of urgency instilled 
J 8 5 
Effective stakeholder engagement / partnership (e.g.
client, contractors, etc) 
K 8 5 
Organisational responsibilities assigned to right-
sized capable team 
L 7 4 
Mature, effective project management change control 
process; effective deviations handling & 
configuration control 
M 7 4 




visibility of risk register 
Project Manager  & PM systems matched to project 
complexity, and culturally aligned 
O 5 3 
Effective means of learning from experience and 
continuous improvement environment 
P 4 2 
Full understanding, and early engagement, of host 
government environment and institutional 
requirements 
Q 4 2 
Right-sized systems engineering; managing and 
procuring in right sized project ‘chunks’ 
R 3 2 
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The management of big, high-technology 
(high-tech) projects has been repeatedly 
investigated but is not well understood (Cook-
Davies, 2010), especially in terms of the 
personal characteristics and applied techniques 
of the project manager. This paper looks 
beyond the obvious skills and qualities of 
high-tech mega-project managers, and seeks to 
reveal the less obvious characteristics, traits, 
and initiatives that lead to project success. In 
short, what are the personal and professional 
attributes, skills and exemplar initiatives that 




In this paper, large high-tech mega-projects 
are defined as those involving research and 
development and/or application of technology, 
having a substantial infrastructure requirement 
and multi-million or even billion dollar 
budgets, and time-frames measured in at least 
years. The project manager is the person 
charged with ultimate delivery of the 
outcomes. 
Post-WW2 years have seen a notable change 
in the mode of mega-project funding, 
approval, and leadership style. The first half of 
the 20th century saw ambitious undertakings in 
science and engineering usually championed 
by visionaries (Miller & Lessard, 2000) 
recognised for their personal knowledge, 
discoveries, and influence. The latter half of 
the 1900’s saw increased complexity of 
machines and the project structures to build 
them. Such projects increasingly depended on 
formal organisation, plans, and budgets, and 
began to be more often identified with the host 
institute (e.g. NASA, CERN) than a single 
champion. 
This development in management is 
epitomised by the case of the giant Mount 
Palomar telescope opened in 1949. Its 
undoubted driving force was George Hale 
whose style reflects the age of the ‘Great Man’ 
projects, as Florence (1994, p92) notes;  
“a round of handshakes was enough 
to inaugurate the largest scientific 
project ever undertaken”, and “the 
committees met from time to time, but 
most of the decisions...emerged in 
notes and memoranda from 
Hale...[who] kept his fingers in every 
pie”. 
However Florence notes that even superb 
project champions have their limit (p91); 
 “Not even Hale at the peak of his 
abilities had the energy to manage 
this project alone. The two-hundred 
inch telescope was one of the first 
ventures into big science. No one had 
tried to research so many aspects of 
technology simultaneously, except 
perhaps [in wartime].”  
Systematic management of projects emerged 
in missile projects in the 1950s such as 
ATLAS and Polaris, and continued to 
proliferate into defence and civil works 
through the 1960s and 1970s. By 1990, project 
management was effectively professionalised 
and great science and engineering endeavours 
in the realm of physics research, computing, 
aerospace, and communications became 
established within modern organisational 
structures, along with their attending 
bureaucracies, ‘stakeholders’, and various 
forms of review committees. 
Contemporary high-tech project managers are 
typically required to work in a number of 
dimensions including project leadership, 
research supervision, technical realisation 
(sometimes amid a daunting range of 
deliverables), financial accountability, 
planning and schedule responsibilities, project 
communications, and the challenging art of 
people management. For those whose forte is 
essentially project execution, the project 
formulative period especially can present 
bewildering problems requiring quite different 
skills and characteristics (Sykes, 1990). 
Adding to the challenge is the complexity and 
seemingly intractable nature of mega-projects. 
Even where authors have devised success 
‘roadmaps’, the number of pathways and 
inter-relationships are daunting (Murphy et al. 
1974; Grun, 2004). 
The quest for a definitive set of managerial 
characteristics is a thoroughly researched topic 
with early reliance on trait theory (inherent 
personal qualities), and later recognising 
training potential as underpinning a situational 
or contingency theory of management. The 
1980s popularized the visionary approach 
focusing on organisational change, followed 
by a move towards the soft leadership factors 
of the emotional intelligence school, and more 
recently the development of the competence 
school (Müller & Turner, 2010). Nonetheless, 
a discriminatory set of managerial qualities 
remains elusive (Gadeken, 1986). 
This paper examines the characteristics of 
project managers that point to high-tech 
project success through examples drawn from 




current cases of large science-based projects. 
While recruitment processes are typically 
diligent when considering experience, 
background, and training of candidate project 
managers, this study identifies more subtle 
and deeper level characteristics of project 
managers that might be of practical use for 
improved selection of candidates for future 
projects. 
 
2.0 Data & Research Method 
 
The present study confines itself to data 
related to large high-tech projects, and 
published from the mid 1970s to the present. 
This period offers rich experience from peer 
reviewed research papers, relevant case 
studies, and articles from the professional 
management domain. 
Many of the notable writers on the subject of 
project success consider the traits of the 
project manager, and the impacts these have 
on the overall success of the project (Baker et 
al, 1988; Cooke-Davies, 2000; Disterer, 2001; 
Gratton et al., 2007; Grün, 2004; Morris & 
Hough, 1986; Shenhar & Dvir, 2007; Smith & 
Winter, 2010). Several authors have looked 
specifically at the topic over a wide range of 
project types (Clarke, 1999; Erno-Kjolhede, 
2000; Geoghegan & Dulewicz, 2008; Laufer 
& Hoffman, 2000; Müller & Turner, 2007; 
Verner & Evanco, 2005), again linking 
behaviour and competence to project success 
outcomes. Müller & Turner (2010) looked 
deeply into leadership competencies of 
successful project managers using a global 
questionnaire, while Keegan et al. (2004) 
examined transformational leadership.   
The present research also canvassed the 
popular ‘bodies of knowledge’ (the PMBOK® 
Guide, the APM’s Project Management BoK, 
and IPMA’s Competency Baseline), as well as 
published accounts of specific big science and 
engineering projects (Florence, 1994; 
Robertson, 1992; Seamans & Ordway, 1977). 
An important initiative from the literature was 
the UK research activity called Rethinking 
Project Management (Maylor, 2006) where a 
number of leading project management 
academics and senior practitioners from 
industry purposely set out to question 
mainstream ideas. Of particular note from this 
work was the need for increased recognition 
of human issues, the social nature of projects, 
and resulting challenges for management. 
Interestingly, the same topics received high 
visibility at the 2010 NASA Project 
Management Challenge, an event focusing on 
best practice in high-tech environments. 
Despite the breadth of work around the topic, 
there remains a knowledge gap relating to 
specific characteristics of managers with high-
tech project success. To help bridge the gap by 
the use of contemporary field data, the author 
conducted a series of investigations at several 
large scientific facilities in Europe and 
Australia (Appendix A, Exhibit 1). The chosen 
sites each satisfied the criteria of having 
substantial and specialised infrastructure, > 
US$100 million budget (except the Antarctic 
LIDAR), and a science goal concerned with 
astro, particle, or nuclear physics. Visits of 2-3 
days were pre-planned to ensure access to key 
project management representatives. Formal 
interviews were conducted, each typically 
lasting 3-5 hours. Use of a question list 
ensured a systematic approach and 
consistency of topic coverage; however 
interviewees were free to amplify their 
responses as necessary. These meetings 
revealed, amongst other research outcomes, 
commonalities and application of traits and 
techniques with a focus on the effects of 
managerial approaches and behaviours.  
 The validation of published material through 
field casework is advanced by Flyvbjerg in his 
seminal paper ‘Five Misunderstandings About 
Case Study Research’. When arguing in 
support of this phronetic approach (Flyvbjerg, 
2006, p221) says; 
“the case study produces the type of 
context-dependent knowledge that 
research on learning shows to be 
necessary to allow people to develop 
from rule-based beginners to virtuoso 
experts”   
Flyvbjerg explains the richness of information 




realities which are hard to reveal or define in 
scientific parlance (Flyvbjerg, 2001). This 
qualitative methodology is aligned with the 
8ed Theory (GT) approach – the systematic 
generation of theory from data that contains 
both inductive and deductive thinking 
(Georgieva & Allen, 2008). The gathered data 
are coded and grouped into similar concepts in 
order to make them more workable. From 
these concepts, categories are formed, which 
are later developed into topic headings for 
ease of reference. GT studies are considered as 
qualitative since statistical methods are not 
used, and are often presented without figures. 
In this study and in accordance with GT 
methodology, a variety of data sources are 
valid for inclusion, not just theoretical 
research and planned observations. Field notes 
made from formal and informal interviews, 
general observations from experience in the 
workplace, and expert group meetings all 
supplemented the research. The combined 
methodologies of literature research validated 
through fieldwork, though by its nature must 
be incomplete, enabled the extraction of 
several recurring topics, each presented as 
findings in sections 3.0 and 4.0, and 
summarised in section 6.0. 
 
3.0 Project Manager characteristics leading to 
success 
 
Processes to recruit, interview and appoint the 
necessary outstanding individual to manage a 
scientific and/or engineering project are 
generally adept at attracting candidates with 
the required qualifications, project 
management exposure, and general 
experience. This study posits that the 
successful management of high-tech mega-
projects especially, as distinct from large 
projects (Sykes, 1990), is a particular and 
highly challenging task, requiring a special 
portfolio of attributes beyond those commonly 
identified at interview.  
These attributes or traits are presented in this 
section as pre-cursors of high-tech project 
success. 
 
3.1 The uncertain nature of mega-projects   
 
A commonality between definitions of a 
project is that of a broadly definable task, and 
therefore necessarily a temporary endeavour. 
Mega-projects surviving the often precarious 
‘approval for expenditure’ stage and lasting up 
to a decade or more may strike hurdles, or 
even get truncated, before reaching an 
operational phase. Those who run such 
projects have to know when to change course, 
when to proceed or pause, and above all, when 
to stop (Sykes, 1990). Thomas & Mengel 
(2008) suggest complex projects present 
ambivalence and ambiguity of the not-yet-
known, with emerging situations that crucially 
shape meaning, interpretation, and social 
significance. When describing project shapers, 
Smith & Winter (2010) add to this the 
scanning of project boundaries for unwelcome 
‘messengers’, and alert us to peripety; the 
arrival of events that reframe understanding of 
all that has gone before. Moreover, in 
developing the concept of ProjectCraft, Smith 
(2007) warns of social uncertainties in the 
form of unknown agendas, and emergent and 
divergent strategies. Fieldwork on this topic 
within the case studies (AAD, 2009; ITER, 
2009; ALMA, 2007) confirm a fundamental 
attribute of the successful project manager – 
the ability to deal with uncertainty, and the 
personal career impacts, within an enterprise 




When asked about characteristics that 
underpin the respect and loyalty accorded to 
project managers, a common response across 
most project teams personally interviewed can 
be summarised as “authenticity’ (AAD, 2009; 
ITER, 2009; CERN, 2009; Samuel, 2009; 
Kendra & Taplin, 2004). Phrases such as 
“he’s done this before and draws on that 
experience”, “ a dogged, quiet achiever”, and 
“he leaves the flag-flying to others and just 




to attributes that are anecdotally linked to 
successful project execution. 
In a Project Management ‘complete reader’, 
Graham and Englund conclude that; “Any 
lapses by upper managers in the authenticity 
and integrity of their dealing…are likely to 
have a severe impact on the achievement of 
project goals.” They go on to say; “It is a 
recurring theme in our experience…that 
authenticity and integrity link the head and the 
heart, the words and the action; they separate 
belief from disbelief, and often make the 
difference between success and failure” 
(Verzuh, 2003, p27-30). When discussing 
leadership, Thompson similarly identifies 
authenticity (the ‘genuine article’) among the 
three basic skills as predictors for success 
(Ashby & Miles, 2002). 
The broad appreciation for the success 
associated with project managers who 
demonstrate authenticity and genuine talent 
should not be confused with, or offset by, 
charismatic charm, despite its reported 
benefits within transformational leadership. 
Morris and Hough’s (1986, p219) seminal 
study of project success and failure notes that 
“not all leaders are charismatic 
personalities...this in no way diminishes the 
significance of their leadership”. When 
considering charisma in his 5-year study of 
leadership, Collins (Ashby & Miles, 2002) 
found that truly successful managers tended to 
be modest, humble, and reserved, but 
enormously wilful personalities. Another 
author writes, “You become a leader not 
primarily because of your natural charisma, 
but because others believe you to be a leader” 
(Smith, 2007, p83).  
Whilst a Major Projects Seminar (MPA, 2007) 
concluded that project manager domain 
knowledge increased the chances of success, 
the attribute of authenticity does not 
necessarily require deep knowledge of the 
project’s science/engineering technologies and 
goals (Verner & Cerpa, 2005). Moreover, 
while technical ability does provide increased 
credibility in a high-tech environment, it 
should not be an overriding indicator of the 
effective project manager (Blanchard, 1990; 
Graham & Englund, 1997). In the case of 
Australia’s nuclear research reactor, OPAL, 
the three project managers spanning the 
construction phase had no specific nuclear 
experience, but all were judged by team 
members as being competent technical project 
practitioners, and well matched to the task. 
 
 
3.3 Collaborative approach  
 
A feature of modern giant scientific and 
engineering programs is their global 
involvement. Whereas projects such as 
CERN’s Large Hadron Collider (LHC), and 
the coming Square Kilometre Array (SKA), 
physically span country borders, almost all 
‘high tech’ mega-projects are international 
collaborations regardless of their host location. 
To share know-how, risk and cost, resources 
may be pooled in the areas of research and 
development, project planning, and funding. 
However, as the preparatory SKA work has 
shown, this is not to say that there is always 
shared agreement of the goals of the 
collaborative partners. 
The project manager, faced with the 
complexities of international collaborative 
working, requires a sound understanding of 
mechanisms for cross-cultural, multi-
disciplinary groups – something only achieved 
by practical experience. The project manager 
is likely to be central to any high level 
strategic collaborations and competency is 
crucial for project success. 
Collaborations with external parties also call 
for experience and skill. Goldratt (1997, p173) 
addresses this point in connection with project 
vendors saying; “Persuading people to 
collaborate is always necessary. The time 
when you could dictate [to suppliers] is over. 
If you want people to think, to take initiative, 
you cannot dictate”. 
In a contemporary UK study (Samuel, 2009), 
the practical coordination of collaborations in 
mega-science is described as particularly 
difficult, with limitations imposed by time 




implications for who is seen as the overall 
leader, and who is accountable and 
responsible for successfully delivering the 
project. Project directorates need to be very 





3.4 Balancing leadership with management 
 
Critical observation against modern theory 
shows that managers do not always transform 
into good leaders, or vice versa. Management 
is largely about coping with complexity and 
good managers bring order and consistency 
through processes, plans and structure, and by 
monitoring results. In contrast, leadership is 
concerned with directing change and aligning 
people by communicating an inspirational 
vision, and then helping them overcome 
hurdles (Crosby, 2006). To achieve success, 
both roles obviously require some capability 
of the other. 
Laufer and Hoffman (2000, p xxi) write, 
“most project management writings stress the 
managerial aspects of projects, failing to 
recognise the significance of leadership”, and 
conclude that project managers have to 
assume both leadership and managerial roles.  
Müller & Turner’s (2010) research into 
leadership competencies by industry type 
revealed strong correlations between 
successful high-tech managers, and critical 
thinking (intellectual [IQ]); team development 
(managerial [MQ]); and influence / motivation 
/ conscientiousness (Emotional [EQ]). 
The supervisory demands of high-tech mega-
projects, characterised by creative people 
operating in environments of minimal formal 
structure and reporting relationships resonates 
well with the ‘transformational leadership’ 
(TL) style. First introduced by Burns and 
added to by Bass (Hötzel, 2004), TL describes 
a leadership approach that transforms 
followers into leaders, inspires extraordinary 
performance, and exemplifies coaching, 
mentoring and intellectual stimulation. 
Whereas transactional management reflects a 
cost-benefit exchange (plan, negotiate, and 
reward), transformational leaders articulate an 
attractive vision (excite, inspire, and support). 
(Stewart, 2006; Keegan et al. 2004). 
The effectiveness of TL within the project 
world was investigated by Keegan et al. 
(2004) who concluded that, while project 
managers are not dissimilar to line managers 
in terms of TL behaviour, the positive effects 
may be less pronounced in the temporary 
project environment. Early results point to a 
weakening of effect due to “the multiple and 
temporary leader-follower relationships, 
shifting alliances, and overlapping social 
relationships [seen in projects, meaning that] 
project managers are unable to make the 
promises or exercise the same influence over 
career paths” (Keegan et al. 2004, p615). 
However, the nature of complex, multi-
disciplinary high-tech projects suggests that a 
TL approach should elicit increased 
performance levels and success, and further 
research may usefully examine new leadership 
theories and forms of organising project teams 
to fully realise these gains.    
Whilst the literature is replete with examples 
of leadership qualities, there is little 
commentary concerning the characteristics of 
project managers relating to project success. 
Practical handbooks tend to skim over the 
topic, confining advice to the need for general 
management proficiency, adding 
characteristics such as knowledge of project 
management, performance accomplishment, 
and personal traits surrounding attitude, 
personality, team guidance, and driving 
project objectives while balancing constraints 
(PMBOK® Guide, 2008). 
Case study interviews (CSIRO, 2008; CERN, 
2009; ASTRON, 2009; ITER, 2009) offer 
richer data revealing commonality of views 
concerning project manager traits as a 
combination of transformational leadership 
and management skills including; 
• Qualified, and experienced, in 




• Knowledgeable and functional in the 
popular project management 
applications (e.g. PRIMA VERA, MS 
Project) 
• Obsessively mindful of the critical 
path, and always driving forward 
• Effective delegator, but not afraid to 
‘get hands dirty’ when needed 
• Ready and able to do ‘what it takes’ 
to remove roadblocks 
• Sets the example in terms of ethics, 
behaviour, and standards 
• Maintains an intellectually 
demanding environment 
• Maintains a systems engineering 
view, but is not stuck at that level 
• Knows what to communicate, to 
whom, and when. 
 
 
3.4 Persuading and negotiating 
 
Interviewees underlined that, high-tech 
projects are characterised by design challenges 
including technology changes e.g. ASKAP 
(CSIRO, 2009), contractual and construction 
delays and amendments e.g. OPAL (ANSTO, 
2009), commissioning problems e.g. LHC 
(CERN, 2009), internal differences of opinion, 
and a host of external environmental 
challenges (Merrow, 1988; Eden et al. 2005). 
In the case of multinational science 
endeavours, it is not unusual for partner 
contributions to be ‘in-kind’ further 
complicating the authority hierarchy. More 
than one interviewee likened people 
management in high-tech projects to ‘cat 
herding’. 
A key skill then for the successful high-tech 
mega-project manager is the ability to foresee, 
mitigate, and manage these problems through 
skilled and sensitive persuasion and 
negotiation.  
When reviewing large, dispersed collaborative 
projects Erno-Kjolhede (2000) explored what 
‘power’ to manage exists in such 
circumstances. He concludes that whilst 
accountability, commitment, information 
management, influence and control, and 
personal powers are attainable, formal 
authority must give way to persuasion and 
negotiation flair. However he argues that in 
research (high-tech) projects, this is not 
necessarily a drawback. Mega-project 
managers will require the confidence that 
comes with experience and maturity to 
strategically influence outcomes, and 
understand the advantages of transformational 
management. 
Project Management Institute (PMI) 
documentation describes several project 
execution scenarios where the project 
managers’ negotiation skills must be adept 
(PMBOK® Guide, 2008). These are borne out 
by fieldwork cases and include the highly 
demanding task of managing stakeholder 
expectations in terms of likelihood of project 
acceptance, proactively anticipating concerns, 
and resolving identified issues. “Managing 
expectations helps to increase the probability 
of project success by ensuring that the 
stakeholders understand the project benefits 
and risks”, (PMI PMBOK® Guide, 2008, 
p262).  
Mega-project procurement, commonly 
assigned to a specialist department, will likely 
have some accountability to the project 
manager, especially when involving any 
major, strategic, or critical path acquisitions. 
Such activities draw on persuasion and 
negotiating skills as a key characteristic for 
successful contract execution and procurement 
logistics. 
 
3.6 Trust, culture and diversity 
 
Trust is a key ingredient (Sauer, 2008) in 
forming and maintaining collaborative social 
relationships, and several interviewees implied 
its importance unprompted. Samuel’s research 
(2009, p28) draws on Politis, Chowdhury, and 
Ross when establishing that; “trust is an 
important condition within any team since 
teamwork is dependent on knowledge sharing, 
and knowledge sharing is influenced by the 
degree of trust that exists between people”. 
Samuel continues, “It is difficult to build 
trust...and whilst this is true of any team, the 




cultural dispersion becomes particularly 
important for managing global teams.” 
The challenge to build trust within global 
multi-cultural projects necessarily tests the 
capability of the project manager in 
dimensions rarely discussed at the project 
outset. Kendra & Taplin (2004) address the 
subject of project success within different 
cultural frameworks and identify the need to 
recognise the differing values and the task of 
developing shared value sets to underpin the 
building of strong project management. 
Riordan (2001) echoes the argument for 
scientific and engineering cultures within 
mega-science projects; while Aronson et al. 
(2010) in their study of project sprit and 
success, suggest that the project manager has 
responsibility for demonstrating a set of values 
which nurture the unique culture of high-tech 
successful projects. 
In discussing knowledge transfer barriers, 
Disterer (2001, p4) asserts that “Trust results 
in common expectations of reliability, 
consistency, and plausibility. Trust reduces 
the fear that others will act opportunistically. 
Likewise…management must act as peers to 
give an example in knowledge sharing”. 
Perhaps when the stakes are highest, issues of 
trust and harmonisation of diversity become 
most valued, yet conversely most testing. 
Following the Apollo program, NASA 
commissioned a ‘lessons for management’ 
report to identify key success characteristics 
that arose from this most complex technical 
endeavour (Seamans & Ordway, 1977, p294). 
In relation to dealing with diversity, the report 
found, 
”NASA was dealing…with all sorts of 
people from all kinds of disciplines. 
Many of them were not used to 
working together, much less in the 
exposed environment characteristic of 
the Apollo program, In addition to 
engineers, technicians, and 
construction workers, [we had] 
theoretical scientists, legislators from 
Congress, lawyers, businessmen – a 
whole gamut of individuals. NASA’s 
goals, problems, failings, had to be 
explained to all, in a language they 
could understand. [We] had to 
encourage all to work in an open, 
time-constrained, team-oriented, and 
stressful environment that was new 
and puzzling to many.” 
Again from the space engineering sector, 
Thomas Coughlin (Leader – NEAR asteroid 
orbiter project) ties trust to the successful 
delivery of a spacecraft within 27 months and 
US$4 million under budget. He explains the 
one-off launch window meant, “I had to let all 
the people involved, including me, do their 
job, and only their job. This involved a lot of 
trust”.  (Laufer & Hoffman, 2000, p193). 
Finally, Graham & Englund (1997), when 
identifying environments for successful 
projects, are clear on the need for 
unprecedented levels of trust and openness, 
and caution that managers may have 
difficulties when coming from a less trusting 
organisation. Certainly, team leader candidates 
at large European projects (CERN, 2009; 
ITER, 2009) are questioned closely regarding 
their skills in nurturing diverse, cohesive 
teams.  
3.7 Personal profile 
 
While contemporary recruitment practices in 
science and engineering are clear regarding 
non-discrimination by way of age, gender, or 
ethnic background (e.g. CSIRO, 2010), it is 
useful to look at what the literature and current 
experience says about profiles and delivery of 
project success. Müller & Turner’s (2007) 
large empirical study of project managers and 
the influence of their profiles (e.g. age range, 
experience,  gender, nationality) on success, 
point out many useful implications when 
matching project managers to roles.  
First, in terms of the importance of project 
success factors, the study reported that more 
complex and challenging projects increases 
the awareness of success factors generally, 
and that project managers should not be 
assigned to projects below their management 
capabilities. Some nationalistic variation was 
detected, with European project managers 




significantly lower than other parts of the 
world (although peaking in middle age).  No 
differences appeared in performance based on 
gender.    
Müller & Turner looked further at differences 
by nationality. They point to Wang and 
Huang’s work showing that project success 
may be determined differently than in the 
mainstream project management literature. 
Contrary to an emphasis on time, cost, and 
quality, Chinese project managers emphasise 
relationships as the main criterion for overall 
success. Research cited on the Indian IT 
industry (by Agarwal and Rathod) identified 
functionality within scope as the foremost 
success criteria. Overall, project managers 
with greater experience emphasise the 
importance and influence of team satisfaction 
on success. 
There are also differences in rating of success 
criteria, and performance against them by age, 
reflecting a growing of confidence with 
experience. Older project managers assign 
higher importance to teambuilding, and 
research in the military acquisition 
environment (Gadeken, 1995) strongly links 
competencies to experience. Müller and 
Turner (2007) found this well supported by 
Lee-Kelley & Leong, Loong, Prabhakar & 
Dolfi, and Andrews, all of whom found a 
significant correlation between project 
manager experience and project success. 
Second, project managers that are capable and 
responsible for the wider project life cycle 
(not just planning, execution and close-out) 
tend to be more successful. Project managers 
should therefore be assigned at the earliest 
stages and ideally lead their project up to the 
commissioning stage (supported by Murphy et 
al. 1974). 
Third, Müller and Turner (2007) found that 
project managers working in their own culture 
tend to be more successful than expatriates, 
implying improved outcomes from local site 
candidates, mentored (if needed) by a more 
senior manager who may come from abroad. 
Gadeken (1986, p41) surveyed the profiles 
and career progression of 1300 engineers and 
scientists and found “that manager-engineers 
exhibit the same preference for leadership 
roles that [other] managers do, but do not 
possess the same level of social poise nor 
enjoyment of human interaction”. Gadeken’s 
(p44) advice that “engineers and scientists 
need more interpersonal development to 
improve both their selection opportunity and 
success” remains a valid pointer for today’s 
recruiters. 
Finally, an intrinsic quality of the mega-
project manager is the intellectual maturity 
and discipline to manage beyond “the 
rational, objective, and universal 
representations of ‘the project’ with a 
phronetic analysis of the ambiguous, 
fragmented and political reality of project 
situations” (Cicmil et al. 2006, p679). For 
high-tech IT projects, Souer & Reich (2008) 
couple these qualities with the need to exhibit 
emotional intelligence that reflects deep 
personal identification with project goals. The 
foregoing notions imply a ‘super-manager’ 
with vast experience, and delivering success in 
the face of great uncertainty, while expertly 
tackling the challenges of the wider economic, 
geo-political, diplomacy, and social aspects of 
the project (Blanchard, 1990). The present 
study found it is precisely this rare mix of 
intelligent gravitas, technical awareness, social 
proficiency, and political confidence that sets 
outstanding mega-project managers apart. 
 
3.8 A sense of mission and urgency 
 
Ultimately a key characteristic of mega-
project managers is the enthusiasm and 
determination to keep driving the project 
forward, and to effectively communicate this 
‘sense of mission’ throughout the team 
(Graham & Englund, 1997; ITER, 2009). 
Mega high-tech enterprises have voracious 
appetites for funds, even during quiescent 
periods, and maintaining progress on all 
possible fronts is crucial. 
 
NASA manager, Jerry Madden (Laufer & 
Hoffman, 2000) argues that a critical 
characteristic for projects managers is the 
application of judgement to position stress 
levels between lethargy and team fatigue.  
This is perhaps most obvious when unplanned 




quickly re-plan, and restore the critical 
pathway requires a special, multi-dimensional 
intellect and the ability to maintain a balance 
between unproductive stress and pressure, and 
motivating urgency. George Morrow, NASA’s 
Director of Flight Projects concurs with 
Madden, adding “If we managed the early 
phase of projects with the same sense of 
urgency as systems integration and test, we’d 
be a lot more efficient in the overall life cycle” 
(NASA, 2009). 
 
From the literature, Grün concurs while 
tackling a different aspect in ‘Taming Giant 
Projects’ (Grün, 2004, p31). He argues that in 
order to achieve success, the project manager 
must be prepared to limit goals so as to 
counterbalance the tendency to expand the 
technical scope of mega-projects. Such forces 
are often hard to oppose in high-tech projects 
and “therefore it is essential to have, or to 
create time pressure for the project.” 
Specifically in the software project area, a 
sense of urgency was strongly linked to 
regular project checks, and listed third in 
Boettcher’s work on IT project success factors 
(Attarzadeh & Ow, 2008). 
When looking to create positive, and diminish 
negative, determinants of success, extensive 
research by Murphy et al. (1974) asserts that 
the project manager should develop 
commitment and a sense of participation and 
mission among project team members from 
the outset. Seamans & Ordway (1977 p275) 
recount from their Apollo project study that 
‘To marshall our resources and order our 
course is a task of the greatest delicacy which 
must be accomplished under the most 
relentless urgency’. 
Finally, fieldwork from the present study 
revealed a tangible sense of proprietorship at 
the ranks of senior management, and this was 
cited among many project teams as important 
in driving the project mission in terms of 
direction and maintaining pace. (CSIRO, 
2009; CSIRO, 2008; CERN, 2009; ANSTO, 
2009) 
 
4.0 Managing Project Initiatives and 
Environment 
 
4.1 Project Structures and Teams 
 
The effectiveness of a project to achieve its 
goals is dependent on the shape and 
functionality of the project structure and 
operating environment (Graham & Englund, 
1997). Miller and Lessard (2000) go further, 
arguing that institutional arrangements and 
strategic systems are greater determinants of 
success of large engineering projects than 
project engineering and management. 
Management structures, and especially the 
relationship between management and 
stakeholders in large high-tech projects, 
commonly generate tensions for the project. 
As one recent European study (Katsanevas et 
al. 2009, p56) found; 
“the existing successful projects 
demonstrate that a certain degree of 
structure and management is not only 
necessary, but can also support the 
success of the science project itself. 
The balancing between enough 
regulation or structure and too much 
has to be done in a way satisfying 
both the researchers and the funding 
agencies” 
Collaborations can also present demands on 
project structures, especially in the case of 
equal partners. The 50:50 division of the 
ALMA radio telescope project between 
European and American partners (ESO and 
NRAO respectively), each having a project 
manager operating under a joint Board, 
naturally slows down and complicates any 
decision making. (ALMA, 2007). 
The Australian OPAL nuclear project 
commenced without a formal project manager, 
favouring instead a Management Board drawn 
from other parts of the ANSTO organisation 
(ANSTO, 2009). However this was soon 
found ineffective and a ‘traditional’ project 
manager role was then established, 
successfully taking the project through to 
completion.  
Experience from the successful Auger project, 
operated under the auspices of Fermilab, show 
that even in loose structures, some rules are 




A noted feature of Auger’s success was the 
project manager’s proclination to frequently 
visit the many partners, facilitate exchange of 
information, and address problems promptly 
and visibly (Katsanevas et al. 2009) 
The ability to effectively manage team-based 
structures applies equally in the commercial 
environment. In a report on the success of the 
343MW Huntstown CCGT power station in 
Ireland (Garnett & Hatfield, undated, p5) the 
authors concluded “Open teamwork [between 
contractors and staff] proved to be a definite 
benefit to the project. With the complexity of 
construction, there will be no shortage of 
[failures and mistakes] to overcome without 
having an institutional adversarial blood 
stream running through the project”. 
Interestingly, Samuel’s study (2009) 
concurred with this study’s fieldwork, and 
commentary from the Auger project, that in 
mega-science teams and particularly academic 
circles, the need for team building activities 
was considered to be inappropriate and largely 
unnecessary, as association with a project 
having a grand science ambition is sufficient 
basis for a robust common passion. 
In the high-tech area smaller teams may work 
more effectively as Moody & Dodgson (2006) 
argue in their study of a complex aerospace 
project. They describe a single small, 
committed team with overlapping and 
complementary skills, made up of a 
proportionately large number of systems 
engineers with specialist knowledge across 
blurred project phases. This flexibility of 
implementation phases - which they suggest 
can only be done with a small team that can be 
across everything – is presented as a key to 
success. 
A study by Gratton et al. (2007) of 55 
collaborative teams isolated eight HR 
practices leading to project success,  
highlighting the benefits of capitalising on the 
trust residing in skilfully managed ‘heritage’ 
teams. Their research indicates that when 20-
40% of the team members have past 
associations, strong collaboration was evident 
at the start. The success rate of ‘heritage’ 
teams points to an interesting area of future 
research. 
The present study found that setting up a 
standard project management structure within 
the organisation should not absolve the project 
manager and/or Directorate from reviewing its 
effectiveness, and instigating change where 
necessary. Germany’s XFEL x-ray laser 
project commenced under a thorough, well 
documented governance structure, yet was 
later  compelled to recommend a taskforce 
review to deal with the orthogonal nature of 
external entities (DESY, 2009). Projects 
managers need to be ready to embrace such 
change. 
 
In summary, when selecting potential 
managers for scientific and engineering 
projects, Directorates should not overlook the 
matching of characteristics to the operating 
environment and structure. A manager may 
appear to have failed at one assignment, yet 
could perform well at another with different 
organisational and team conditions. 
Organisational structure, control, systems, and 
processes are not on their own sufficient for 
successful innovation, and there is 
overwhelming evidence that the right 
individual is a necessary condition for project 
success (Rubenstein, 1976) 
 
4.2 Task Forces 
 
Despite considerable planning, risk 
assessment and capable management, it would 
be most unusual for a major scientific and 
engineering project to proceed to conclusion 
without a significant problem appearing. 
Occasionally a ‘wicked problem’ may emerge 
that defeats normal problem-solving 
approaches (Partridge, 1981). One study found 
that, on average, projects met five unexpected 
events during execution, and some had twelve 
(Miller & Lessard, 2000). The handling of 
problems that threaten the critical path is a key 
test of capability for the project manager, and 
any recruitment process should carefully 
review the candidate’s approach, experience 





The recognition of the need for immediate 
assistance, convening of specialist personnel 
(physically or virtually), managing the process 
to solve the issue, and transferring the 
outcomes to the project team(s) are all vital 
functions, requiring leadership, mature 
judgement and coordination skills of project 
managers. Each of the case studies for this 
paper employed the task force (or’ Tiger 
Team’) concept, an ad-hoc group operating 
heuristically to deal with a crisis, critical 
deviation or roadblock (Pavlak, 2004). 
 
To further explore this aspect, the author 
surveyed experienced leaders of large 
scientific and engineering projects (Appendix 
A, Exhibit 2) to better understand the 
operative nature of task forces, and the 
challenges they pose for high-tech project 
managers. The conclusions of the research 
focus group were gathered under three aspects: 
 
Membership & Support 
The ideal team size is between six and ten 
members. Other than support staff, all 
members must be professional 
scientists/engineers offering a fair 
representation of skill and opinion. As in other 
project groups, it helps if members know each 
other and can bond quickly. A mixed gender 
membership from the same or close generation 
is suggested. An expense budget should be set, 
and if secretarial support is required, this 
function should be managed only by the 
leader. 
 
Authority & Scope 
The task force must be given a clear mandate 
in the form of a task statement and deadline. 
The problem to solve must be clearly scoped, 
and any terms of reference should be brief and 
non-restrictive, other than having task depth 
and boundaries defined. Often, the task force 
itself will not be given authority to make 
actual decisions, however any authority 
awarded must match the 
responsibility/accountability required. 
 
Success factors for task forces  
• Task forces operate best when 
tackling (a) emergent program level 
challenges to enable an effective 
technical way forward, and (b) 
addressing deficient organizational 
practices to improve the program. 
• There is a will amongst stakeholders 
for a situation to be un-stalled, or 
solved. 
• A deadline or other imperative exists. 
• The task force members are able to 
“roll their sleeves up”, leave their 
egos at the door, and become totally 
objective. “A ‘burn’ on the problem 
by a small group can often break the 
impasse.” 
• The group is co-located, 
appropriately isolated, and really 
taken ‘offline’. The group is given 
management and organisational 
support, and is relieved of other 
duties and distractions. 
• Frequent meetings and reports to the 
project manager or sponsor are used 
to keep on track. 
• The format of the outcome is defined, 
and the ‘end conditions’ built-in so 
that closure is effective. 
• The results must be capable of being 
actioned/implemented. 
• The taskforce leader must have 
technical expertise and a systems 
perspective, be experienced in the 
domain, and have the ability to 
synthesise the outcomes. The team 
leader needs to be smart, objective, 
build confidence and trust, and be a 
respected ‘dictator’.  
 
The survey indicated that task forces were 
effective in quickly tackling ‘showstopper’ 
events, bringing focus to wide-ranging 
discussions (e.g. technology options), 
simplifying complex problems, and are useful 
to reset the existing pathway to an outcome. 
As such, the timely assembly and deployment 
of a task force in response to project stress 
offers a useful interview topic for candidate 
managers.  
 





It is one thing to create or shape a project 
structure, and another to make this effective 
through communications and information 
management. high-tech projects have an 
inherent need to convey large amounts of 
complicated information across a range of 
domains and levels both inside and outside the 
organisation. 
Fieldwork for this study revealed two 
important areas beyond functional document 
control processes that draw on the 
characteristics of the project manager – that of 
managing information exchange (the delivery 
dimension), and managing information 
dissemination (the content dimension). 
Technical data, designs, system descriptions, 
and other evolving documents normally 
require iterations within and outside the 
project and need careful consideration by 
management in terms of their distribution, 
especially among collaborative groups. The 
project manager must display firmness in 
approving circulation lists and meeting 
participants, yet be ready to modify according 
to circumstances. Case interviews verified that 
the project manager is unable to be involved in 
every information exchange; therefore clear 
protocols must be implemented that reflect the 
project needs and management style, as well 
as the expectations of stakeholders (CSIRO, 
2008; ANSTO, 2009; SYNCHROTRON, 
2009). Moreover, science and engineering 
projects tend to generate valuable intellectual 
property (IP), and project management must 
establish and demonstrate standards in 
compliance with IP policies.    
Managers also declare their character through 
the quantity, quality, and detail of the 
information they disseminate, and to whom. 
This especially applies to reports, meeting 
outcomes, and funding matters where the 
attributes of judgement and discretion must be 
keenest. Case study interviewees agreed that 
project managers releasing information 
through messages to sub-groups and teams 
(especially from headquarters to sites); need to 
strike an appropriate tone of leadership rather 
than officialdom.  Trust issues were evident 
here also, and the experienced project 
manager is expected to display care 
concerning delicate and confidential matters.  
In a study using success factors to improve 
project management, Clarke (1999) identified 
communication throughout the project as 
critical, in particular its influence on the 
acceptance of change. Her research strongly 
links effective communication with 
interpersonal skills. 
Lastly, Clarke (1999) emphasises the 
importance of communicating within the final 
stages in a project as opportunities to convey 
achievement and project learning.  She also 
proposes that one of the best ways to motivate 
people and make them more confident of what 
can be achieved is through more effective 
communication. A practical example is 
NASA’s annual Project Management 
Challenge that includes a formal awards 
ceremony where group and individual 
achievement is recognised through motivating 
project story information. 
 
4.5 Mission Assurance 
 
A particular characteristic of project managers 
drawn from fieldwork combines leadership 
with the traits of being ‘resolute’ and 
‘fastidious’, and is displayed as an unwavering 
sense of purpose in making mission success 
the highest priority at all levels of the project. 
This single-minded (though not tunnel-vision) 
approach becomes very apparent during 
deeper investigations of project system 
management, where integration of technical 
domains often reveals both technical and 
philosophical inconsistencies at the interfaces. 
The resolution of these tensions can easily 
lead to outcomes that can potentially 
compromise the sustainability of the project, 
and it is imperative that the project manager 
applies fortitude and leadership to maintain 
project focus, and as highlighted in the 
fieldwork, is supported by the Project 
Directorate in doing so (ITER, 2009; CERN, 




The adoption of a mission assurance approach 
is captured most compellingly within NASA 
reports. Following a review of NASA’s 
‘Faster, Better, Cheaper’ (FBC) approach to 
space missions in light of a growing failure 
rate (Spear, 2000), certain flaws began to 
emerge concerning cost cap challenges, taking 
shortcuts under pressure, and risk conflicts for 
project managers However the 
recommendations largely missed the root 
cause. Meanwhile NASA’s Mars Climate 
Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board (MIB) 
independently concluded that “[FBC] has 
failed to instil sufficient rigor in risk 
management throughout the mission cycle” 
(NASA 2000, p6), and recommended the 
implementation of a new paradigm, termed 
Mission Success First. The MIB went further 
to describe how the Mission Assurance 
function should operate within projects, its 
rigorous oversight of testing and verification, 
and most importantly, interfacing with project 
management in driving mission success 
criteria. 
In NASA’s model (NASA, 2000), mission 
assurance requires that institutional line 
management become more engaged in the 
execution of the project, and be held 
accountable for mission success. This means 
project managers asking the right questions at 
meetings and reviews, getting the right people 
to those reviews to fearlessly uncover mission 
critical issues early in the program, and 
pursuing their resolution. Given the obvious 
tensions arising between mission assurance 
and project deliverables, these are clearly key 
responsibilities requiring valiant project 
management. 
The legacy of past methodologies applied to 
high-tech/long lifetime projects can remain to 
challenge contemporary project managers, as 
in the case of FBC and the Space Shuttle 
navigation units (Goodman, 2002), and 
NASA’s Genesis spacecraft program (NASA, 
2005). Project managers joining existing 
science and engineering enterprises need to be 
capable and ready to build latent risk into their 
mission assurance programs. 
 
4.6 Project Complexity 
 
Scientific and engineering mega-projects are 
typically characterised by multiple 
components, multiple functions, and requiring 
the involvement of multiple organisations 
(Milosevic & Patanakul, 2005; Grün, 2004). 
They are information rich (Thomas, 1997), 
and cannot be designed or communicated by a 
single expert (Moody & Dodgson, 2006). The 
management of complicated (intricate, of 
many parts), and complex (interwoven, 
interdependent), projects demands exceptional 
skills, described succinctly by Shenhar & 
Devir (2007, p115); 
 
“Managing successful [complex] 
projects is a serious challenge. Not 
only must project leaders cope with 
poor communication among 
managers, designers, and customers, 
but also they are strongly dependent 
on a complex web of external 
suppliers, complicated procurement 
systems, and lengthy, detailed 
contracts … and other collaborators.” 
Cavanagh (2009, p4) captures both the range 
and essence of what complex project 
management demands of the project manager 
as; 
“vision and motivation; empathy; 
attention to relationship building, in 
order that trust may be mutually 
awarded and maintained through 
difficult periods; the ability to take a 
holistic view; consummate 
communications skills; practical 
application of experientially-derived 
wisdom; and perhaps most of all, 
courage – the courage to be able to 
speak the truth (and hear it!), and to 
take good risk”. 
In dealing with project performance in large 
engineering projects, Miller & Lessard (2000, 
p19) note that, “Their technical difficulties do 
not condemn them to failure; far more 
troublesome, however, are the difficulties 
arising from their complexity, irreversibility, 




and dynamism leads to unpredictability with 
new risks emerging correspondingly with 
project length. 
Commenting on the success of the Gemini 
telescope project, Dick Kurz tells how the job 
of building such a complex scientific 
instrument required a new kind of partnership, 
incorporating multiple countries and expert 
project management. “[It was recognized] 
that a project of this magnitude 
takes…professional management and 
professional system engineering to really 
carry it off” (Michaud, 2009, p34)  
 
In a recurring theme in this study, mega-
project complexity is not restricted to 
technical design, interfacing, and execution; it 
extends to structural, social, and exogenous 
factors that will severely test the less 
experienced manager. Schein and Kanter 
highlight the interplay between individuals, 
teams, and management that can work 
positively and negatively in a context of 
personal ambitions, confluences and conflicts, 
and project goals (Levine, 2002). 
Cooke-Davies and Teague (2009, p7) 
elegantly summarise the aptitude required of 
project managers when they write; 
“delivering a complex project is not 
so much…knowing what to do and 
designing a system and processes 
to do it, as a matter of skillfully 
navigating the tides, storms, and 
cross-currents of human beings, 
with all their desires, motivations, 
quirks, and behaviours, while 
constructively engaging with them 
to achieve desirable outcomes” 
 
5.0 Practice Guides and Success Attributes 
 
Since the 1970s, project management 
institutions have formed around the world, 
offering their membership the benefits (inter 
alia) of shared information and professional 
certification, based on published ‘Bodies of 
Knowledge’ (BoKs) largely developed 
through practice rather than research. The 
attractiveness of formal recognition is 
indicated by Project Management Institute 
(PMI) data showing that in 2006 almost 86% 
of its 210,000 members were certified as 
Project Management Professionals (PMP). 
(Morris et al. 2006). Other BoKs are offered 
by the UK’s Association of Project 
Management (APM), the International Project 
Management Association (IPMA) whose 
Competency Baseline is an amalgam of 
European BoKs, and the Engineering 
Advancement Association of Japan (ENAA). 
The role and effectiveness of the BoKs was 
deeply researched by the UK Rethinking 
Project Management group in 2006, who 
found that while clearly useful, there are flaws 
in their development. Project front-end 
management in particular, with its human, 
structural, and external issues so influential on 
project outcome, is cited as being especially 
deficient in BoKs (Morris et al. 2006). This 
general view is echoed in a recent Position 
Paper from the International Centre for 
Complex Project Management which stated; 
“we have a bagful of well-developed 
methods and tools, and a reasonably 
comprehensive project management 
body of knowledge. Ironically, these 
things…aren’t enough, and relying on 
them alone won’t work” (Cavanagh 
2009 p2). 
Nevertheless, while project management 
certification against the BoKs principles alone 
does not guarantee good project management 
execution, a track record of well run projects 
plus certification is a very strong indicator of a 
high performing project manager (Müller & 
Turner, 2007). 
The PMI is strongest in terms of spread and 
influence, and their guide (PMBOK® Guide, 
2008) is the most widely recognised and 
accepted Book of Knowledge (Crawford, 
2000), being promoted as a foundation 
reference in the area of “knowledge, 
processes, skills, tools, and techniques that can 
have a significant impact on project success.” 
Although not purporting to go beyond the 
status of practice handbook, it is useful to 




with the ideas presented in this study, and test 
for any epistemic value supporting the 
practical application of the research outcomes; 
refer to Table 1. 
Table 1 – Showing alignment between the concepts in this study, and the PMBOK® Guide 
 
Characteristic/Attribute/Skill  PMBOK® Guide 2008 Alignment 
 
Authenticity Generally implied only in sections 1.6, 2, 
4.3, and 9.3 
Weak 
Collaborative Approach Touched on in Section 9 and  
Appendix G 
Weak 
Leadership and Management 
Capability 
References in sections 1.6, 2, 9, with ‘soft 
skills’ addressed in Appendix G 
Moderate 
Persuasion and Negotiation Referenced in sections 9, 10, 12 and 
Appendix G 
Strong 
Trust and Diversity References in section 9 and Appendix G Moderate 
Personal Profile Not addressed Weak 
Sense of mission and urgency Urgency only addressed in t rms of risk in 
section 11 
Moderate 
Project structures Referenced in section 2, 4, and 9 Strong 
Task Forces  Implied references in sections 5, and 10 Weak 
Information Management Referenced throughout Strong 
Mission Assurance  Implied in section 8, 11 in terms of quality 
and risk only 
Weak 
Project Complexity Scattered mentions in various sections Weak 
The conclusions indicate, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, that the PMBOK® is intended 
much more as a practicing project manager’s 
handbook than a project personnel assessment 
or development tool. Whilst ‘good practice’ is 
captured in terms of knowledge, processes, 
tools, and techniques, the publication is less 
informative concerning the more subtle (e.g. 
interpersonal) characteristics required of 
project managers that can significantly impact 
on project success, and currently falls short of 
being strategically useful in this regard. 
Nevertheless, the latest (4th) update begins to 
address some of the characteristics dealt with 
in this paper, largely listing these in a new 
appendix (PMBOK® Guide, Appendix G – 
Interpersonal Skills). This is suggestive of 
recent acknowledgement of the importance of 
these types of factors and offers potential for 
future expansion. 
 





This paper set out to look beyond the 
‘standard’ set of skills and qualities 
attributable to managers of high-tech mega-
projects, and sought to add new knowledge by 
exploring the less obvious key characteristics 
of project managers that lead to project 
success. 
Data were sourced from the published 
literature spanning the last 30 years, together 
with extensive fieldwork from nine mega-
science facilities, and the personal experiences 
of a selected group in relation to task forces. 
The data were examined using a grounded 
theory approach, gathering supporting 
arguments, and drawing compelling and 
practical inferences. 
The limitations of the methodology are 
acknowledged, and adding a temporal 
dimension with numerical analysis to show 
management trends would likely yield further 
conclusions. The study also reveals an 
incomplete understanding of the application of 
transformational management in high-tech 
projects, and the relationship between 
charisma and success, and further research is 
warranted. 
Whilst a definitive set of personal qualities is 
idealistic, the research shows that eight 
personal characteristics, traits, or skills are 
strongly indicated as subtle, though 
significant, factors in driving success within 
scientific and engineering mega-projects. 
These are: 
 
• The ability to deal with the temporary 
and uncertain nature of mega-projects; 
• Having and demonstrating personal 
authenticity; 
• Applying skill in the management of 
collaborations; 
• Having an appropriate balance of 
management and leadership talent; 
• Motivating strategic influence through 
persuasion, encouragement, and 
negotiation; 
• Building trust in a diverse cultural 
environment; 
• Having a personal profile well matched 
to the project; and 
• Driving a clear sense of project 
urgency. 
 
These factors are interrelated and careful 
consideration is required in the selection of 
someone with the right mix of traits (Nicholas, 
2004). A further five factors were shown to be 
positively related to project success in the 
context of creating, managing successful 
project structures. These are: 
• Establishment of an appropriate project 
and team structure; 
• Deployment of effective project task 
forces; 
• Effective information management; 
• Application of a mission assurance 
approach; and 
• Competent management of complexity. 
 
The success drivers described could usefully 
supplement the discussion agenda at the 
project manager interview stage by exploring 
the candidate’s approach and experience in 
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Abstract 
The procurement of goods and services for projects is traditionally seen as a largely administrative or 
operational task rather than having strategic importance. Modern high-technology mega-projects are 
dependent on mutual and enduring industry collaborations and demand a strategic management 
approach. Effective procurement for giant science/engineering projects has thus become a necessary 
prerequisite to overall project success.  This paper resents a review of the literature and 
contemporary cases related to high-tech mega-project pro urement, and references various legislative 
and operational environments. Nine acquisition strategies are presented as newly distilled planning 
topics that are important to procurement success. The study proposes that by addressing these key 
strategies, large scale ‘high-tech’ projects can improve the effectiveness of the procurement processes, 
and enable a more productive and open relationship with suppliers. 
Keywords: project success, procurement, mega-project, supplier evaluation, contractor, risk 
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The procurement of goods and services for 
projects was traditionally seen as largely 
administrative or operational rather than 
having strategic importance (Virolainen, 1998; 
Schill, 1979). However project complexity is 
driving a more strategic approach (Jaakkola, 
2004), and recognition of forces other than 
purely transactional, show a maturing 
approach to the contracting problem (Winch & 
Gil, 2010). Within the world of science and 
engineering mega-projects, the breadth and 
pace of technology advance, and demands for 
cost control, bring new importance to 
professional management of procurement 
including technology identification and 
access, supply channels, and industrial 
relationships (Schill, 1979). 
This paper presents a study of large scale 
procurement practices relating to big science 
and engineering projects, and is particularly 
relevant to the Square Kilometre Array project 
(see Appendix A) – a €1.5 million global 
enterprise to design and construct the largest 
radio telescope yet built, and to be located 
either in Australasia or Southern Africa (SKA 
2010). This paper aims to distil key 
acquisition strategies relevant to success in 
high-technology (high-tech) mega-projects.   
‘Mega’ or ‘giant’ projects are defined as those 
endeavours typically having multi-million or 
even billion dollar budgets; time-frames 
measured in years, and attracting a high level 
of public or political attention. High-tech 
projects are inherently complex, and involve 
research and development (R&D) and/or 
novel application of science/engineering 
technologies, and require substantial 
infrastructure. The term ‘procurement’ is used 
in its wider sense to cover the process ranging 
from establishing the requirements, global 
sourcing, placing of the contract, overseeing 
execution, and in some cases dealing with 
through-life support (Hall & Khan, 2006). 
Modern procurement management in the high-
tech environment is more reliant on buyer-
seller partnerships than a traditional 
adversarial approach. These relationships tend 
to be longer term, ongoing, and risk-sharing, 
and strive for win-win outcomes at lower cost 
(Virolainen, 1998). Within procurement, the 
key task of contract management itself can be 
broadly grouped into three areas: service 
delivery management, relationship 
management, and contract administration. “All 
three areas must be managed successfully if 
the arrangement is to be a success [and] good 
preparation and the right contract are 
essential foundations for good contract 
management” (OGC, 2002, p5). Contract 
execution, administration and specific 
documentation are of course vital to 
procurement outcomes, though beyond the 
scope of this study. Suffice to say that the 
“light legal touch” suggested by Hall & Khan 
(2006, p22) is consistent with the general 
thesis of key, yet simple principles offered in 
this paper. 
 
2. Scope, data sources and study method. 
This study addresses the institutional (publicly 
funded) procurement environment, contracting 
models, procurement specifications and terms, 
contracting instruments and value, tender 
evaluations, supplier relations, planning, and 
risk. To extract best practice and subject 
wisdom, input is drawn from published 
research papers, generic project management 
texts, and articles from the popular literature. 
Complementary and supportive experience is 
taken from recent and current international 
‘high-tech’ projects so as to offer relevant 
learnings for the SKA.  
The collected findings are presented within 
nine topic headings in section 5.0. For each 
topic, a ‘key strategy’ is presented as both a 
success driver, and as a suggested topic 
heading within the structure of any ‘high-tech’ 
mega-project procurement plan. 
 
3. The extant literature 
Although there is a great deal of written 
material concerning general purchasing 
strategy and approaches there is little that 
focuses on procurement for high-tech mega-
projects per se. Much of the literature resides 




centred on the transaction.  Several authors 
(Jaakkola, 2004; Morris & Hough, 1986; 
Blanchard, 1990) offer solid advice regarding 
strategic contract policy and procurement 
management, linking contract management 
success to project and business performance. 
Winch and Gil (2010) go further by 
considering theories for complex project 
contracting strategies and present approaches 
to deal with the dual problems of contractor 
selection, and motivation. Tender evaluation 
criteria and contractor selection is an area 
deeply researched by Watt et al. (2010), and 
Zeydan et al. (2010) who offer a mathematical 
model. Supplier selection is described in 
detailed practical terms by Blanchard (1990). 
Both the UK National Audit Office (NAO), 
and the Office of Government Commerce 
(OGC) publish a range of business guides 
including the NAO’s Improving Procurement 
manual (2004), and OCG’s Contract 
Management Guidelines (2002), both 
containing much practical advice.  
More specifically, contract design and 
execution in the engineering field is tackled by 
Nicholas (2004). The published proceedings 
of the UK’s Major Projects Association offer 
relevant case material. Virolainen (1998) 
undertake a theoretical study of procurement 
strategy for industrial firms, emphasising the 
importance of the buyer-supplier relationship 
over a mix of approaches. Schill’s (1979) 
examination of the topic in advanced 
technology organisations acknowledges the 
growing strategic and entrepreneurial 
importance of high-tech procurement. 
Carnegie Mellon’s Software Engineering 
Institute issues the CMMI for Acquisition 
Technical Report (2007) – a collection of best-
practices for high-tech acquisition.  
Finally, this paper is generally informed by 
institutional and project based material e.g. 
CERN’s research into technological learning 
through project procurement (Autio et al., 
2003), SKA Memo 80 on industry liaison 
(SKA, 2006), and the NEON organisation 
Project Acquisition Plan (Ashley, 2009). 
 
 
4. Framing procurement as a precursor to 
project success 
 Acknowledging the strategic nature of 
procurement means giving proper and early 
attention at the project preparatory stage to 
policies, processes, and resources. Jaakkola 
(2004) points out that the process of 
establishing contract management in an 
organisation can take years, and should be 
viewed as an on-going process designed to 
generate cost savings. By documenting the 
process, the steps and interactions may be 
clarified. A proposed process flow for the 
SKA is shown in Appendix B. 
In considering modern procurement 
challenges, A Major Projects Association 
seminar concluded that the following 
questions can help organisations decide on a 
procurement approach through better 
understanding of the determining factors 
(adapted from MPA, 2009); 
• What is vital for success? 
• What is the funding [and how secure is 
it]? 
• What are the possible risks to success, 
and what risk must be managed by the 
organisation? 
• How will those risks change, or how 
can they be mitigated over time? 
• What experience requirements are 
needed for other parties to manage risk, 
and what reward/commitment 
incentives can be put in place? 
 
The legislative environment 
‘High-tech’ mega-project procurement will 
almost certainly be a global endeavour, and 
aside from the giant aerospace/defence 
contractors, is likely to occur in the 
institutional (or public) domain.  
Public funding for such science / engineering 
projects or programs requires that 
procurement complies with regulations e.g. 
the European Procurement Directives, the 
World Trade Organisation rules, and national 
legislation (Hall & Kahn, 2006). In the USA, 
public purchasing is enshrined within FAR 
Part 12 (NASA, 2009a). A full description of 




beyond the scope of this paper, suffice to say 
that the technicalities, procedures (especially 
related to maintaining open competition) 
demand expert attention. 
The self-contained treaty organisations adopt 
strict procurement rules. In CERN’s case the 
FIDIC Conditions of Contract are embraced, 
incorporating an industrial return coefficient 
for member states. The legislative impact, 
including its taxation status which impacts 
directly on procurement instruments, will 
depend upon the legal identity of the project. 
The legal structure for the SKA has yet to be 
decided and will require expert advice to 
review options for appropriateness. However 
useful experience comes from contemporary 
examples. Treaty organisations (e.g. CERN, 
ESO) are generally satisfactory entities 
although bureaucratic and take a long time to 
establish. The ITER treaty model with a 
supervisory Council appears less effective. 
Similarly, the European Research 
Infrastructure Consortium (ERIC) entity takes 
a long time-to incorporate (at least nine 
months), and being a relatively new 
construction, has some uncertainties and likely 
difficulties for an SKA (Chance, 2010).  
Formalised collaborations under an MoU (e.g. 
AUGER, HESS) are simpler and succeed in an 
environment of goodwill. Commercial-like 
structures such as LOFAR (formed as a 
special limited partnership under Dutch law) 
and XFEL (established as a German limited 
liability Company) enable a legal trading 
entity to be quickly created. Research by 
ASPERA concluded that ‘high-tech’ 
collaborations are complicated and lengthy to 
realise, and linking between unequal partners 
is intrinsically difficult; it may be more cost 
effective to link to an existing organisation 
(ASPERA, 2009).  One independent 
(commercial-in-confidence) study concluded 
that (i) a Dutch foundation (stichting), (ii)  a 
UK company limited by guarantee, or (iii)  a 
US not-for-profit corporation in Delaware, are 
equally suitable for the purposes of effectively 




Schill (1979) points out the strategic liaison 
role played by procurement to ensure that 
suppliers remain competitive and at the 
forefront of technology, as well as realise 
better cost and product performance. 
Moreover, he assigns strategic responsibility 
for materials and technology identification 
both to the buyer, and the market – an 
important tactic identified in the SKA 
Capability Assessment Model (Crosby, 2010). 
This approach addresses the concept of 
‘scaling up’ in terms of industry capability, 
where science-based mega-projects may 
demand hundreds or thousands of an item 
previously produced only as a speciality part. 
Even so, there may be no ongoing commercial 
market. 
The strategic identification, stimulus, and 
utilisation of global capability (Virolainen, 
1998) may be ‘kick-started’ by a formal 
scouting process which may itself be coupled 
to preliminary vendor screening; the focus 
being on determining which suppliers are 
(actually or potentially) qualified, and have 
the capacity and/or talent to perform the work 
(Blanchard, 1990). The NEON organisation 
identifies this phase as ‘pre-
solicitation/evaluation’ in their technology 
procurement plans.  
 
Internal-external procurement 
In ‘high-tech’ projects many of the outcomes 
are entirely dependent on new technologies 
that must be demonstrated to ‘proof of 
concept’ level (e.g. the SKA Pathfinders) 
before production quantities can be 
considered. Even then, commercial restrictions 
may limit procurement choices. If a “make” or 
a “buy” decision is feasible, a lifecycle 
cost/benefit analysis should be conducted 
between the alternatives and/or competitive 
offers to determine the best option for 
specified performance at least cost, without 
jeopardising other project interests or resource 
priorities. Due consideration must be given to 
intellectual property ownership, as well as the 
long term capital and cost-benefit impacts of 




In NASA’s case, most of its funding is spent 
on contracts; however its strategic plan 
outlines the need to maintain institutional 
capacity and core competencies through 
having its workforce perform some of the 
hands-on work. The advantages and 
disadvantages between in-house and 
contracted work was recently reviewed for the 
MMS spacecraft project, with the conclusion 
that both approaches have significant strengths 
and weaknesses, while acknowledging clear 
benefits in maintaining a level of in-house 
competency (NASA, 2009b). 
 
5. Strategies for procurement, with 
applicability for the SKA 
 
The SKA project, a global collaboration 
currently in its preparatory stage (PrepSKA), 
is expected to commence a detailed design 
period in 2012/13 and begin phase one 
construction in 2015/16. Given the 50 year 
lifetime of the instrument, strategies 
necessarily enacted early may have long term 
ramifications, and are clearly important to get 
right. The following topics describe key areas 
where prevailing wisdom and lessons learned 
can help shape strategies for procurement 
success. 
 
5.1 The procurement office 
Given the lead times involved with ‘high-tech’ 
mega-projects, the establishment of a 
functional procurement team should be 
considered early. Underpinning the strategic 
arrangements, Jaakkola, (2004) states “The 
first step is simply to get the basic contract 
management operations established. These 
include…a centralised contract repository, 
appointment of person(s) responsible…a 
contract management handbook, contract 
templates”. The procurement system, in terms 
of software tools and processes integrated to 
the project management, also require early and 
careful selection and management. 
Roles and responsibilities require definition 
and approvals assigned, ideally with an 
individual assigned as focal for each major 
contract. As the UK Office of Government 
Commerce (OCG, 2002, p7) advises “The 
importance of contract administration to the 
success of the contract, and to the relationship 
between customer and provider, should not be 
underestimated”. The American styled 
Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) model has 
showed functional success in procurement.   
Successful management of any enterprise 
relies on effective communication and no less 
so in procurement, especially between the 
procurement office and design team during 
early phases. The conveyance of information 
concerning emerging technologies, forecast 
changes, financial analyses of upfront costs 
and investments, and cash flow risks, when 
added to the more traditional price and 
delivery schedule data, ensure strategic value 
for the project. 
Key Strategy #1: Early establishment of 
procurement office structure, resources, 
processes, roles and responsibilities, and 
information management systems.  
 
5.2 Procurement policies and planning 
The overall approach to the ‘high-tech’ 
acquisition program is captured in the 
procurement plan; itself linked to the project 
master plan/system timeline.  The 
procurement plan sets out top level policies 
for sourcing, tender management, contract 
evaluation and approvals, juste retour, as well 
as the regulatory environment, responsibilities 
and authorities, procurement strategies, and 
pointers to detailed procedures and guidance. 
The procurement plan may be in the form of a 
public document (Crosby, 2008a), enabling 
industry and other stakeholders to understand 
and prepare for project opportunities, and 
possibly an internal version created for the 
project (Hall & Kahn, 2006).  
Strategic planning of mega-project 
procurement will include research and 
monitoring of lead times of major system 
components (Appendix C), and relating this 
information to the project timeline (Appendix 
D). This is crucial for all stakeholders 




complemented by national or international 
industry participation plans describing the 
intent of procurement policies in relation to 
fair competition, strategic capacity building 
(regional development), and indigenous 
involvement (Crosby, 2008b). 
Such plans need not be large documents, a 
current example being the NEON Project 
Acquisition Plan, covering references and 
scope, procurement strategy, functional 
responsibilities, and procurement plans 
succinctly within its nine pages (Ashley, 
2009). LOFAR’s plan covers similar topics in 
11 pages (de Geus & Kahn, 2002).  Plans for 
specific type acquisitions can be referenced 
and separate, as can general institutional 
purchasing manuals, regional rules, and 
Conditions of Contracts.  
Key Strategy #2: Formally approve 
procurement policies, strategies, and plans, 
and document these within a concise 
approved Project Procurement Plan.  
 
5.3 Informed contracting with industry 
The level and method of industry interfaces 
will vary according to the stage of the project 
e.g. preparatory and construction phases, 
through to operations. In the early stages, 
there are four ways in which industry may be 
engaged (Perna et al. 2009, p21); 
• High level engagement, at the concept 
level, to discover new technologies or 
industrial information and skills 
• R & D contracts for prototyping & 
design 
• Global price enquiries for COTS 
requirements 
• ‘In-kind’ contributions of personnel, 
tools, technical services, or other 
resources 
 
These engagement options, and later 
construction phase activities, will normally 
lead to selection, approval, and a contract 
using instruments such as a collaboration 
agreement, Request for Information (RFI), 
Request for Quotation (RFQ), or Request for 
Tender (RFT). These processes build on, and 
are informed by, the global industry ‘scouting’ 
process which takes account of the 
regional/country capabilities to the appropriate 
extent. Mega-projects may choose to be more 
proactive; ITER for example, pre-announces 
each year’s intended procurements for next 24 
months. 
Although RFTs may be restricted to project 
member states, open RFTs are most common 
for science/engineering supply acquisitions (as 
used in ESO). This more likely guarantees 
both the largest number of industry enquiries, 
and a fair approach in gathering industrial 
information, and supply offers. Price enquiries 
and R&D contracts performed via open 
tenders provide the following advantages: 
• guarantee of  full access to a worldwide 
market to identify the best available 
technologies, free from any 
geographical boundary restrictions; 
• continuous monitoring by project 
stakeholders for fairness in the 
industrial involvement. 
• the ability to look strategically at 
regional capability for possible 
‘chunking’, bundling or split of 
contracts, or to address juste retour 
issues. (Not permissible under some 
US Funding rules).  
 
The contents of RFTs and other issued 
documents are normally closely scripted by 
institutional templates validated by legal 
professionals. However care should be taken 
to ensure that standardised language and text 
does not mask or generalise either the specific 
need or overriding objectives of the 
procurement. Blanchard (1990) identifies 
several issues for which tender documentation 
should solicit an expanded response from the 
contractor; 
• A detailed plan of execution (to ensure 
the scope is understood) 
• An overall staffing chart, and project 
schedule with critical path defined 
• A ‘manpower’ load chart indicating 
committed and available resources  
• Resumes of key staff with at least one 
alternative each 





• An estimate of the number of 
engineering plans to be supplied 
 
Whilst open requests for information or offers 
have advantages, and are usually a legislated 
requirement in public procurement for ‘high-
tech’ mega-projects, some experts point to the 
benefits of a more direct approach. Partnership 
sourcing, where the buyer and supplier 
develop a close and long term relationship 
resulting in lower total costs, can enhance 
dependability and overall supplier quality 
(Virolaonen, 1998). The arrangement 
encourages early strategic supplier 
engagement and recognises distinctive value. 
Blanchard (1990) too promotes direct 
negotiation through the question, “When a 
company is seeking to convert a concept or 
idea into a reality...why not get the best [firm] 
that is available?”. Once that vendor(s) is 
known, discussions can begin early, and 
eliminate much of the time and cost of the 
competitive bidding process. Blanchard 
continues “administrative niceties have crept 
into the execution of projects...and are 
indicative that we may have lost sight of the 
real objective – to convert a concept...into a 
reality and to begin returning the investment 
as rapidly as possible”.  Whichever mode is 
selected for supplier contracting, it should be 
subject to cost/benefit analysis, and risk of 
long term innovation and costs being 
sacrificed for expediency.   
 
Terms & Conditions 
Contractual terms and conditions (T&C) will 
largely be set by the governance model 
adopted, and with advice from project funding 
agencies. Nevertheless guidance can be drawn 
from documented experience generally, and 
also from many of the major contemporary 
science and engineering facility projects. 
Some of the applicable terms and conditions 
that warrant particular discussion are listed 
below, and have relevance for the SKA 
project. 
Penalties – Whilst penalties are commonly 
applied to contracts at the general level, or 
against specific deliverables, some care is 
required with their construction. The nature of 
mega-science programs usually entails both 
design modifications and unexpected events 
that can cause delays which may (even 
inadvertently) trigger penalty clauses invoking 
liquidating damages within supply chains. 
Expert legal advisers are needed  to draw up 
such clauses so as to reflect the collaborative 
nature of the contract, yet ensure retention of 
power to act in circumstances of supplier 
failure. Notably, T&Cs for the OPAL project 
required that disputes are not permitted to 
delay delivery of contracted goods or services. 
Delivery Timing – Procurement programs will 
be based on project master plans that will 
almost certainly be amended over time. 
Contractual documents will therefore need to 
incorporate some avenue to adjust schedules 
of procured goods and services (particularly 
within ‘Just-in-Time’ arrangements). Failure 
to do this may lead to delivery of goods at 
incorrect project phases, causing delays or 
requiring storage, and resulting in cash flow 
problems from unsynchronised contractor 
billing.   
Payment – Extended contracts will usually 
incorporate payment milestones. Payments 
should only be made against measurable, and 
tangible deliverables, or otherwise verifiable 
‘earned value’. Clawing back over-payments 
is a very management intensive task, and leads 
to breakdown of goodwill across the supplier 
base. 
International Pricing – To facilitate proper 
competitive procurement, and ensure fair 
evaluation, contracts should require price 
offers to be in a single, universal currency. To 
enable this, a foreign exchange (FX) 
conversion methodology will be required, and 
directions given regarding the application of 
duties and tariffs. 
Guarantee – Contracts stating or requiring 
guarantees against goods or services 
performance, delivery dates, or compliance 
need to be very explicit regarding the extent of 
the warranty issued, and remedies for failing 
to meet it. Compensation must not only 
include rectification of the fault or breakdown, 
but also any costs or associated effort on the 
part of the buyer’s organisation to restore 
performance. In the case of the SKA, systems 
and components may well approach or exceed 
their advertised warranty period prior to 
entering service. Procurement contracts should 




warranty period until the goods are 
operational, or extending the period to cover 
any such delay. 
 
Ethical standards – Not all countries and 
regions have equivalent ethical standards. 
These should be overtly stated in contractual 
documents and made clear in all dealings. This 
is especially important concerning hospitality, 
gift giving, and passing of information. It is 
not suggested that such policies should 
prohibit social customs or observance of 
business courtesies, merely that these customs 
be conducted openly, be of an acceptable 
scale, and transacted without prejudice. 
Environmental awareness – The project may 
consider taking an official position on global 
warming impacts and incorporate a ‘green’ 
policy (as per GEMINI) into its procurement 
function. This could take the form of 
addressing issues such as packaging, shipping-
miles, favouring firms employing sustainable 
systems, and using fully electronic purchasing 
systems. 
Subcontractor conditions – Contracts must 
address the topic of subcontracting, stating 
clearly the conditions and approvals required. 
(E.g. ESO’s contractors require authorisation 
before subcontracting). Ideally, any 
subcontracts will be ‘back-to-back’ with the 
prime contract for all terms and conditions, 
and be especially clear on the requirement to 
mirror quality assurance and performance 
requirements fully down the supply chain (as 
per CERN practice). Subcontractors must be 
identified within tender offers, and their 
credentials verified. 
Intellectual Property (IP) – The management 
and treatment of foreground, background, and 
project generated IP and copyright material 
should be addressed through an IP policy, and 
must be known, practiced, and conveyed to 
suppliers through the procurement process, 
especially where ‘open sourcing’ is applied. A 
vital feature of the SKA procurement function 
is the requirement for the project to have 
‘freedom of use’ for all such IP. Where this is 
not possible or acceptable, the SKA will 
require clear understanding of royalty/licence 
costs.   
Key Strategy #3: Obtain full understanding 
of global capability scouting information, 
and employ appropriate approaches and 
instruments with terms and conditions 
supporting project goals. 
 
5.4 Contracting models 
Various contracting arrangements are possible 
for SKA-like projects, and several models are 
shown in Appendix E, Figs 1-6 (adapted from 
Morris & Hough, 1986).  The actual structural 
links between the project organisation and 
suppliers may vary over project phases, and in 
accordance with contract size, geographic 
spread of members, funding shares, and the 
legal entity structure.  
Contractual relationships are unlikely to 
remain stable over the entire project, being 
subject to company buy-outs, change of key 
personnel, and even change of business focus. 
Procurement documentation needs to be 
contractually robust to ensure continuation of 
supply. 
The prime contractor–subcontractor 
relationships shown in Appendix E also 
embrace the concept of supply chains, where 
suppliers can usefully engage with SMEs to 
exploit niche capability.   
Key Strategy #4: Establish the contracting 
model, aligned with the legal entity. 
Develop relationships with principal 
contractors and the supply chain.   
 
5.5 Ensuring competitiveness 
‘High-tech’ mega-project acquisition both 
enables and benefits from market 
competitiveness framed by the strategic 
approaches described previously, and driven 
through project procurement policies and 





The offered price for any good or service 
reflects the contractual risk involved, and is 
therefore to some extent influenced by the 
buyer’s policy. “If the risk is large (say more 
than about 10%) the price becomes 
unnecessarily high, especially if there is no 
real competition”, say Hall & Kahn (2006, 
p20). They further explain that if the risk is 
under-estimated, cost-cutting can ensue, thus 
working in a highly detrimental way for 
complex scientific projects, and most 
dangerous when the contract was won with an 
artificially low bid. These concerns are also 
voiced by Nicholas (2004) who describes 
‘fixed price with determination’ to counter the 
tendencies described above. Blanchard (1990) 
posits that risk and contingency for 
uncertainty should not exceed 5% of the total 
expected cost for fixed price contracts. 
Even under a ‘best value for money’ 
procurement approach, price remains a key 
discriminator among tender offers. This is true 
whether a competitive contract is ‘cost-plus 
reimbursable’, a fixed price basis, or 
somewhere in-between. Since bidders will 
build contingency in their offers 
commensurate with their perception of the 
risk, each offered price will contain a 
combination of costs, profit margin, and ‘risk 
money’. It is not uncommon in aerospace 
projects for early contracts to be on a cost-
reimbursable basis, and later production orders 
to be firm price contracts – the latter requiring 
much lower procurement management effort. 
Fixed price contracts are most common in 
mega-projects (ESO, VLT, and LOFAR) 
generally, though Morris & Hough (1986, 
p217) argue they are “clearly inappropriate in 
high risk situations,” Contracts may 
incorporate financial incentives for achieving 
or exceeding defined project objectives e.g. 
delivery date, performance, etc. Damages may 
apply for failed performance, but as shown in 
the VISTA project, and in MoD reports, are 
not always effective (UK Ministry of Defence, 
2009). Buyer-driven changes in scope can be 
accommodated, but generally at a cost, with a 
premium value attached for any contract 
variations. 
Cost reimbursable contracts involve payment 
to the contractor for legitimate expenses for 
completed work, plus a profit margin. 
Financial incentives may be applied. This type 
of contract is useful for flexibility in directing 
the contractor when the precise scope of work 
cannot be defined at the start, and may well be 
applicable to the SKA environment. 
Moreover, some price certainty is possible 
with cost caps in place. Simplified cost 
reimbursable contracts are often useful for R 
& D work and are conducted on a ‘time and 
materials’ reimbursable basis using a pre-
agreed schedule of fees.  
Economic price adjustments, tied to a reliable 
financial index, are commonly applied to large 
project procurements spanning a period of 
years. A special provision is included allowing 
for pre-defined changes to the contract price 
due to changed conditions e.g. inflation, 
exchange rate variation, or less commonly, 
specified commodities. 
 A novel approach taken by some large scale 
technical integrators (e.g. cell-phone 
assemblers) is to take the stance of price-setter 
rather than price taker. In this case the tender 
documents will include either (a) fixed price 
per item, or (b) a variable price per item based 
on quantities offered, or (c) a price cap 
representing the maximum price that will be 




For procurement of high quantity parts, split-
buying offers the advantage of spreading the 
production risk over two or more suppliers. 
This can be appropriate in cases where each 
supplier indicates an individual production 
capability beneath that required by the project, 
and especially where sharing of tooling is 
practical. Apart from raising competitiveness, 
split-buying is also appropriate where the 
purchaser has a policy preference of not 
becoming the dominant or exclusive customer 
of the supplier. Counter to this, spreading a 
quantity order over too many suppliers will 






Another way to encourage competitiveness is 
to specify Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) 
products (where possible) within tender 
documents. The GEMINI telescope project 
experience tells us that COTS products are 
always cheaper to acquire, support and 
upgrade, and are often available from several 
sources, sometimes via global channels. 
 
Industry Consortia 
To better understand and potentially service 
the needs of major high-technology projects, 
local or global industry consortia may be 
formed, either as regional (possibly 
government) initiatives, or encouraged by the 
project itself. Such teaming arrangements are 
usually beneficial in allowing industry to more 
efficiently work together to address mega-
project needs, as well as spawn ‘spin-off’ 
collaborations or opportunities to service 
adjacent markets. 
Mega-projects should be alert to the formation 
of cartels, especially where there are restricted 
numbers of bidders. A cartel is a formal 
organisation of suppliers that agree to 
coordinate prices, marketing and production, 
and are anti-competitive. 
The EU's competition law explicitly forbids 
cartels and related practices in its article 81 of 
the Treaty of Rome. Long Term Partnering 
Arrangements (LPTAs) with key vendors 




Overlying project acquisition strategies for 
capability deployment, and application of juste 
retour, may modify price-based decisions in 
terms of allowing for the non-financial 
benefits of technology transfer and 
exploitation, and regional capacity building. 
The importance of this latter item is 
recognised for the SKA project, and explored 
and reported through a recent COST initiative 
(COST, 2010). 
Value for money (VfM) comes from the 
effective, efficient and economic use of 
resources. Getting value for money means 
optimising the ratio between value and cost, 
and may be numerically or subjectively 
quantified (OGC, 2002). A VfM bid 
assessment not only provides lower overall 
cost benefits, but also the common ground for 
very different offers to be compared. The 
simplistic ‘lowest price’ criterion is unable to 
grant neither the lowest total cost of 
ownership (costs over the whole life cycle) 
nor project life performance. The VfM 
decision criteria must consider project quality 
and performance, in relation with other 
requirements including economic value, 
reliability, supportability, purchase risk, and 
price (Perna et al. 2009).  
Key Strategy #5: Ensure competitiveness in 
contracting, through carefully planned 
pricing strategies, and a ‘value for money’ 
approach.  
 
5.6 Procurement Specifications 
The purchase of products, materials, software, 
tooling, systems, and other tangible needs for 
complex high value projects requires focused 
attention on defining the specification. This 
can be done through (a) documented designs 
(blueprints), controlled engineering drawings 
and notes, prototype examples, and 
supplemented by part numbers; or (b) a 
detailed performance specification where the 
inputs, outputs, design constraints and 
tolerances are stated, but not the precise 
physical design. Both approaches are validated 
with test plans against performance criteria. In 
the former, the contractor will be expected to 
deliver an exact version in every respect to the 
designs provided. In the latter, the contractor 
has some latitude to develop and 
construct/create the item(s) as long as the 
performance criteria and design constraints are 
met. It is not uncommon for both approaches 




Linked to this concept is the notion of 
manufacturability (or ‘design for 
manufacture’). It is essential that designs 
intended for large scale production are 
developed with input from industrial experts 
so that contracts can be issued with the benefit 
of knowledge from practical production 
techniques and limitations. The procurement 
office has an important role in this. Another 
vital consideration is ‘upgradeability’ – the 
application of production expertise to ensure 
that future production runs can be modified to 
accommodate improvements in the design at 
low cost. A relatively small increase in the 
initial procurement cost may lead to great 
savings later. A procurement policy is also 
required to cover the specification 
requirements of professional services.  
Contemporary cases offer useful advice for the 
SKA. CERN commend flexibility and 
innovation in procurement, and suggest that 
procuring initial sets of spares as part of the 
construction procurement avoids potential 
commissioning delays. Australia’s OPAL 
program mostly used a performance 
specification, and noted that a pre-solicitation 
‘scouting’ process reduced cost and time 
overall. LOFAR experience from The 
Netherlands warns of underestimating the 
specification difficulties of mass production 
and systems integration. A general 
recommendation was that the combination of 
processes forming the leanest model that 
meets the requirements of the project is best 
adopted. 
Key Strategy #6: Apply purchasing 
specifications that are appropriate to the 
goods or services required, are flexible for 
optimal outcomes, and developed with 
input from industry. 
 
5.7 Procurement risk 
The procurement process and fulfilment of the 
contract may be endangered by several kinds 
of risk as listed below, only some of which are 
within the provider’s control (adapted from 
OGC, 2002, p13); 
• Poorly drafted contracts 
• Inadequate resources assigned to 
contract management 
• Customer team not matched to the 
supplier team in terms of either skills 
or experience (or both) 
• Wrong people put in place, leading to 
personality clashes 
• Context, complexities and 
dependencies of contracts not well 
understood 
• Failure to check supplier assumptions 
• Unclear authorities or responsibilities 
relating to commercial decisions 
• Lack of performance measurement or 
benchmarking by the buyer 
• Focus on current arrangements rather 
than what is possible or the potential 
for improvement 
• Failure to monitor and manage retained 
risks (statutory, political and 
commercial) 
• Lack of supplier capacity, or scope 
creep beyond ability. 
• Loss of supplier’s key staff 
• Change of supplier’s business focus 
• Financial insecurity, and force majeure 
 
Risks are heightened by procurement itself, 
with a dependency on one or more external 
providers, leaving the buyer with reduced 
ability to command and manage variables 
(Schill, 1979). Even when a risk is notionally 
subrogated to the supplier it cannot be 
dismissed, “transferred risks…cannot be 
forgotten about simply because the contract 
obliges the provider to deal with them. A key 
point is that business risk can never be 
transferred to the provider” (OGC, 2002, p25)  
In discussing advanced technology 
organisations, Schill (1979) specifies nine 
specific risk areas; concluding that ‘high-tech’ 
procurement is especially prone to a wide risk 
front when requiring development of new 
materials, components, or equipment. He cites 
time overruns of some 180% and cost 
overruns of 200-300% on Government 
contracts. 
 
Risk of Pre-competitive relationships (lock-




As a general principle, potential bidders 
should not be given foreknowledge of 
contractual requirements and it is good 
practice to avoid direct contact between 
contracting personnel and potential bidders 
once a purchase action has commenced. In 
‘high-tech’ mega-projects, this is not always 
easy, as there is often contact between project 
personnel and industry; nevertheless policies 
must be observed and a culture of internal 
discipline is required. Such a policy poses 
major problems for large scale, long term 
projects with considerable R&D, since public 
procurement rules are not always in sympathy 
with the specific needs of such projects. 
An example is where a company is involved in 
an early (and vital) stage of the project there is 
a risk that the (potential) bidding firm might 
be excluded from subsequent participation 
precisely because of its prior knowledge (also 
known as ‘lock-out’). This could mean 
exclusion of precisely those organisations that 
have specific relevant knowledge or skills 
from the early stages of a project. This 
situation creates difficulties for the strategic 
engagement potential for early involvement in 
multi-million Euro ‘high-technology’ projects 
(such as the SKA). 
Another extreme example is when one of a 
number of potential bidders for a contract has 
already been given a contract for a prior phase 
of the work. The advantages are obvious and 
include a better understanding of what will be 
needed, reduced costs through familiarity of 
system interfaces, and the possibility of 
customer developed hardware. 
However, it is possible to operate properly 
within the rules and still do what is technically 
and scientifically necessary (as shown by ‘real 
world’ examples) but it does require a lot of 
care, forethought and advance preparation 
regarding the procurement scheme. 
In practice, the LOFAR project found success 
with software correlator development largely 
because of effective nurturing and 
management of industry collaboration with 
IBM. The ALMA radio telescope also features 
pre-competitive engagement with industry 
mostly via conventional contracts. 
Some of the approaches that projects can take 
include: 
• Crafting the legal entity, so that 
specialist contractors can be legally 
engaged. 
• When placing a study or technology 
development contract, do this on the 
basis of a competition, thus providing 
a justification for continuing relations 
with the contractor. 
 
• Assign the study or R & D work with 
provision for the results to be made 
available to all potential bidders for 
the main contract. 
• Employ parallel competitive studies. 
These can sometimes produce better 
results, as well as justifying the 
further selection of one contractor, 
though cause added expense. 
• Seek contractors for early stage work 
who do not have the capacity or 
desire to engage in large scale 
manufacture. A contractual condition 
can be that the contractor agrees to be 
available as a potential sub-contractor 
to any future potential main bidder. 
• In extreme circumstances a 
developed technology that is 
regarded as vital can be treated either 
as customer furnished equipment or 
as an imposed sub-contract. This has 
the disadvantage that it entails 
considerable customer responsibility 
for the results. 
 
Key Strategy #7: Understand and actively 
manage procurement risk, including the 
critical early stage engagement phases.  
 
5.8 Tender evaluations and contractor 
selection 
The evaluation of potential contractors for 
public, ‘high-tech’ mega-projects demands 
close attention, especially for high value prime 
contracts. Blanchard (1990) favours a two-
stage process, pointing out that tendering 
imposes costs on all parties, and limiting the 
‘full and final’ offers to a few qualified firms 
narrows the choice and lifts the quality, 
though possibly results in higher prices. He 




invitations to four or five for very large 
projects, but no less than three.  
Practitioners agree that effective contractor 
evaluation requires an approved, transparent 
procedure, and should be conducted against 
pre-determined criteria (Hall & Kahn, 2006). 
The application of the ISO 9000 Quality 
Management Systems has seen useful 
standardisation in this. However while 
supporting the principle, Crosby (1996) calls 
for sensible application of such standards, 
particularly in the area of approved supplier 
lists, where completion of a questionnaire 
often falls well short of the intended diligence. 
Project Directorates should ensure that 
funding is allocated for an appropriate level of 
quality audit as well as technical compliance 
checking for each major procurement contract, 
and that this ‘mission assurance’ aspect is 
documented within tenders and acknowledged 
by bidding firms. 
Contractor selection 
A study undertaken by Watt et al. (2010, p59) 
contributes interesting data from 222 
engineering project cases concerning the 
relative importance of tender selection criteria. 
Their research shows that “past project 
performance and technical expertise were of 
almost equal importance, but twice that of 
tendered cost. These, coupled with project 
management expertise contributed to a 
combined importance >85%” of the nine 
measured criteria. Blanchard (1990, p47) 
concurs, saying “Nothing can replace the 
experience with suppliers as a determinant of 
the probability of on-time delivery”. 
Experience from the GEMINI project 
recommends active checking of past work and 
competency, not simply relying on contractor 
assertions. 
Key Strategy #8: Evaluate and select 
project contractors using a fair and 
balanced process, executed against 
standardised procedures, and focussed on 
criteria weighted in favour of mission 
success parameters.  
 
5.9 The purchaser-supplier relationship 
A close partnership style relationship is crucial 
for publicly funded science/engineering 
procurement where economic benefits flowing 
to the community through contracts are 
viewed as equal success indicators to project 
outcomes. Nonetheless, the procurement 
activity must be impartial, formal, and 
transparent, and with the expectations of each 
party clear and actively managed. 
 
In long term mega-project contracts, where 
interdependency between buyer and provider 
is inevitable, both parties have an interest in a 
fruitful relationship, though the profit motive 
must not be overlooked. The three key factors 
for success are trust, recognition of mutual 
aims, and communication. In discussing 
information flows in procurement, the UK 
Office of Government Commerce argue 
strongly for a change of paradigm in 
information sharing and suggest that fear of 
exposing the buyer’s thinking, position, or 
concerns should be modified by adopting “a 
realistic balance between openness and 
reserving negotiating positions” (OGC, 2002, 
p30). 
The relationship between some suppliers and 
the project often begins at the project 
inception and early R&D phase where 
technologies and niche capabilities are being 
investigated, products tested, and experiments 
conducted. Companies (particularly large 
ones) are sometimes open to (or volunteer) 
early stage collaborations or other strategic 
synergies such as personnel exchanges, expert 
advice, or free/loaned tools and technology. 
The procurement office needs to be aware of 
these pre-contract arrangements to ensure that 
‘lock-out’ situations don’t develop (see 
section 5.7), and that such opportunities are 
agreed to fairly and are transparent to the 
industrial community. 
Once contracts are awarded in the construction 
phase, the relationship between suppliers and 
the project must be formalised under a 
contractual framework that maintains this 
positive interaction and openness. This is 
especially vital concerning inspections and 
acceptance of work which lessons learned 




be a defining point in procurement success. 
ESO asserts the right to inspect and verify 
goods anytime, whereas both ITER and CERN 
undertake planned inspections of work at 
suppliers. OPAL participates in witnessing of 
hold points defined in test plans, and 
collaborates in commissioning. LOFAR 
emphasise close relations with suppliers; using 
the process to guarantee quality. Their 
procedures include installing inspectors in 
supplier’s factories. CERN go further, 
swapping inspectors between suppliers and 
choosing not to rely on ISO 9001 certification 
or supplier’s QA records. However close and 
positive the relationship, the VISTA project 
found that contractors always need help 
regardless of any contract conditions. 
Another important aspect to supplier 
relationships is the amount of dependency 
involved, and a project policy decision is 
required regarding limitations to the size of 
order in respect to any given company’s size 
or turnover. This decision will take account of 
the balance between desired level of reliance 
of the firm on the contract, and the buyer risk 
attached to highly geared contracts. CERN 
takes the standpoint of preferring not to be 
>20% of the supplier’s business, while NASA 
promotes multiple suppliers as both a risk 
mitigation strategy and competition driver. 
A point made strongly by the UK’s National 
Audit Office report ‘Improving Procurement’ 
(NAO, 2004) is the need for sound client 
capability, particularly senior management 
leadership skills, and paying particular 
attention to enhancing key aspects of 
procurement capability. These are: 
• raising commercial awareness, 
having better, more up to date 
management information particularly 
on current market prices 
• more joint purchasing between 
departments, and more proactive 
management of suppliers 
• managing the risk of relying on too 
small a number of suppliers for key 
commodities, and 
• developing procurement expertise 
and better targeting of value-for- 
money improvements. 
 
Key Strategy #9: Implement fair and 
transparent procurement processes, and 
exploit open strategic partnerships while 
allowing for evidence based supplier 
inspections.  
 
6.0. Summary and conclusions  
Procurement is vital to the success of mega-
projects, being both shaped, and the shaper of, 
the ‘high-tech’ environment, and influencing 
how much R&D vendors do. Schill notes US 
Air Force Commander Schriever’s comment 
“The pacing factor in acquiring 
technologically-based modern aerospace 
systems is management, not science and 
technology” (Schill, 1979, p299). 
In fast changing technological situations, 
effective acquisition strategies can help 
decrease risk, shorten lead times, reduce 
investments, and improved response to project 
needs (Virolainen, 1998). This paper has 
shown that an informed, holistic approach to 
procurement can improve the effectiveness of 
the process, and underpin more productive and 
open relationships with suppliers. In 
particular, nine key strategies are suggested as 
being necessary to address in order to position 
the procurement function as a precursor for 
‘high-tech’ project success. These are shown 
listed in Appendix F, together with potential 
management implications for the SKA project. 
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ALMA Atacama Large Millimeter/submillimeter Array 
http://www.almaobservatory.org/ 
AUGER Pierre Auger Cosmic Ray Observatory 
http://www.auger.org/ 
CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research 
http://public.web.cern.ch/public/ 
COTS Commercial off-the-shelf (readily available from industry) 
ESO European Organisation for Astronomical Research 
http://www.eso.org/public/ 
GEMINI The Gemini Observatory 
 http://www.gemini.edu/ 
HESS High Energy Stereoscopic System 
http://www.mpi-hd.mpg.de/hfm/HESS/ 




A multi-disciplinary team led by a project manager responsible and 
accountable for planning, budgeting, procurement and life-cycle management 
of the investment to achieve its cost, schedule and performance goals. Team 
skills include: budgetary, financial, capital planning, procurement, user, 
program, architecture, earned value management, security, and other staff as 
appropriate 
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http://www.iter.org/ 
LOFAR (ASTRON) Low Frequency Array 
http://www.lofar.org/ 
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http://science.nasa.gov/missions/mms/ 
NASA National aeronautics and space administration 
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http://www.neoninc.org/ 
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http://www.ansto.gov.au/discovering_ansto/anstos_research_reactor 
PrepSKA Preparatory phase for the SKA project 
SKA Pathfinders Generic title given to projects where prototype technologies are developed and 
deployed as testing facilities for proposed SKA technologies. Includes the two 
precursor instruments in Australia and South Africa 
SME Small and Medium Enterprises 
subrogated substituted (one person or body) for another with reference to a claim or right 
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http://www.vista.ac.uk/ 
VLT Very Large Telescope 
http://www.eso.org/public/teles-instr/vlt.html 
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About the Square Kilometre Array 
 
The Square Kilometre Array (SKA) will be a revolutionary international radio telescope for the 21st 
Century designed to address fundamental unanswered questions about our Universe. 
 
The total collecting area will be approximately one square kilometre giving 50 times the sensitivity, 
and 10,000 times the survey speed, of the best current-day telescopes. With receptors extending out to 
distances of 3,000 km from the centre of the telescope, the SKA project stretches the limits and risk 
profiles of several leading edge technologies. 
  
More than 70 institutes in 20 countries, together with industry partners, are participating in the 
scientific and technical design of the SKA telescope which will be located in either Australia – New 
Zealand or Southern Africa extending to the Indian Ocean Islands. The target construction cost is 
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Contracting Models for the SKA 
 
Fig 1: Owner Organisation Managed - Single Contractor. The Owner organisation has direct contact 
with a prime Contractor. 
 
                
KEY
O = Owner Organisation
E = Engineering / Design
C = Prime Contractor
S = Subcontractor
M = Management Contractor
I = In-kind support (Member State)
P1 = Project Manager








Fig 2: Owner Organisation Managed – Multiple Contractors. The Owner organisation has direct 




Fig 3: Management Contractors. Owner organisation engages a Management Contractor (MC) to 
assist planning, supervise work, and check performance. The MC may direct contractors, but 






Fig 4: Project Manager. Owner organisation engages a Project Manager (PM) to coordinate and 
supervise the work. The PM has some project performance accountability, and contracts are between 







Fig 5: Project Services Contractor. The Project Services Contractor joins the Owner organisation 
project management team. Staff from the two groups work jointly, but contracts are between the 





Fig 6: The Owner organisation shares the contractual responsibility with member States who have 
agreed to manage ‘in-kind’ contributions (refer ITER model). Responsibility for cost/schedule 


















Most important key strategies for procurement success, and implications for the SKA project 
Key 
Strategy 




Early establishment of procurement office 
structure, resources, processes, roles and 
responsibilities, and information 
management systems. 
Begin consideration of staffing and other 
resource requirements for the SKA 
procurement office, including a capital 
and operating estimate for early 
approval. Commence recruitment.  
 
2 
Formally approve procurement policies, 
strategies, and plans, and document these 
within a concise approved Project 
Procurement Plan.  
Drawing on the work of PrepSKA Work 
Package 5, approve and implement an 
SKA procurement policy and associated 
strategy, responsibilities and authorities, 
and operating procedures. 
 
3 
Obtain full understanding of global 
capability scouting information, and 
employ appropriate approaches and 
instruments with terms and conditions 
supporting project goals.   
Ensure the global industry capability 
assessment process is completed, and 
reports available to procurement 




Establish the contracting model, aligned 
with the legal entity. Develop 
relationships with principle contractors 
and the supply chain.   
Work with SKA governance board to 
align the SKA legal entity with the 
adopted models for contractual 
relationships with suppliers.  
 
5 
Ensure competitiveness in contracting, 
through carefully planned pricing 
strategies, and a ‘value for money’ 
approach.  
Procurement management to devise 
acquisition strategies that ensure value 




Apply purchasing specifications that are 
appropriate to the goods or services 
required, are flexible for optimal 
outcomes, and developed with input from 
industry. 
Procurement management to devise and 
apply purchasing approaches that match 
required goods and services. Consult 
with strategic industry partners to the 
SKA (e.g. SoMI signatories).  
 
7 
Understand and actively manage 
procurement risk, including the critical 
early stage engagement phases.  
Devise and implement an active system 
for identifying and tracking procurement 
risk. Consider contingency reserves.  
 
8 
Evaluate and select project contractors 
using a fair and balanced process, 
executed against standardised 
procedures, and focussed on criteria 
weighted in favour of mission success 
parameters.  
Ensure that a competent system and team 
is established to undertake formal 
assessment of SKA supplier offers. 
Implement sound and defensible 




Implement fair and transparent 
procurement processes, and exploit open 
strategic partnerships while allowing for 
evidence based supplier inspections.  
Procurement management to work with 
legal advisers in preparation of specific 
and generic contracts documentation. 
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Success in mega-projects is frequently discussed among project theoreticians and practitioners. This 
research focuses on high-technology projects and draws on recent literature and fieldwork at ten 
contemporary mega-science projects in Chile, Australia, nd Europe. This study concludes that project 
success is not random, and that early adoption of certain approaches, activities, and launch conditions 
will position a project for success and resilience. Nine resilience factors (beyond a priori 
programmatical artefacts) are grouped into three ‘attitudinal’ factors, and six ‘conditioning’ factors. 
These are then examined in detail against three cas study projects. The study conclusions show that 
attitudinal factors remain a challenge, especially within institutional type high-tech projects, and 
launch conditioning shows mixed levels of application. Through the nine factors, this paper offers 
newly consolidated insights for high-tech project start-ups. It presents the case for co-application of 
contingency funding and ‘proto’ task forces in response to unknown risks, and advocates the 
establishment of more formal information ‘traffic’ management through an empowered centralised 
project information office. 
Keywords: resilience; project success; mega-project; high-technology; optimism; lessons-learned; 
ambiguity; information management; risk; contingency 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Success and failure in projects is a frequent 
topic among both project theoreticians and 
practitioners. Mega-projects especially have 
received attention from academic authors and 
the popular press, often recounting 
performance failures and cost and time 
overruns, which sometimes lead to fiascos 
(Grün 2004). Less reported are the great 
successes where project goals were met, 
budgets contained, and most importantly, the 
customer or users were satisfied. Regardless 
of outcome, each case offers a learning 
opportunity providing the causal factors are 
investigated and the lessons applied. 
This study posits that project success, 
unlike project planning (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, 
& Rothengatter, 2003) is not indeterminate by 
nature, and that undertaking certain activities, 
coupled with application of particular policies 
and launch conditions at the front end, 
positions a project for success and resilience. 
Evidence of continued high-tech project 
failure (e.g. Standish, 1995, Proccacino, 
Verner, Overmyer, & Darter, 2002) indicates 
that a specialist examination is warranted, 
with the aim of convincing project managers 
to focus harder in nine areas contributing to 
project robustness and resilience. In this paper, 
I aim to identify the early conditions required 




the basic ‘givens’ of project structure, funding, 
tools, and plans. 
Resilience is defined here as being 
akin to robustness in the sense of building 
strength and the ability to recover from, or 
adjust easily to, misfortune or change. The 
parameters of mega-projects are not tightly 
specified here, except to note that these 
endeavours typically have hundreds of 
millions or even billion dollar budgets, time-
frames usually measured in at least years, and 
often a high level of public or political 
attention. In this paper, high-tech projects are 
defined as those involving research and 
development (R&D), a significant information 
technology (IT) component, application of 
leading edge science/engineering 




Compared to the amount of project 
management practice guides, Books of 
Knowledge (BoKs), and ‘how to do it’ 
literature, written project management theory 
is less common and better described as a 
collection of techniques and best practice than 
a scientific treatment of the topic. In response 
to project management approach and attitudes, 
Erno-Kjolhede (2000) tackles the management 
of research projects, addressing the underlying 
concepts of complexity and uncertainty at the 
conceptualisation phase, and the balancing of 
risk-taking and failure. Difficulties with early 
stage risk assessment in relation to over-
reliance amid uncertainty are examined by 
Bakker, Cambre, Korlaar, & Raab, (2010); 
Flyvberg et al. (2003); and Geraldi, & Kutsch, 
(2010). Project shaping as a management craft 
is investigated by Smith & Winter (2010) who 
show clear links to project success, while 
Miller and Olleros examine episodic style 
project shaping as a competitive advantage 
(Miller & Lessard, 2000). Blanchard (1990) 
and Cook-Davies (2002) discuss the ‘people’ 
aspects of new projects and the pivotal role of 
management as the first human resource, 
while new work by Jani (2010) asserts that 
self-efficacy enables resilience in IT project 
teams. Nonetheless, attitudinal factors for 
project shaping and context setting have yet to 
be set out in relation to high-tech projects 
specifically. 
A number of early critical success 
factors (CSF) are proposed by Elenbaas 
(2000) who notes the crucial conditions and 
complex environments within project start-
ups. Much referenced authors Shenhar & Dvir 
(2007) emphasise the need for early tailoring 
of project success measures and dimensions. 
In their examination of project peripety (an 
abrupt turn of events), Engwall & Westling 
(2001) explore assumptions around linear 
project processes and the limiting effects of 
articulating imperfect knowledge at project 
start-up. Lechler & Dvir (2010) offer recent 
work on linking project management 
structures to project success, arguing for 
serious attention to early organisational 
structure. Weston (2007), Fellows & 
Alexander (2010), and Fisher (2010) each 
touch on early stage risk of immature 
technologies and the gap in understanding 
between industry and institutions. While these 
(and other) authors address diverse facets of 
early stage project conditioning, there remains 
a gap in the literature for an empirically based 
summary of early stage conditioning factors 
concerning resilience within high-tech 
projects. 
 
STUDY APPROACH & METHODOLOGY 
This study draws from material largely 
published between 2000 and 2010. While 
peer-reviewed papers and books offer expert 
knowledge, reports from project publications 
revealed more practical experience. 
Discussions at relevant conferences and 
workshops gave further insights; in particular 
the topics of peripety, optimism, and mission 
assurance which were prominent at the 2010 
NASA Project Management Challenge, an 
annual best practice networking event (NASA, 
2010a). 
This paper includes data from ten 
cases from a broader research assignment by 
the author into mega-science project 
management being conducting at 16 large 




Australia. Each project is characterised by 
having specialised infrastructure, > US$100 
million budget, a challenging IT and software 
requirement, and a science goal concerned 
with astro, particle, or nuclear physics. I 
observed planning and execution processes, 
and formal and ad-hoc meetings, both in the 
office and worksite. At each project, I 
undertook between five and ten formal 
interviews with project directors and 
managers, each typically lasting 3-5 hours, 
and loosely structured to permit the gathering 
of salient learning aspects from each case. The 
fieldwork study list is shown in Appendix A, 
Exhibit 1. The data gathered from casework is 
referenced in upper-case throughout this study 
and introduces the ‘lived experiences’ of 
project practitioners. 
The value of field casework is 
advanced by Flyvbjerg (2006), who explains 
the richness of information in the case 
narrative, including single studies depending 
on the case and how it is chosen. He asserts 
that casework capability can describe realities 
which are hard to reveal or define in scientific 
parlance (Flyvbjerg, 2001).  The case study as 
a research method is supported by Yin (2009), 
who describes the rigorous methodological 
approach required for conclusion validity, and 
usefulness when investigating complex 
phenomena.  The present study applies pattern 
matching from complementary evidence 
(triangulation) to avoid reinforcement of 
preconceived ideas and strengthen validity in 
accordance with Yin’s principles. 
This research effort focuses on 
eliciting resilience factors beyond a priori 
programmatical processes, resources and 
artefacts (such as execution plans, project 
funding, Work Breakdown Structures, etc.). 
The findings are grouped into three 
‘attitudinal’ factors, and six ‘conditioning’ 
factors described in the following sections and 
defined as ‘special’ factors to distinguish them 
from traditional programmatical factors. 
Attitudinal factors are those which require an 
intellectual stance or approach, whereas 
conditional factors are realised through 
purposeful activity. These ‘special’ resilience 
factors are then examined against three 
contemporary mega-science cases and the 
findings used to inform the study conclusions. 
 
ATTITUDINAL PROJECT SHAPING 
 
Balancing enthusiasm with realism. 
 
A necessary component of any high-tech 
project funding bid is the enthusiastic belief 
by the protagonist(s) that it can be executed on 
time, on budget. This often leads to inaccurate 
estimates, most disappointing when over-
selling is used to win favour with funders. 
Grün (2004) talks of project proponents, 
project managers, contractors, and planning 
experts who may form ‘over-optimism-
coalitions’. Grün further identifies over-
optimism (p41) as the “tendency to 
underestimate the difficulties of achieving the 
technical goals… the operation & 
maintenance costs, and the costs caused by the 
changing of technical goals.” 
Evidence of optimism is not hard to 
find. A lessons-learned workshop from the 
Gemini telescope project revealed that the 
effects of science drivers on cost and schedule 
led to overly optimistic estimates, resulting in 
a 300% over-budget in one instrument (NRC, 
1999).  Observations in a radio astronomy 
technology White Paper describe overly 
optimistic cost and development time 
estimates as the most frequent cause of project 
de-scoping (Fisher, 2010). A UK defence 
report lamenting a £205 million cost increase 
over 20 projects admitted that “on far too 
many projects, the Department is over-
optimistic and sets unachievable cost, time 
and performance objectives” (MoD, 2009). In 
the US, NASA officials, seeking to boost 
congressional support, sought to emphasise 
the Space Shuttle’s apparent low development 
cost. Such optimism proved flawed, as the 
program encountered delays of three years and 
cost overruns of 60% prior to its first mission 
loss in 1986 (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007). When 
interviewed, NASA Director, George Morrow 




optimistic early in the project lifecycle.” 
(NASA, 2009) 
The cost-schedule paradox is a 
formidable enemy. A US Defense Acquisition 
office investigation concluded that once past 
15%, an over-budget program is ‘highly 
unlikely’ to recover original projections and 
the final overrun will get worse (Butts & 
Linton, 2009). Over-optimistic budget and 
schedule expectations are shown to inhibit 
project success, and are especially likely on 
projects with institutional difficulties 
(Murphy, Baker, & Fisher, 1974). IT projects 
appear to be especially vulnerable (Verner & 
Cerpa, 2005). 
How then might we recalibrate our 
thinking without losing the all-important 
project enthusiasm? Blanchard (1990) claims 
objectivity may be the only defence against 
the snowballing effect of eagerness, and 
suggests that, as a balancing process, project 
proponents should also develop a case for not 
proceeding. Realistic estimates and plans (i.e. 
neither optimistic nor pessimistic) would seem 
a correct approach, but Erno-Kjolhede (2000) 
argues that this could lead to project 
participants failing to innovate, and result in 
second-best performance. He recommends a 
tone of ‘highly ambitious’, or ‘challenging’ 
planning, driving stretch goals underpinned by 
factual data. Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) strongly 
support cost estimates accompanied by a risk 
analysis of future cost regimes, thereby 
offering a realistic view to curb against 
‘appraisal optimism’. The Acquisitions 
Defence RUSI Group offer practical advice to 
break the ‘conspiracy of optimism’ including 
transparency, realism, de-risk programs and 
interfaces, and ultimately consider cancelling 
programs (Weston, 2007). 
Butts & Linton (2009) who 
investigated NASA’s cost estimation 
performance, conclude that undershooting cost 
and schedule projections is a well verified 
NASA phenomenon, being rooted in an 
historical practice of over-optimism. In 
response, their report introduces a hybrid 
model (the Joint Confidence Level - 
Probabilistic Calculator, JCL-PC) for 
accurately estimating cost and schedule reality 
in complex science and engineering 
environments where maturing technologies are 
present. The adoption of sophisticated cost 
tools (e.g. the Square Kilometre Array Cost 
Engine), managed by trained and experienced 
project personnel, perhaps heralds a maturing 
approach to cost realism that could be adopted 
by other projects. 
 
Checking for relevant lessons learned 
The value of recording lessons-
learned from past projects, and the 
investigation of experiences from like-projects 
during early stage high-tech project planning, 
seems obvious. But casework reveals little 
effort is applied to these valuable activities. 
Many of the facilities investigated for the 
present study almost totally relied on the 
collective experiences of project staff and 
management rather than any formal survey of 
analogous projects, thereby failing to learn of 
other’s mistakes (ALMA, 2010; ASTRON, 
2010; CSIRO, 2009 ). 
Authors consistently promote the 
need to learn from project experience, and cite 
this as vital for continuous improvement as 
well as evidence of project management 
maturity (Cao & Hoffman, 2010; Verner & 
Cerpa, 2005; Cooke-Davies, 2002; Kerzner, 
1998; Williams, 2004; PMI, 2008; Fisher, 
2010). Nevertheless, Disterer (2002, p512) 
concludes “only a few firms manage 
systematically to identify and transfer 
valuable knowledge from projects to following 
projects [so that people can] apply it to future 
tasks”. Smith & Winter (2010) directly link 
‘front-end’ management with project success 
and promote the idea of deliberately exploring 
insights and implications flowing from past 
project perspectives, and crafting appropriate 
action responses. Formal lessons learned 
capture mechanisms are needed to avoid 
‘project amnesia’, including knowledge 
management systems. Schindler & Eppler 
(2003, p223) suggest methods for learning 
from experience and cite the Boeing approach 
of applying the results of past project 
investigations, thus delivering “the most 
successful and error free market launches... 




Industry are more adept at systems to capture 
and retrieve previous learnings, experience put 
to great use in lowering costs in orbital 
satellite projects (TOPSAT, 2010). 
Within organisations, project staff 
have opportunities to learn and reuse lessons 
(Davies & Hobday, 2005), and post-mortem 
results can be stored within knowledge 
systems, or communicated directly to other 
teams (Collier, DeMarco, & Fearey, 1996). 
Mapping techniques that show chains of 
causality are useful in transferring lessons-
learned to other projects (Williams, 2004). For 
the high-tech planner in single project 
organisations effort is required to access and 
locate such learnings (CSIRO, 2009). 
Schalken, Brinkkemper, & van Vliet, (2006) 
address this problem with a (highly qualified) 
method based on Grounded Theory to deal 
with qualitative information from project 
reviews. An alternative is to access public 
databases such as NASA’s Engineering 
Network (NASA, 2010b), and The Software 
Program Manager’s Network (SPMN, 2010). 
Whatever method is used, lessons-learned and 
wisdom applied from analogous projects is 
concluded to be a vital, though largely 
underused, project success factor. 
 
Embracing complexity, ambiguity and 
uncertainty 
High-tech mega-projects are 
characterised by risk, complexity, ambiguity 
and uncertainty, not just related to technology, 
but introduced via multiple collaborative 
parties, and often a dispersed infrastructure. At 
start-up, uncertainty surrounds performance 
levels, objectives and motivations, 
capabilities, stakeholder expectations, and 
political environments. 
High-tech mega-projects are always 
complicated, and almost always (by adding 
uncertainty) complex. Not only through the 
abundance of programmatic interfaces, but 
also because of the interactions between 
systems. Complex systems as understood in 
the contemporary sense are testing of 
management (Crosby, 2012a), and have an 
inherent level of unpredictability (Pavlak, 
2004a; Miller & Lessard, 2000). Grasping this 
complexity, and preparing the project for it, 
demands early stage agile and adaptive 
management (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007). To 
respond strategically, project management will 
likely develop more than one (possibly 
several) management strategies (Crosby, 
2006; Pich, Loch, & De Mayer, 2002), before 
down-selecting the final way forward. 
Beinhocker (1997 p8) supports this approach, 
saying “In a complex adaptive system, a 
focused strategy…is necessary for day-to-day 
survival, but [is] not sufficient in the long 
run…strategies must be robust [and] perform 
well in a variety of possible future 
environments”. Thus project shaping is as 
much about keeping options open, as about 
trouble-proofing. 
Traditional project management 
practice as outlined in the Project 
Management Bodies of Knowledge 
(PMBOKs) applies a rational probability-
based approach to management, but is poorly 
equipped to deal with project uncertainty 
(Pender, 2001). Atkinson et al. (2006) 
characterise uncertainty as the incompleteness 
of information, a normal situation for early 
stage high-tech projects that requires tolerance 
from development teams, and may only be 
mitigated by trust in management. 
The early stages of R&D (high-tech) 
projects are dominated by long periods of 
ambiguity where solutions (and even 
problems) are unclear, possibly conflicting, 
and where change is incremental. There 
follows a short period of peripety (Engwall & 
Westling (2001), where one solution (or a set 
of solutions) becomes the obvious candidate 
as the legitimate path forward. Peripety is a 
turn of events leading to cognitive transition 
from ambiguousness into a less daunting state 
of uncertainty, often recalled as a time when 
real achievement occurred. It is not simply a 
change of fortune, but a change of 
understanding of all that has gone before 
(Smith & Winter, 2010). 
In dealing with uncertainty, Smith 
(2007) invokes the pragmatic skills of 
‘ProjectCraft’ starting with uncertainty 




delegate this to risk managers. He suggests we 
pose the critical questions: are we confident in 
our assumptions, and if wrong, could the 
impact be serious? Moreover he supports 
uncertainty workshops, stating that (p134) 
“we must spot the potential frauds, and shake 
the tree to find out what is not secure”. 
However fieldwork suggests that such analysis 
is rare, and is absent from the ten cases 
investigated. 
Based on the literature and casework, 
managers of high-tech projects can lift 
confidence by addressing ambiguity through 
preliminary studies and by using new 
knowledge to improve sense-making and thus 
refine the way forward. Uncertainty can only 
be reduced by acquiring necessary information 
through explicit questions (Engwall & 
Westling, 2001). 
 
LAUNCH CONDITIONING  
 
Project mission & success definition 
 
While the setting of time and budget 
limits at project commencement is 
problematic (Bakker et al., 2010), no project 
should start without at least a broad 
objective(s) aligned to stakeholder 
expectations and priorities.  The IPMA Project 
Manager’s BoK (Caupin, Knoepfel, Koch, 
Pannenbacker, Peres-Polo, & Seabury, 2006) 
list objectives, mission, and project charter in 
its start-up guidance. However Atkinson, 
Crawford, & Ward, (2006) warn of ‘premature 
definition’ based on insufficiently defined 
specifications, especially in novel, one-off 
high-tech projects. Having a well-defined 
project mission was ranked #1 in the project 
definition stage by Hyvari (2006), and ranked 
#2 in a recent meta-study of high-tech project 
success drivers (Crosby, 2012b). When 
linking success to project types (including 
high-tech), Shenhar & Wideman (1996 p9) 
assert “As part of every project’s front-end 
planning...agreement should be reached on 
the project’s principal success criteria having 
regard to its project type”. In software 
projects, Verner & Cerpa (2005) found that 
the start of a project offers greatest chance of 
quality improvement through better 
requirements setting. O’Brochta (2002 p1) 
draws on CIA technical project experience to 
conclude that, “the earliest phases of the 
project life cycle have the most dramatic 
impact upon the odds that projects will be 
viewed as successful”. Clearly it makes sense 
for project success measures to be integrated 
with planning at project initiation, and 
possibly included within the project team’s 
charter if it exists (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007). 
Fieldwork findings for this research 
agreed that statements around the mission and 
science goals were often established early 
(driven by funding applications and 
collaboration approaches), but project success 
definitions were less obvious in early planning 
(ITER, 2009; CSIRO, 2008; VISTA, 2010), 
although in hindsight were considered useful 
by interviewees and incorporated earlier in 
future projects. 
 
Reporting and decision-making policies and 
structure  
A common characteristic of large 
high-tech projects is the distributed nature of 
the technical and governance committees. In 
the commercial world this is evident through 
strategically located research nodes (e.g. 
Boeing’s virtual PhantomWorks) and global 
procurement management. Institutional mega-
projects frequently assemble executive and 
technical committees from world-wide 
nominations, and from a third stakeholder 
group – the funding agencies which pay for, 
but do not benefit from, the project output 
(Khang & Moe, 2008). This coming together 
of diverse people and interests to achieve a 
common purpose requires perceived and 
actual distances to be overcome, and 
responsibility to be shared (Aronson, Shenhar, 
& Reilly, 2010). Ideally, all this happens in a 
spirit of effective communication and 
coordination, active participation, trust, and 





Such challenges prove difficult to 
meet in practice. Fieldwork interviews 
exposed tensions where operative project 
managers felt frustrated by a lack of decision 
or feedback on project shaping proposals. 
Project staff also reported irritation when 
committees made pronouncements or aired 
concerns regarding matters considered outside 
their remit, especially when related to early 
stage technology selection. Several 
interviewees thought their committees were 
too large to work effectively. 
Davies & Hobday (2005) write 
“Different organisational cultures, problems 
in contractual relations and the need to 
integrate different domains of knowledge 
make collaborative projects very difficult to 
execute.”  A recent ASPERA report 
addressing start-ups of science infrastructures 
(Katsanevas, Miller, Berghöfer, Metzger, 
Rülle, & Zickgraf, 2009) emphasises the need 
for clear decision-making processes with one 
body/person having final say, and reject a 
50:50 sharing of decision-making (ALMA, 
2007) as ineffective. Lessons learnt from the 
ASPERA report encourage early formation of 
a Management Board, supported by a core 
management group, interlocked to the 
researchers and administration through a clear 
(documented) decision-making and reporting 
hierarchy. 
In establishing clear reporting and 
decision-making, top management can either 
help or hinder a project. Several authors 
(Hayfield, 1985; Baker, Murphy, & Fisher, 
1988; Rubenstein, Chakrabarti, O’Keefe, 
Souder, & Young, 1976; Procaccino et al., 
2002) give some emphasis to the negative 
effects too much management, citing 
‘interference’ and ‘meddling’. The last author 
adding that removal of a project sponsor has 
more detrimental effect on success than 
starting without one. Conversely, fieldwork 
revealed protracted decisions as the only real 
complaint of management efficacy, with only 
the (German) XFEL project identifying the 
need for total management restructure (DESY, 
2009). 
 
Project information control  
Large projects generate a vast 
amount of information. Much of this, 
especially the formal project procedures, 
plans, and records, are usually organised 
within some form of centralised Project 
Management Information System (PMIS). 
Computer based PMIS not only store large 
amounts of data, but can intelligently handle, 
sort, back-up and report timely (sometimes 
predictive) information of immediate use to 
managers. Most importantly for high-tech 
mega-projects, modern packages will integrate 
complex data relationships between 
scheduling and network planning, resource 
management, budgeting, cost control and 
performance analysis, and risk burn (Nicholas, 
2004). Clearly it makes sense to establish a 
PMIS of appropriate scale and capability 
early, and enforce its use. 
However case investigations 
(CSIRO, 2008; CSIRO, 2009; ASTRON, 
2009; DESY, 2009) show that the discipline 
required to create, register and link all relevant 
project documentation within a controlled 
environment is rarely maintained outside of 
externally audited (usually industrial) projects. 
Observations during fieldwork show a mixed 
attitude to centralising plans and data, with 
personal storage practices representing the 
highest risk. 
Of at least equal significance to the 
successful project execution is the abundance 
of information exchanges that take place 
around the project, internally and externally, 
and often not recorded centrally. This 
information ‘traffic’ flow includes face-to-face 
meetings and conferences, telephone and 
video meetings, emails and presentations, all 
sometimes involving arms-length groups. As 
the project community grows through the 
conception stage through to execution, the risk 
of misalignment of working group effort, 
misunderstandings of priorities and changes, 
and misinformation to external parties grows 
accordingly. Moreover, exercising weak 
control over these ‘satellite’ information 
channels leaves aspects of the project 
imperfectly recorded, leading to inefficient 
external reviews and limiting the usefulness of 
central repositories as stores of lessons learned 




How should early phase project 
managers address this situation? Implementing 
a project management system based on an 
accepted professional guideline (e.g. PMBOK) 
may go some way to instilling the required 
practices. Implementing a certified 
(independently audited) management system 
(e.g. ISO 9001) will demand compliance with 
procedures designed to apply control of 
information flows, as well as instigate 
corrective and preventive action for process 
failures. However, the present study concludes 
that the most effective means of establishing 
an information controlled environment is to 
introduce it early, drive it through 
management example, and dedicate resources 
to maintaining it. The early phase UK HIPER 
project is already benefiting from a distinct 
Work Package entitled Public Relations and 
Communications. In its most mature form, this 
might involve a Project Information Office 
(PIO) as the repository of centralised 
information, documents and data; holding 
responsibility for arranging meetings, 
telecons, etc, and managing their inputs and 
outputs. The PIO would hold authority for 
approval and recognition of any satellite group 
information needs, including the use of project 
templates, branding, intellectual property (IP), 
and single point management media 
interfaces. 
Experience from the Dutch LOFAR 
project suggests that extensive formalisation 
(PIO-style) early in the project was viewed 
unfavourably (ASTRON, 2010). However the 
increasing drive for industrial class high-tech 
mega-projects (as opposed to technical 
institution models) is demanding greater 
rigour. LOFAR’s Dr. de Vos suggests that a 
balance might be struck by providing a Wiki-
type environment where early stage 
documents and concepts from scientists and 
engineers can be assimilated less formally. 
 
Risk & Contingency 
High-tech projects have inherent risk 
as a consequence of their raison d’être, and 
higher risks must be consistent with higher 
contingency (Fisher, 2010). A standard 
method to deal with project execution risk is a 
register type tool using a rating system to 
score anticipated risk based on the likelihood 
and consequences of the defined event 
occurring. Management decisions are then 
taken to accept, mitigate, or remove those 
risks. This approach is reasonably effective at 
project start-up for the known knowns, but 
takes little account of the unknown unknowns 
– events, circumstances or results that are 
invisible to the project. Howell, Windahl, & 
Seidel, (2010) link ‘consequences’ to risk by 
reasoning that extreme uncertainty (chaos) 
equates to a 100% probability of an 
unexpected event. 
The conventional approach is 
therefore problematic because of the 
perception that resilience has been instilled to 
deal with all unexpected events (Pender, 
2001), whereas it is actually most reliant on 
experiential hindsight as a risk predictor. 
Geraldi et al. (2010 p548) contends that in 
projects “it is not a question of if  but when 
unexpected events will emerge”. These may 
include transactional issues such as exchange 
rate fluctuations, market changes etc. 
(Nicholas, 2004). On average, projects 
encounter five unexpected events in the 
formative stages and some confront as many 
as twelve (Miller & Lessard, 2000). The 
ALMA telescope gas energy supply 
interruption being one example where an early 
assumption appeared fully reliable, only to be 
unexpectedly revoked (ALMA, 2007). 
If the substantive risk to the project is 
unknown, how might we deal with it at the 
project formative stage? This study suggests a 
dual response: applied contingency, and threat 
readiness. 
‘Project contingency’ (rather than 
specific threat contingency) includes those 
external factors or events that cannot yet be 
pinpointed but will seriously jeopardise the 
project when they materialise. However 
quantifying contingency is non-trivial. The 
PMBOK mentions reserves and contingency 
but not how they are computed or applied 
within the project (Pender, 2001). Nicholas 
(2004) offers a calculator as well as 
suggesting an overrun allowance in some 




‘Joint Confidence Level – Probabilistic 
Calculator (JCL-PC) founded on the 
hypothesis that a project’s early phases hold 
many unknown risks (Butts & Linton, 2009). 
Many contemporary high-tech project reports 
recommend early budgeting for (cash) 
reserves around 20% - 25% (Fellows & 
Alexander, 2010; JPL, 2010). 
Since the unknown cannot be 
planned in detail, an alternative method is to 
plan for everything; (the Napoleon approach) 
expecting that something will go wrong and 
that a solution will be needed as the challenge 
emerges. When referring to the aggressive, 
revolutionary high-tech F117 Stealth Fighter 
program, Nicholas (2004) writes; “Expecting 
the unexpected is often better preparation for 
coping with risk than preparing extensive 
plans and believing that the unexpected has 
been eliminated.” 
General managerial alertness is 
clearly required to scan broadly for potential 
threats. Smith (2007) describes ‘uncertainty 
spotting’ skills; the early seeking out and 
challenging of threats and assumptions. Being 
watchful, and informed by timely and accurate 
trend-type data, is indicated as a key strategy 
for building resilience. 
Coupled with this are task force 
response teams (aka ‘tiger’ or ‘cheetah’ teams) 
which are shown to operate effectively to 
contain and direct events (Crosby, 2012a). The 
strength of task forces lies in their combined 
expertise, detachment from the project, and 
freedom from project bureaucracy (CERN, 
2009). Power is concentrated through limiting 
numbers and very careful participant selection 
(Pavlak, 2004b). However, task forces take 
time to establish and become effective, and 
this paper posits that one or more task force 
panels might be anticipated, assembled 
virtually during project start-up, and 
periodically offered a project ‘health’ report so 
that a dormant state of readiness is maintained. 
In the event of an unforeseen disruption, a 
panel of previously enrolled experts are far 
better placed begin problem solving than a 
bricolage type response. 
In addition to applying contingency 
and maintaining a quiescent threat readiness, 
wise project managers will practice skilful 
early stage planning to try and avoid 
unplanned events. Activities including 
response training, stakeholder negotiation 
skills, avoidance of panic and over-reaction, 
and speedy approval processes, all serve to 
strengthen resilience (Geraldi et al., 2010). 
 
Project environment 
Whatever their size or structure, 
projects exists within a larger financial, geo-
political, and governance framework (project 
environment) that can both enable and 
constrain the enterprise (Blanchard, 1990). 
The high-tech projects considered in the 
present study generally require physical space 
for infrastructure, often in underdeveloped 
(green-field) areas prone to host site 
sensitivities. Gaining approvals for large 
engineering facilities, often involving decades 
of operations, can be a slow process fraught 
with challenges. Merrow’s (1988 p vi) study 
of 52 mega-projects concludes: 
“Cost growth and schedule 
slippage...are driven primarily 
by conflicts between the projects 
and host governments, i.e., 
institutional problems relating to 
environmental regulations and 
opposition, health and safety 
rules, labor(sic) practices, and 
procurement controls. The 
importance of institutional 
factors clearly distinguishes 
mega-projects from their smaller 
cousins.” 
Projects encumbered by excessive 
government restrictions or involvement 
showed a strong negative relationship to 
success in a study by Murphy et al. (1974), 
while Pinto & Mantel (1990 p274) add 
“change in the project environment beyond 
the control of management” as a cause of 
project failure. 
There is advantage in establishing the 
project within known, coherent and mature 
institutional arrangements. Miller & Lessard 




and shifting arrangements have a hard time 
taking off: they require deals and agreements 
that may not stand for long”. In the $3bn 
Accelerator Production of Tritium (APT) 
project, project management successfully 
adopted the concurrent engineering approach, 
integrating design, planning, and operations 
teams early on, and conducting up-front 
analysis driven by environmental (NEPA) 
requirements. Consideration of these early 
resulted in significant changes to design and 
operability of the plant (Laufer & Hoffman, 
2000). 
A proactive approach to government 
negotiations offers real benefits. By leveraging 
the infrastructure investment, the ALMA 
project not only won significant concessions, 
but also eased visa processes for foreign 
workers (ALMA, 2011). However, failure to 
fully understand regulatory compliance can be 
costly. For example, the Australian ASKAP 
radio telescope encountered unanticipated 
delays in achieving government approval for 
land use, requiring significant diplomacy and 
skilled effort from project personnel (CSIRO, 
2009). Blanchard (1990) urges early attention 
to regulatory approvals, and argues that the 
cost of compliance with environmental and 
special interest groups needs must be factored 
into project cost estimates. 
A 2007 report of major astronomy 
project surveys warns of changing political 
agendas, agency priorities, budget pressures, 
as well as unanticipated disasters, and 
scientific results. It recommends to “start with 
a more realistic sense of agency budgetary 
and policy environments...so that [project] 
surveys can be more resilient” (Fellows & 
Alexander, 2010 p3). The world beyond the 
project is neither benign nor complacent, and 
early stage investment into securing a legally 
compliant, socially acceptable, and affordable 
project deployment plan pays dividends. 
 
Mission Assurance 
Fieldwork undertaken by Crosby 
(2012a) reveals a particular characteristic of 
some high-tech project managers; an 
unwavering sense of purpose in making 
mission success the highest priority at all 
levels of the project. The adoption of this 
‘mission assurance’ approach is captured 
compellingly within aerospace industry 
reports (e.g. NASA, 2000) which encourages 
institutional line management to become more 
engaged in the execution of the project and be 
held accountable for mission success. So 
important is this viewed at NASA, it now 
maintains specific safety and mission 
assurance functional offices. 
The implementation of a mission 
assurance function (part auditor, part advisor, 
part ‘devil’s advocate’) means placing this 
vital resource outside of mainstream project 
delivery, yet close enough to have ready 
participation in critical testing, meetings, and 
reviews, and with access to project 
management. The role is principally one of 
questioning and checking that activities, 
deviations and changes, particularly at project 
interfaces, pose no unrecoverable threat to 
execution and performance. 
Created at project start-up, the 
mission assurance function is best placed to 
conduct a project audit after the definition 
stage but before execution begins. Graham & 
Englund (1997 p192) describe this as “like a 
group of expert consultants...review the plans 
and proposals before the project team 
begins...and provide feedback on the technical 
and managerial feasibility of the plans...using 
their knowledge and experience to foresee 
problems.” 
Several of the interviewees for this 
study claimed that external panels fulfilled the 
niche of mission assurance while conducting 
design reviews etc., but the temporary nature 
of these panels is never equivalent to a 
project-bound person or group. Moreover, 
rather than be created as part of the project 
execution and deployment team, this paper 
argues for a distinct mission assurance role to 
be assigned at project inception, and 
developed as a central (overhead) function 
necessary for driving project success. 
 





Having drawn out the more subtle, 
though highly influential, attitudinal 
environmental and launch conditions shown to 
be important for project success, it is useful to 
examine how these nine factors are addressed 
in practice. 
For this, I selected three large radio-
astronomy projects from the fieldwork studies. 
Although similar in terms of being remotely 
located giant radio telescopes with large and 
complex information technology (IT) 
requirements, they are discriminated primarily 
by project budget, infrastructure size, and 
execution stage (see Appendix A, Exhibit 2). 
In preparation for the comparative 
assessment, I examined the data collected 
during detailed on-site investigations, as 
described in the study approach & 
methodology. The data were sorted to expose 
relevant examples of situations or events that 
fell within the special factor categories 
identified in the present study. Against each 
factor, I describe a challenge that faced each 
of the three cases, and the method and extent 
of the response from each project. Appendix B 
shows this work tabulated to enable ready 
comparison and contrasting of challenges and 
responses between the case projects, and 
reveal commonalities. 
Space limits preclude an in-depth 
data analysis here; however a summary 
presents useful insights. Cost, schedule and 
performance optimism was universal, and 
each project introduced constraints to meet 
budgets. Little effort was evident to learn from 
analogous high-tech projects. All three cases 
struggled at some point to deal with project 
ambiguities and uncertainties, though 
responses showed these challenges are 
surmountable. Some disconnect was apparent 
between lofty science goals and practical 
execution, later bridged through individual 
project initiatives. Both reporting and 
decision-making processes, and project 
information control, were competently 
managed, but with room for maturation to 
industry standards. Risk and contingency 
factors were handled only moderately well, 
exposing the ASKAP and SKA projects 
especially to the effects of unforeseen 
disasters. While the important external project 
landscape was managed well in all cases, the 
potential advantages of a formal mission 
assurance program have yet to be exploited. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
The present study illustrates that for most 
high-tech projects, both attitudinal and 
conditioning factors remain a challenge, no 
less so for large and complex IT projects. 
Schedule and cost optimism 
especially is a well known phenomenon, yet it 
continues to be neglected. The issue results 
partly from failure to forecast project costs 
accurately (especially software) and partly 
through competitive funding environments 
where underestimates in time and/or cost have 
traditionally been tacitly accepted or even 
encouraged. Anecdotally, current global 
economic conditions indicate reducing 
tolerance to this approach in the face of 
stricter funding priorities (Matson, 2010). Use 
of lessons learned has been historically weak, 
and remains patchy. High-tech mega-projects 
especially should formally plan for at least a 
degree of up-front research to inform the 
major challenges and decisions ahead. Early 
ambiguity in projects can frustrate project 
groups used to a more industrial model, yet 
are overcome through trust building – itself 
dependent on effective and frequent project 
team communication. 
Regarding launch conditions, the 
benefits of defining the project mission and 
success definitions early are strongly evident, 
as are clear and consistent structures for 
reporting and decision-making. The concept of 
a Project Information Office (PIO) is 
advanced with a remit covering not only 
information, documents and data, but also the 
broader responsibility for convening 
conferences, meetings, telecons, and 
managing / recording their ‘traffic’ flows. As 
such, the PIO would be the central coordinator 
of project community information needs, 
including project templates, branding, IP, and 




Risk management is typically dealt 
with programmatically and tends to see 
projects as a deterministic process, but this 
approach fails to fully consider unknown 
unknowns. To address this epistemic 
uncertainty in high-tech projects, a two-
pronged approach is suggested: (i) estimating 
and establishing an identified contingency 
reserve, ideally integrated to dynamic risk 
‘burn’, and (ii) the early appointment of one or 
more ‘proto’ task forces panels kept in 
dormant readiness to offer expert advice 
against unanticipated events. 
The execution of large infrastructure 
projects carries compliance obligations 
involving national authorities. Even with State 
blessing, these external negotiations are rarely 
simple, and need careful and dedicated 
stewardship at (or before) project start-up. 
Lastly, this study supports the formation of a 
mission assurance function working alongside 
project management, supporting the project 
teams, and reporting at Director level. 
Integrated at the conceptual phase, the mission 
assurance specialist(s) brings experiential 
capability and intellectual rigour to project 
definition.  
Management of the conceptualisation 
and planning phases is shown to have a pivotal 
effect on the ultimate success of projects. For 
international high-tech projects especially, the 
alignment of key activities with key players is 
crucial. It is people, with their talents, attitudes 
and experience, who ultimately deliver the 
initiatives (and thus the performance 
objectives) outlined in this study and sponsors 
should strive to hire the best staff available 
(Katsanevas et al., 2009). This underpinning 
aspect of projects is advanced by Cook-Davies 
(2002 p189) as “people perform every 
process, and it is the people who ultimately 
determine the adequacy”. 
 
SUMMARY 
The paper has drawn together and 
deepened knowledge of how large high-tech 
projects may be conditioned (beyond a priori 
mechanistic attributes) to improve resilience 
in the face of inevitable set-backs and 
unexpected events.  The new insights drawn 
have value for early stage mega-project 
planners to improved conditioning of projects 
for success. Recent literature was examined, 
complemented by relevant field casework. 
Nine resilience factors were grouped as: 
 
(a) Attitudinal  
• realistic, fact based 
• a lessons-learned culture 
• ambiguity/uncertainty tolerant 
 
(b) Conditioning  
• mission and success clearly defined 
• clear reporting and decision 
structures 
• strong information control 
• risk preparedness 
• external environmental awareness 
• mission assurance role implemented 
 
These factors were tested against three 
large high-tech (science /engineering/IT) 
projects to determine their relevance and value 
in framing early-stage adjustments to typical 
and contemporary high-tech mega-projects. 
Commonalities were reviewed, and these 
informed the general conclusions. 
 
 
STUDY LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER 
RESEARCH. 
This study has taken a case-study analytical 
approach by presenting data from selected 
literature research, validated by contemporary 
case experience, and presented this in 
explanatory form. The limitations of this 
qualitative methodology (without deep 
numerical analysis) are recognised, and the 
possible observer bias in study is 
acknowledged. The number of case studies 
could be widened and possibly broadened to 
introduce other stakeholders e.g. IT backbone 
providers, funding agencies, and land-owners. 
Interesting further research is indicated to 




and other project typologies (e.g. large civil), 
to reveal early stage initiatives beneficial to 
increasingly industrialised science mega-
projects. 
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EXHIBIT 1: Fieldwork Case Studies (Principal contact identified only) 
• ALMA, Dr. Tony Beasley, ex-Project Manager ALMA radio-telescope project. Discussions on 
mega-project management and risk. Personal communications, Chile, 19-22 November, 2007, 28 
October, 2010, and 12 June 2011 http://www.almaobservatory.org/ 
• ASTRON, Dr. Marco de Vos, Head R&D ASTRON/LOFAR mega-array. Discussion on science 
project characteristics. Personal communications, The Netherlands, 23 July, 2009 and UK, 28 
September, 2010  http://www.lofar.org/ 
• CERN, Dr. Lyndon Evans, Project Manager - Large Hadron Collider. Discussion on 
characteristics of mega-projects. Personal communications, Switzerland, 23 July, 2009 
http://public.web.cern.ch/public/en/lhc/lhc-en.html 
• CSIRO, Dr. Ron Ekers, ex-Director Aust. Telescope. Discussion on major project success 
factors. Personal communication, Australia, 12 March, 2008 http://www.narrabri.atnf.csiro.au/ 
• CSIRO, Dr. Dave DeBoer, ex-Project Director - ASKAP telescope. Discussion on project 
management. Many personal communications during 2007-2009 
http://www.atnf.csiro.au/projects/askap/ 
• DESY, Dr. R Wichmann, XFEL Project, Deutsches Elektronen-Synchrotron (DESY). Discussions 
concerning project structures and systems. Personal communications, Germany, 19 July, 2009 
http://xfel.desy.de/ 
• HIPER, Dr. C Edwards, HiPER Project Director, STFC Rutherford Appleton Laboratory. 
Discussion concerning project resilience in early stage high-tech projects, Personal 
Communications, Didcot, Oxfordshire, 15 November, 2010 http://www.hiper-
laser.org/overview/hiperproject/managerstructure.asp 
• ITER, Mr. Peter Swinson, Head of Project Office -ITER Facility. Discussion on major project 
management. Personal communications, France, 20 July, 2009 http://www.iter.org/ 
• TOPSAT, Professor Richard Holdaway, Director of Space Science and Technology, STFC 
Rutherford Appleton Laboratory. Discussion concerning success factors in high-tech space 
related projects, Personal Communications, Didcot, Oxfordshire, 20 May, 2010 
http://www.sstd.rl.ac.uk/Topsat/ 
• VISTA, Dr. Ian Bryson,  Head of Strategic Development, UK Astronomy Technology Centre, 
Royal Observatory Edinburgh, VISTA Team discussion, 2 February, 2010 
http://www.vista.ac.uk/ 
EXHIBIT 2: Key Project Data – ALMA, ASKAP, and the SKA 
Identifier  
 
Budget Infrastructure  Location Stage 
Atacama Large 
Millimetre 
Array (ALMA)  
US$1.4 
billion 
50 dish high-frequency 
radio telescope array, plus 












36 dish mid-frequency 
radio telescope array and 

















• Expectations of a networked 64 dish array in 
original (2001) budget. Bottom up costing 
revealed significant project costs overlooked 
• Underestimates of cost and resources to 
develop receptor (PAF) technologies 
• Possible descope impact due to budget trade-
offs. Stakeholder expectation issues 
• Underestimates of cost, time and resources to 
meet software and computing requirements  




• Re-baselining exercise in 2005 triggered call 
for additional funding 
• Descope to 50 dishes pre-construction 
• Project now proceeding 
• Consultation with industry regarding volume 
production costs 
• Revised plan / funding proposal developed to 
show viability with alternate project pathway 
• Use existing code wherever possible 
• Top-down ‘cost-cap’ budget ‘as a design 
constraint’ approach to development 
• Use first order parametric estimating models 






• Domain knowledge considered held within 
the partners (NSF, ESO, NAOJ) through 
specific capabilities. However weakness 
emerged for industrial integration capabilities 
• Domain system engineering knowledge held 
tacitly by individuals. 
• No formal systems to codify, archive, or 
transfer lessons learned  
• Domain system engineering knowledge held 
tacitly by individuals. No formal systems to 
codify, archive, or transfer lessons learned.  
The level of coordination and hence 
collaboration is negatively impacted 
 
Response 
• Level of stakeholder investment meant major 
decisions not optimised 
• Therefore all decisions still not ideal or based 
on researched experience 
• Currently no formal lessons learned 
mechanism evident 
• Some effort made to consult developers and 
operators of like-projects, however highly 








• Deep technical domain knowledge for major 
system components and software, but project 
interfaces less defined and complex 
• Push for technology break-throughs, 
especially in PAF’s, computing, and ‘green 
‘energy 
• These are complex, inter-related problems 
with unclear solutions  
• Unfolding science goals and ‘proof of 
concept’ TRLs causing ambiguity 
• Complex Exascale computing capabilities do 
not yet exist, and may be unaffordable 
 
Response 
• Large investment in system engineering 
resources to continually resolve interface 
issues 
• Project leadership instilled culture of ‘relay-
race’ rather than ‘marathon’ 
• Highly intensive and frequent technical and 
planning meetings held 
• There is some sense-making emerging, but 
peripety has yet to occur 
• A more modest Phase1 SKA design released 
• Science ambitions scaled to computer power 
budget (flops and watts) 
•  ‘Moore’s Law’ uncertainty remains  




Factor Project ALMA (Chile) ASKAP (Australia) SKA ( UK based) 
Mission & Goals 
 
Challenge • Science high-level goals considered fixed 
objective, with clear vision of project success. 
However re-baselining meant compromise 
• The broad project goal is clear; however 
some divergence is apparent between long 
term and short term objectives  
• Development of a mega-project mission 
within an international collaboration and 
funding framework. Scope creep 
Response 
• Re-scoping of project largely maintains 
achievement of science objectives through 
adjusted operations  
• A group is assigned to bring certainty to the 
long term purpose of ASKAP 
• Overcoming shorter term technical barriers is 
the present mission 
• The SKA now has stated science goals 
against a top-down budget, a Design 
Reference Mission, and a Phase1 pre-






• Need for strong and clear project reporting 
and execution structure, in face of 50/50 
ownership 
• Decision structure and process must be 
consistent and workable  
• ASKAP resides within a well defined project 
management structure. Reporting at the 
Integrated Project team (IPT) level is less 
consistent, though competent 
• Reporting and decision-making structures are 
complex and variable, typifying the science 
community decision-making behaviour 
• Participation in committees and at decision 
meetings is inconsistent 
Response 
• ALMA project structure well defined and 
implemented at work-site level 
• More prone to compromise and decision-
delay at higher management levels 
• Third partner added (NAOJ) 
• Major decisions need lengthy discussion at 
Joint Alma Office (JAO) level 
• Fine tuning the project structure to reflect the 
project team site location is in process. 
• Project reporting is enhanced through 
migration and automation of reporting 
processes to DAPTIV© platform  
• Efforts to lift effectiveness and integration of 
meetings and decisions mostly unsuccessful 
• Task Forces work effectively 
• The planned move to a project office 
structure will ‘normalise’ reporting and 





• Project information control extremely 
important to maintain project control, and 
effective procurement systems 
• Possible mismatch between ASKAP 
execution, industry, and large institutional 
framework 
• IP requires specialist management 
• SKA design and cost data yet to be brought 
under a formal control system, and there is no 
formal PMIS in place. 
Response 
• The JAO maintains strict controls on project 
technical data, procurement data, system 
engineering documents and Standards, and 
PR material 
• Major meetings administered centrally 
• Some reluctance by NAOJ to announce 
problems early 
• ASKAP project information is under 
dispersed control. IPT leaders maintain 
technical data control 
• Industry consortium established 
• IP is periodically identified through active 
scan and appropriately managed 
• Appointment of a Systems Engineer under a 
Project Manager is starting to create 
information discipline 
•  The planned move to a project office 











• Need for full identification and tracking of 
project risk, despite differing risk and 
contingency culture within the major project 
owners 
• Propensity to focus on tactical risks, and 
downplay need for contingency, despite 
evidence of significant likely cost-growth 
• Propensity to focus on tactical risks, and 
downplay need for contingency reserves, 
despite past experience in mega-science  
Response 
• American approach to risk adopted 
• Comprehensive risk register, risk ‘burn’ 
reports, and contingency established and 
tracked - 15.8%, later reduced to 9.2% 
• Task forces readily established (e.g. antennas 
specification problem) 
•  Little overt acknowledgement of, or pre-
planning for, unknown risks 
• Recent moves to address project and 
corporate risk and contingency in new 
business plan 
• Recent costing strategy foreshadows a 
contingency component 
• Growing awareness of importance to 
acknowledge unknown risks within the 
professional team, yet specific cash reserves 






• Construction and operation of a mega-science 
facility in the Chilean Andes 
• The location is harsh and remote 
• Need for skilled and unskilled workers during 
construction phase 
• ASKAP will be situated in remote Australia. 
There are indigenous people sensitivities, 
some environmental fragility, and 
competition from mining companies. 
Electrical quietness requires legislation 
• Deployment of a large infrastructure project 
in sensitive geographic location requires 
lengthy and careful planning in conjunction 
with approval authorities 
• Requirement for a ‘neutral’ HQ site 
Response 
• Substantial planning and site negotiation with 
Government at early stages 
• Landowner on ALMA Board 
• Specific ‘Astronomy Site’ legislation enacted 
• Tax-free ‘diplomat’ status for foreign project 
personnel. Project has sales tax-free status 
• Substantial effort and cost is being applied to 
ensure compliance (in spirit and in fact) with 
land use policies 
• Radio-quietness is under legislation 
development 
• Negotiations are proceeding with mining 
interests 
• There is Team awareness of project 
environmental aspects - mostly funding 
scenarios and site issues. These are dealt with 
by the Project development Work Packages, 
and overseen by the SKA Project Executive 





Challenge • Requirement for project ‘watchdog’ role to 
ensure vigilance and prompt response against 
threats to mission goals 
• Implementation of project ‘watchdog’ role to 
ensure vigilance and prompt response against 
threats to mission goals. 
• Implementation of project ‘watchdog’ role to 
ensure vigilance and prompt response against 
threats to mission goals.  
Response 
• ALMA Advisory Committee charged with 
taking longer term project perspective, to 
identify potential dangers to project delivery 
• No specific in-project role identified for 
NASA- style Mission Assurance 
• The establishment of a ‘mission assurance’ 
(MA) function is unfamiliar to Australian 
based science projects 
• There is no role assigned in ASKAP for a 
specific mission assurance function 
• The establishment of a MA function is 
unfamiliar to European science projects  
• Current budget restrictions preclude 
establishment of a formal MA function 
•  Internal and external engineering reviews 
(e.g. PDRs), fulfil part of the role 
 
